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INTRODUCTION
This thesis is concerned with a minor yet 
significant strand of thought in the Australian labour 
movement. It focusses on the various socialist parties 
and groupings amongst labour organisations and traces their 
reactions to local and overseas affairs. My main interests 
have been several: to record and analyse the changes in
left-wing ideologies after the first world war; to measure 
the influence of socialist doctrines on the industrial and 
political activities of their adherents; and, more generally, 
to assess the nature and extent of left-wing and socialist 
internationalism in relation to its influence on the mass 
unions and the mass political parties of organised labour.
The thesis is not principally an individual party history, 
nor a series of histories of socialist groups, but seeks to 
concentrate on the impact on the broader labour movement of 
the concepts which those on the far left wing professed.
The period covered in detail in this study - from 
the beginning of ^^^8 to around the beginning of 1932 - saw 
the narrowing of international socialism from a novel but 
widely held ideal of the organised working-class movement, 
to a minority creed, viewed by most labour spokesmen with 
abhorrence or distrust. These were foundation years for 
the Communist Party in Australia which saw a plethora of 
ideologically diverse parties and groups replaced by the C.P.A. 
as the most authentic voice of working-class internationalism 
and supported in its claims by its direct links with the Soviet 
Union: "the first workers' state". These were also years
which saw the steady growth of a nationalistic isolationism
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championed by A.L.P. politicians, and the re-emergence of 
such ideas as a dominant strain of thought in the labour 
movement. The symbiotic and frequent intermingling of these 
themes serve as guideposts and points of reference throughout 
the following narrative.
The subject straddles two distinct areas of 
historical writing. Though principally concerned with the 
broad spectrum of international socialism and its influence 
on organised labour’s attitudes and actions, a large amount 
of space is devoted to the development of the different 
ideological stances of parties and groups on the far left, 
and therefore to a considerable degree this is a study in the 
history of ideas. These ideological developments largely 
explain the interaction of parties within the grouping of 
left-wing socialists, and they throw light too on the demise 
of those parties’ overall influence: a major theme developed 
here being that the internal history of international socialism 
tended to skew it out of the boundaries of the practical 
politics of organised labour by the early depression years.
Yet throughout most of the 1920s the prevailing notion amongst 
socialist groups was the idea of pursuing a united front 
against capitalism, and as this could only be manifested in 
the sphere of practical politics, an attempt is made to deal 
also with the everchanging scenario of particular events in 
the history of the labour movement in these years. The fate 
of the ideals propagated by small socialist parties on the far 
left of the labour movement was closely involved with the 
struggles for power, the personality clashes, and the sometimes 
exaggerated concern for issues of day to day living which were 
endemic factors in the affairs of Australia's mass unions and 
in the strongest political expression of the working class, 
the A.L.P.
Socialism is a word of many uses, and the strategy 
of directing attention to those on whom the title was most 
often bestowed and who most unequivocally welcomed its use 
does not of course eliminate the general fuzziness of that
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concept. What is to be done, for example, with the claim 
that the A.L.P. is a socialist party and thus itself open to 
examination for reflection of an underlying philosophy in its 
approach to foreign politics? An author of a recent study of 
the British Labour Party has claimed to discern a number of 
consistent ’socialist principles’ which members of that party 
have shared, and he has interpreted the recurrent conflicts in 
that party over foreign policy issues largely in terms of 
clashes between its ideology and the objective political
conditions which have inhibited theory’s application in
1practice. The question reasonably arises as to whether such 
an argument could be mounted for the A.L.P.
I have chosen not to attempt to do this for the 
following reasons. Firstly, to establish the A.L.P. as a 
socialist party would require the watering down of the meaning 
of that word to cover sometimes exceedingly vague notions of 
anti-capitalism, anti-imperialism, and egalitarian tendencies 
which are almost useless to try to apply as explanations of 
the handling of specific political and international questions 
by the A.L.P. Xt appears far more satisfactory to opt for a 
closer level-of-analysis approach to the subject of socialism 
and to treat the A.L.P. as a broad coalition of interest groups 
with the socialists one factor among many and depending on the 
broad historical circumstances of the Labor coalition to carry 
their partner groups with them on any given question.
Secondly, the place of the A.L.P. in the wider
labour movement has always been vastly different from that of
2its British counterpart. In Britain the Labour Party has 
traditionally championed mass socialism in the organised 
working-class movement through the close association of its 
leadership with the smaller and more theoretically inclined 
groups such as the Independent Labour Party and the Fabian 
Society. In adapting the ideas of these parties further to 
the left to a moderate and electorally acceptable socialist
1. M.R. Gordon, Conflict and Consensus in Labour’s Foreign 
Policy, 1914-1965 (Stanford, 1969)
2. See D.W. Rawson: "Politics and ’Responsibility’ in Australian
Trade Unions", in Australian Journal of Politics and History, 
Vol.4, No.2, Nov., 1958, p.227.
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outlook on a fairly wide range of issues the B.L.P. leaders 
have often been urged on from below by their traditionally 
radical constituency parties, and the most powerful restraining 
influence within the labour movement has come from trade 
unionists, who for various reasons have been reluctant to adapt 
to policy changes or have even been outright conservatives 
politically. Though in a fragmentary form some elements of 
this model have operated in the Australian context, for the 
most part the roles of the A.L.P. and the trade unions have 
been reversed. The far left socialist parties have operated 
as a force in the affairs of the A.L.P., but they have overall 
excited much greater opposition within the Labor Party than in 
the affiliated mass trade unions. Indeed, trade unionists 
have taken over many of the ideas of far left groups as their 
very own, and it was the de Leonite 'One Big Union' concept 
emanating from the extreme socialists which gave the Australian 
'industrial versus political' division of the mass labour 
movement its very edge in the years leading up to the post- 
World War One era. Further, because of their own close 
relationship with the far left-wing socialist parties and 
their insulation from electoral considerations, unionists have 
tended simply to echo and amplify ideas originating from these 
fringe groups. As a result the A.L.P. has typically attempted 
to counter left-wing initiatives in the trade union movement 
with alternative proposals of its own rather than adapt and 
modify proposals which, it must be pointed out, have anyway 
usually been framed in much more extreme terms than in 
Britain. The A.L.P. has been forced by circumstances to 
minimise rather than encourage wide-ranging socialist 
theorising in the labour movement.
Thirdly, the case for arguing that the A.L.P. 
itself is a socialist party is markedly stronger in relation 
to domestic questions than to foreign affairs. It is indeed 
true that from the early years of the twentieth century a 
kind of Fabian socialist doctrine positing for the A.L.P. the 
task of emancipating Australian society from the restrictions 
of individual and class ownership of capital and transforming 
it towards public ownership and control of resources for the
Vgeneral benefit has been widely accepted and applauded by 
the party’s members. The popularity and pervasiveness of this 
gradualist brand of socialism is easily understood when it is 
seen that it reconciles and binds together both those Labor 
Party members of a mild ideological bent and those non­
socialist groups who look to the same electoral machine and 
the same politicians to achieve their more immediate ends.
But there is nothing in this generally conceded aim concerning 
foreign politics, and although at times it has led to vague 
formulations about the A.L.P.’s kinship with similar overseas
organisations it has more often become blended in with various
3formulations of Australian nationalism and isolationism. As 
a result the A.L.P. has not provided a fertile field for 
socialist internationalism and is much more suited to 
consideration as an institutional forum utilised at times by 
more truly socialist groups in attempts to extend their 
influence, but itself as likely to interpret socialism as an 
impetus to nationalism or isolationism as to internationalism.
This aspect of A.L.P. thinking is typical of the
mild Fabianistic approach to socialism and has a basis in that
form of socialist theory. The gradualist idea of altering
society, though it asserts the moral desirability of socialist
change, has at least equal roots in glorifying the mundane
day-to-day activities of the vehicle of its aspirations: the
particular labour movement involved or the coterie of socialist
intellectuals or whatever. In Australia as in Britain this has
meant identification of socialism with activities closely
concerning the state apparatus and thus running the risk of an
almost certain infection with the ideals of the particular
nation-state which the gradual socialists made their chosen
arena. In Britain the Fabian Society came to glory in and4justify imperialism while in Australia both theorists and 
supporters of gradualism became ardent enthusiasts of one or 
another brand of Australian nationalism. In both cases the
3. See L.F. Crisp, The Australian Federal Parliamentary Labour 
Party (London, 1956), p .98.
4. For a comprehensive account of the Fabian Society's attitude
towards imperialism see A. McBriar, Fabian Socialism and 
English Politics , 1 884-1 9 '\ 8 ( Cambridge , 1 962 ) , esp. Ch. 3 •
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basis of their involvement lay in their ideas of working 
within capitalism and their intense emphasis on practical 
everyday achievements which could move society in a socialist 
direction. Internationalism has had the greatest difficulty 
in surviving as an ideal amongst advocates of such a 
gradualist approach.
Consequently it is somewhat to the left of the 
A.L.P. as a party that one must look for any consistent 
manifestations of socialism. It was in the numerous small 
left-wing groups and parties operating around and within the 
broader labour movement that international socialism first 
flourished and was kept alive as an ideal. This ’socialist 
movement’ - of which I try to build up a general picture in 
Chapter One - contained diverse ideas and beliefs ranging 
through the outright anarcho-syndicalism of some members of 
the Industrial Workers of the World to leftist varieties of 
parliamentary socialism amongst members of the Victorian 
Socialist Party and the Social Democratic Leagues in New South 
Wales and other States. Pew of these ideologies were 
elucidated in great detail or with overmuch concern for 
theoretical exactitude and logical consistency, but they 
nevertheless constituted coherent and ordered sets of ideas 
widely at variance with the loose and populist-inclined outlook 
of the broader labour movement. It is the impact of such 
left-wing and internationalist doctrines on the outlook, 
organisations and institutions of the labour movement with 
which this thesis is most concerned.
Internationalism was deeply rooted in the thinking 
of those who composed Australian labour’s extreme left wing.
The explanation of this state of affairs seems obvious enough, 
for the doctrines utilised by Australian socialists were largely 
imported from the far left of the English and American socialist 
movements and not infrequently the basis for organisations 
directly modelled on (and closely following developments in) 
the overseas parties which were their source of inspiration.
In this sense the formation of the Communist Party of Australia
vii
in 1920 reflected a well established habit of the labour 
left to scan the horizon of world working-class politics and 
establish an Australian branch of a movement whose efficacy 
was established overseas.
Yet beyond these pragmatic and organisational factors 
there were also more general reasons for the socialist left’s 
internationalism. In the days before modern Communism had 
been able to stake out and successfully defend its claim as 
the only heir to the Marxist tradition this brand of socialism 
had an adherence transcending Leninism, de Leonism and the 
other doctrinaire tenets of the various sects of the time. 
Marxism was indeed a kind of lingua franca for the socialist 
movement, and pervading its full range of doctrines - even 
the anarcho-syndicalist I.W.W. fringe - were a number of 
ideas and suppositions with puissant origins in Marx’s great 
historical synthesis of socialism and internationalism.
As a number of writers have pointed out, all the 
great foundation theories of socialism imbibed internationalism 
from their intellectual milieu in early and mid-Victorian days. 
For Marxism, especially, the impact of the liberal-radical 
slogan of internationalism was enormous, for Marx saw the 
development as marking a positive progress for humanity 
generally, and modified and incorporated the ideal into a 
socialist programme which was envisaged as both transcending 
and extending the bourgeois phase of human history. To Karl 
Marx internationalism seemed both morally desirable and 
certain of achievement, for it was impelled by the logic of 
capitalist development. The bourgeoisie, according to Marx, 
had prepared the ground for a true internationalism, their 
rapid improvement of the instruments of production and 
communication breaking down all national boundaries and 
spreading a cosmopolitanism throughout the whole world. This 
bourgeois achievement was almost wholly praiseworthy in Marx’s 
view, and in the long-run quite irreversible; it only remained 
for the fetters of the bourgeois era itself to be overthrown 
for the ushering in of true and cooperative fellowship on an
5. See for example F. Borkenau, Socialism: National or 
International (London, 1942), pp.32-38; F.S.L. Lyons, 
Internationalism in Europe, 1815-1914 (Leydon, 19^3)»
p . 1 64 ff.
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international scale. Furthermore in his examination of the 
contradictions of capitalist society Marx discovered that the 
vehicle of human emancipation, the proletarian class, ensured 
the achievement of the internationalist ideal. In Marxian 
analysis the working class was seen as the 'universal class’ 
steadily moulded by advancing capitalism the world over into 
a propertyless, destitute and radical proletariat, whose only 
resort was unity and cooperative fellowship in overthrowing 
bourgeois society. In all capitalist societies the logic of 
historical development meant that the fundamental divisions 
were between bourgeois and proletarian, and in the course of 
its emancipation the working class was destined to develop a 
world wide and truly human unity. For Marxism the concept of 
the class struggle knew no boundaries, except that of humanity 
as a whole. The internationalist orientated exhortation and 
analysis in Marxism was well summed up in the famous concluding 
sentences of the Communist Manifesto; "The proletarians have 
nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. 
WORKING MEN OF ALL COUNTRIES UNITE’"
As in almost all Marx's utterances and theories 
however there was a considerably degree of subtlety and 
ambiguity in his attitude towards internationalism. In 1864 
Marx assisted in establishing the International Working Men’s 
Association as a central medium of communication and 
cooperation for working-class organisations, and he came to 
dominate this 'First International' until its breakdown in 
the early eighteen seventies. The role Marx helped to define 
for the First International throughout this period was for the 
most part pragmatic and flexible; except for a time in 1871 
when he promoted efforts to impose the will of the 
International’s General Council on its sections. Marx 
generally stressed the need to unite as widely as possible the 
mass organisations of the working class in the different 
countries and insisted that the International should not lay 
down in advance the form which the various national political 
movements must take: great scope was allowed to affiliated 
labour movements to adapt their organisation and methods of 
action to the particular political and social conditions and
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traditions of their respective countries. On the other hand
in his battles against Bakunin in the early eighteen seventies
Marx was prepared to invoke a rigid centralism in the affairs
of the First International on a range of organisational,7political, and ideological questions. From such vacillations 
between decentralisation and centralism future generations of 
Marxists were to derive justifications for the radically 
different Second and Third Internationals which succeeded the 
International Working M e n ’s Association following its collapse 
shortly after Marx succeeded in excluding Bakunin from its 
affairs in 1871. What is irrefutably clear is that the First 
International flourished as a loose-knit organisation of 
socialists and trade unionists and responded to factionalism 
and centralisation by entering an almost instantaneous decline. 
Following the removal of the General Council to New York in 
1872 the International Working Men's Association played no 
significant part in labour activities and was formally 
dissolved at a conference in Philadelphia in July 1 8 7 6 .
In 1889 - following the growth of Marxist socialist
movements throughout the world - the Second International was 
formed, and in the years up to World War One succeeded in 
becoming a focal point for working class organisations in allgcountries. The Second International was a very loosely 
organised body, and it was not until 1900 that it acquired an 
authoritative centre analogous to the earlier General Council, 
Obsessed with the growth of socialist organisational strength 
in its separate sections in Europe the Second International 
also moved very slowly in formulating the common theoretical 
programme which Marx had hoped would emerge from the exchange 
of ideas between member parties joined in internationalist 
endeavours. In particular the attitude of the Second 
International towards the question of war remained general and 
vague despite repeated attempts to devise a specific programme
6 . For a recent comprehensive account of the First International 
see J. Braunthal, History of the International 1864-191^ 
(London, 1 9 6 6), esp. Pt.2.
7. See M.M. Drachkovitch (ed.), The Revolutionary Internationals, 
1864-1943 (Stanford, 1 9 6 6), esp. Pt.1.
8 . On the Second International see Braunthal, op. cit., esp.
Pt .3.
Xof action against such a catastrophe. And even this generally
endorsed commitment to oppose war proved impossible to maintain 
when war broke out in August 191^* The Second International 
contributed greatly to the immense hopes held by working-class 
organisations throughout the world that solidarity could 
substitute for the bonds of country, but it failed when put 
to the test.
The First International maintained an Australian 
section through a small group of radicals in Victoria in the 
early eighteen seventies, but it was not till many years later 
that the concepts of international socialism exerted a 
significant influence on the left wing of the labour movement.
At about the same time as the formation of the Second 
International, socialist organisations began to appear in 
Australia, their leading spokesman playing a part in the setting 
up of the official political arm of organised labour which 
later became the A.L.P. The early twentieth century saw 
increasing acceptance of socialist ideas in the Australian 
labour movement and increasing interest in and adherence to 
Marxism by militant leftist groups. Sporadic efforts ensued 
to affiliate the A.L.P. to the Second International but the 
determination and enthusiasm required to overcome the 
reticence of that institution were lacking and it was left to 
the militant socialists to establish their own connections 
with the international movement. This most of the small 
socialist parties contrived to do, and despite the problems 
of distance Australian socialists succeeded in being 
represented at the International: either by direct 
representation or by proxy delegates of kindred parties 
overseas.
Unlike their European counterparts Australian 
socialists did not suffer the acute and overwhelming 
embarrassment of seeing their leaders transformed into 
chauvinists by the outbreak of war in 191^* The V.S.P., intent 
on converting the established institutions of the labour 
movement to international socialism, suffered a crisis in 
tactics through the A.L.P. declaring complete and unequivocal 
support for Britain for the duration of the war, but the drift
xi
towards Empire loyalty in that organisation had long been 
observed by militant socialists and few of them were surprised 
at the turn of events. Nevertheless although the socialist 
movement was clear and principled in its attitude to World War 
One the collapse of the Second International in Europe and the 
general enthusiasm for the war amongst all classes in Australia 
ensured the dissenters' voices were muted at first. Yet slowly, 
as the war dragged on and the cost of fighting increased the 
working class began to turn an ear to the socialist analysis 
of the nature of the conflict in which Australians were 
embroiled, and the labour movement began to look to the left 
for guidance out of the morass. By the latter part of World 
War One leading socialists had come to occupy positions of 
unprecedented power and influence in the Australian labour 
movement, and with great confidence and enthusiasm turned 
their attention to interpreting developments in world socialist 
politics. From this time onwards such developments were to 
assume immense importance in labour affairs.
CONTENTS OUTLINE
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER ONE - THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT OF 1918
This chapter works towards a model of the socialist 
movement as a number of small groups and parties 
linked to both the political and industrial sections 
of the left wing of the labour movement. These two 
sections of the labour movement represented the usual 
extent of socialist influence, but in the circumstances 
of 1918 the left had developed a much wider hegemony 
over organised working-class thought. In describing 
and explaining this situation four themes are pursued: 
the historical development of the socialist movement 
up to 191^; the effect of World War One on socialists 
and trade unionists; the impact of wartime industrial 
and political experiences on the broader labour 
movement; and the tremendous impact in these circum­
stances of the revolutions in Russia, interest in 
which helped temporarily to internationalise the 
Australian labour movement.
CHAPTER TWO - THE IMPACT OF LENINISM
Looks at the nature and influence of Leninist ideas 
in Australia in three sub-sections:
i. Leninist doctrines of world revolution (dealing 
with Leninist theory as it was expounded as a world­
revolutionary set of ideas from 1917 onwards);
ii. Bolshevism and socialism, 1918-21 (treating the 
differing interpretations and reactions to Bolshevik 
doctrines of the parties and groups constituting the 
socialist movement in Australia);
iii. Australian Communism, 1921-29 (concerned with 
the early debates between the declared Communist 
parties who claimed to represent the Comintern in 
Australia, and the subsequent history of the C.P.A.
up until the change of leadership at the end of 1929)*
CHAPTER THREE - THE LEFT-WING WORLD OUTLOOK 1918-29
Deals briefly with the history of socialist parties 
and groups other than the Communist Party, and 
describes the left-wing outlook on questions of war, 
socialism and internationalism. These attitudes are 
dealt with under several sub-sections:
i. The inevitability of capitalist war (outlining 
the Cassandra-like prophecies of war which emanated 
from the socialist movement);
ii. Revolution - in a changing perspective (dealing 
with the non-Communist 'revolutionaries’ - ie. 
those who aimed at an immediate socialisation of 
society - and the problems of maintaining this 
stance in the increasingly non-revolutionary 
environment of the 1920s);
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iii. Marxism and the White Australia policy 
(dealing with the problems arising Prom conflict 
between Marxist ideas of proletarian brotherhood 
and racialist aspects of the White Australia 
policy of the labour movement);
iv. The Internationals question (summarising the 
attitudes of various left-wing groups towards the 
competing socialist and Communist Internationals)•
FOUR - ECHOES AND REVERBERATIONS IN THE LABOUR MOVEMENT
Outlines the wider impact of Leninist and other 
socialist ideas in the labour movement in the 
years 1918-29» Those in the labour movement most 
receptive to socialist ideas were the militant 
unionists, and their reactions are dealt with in 
detail under five chapter sub-headings:
i. Socialism and the trade unions (outlining the 
socialisation programme of the 1921 Melbourne 
trade union congress and the structure of radical 
opinion in the union movement);
ii. 'Hands Off Russia' agitation (treating labour 
movement reactions to Allied intervention in 
Russia in the period from 1918-20);
iii. The 'Hands Off China' campaign (dealing with 
the campaigns against Australian participation in 
British moves to intervene in the internal affairs 
of China);
iv. Causes celebres and international solidarity 
with class war prisoners (dealing with the various 
unionist protests against 'class justice', and 
demonstrations of working-class solidarity with 
its victims overseas such as Tom Mooney and Sacco 
and Vanzetti);
V. The pan-Pacific trade union movement (describing 
the origins and development of the pan-Pacific 
idea and its crystallisation in the A.C.T.U.- 
affiliated Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat).
FIVE - THE A.L.P. AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM
Treats the A.L.P. as a coalition of interest 
groups which under the leadership of Labor poli­
ticians sought to dilute left-wing influences in 
response to electoral pressure. This argument is 
pursued in the following sub-sections:
i. The mood of the electorate and the radical goad 
(describing the constrictive and anti-radical 
political environment of the 1920s and the 
politicians' attempts at marshalling the right- 
wing forces of the A.L.P. in favour of moderate 
policies);
ii. The 'Red' objective (treating the fate of the 
socialisation objective of 1921 up to its 
replacement in 1927)»
iii. The A.L.P. and the C.P.A. (dealing with the 
idea of affiliating the C.P.A. to the Labor Party
xiv
CHAPTER
CHAPTER
and the way in which attempts to do so met 
defeat);
iv. International affiliations of the A.L.P.
(dealing consecutively with
A. The Labour and Socialist International
B. The World Migration Congress
C. The Honolulu pan-Pacific Conference
D. The Commonwealth Labour Conferences
E. The League of Nations and the I.L.O.);
v. The Labor Party's world outlook (outlining the 
development of reformist domestic policies and 
nationalist and isolationist attitudes in the 
A.L.P.).
SIX - COMMUNIST INTERNATIONALISM AND LABOR ISOLATIONISM 1930-32 
Deals with the decisive turn towards nationalism 
and isolationism in the labour movement with the 
onset of the depression years. This is explained 
by discussions under the following sub-sections:
i. The C.P.A. under new leaders (treating the 'new 
line' C.P.A. leadership of 1930 and the application 
of its policies);
ii. The trade unions and the P.P.T.U.S. (dealing 
with the 1929 Vladivostok Conference and the 
resulting disaffiliation of the A.C.T.U. in 
March 1930);
iiii. The third period and the 'left social fascists' 
(looking at the effects of third period policies 
on non-Communist left-wing groups);
iv. Labor isolationism (outlining Labor attitudes 
to questions of socialism and foreign affairs);
v. Communist internationalism (examining the various 
front organisations set up by the C.P.A. to promote 
Communist ideas).
SEVEN - CONCLUSION: LABOUR AND SOCIALISM
Recapitulates arguments pursued throughout the 
thesis and briefly looks ahead into the 1930s and 
beyond.
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I.L.O. International Labour Office (Organisation)
I.L.P. Industrial Labor Party
I.R.A. International Red Aid
H • • • • • o • International Revolutionary Transport Workers’ 
Propaganda Committee
xv
xvi
I.s.c. International Socialist Club
I.S.H. International of Seamen and Harbour Workers
I.S.L.P. Industrial Socialist Labor Party
I.U.P.G. Industrial Union Propaganda Group
I.U.P.L. Industrial Union Propaganda League
I.W.W. Industrial Workers of the World
K.P.D. German Communist Party
L.A.I. League Against Imperialism
L.P.G. Labor Propaganda Group
L.S.I. Labour and Socialist International
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Abstract
This thesis traces the impact of left-wing and 
internationalist doctrines and influences on the organised 
labour movement in the years 1918-32. Chapter One outlines 
the history of socialism in Australia up to the end of the 
first world war. Chapter Two looks at the influence of 
Leninism on the various socialist parties and groups in the 
labour movement, and the history of the Communist Party of 
Australia up to 1929« Chapter Three deals with developments 
in the other left-wing parties and sketches their attitudes 
on questions of war, revolution, racialism and international­
ism. Chapter Four examines the reactions of trade unionists 
to socialist ideas. Chapter Five looks at the A.L.P. and 
the struggle between radicalism and electoral necessity. 
Chapter Six deals with the impact of the Comintern’s third 
period and the decisive turn towards nationalism and 
isolationism in the labour movement in the early depression 
years. In conclusion Chapter Seven recapitulates arguments 
pursued throughout the thesis and briefly looks ahead into 
the 1930s and beyond.
xviii
CHAPTER ONE
THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT OF 1 91 8
Prior to the war the acceptance, even as a 
theory, of internationalism as a basic foundation 
of working-class organisation, without which no 
permanent or material progress could be achieved, 
was confined, with a few notable exceptions, to the 
purely Socialist organisations....
Fortunately for Australian unionism, as a 
direct result of the war this grave reproach on the 
intelligence, class-consciousness, and progressive­
ness of the Australian workers has now been removed 
.... and out of the evil, the madness, the 
suffering of this war has been born a new under­
standing, a higher ideal on the part of the workers, 
that will not only save them from a like future 
disaster, but also consolidate and strengthen the 
scattered forces of Labour, which in the end will 
enable the workers to destroy the present hellish 
system of commercial robbery and human exploitation 
and inaugurate the reign of the co-operative 
Commonwealth.
On Sunday 23rd March, 1919» several hundred demonstrators 
gathered at the Trades Hall in Brisbane for a procession to that 
city’s Domain. There a meeting was scheduled to protest against 
the Federal government's continued enforcement of the War 
Precautions Act and its refusal to allow unionists and labour 
organisations to display the red flag in public as symbols of 
their solidarity with the new Bolshevik regime in Russia. As 
the procession got underway a number of red flags were unfurled 
to signify defiance of the Federal government, and this resulted 
in a series of clashes with police and ex-soldiers which mounted 
in intensity until by nightfall several hundred people had 
engaged in melees throughout various parts of the city. From 
this time onwards Brisbane was plunged into weeks of daily 
rioting and demonstration. Mobs of angry ex-soldiers repeatedly
* E.H. Lane, The One Big Union and Reconstruction in the Light of 
the War (Melb., 1918), pp.59-60.
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2attempted to storm the premises of the emigre Russian Workers’ 
Association in South Brisbane; the offices of the Labor Party 
newspaper the Daily Standard were also set upon and stoned, and 
the anti-Bolshevik orgy only slowly faded into a series of heated 
public meetings where crowds estimated in the tens of thousands 
called for the immediate deportation of local Russian radicals 
and the suppression of their Australian sympathisers to boot.
Any explanation of this outbreak of riot and 
demonstration is necessarily complex, and the motivations of its 
participants were mixed and doubtless partly confused. Strained 
nerves and ’over the top' reflexes jostled with traditional
1larrikin behaviour to form a volatile demobilisation psychology.
More particularly the participation of Russians in the red flag
demonstration of the 23rd March aroused resentment against a
race that ’let the side down’ on the Eastern Front during the
Great War, and who besides were said to be holding down jobs in
railway and government workshops which ex-diggers should by all
2natural rights have been given. Yet pervading the thoughts of 
the rioters was a more truly political motivation too. As can 
be seen in the harangues and attacks on the A.L.P., the union 
movement, and the State Labor government, the riots in Brisbane 
were an expression of concern at the threat Bolshevism posed to
3the Australia that most ex-diggers and nationalists aspired to. 
Accentuated by the reality of a Labor government in Queensland 
the fear was widespread amongst conservatives that the labour 
movement’s sympathy with radical and revolutionary causes 
overseas posed a serious threat to capitalism and the established 
order in Australia. And exaggerated as such concern may have 
been it was not lacking basis in established facts. For organised 
labour at wartime's end was at its most radical ever, and the 
extreme socialist doctrines that had in pre-war years posed little 
danger as a political force were no longer aired only to the 
converted few on Sunday afternoons in the Domains and Botanical
1. D.S. , March 25, 1919, PP»^,5; March 26 , 1919, p.^.
2. D.S., March 26 , 1919, p .5; Brisbane Courier, March 27, 1919,
p.7.
3. Brisbane Courier, March 26 , 1919, pp.6,7; March 27, 1919,
PP. £>, 7.
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Gardens of Australia's capital cities. Left-wing and 
international socialism was indeed a powerful force in the 
affairs of Australian labour.
* * *
Australia's first links with the 'foreign' world of
modern European socialism were forged in early 1872 by the4Democratic Association of Victoria. The D.A.V. was far from 
a Marxist party and consisted for the most part of fringe 
radicals influenced more by ersatz philosophies such as spirit­
ualism than coherent socialist ideas. Nevertheless the D.A.V. 
caused a furore as a declared section of the First International 
in Australia, and it was responsible for focussing considerable 
public attention on the development of the European socialist
movement and Marxian theory till it became inactive late in
51872. None of the minute and short-lived parties of 
doctrinaire anarchists and internationalists that were founded 
intermittently in the years following the D.A.V.'s collapse 
were to achieve comparable notoriety.
Far more significant for the future development of 
socialist ideas however was the radical ferment and labour unrest 
of the late 1880s and early 1890 period. In these years a 
plethora of new ideas found acceptance in Australia. Henry 
George's book Progress and Poverty became very popular amongst 
wide sections of the community and his advocacy of collectivist 
action on the land question aroused interest in the ideas of more 
socialistic writers such as Lawrence Gronlund, W.H. Dawson,
William Morris, Charles Kingsley, Sidney Webb and Edward Bellamy. 
Perhaps the most popular books were Morris's News from Nowhere and 
Bellamy's Looking Backward. Bellamy's famous novel set out to 
describe an ideal socialist society set in late twentieth century 
America. In this society co-operation had replaced competition
4. See H. Mayer, Marx, Engels and Australia (Melb., 1964), 
pp.1-87*
5* Ibid., esp. pp.7-23; R.N. Ebbels, The Australian Labor Movement 
1850-1907 (Syd., i960), pp.199-201.
6. Concerning these tiny parties and the individuals associated 
with them see G.D.H. Cole, A History of Socialist Thought 
(London, 1956), Vol.3, Pt.2~ pp.868-9.
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and there was no longer any poverty; the waste of capitalism
had been eliminated by state-planned use of resources and
intelligent control of production and distribution; material
wants were thus amply provided for and the inhabitants of the
ideal society were able to devote themselves increasingly to
the pursuit of higher physical and intellectual pursuits and
follow their own inclinations. Wholly utopian in its doctrines
Looking Backward prescribed simple persuasion and argument as
the method of producing such a society. Nevertheless it was
tremendously influential in popularizing socialist ideals and
was credited with a ’prodigious’ circulation amongst working 
7class readers.
One of the great popularisers of Bellamy’s ideas was 
William Lane, who in 1890 assumed editorship of the new union 
newspaper the Worker, published in Brisbane. In his own writings 
Lane fused a variety of ideological influences current in 
Australia at the time. Greatly influenced by Bellamy and English 
Christian socialists, Lane was also impressed by the various 
experiments in co-operative living undertaken in North America 
in the nineteenth century, and the exposition of Europeangsocialism in Gronlund’s Co-operative Commonwealth. From these 
ideas Lane defined a programme for revolutionary socialist 
reconstruction that sought to identify socialism with the mass 
of the working class: as "a distinct political issue which none
but workers or true sympathisers with the workers would pretend
9to adopt". Convinced that the rapidly expanding and militant 
trade union movement in Australia was itself the basis for the 
ideal future society he threw himself into labour organising 
work. In 1889 he took a leading part in the formation of the 
Australian Labour Federation, aimed at creating a united 
working-class industrial and political organisation, and the 
following year he persuaded the Queensland section of the 
Federation to adopt a political programme centring round a 
socialist objective.
7. T.A. Coghlan, Labour and Industry in Australia (Lond., 1918), 
Vol.4, p.1836. See also R.A. Gollan: "The Australian Impact", 
in S.E. Bowman et al., Edward Bellamy Abroad (New York,
1962), pp.119-136.
8. R.A. Gollan, Radical and Working Class Politics (Melb., 1970) 
p.123.
9. Worker, Nov.15, 1890, p.7-
9
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Lane’s influence was wrought in the extremely
favourable atmosphere of the great strikes and generalised
conflict of labour and capital which marked the onset of the
1890s depression. As the crisis atmosphere of 1890-91 faded
so too did Lane’s influence on the labour movement contract.
With the smashing defeat of the shearers in 1891 and the
increasing resistance to his ideas becoming apparent within the
1 0emergent Australia-wide political labour movement itself Lane 
was brought to a realization that the obstacles in the path of 
socialism demanded considerable patience and extreme perseverance 
from its advocates, and he subsequently abandoned the cause of 
Australian socialism, turning to the more appealing role of a 
Messiah bringing down a co-operative utopia on the wilds of 
Paraguay. In 1893 he set off on this futile attempt at 
establishing a ’New Australia’, taking with him many of the 
militant socialists who had fallen under his influence.
In Victoria and New South Wales, where the political 
development of labour was more advanced and reform traditions 
established, the small radical groups enthused by new socialist 
ideas were less influential. Like the tiny Bellamy Society with 
which Lane had been associated in Brisbane in the 'eighties, the 
socialistic clubs and societies that emerged in Sydney and 
Melbourne functioned initially as intellectual debating clubs
whose members struggled to grasp ideas imported from England
1 1and America. None of the members of these clubs and societies 
however was able to move from their intellectualising about 
socialism to impregnating the labour movement with socialist 
ideas with the degree of success enjoyed by Lane. Though the 
idealist socialist doctrines of Bellamy and other writers acted 
as a catalyst in the formation of the Labor Party in every State, 
outside Queensland the well established institutions of the 
labour movement made it impossible for the ideologues to impose 
their ideas in the way Lane was able to.
The Australian Socialist League, founded in Sydney in 
1887, was the most important of the small organised socialist
10. Cf. N.B. Nairn, Civilising Capitalism (Canb., 1973)
11. Gollan, Radical and Working Class Politics, p.124.
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1 2influences in the ’nineties: it assisted in the formation of
the Labor Party in 1891, helped to influence it towards
1 3acceptance of a broad state socialism, and maintained an 
active affiliation with the N.S.W. Labor Party till 1898.
In February 1898 however the shelving by the Labor Conference 
of the party’s socialisation objective precipitated a majority 
of the hundred or so remaining A.S.L. members to revitalize 
their programme, cut their links with the Labor Party, and throw 
themselves into open competition with that party for influence 
in the unions and in politics. The League members charged the 
Labor Party with abandonment of the working-class cause and in 
1900 sponsored a Senate team to stand against the official Labor 
Party as candidates of a new Socialist Labor Party.
In Victoria a Social Democratic Federation was 
established in 1889, partly out of the ruins of an earlier 
anarchist club and a short-lived branch of the Sydney A.S.L.
By 1891 however most S.D.F. members had become absorbed in 
labour organising work and that body ceased to exist for several 
years. In the next decade a small Fabian Society, a branch of 
the American Knights of Labor organisation, and another branch 
of the A.S.L. appeared, and quickly passed from the scene.
After 189^ the English socialist H.H. Champion managed to breathe 
new life into the S.D.F. and branches were formed in Sydney and 
New Zealand; but it attracted little interest from the Victorian 
labour movement, which remained hostile and suspicious of Champion 
over his earlier unfortunate intervention in the Maritime Strike
1 hof 1890. However in 1897 a new organisation called the 
Victorian Socialists’ League was founded whose members were to 
add a new tone to left-wing politics. They included A.C.
Cassimir, H. Scott Bennett, Tom Tunnecliffe and G.M. Prendergast, 
all of whom were to achieve prominence in Melbourne intellectual 
and social life over the next few years. In addition the V.S.L. 
forged strong links with the Melbourne Trades Hall Council and
12. The Socialist, May 18, 1907, p.3 claimed that the A.S.L. at 
one stage had as many as 700 members. Cf. Nairn, op.cit., 
p.33.
13. See P.J. 0 ’Farrell: "The Australian Socialist League and the 
Labour Movement, 1887-1891", in Historical Studies, Vol.8,
No.30, May, 1958, pp.152-165.
14. On this incident see L.E. Fredman: "A Note on Henry Hyde 
Champion and the Maritime Strike of 1890", in Labour History, 
No.11, Nov., 1966, pp.62-65.
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achieved prominence in labour circles by promoting the visit
of the British trade unionist Ben Tillett in 1898. Following
Tillett's visit however V.S.L. members tended to disperse.
A number became involved in activities surrounding the radical
newspaper Tocsin, later to emerge as the official voice of
Victorian Labor the Labor Call. Others merged into the Social
Democratic Party of Victoria, founded by Champion in 1902 as a
continuation of his earlier S.D.F. The rump of the V.S.L.
eventually formed themselves into a branch of the Sydney A.S.L.'s
1 5new party the S.L.P.
A further development occurred following Tom Mann's 
arrival in Australia in late 1902. Mann, like Tillett before 
him, had been schooled in the diverse currents of thought which 
had constituted the socialist movement in Britain. He brought 
with him to Australia a strong trade union background, an 
international outlook, and an unquenchable enthusiasm for 
creating viable and effective socialist movements. Surveying 
the Australian situation he decided that what was most needed 
was a widespread socialist consciousness, and he set about 
creating a socialist party that could carry out propaganda 
amongst the workers and through them influence the Labor Party. 
Labor politicians, though obviously not in any satisfactory 
manner moving towards socialism, were, Mann decided, capable of 
being moved through their rank and file towards a strongly 
socialist stance. Failure to recognise the A.L.P. as a possible 
vehicle of socialism and to tread the path of the A.S.L. and 
create a separate working-class political organisation would 
mean that socialists "should soon become doctrinaire, exclusive,
pedantic, and narrow and therefore... comparatively useless
1 6and perhaps even mischievous".
Based in Melbourne for most of his stay in Australia
Mann's first forums for his views were the existing socialist
1 7and labour organisations of that State. Then in June 1905
15. See U.V., July 17, 1926, p.1.
16. T. Mann, Tom Mann's Memoirs (London, 1923), p p .202-3.
17. For a full account of Mann's activities in Australia see 
G. Osborne, Tom Mann: His Australasian Experience 1902-
1910 (Ph.D. thesis, A.N.U., 1972).
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he began a series of lectures for the Social Questions Committee 
of the Trades Hall Council in Melbourne, and within months had 
attracted sufficient followers to organise his own Victorian 
Socialist Party. The V.S.P. was an immediate success and quickly 
established itself as a leading force in Melbourne’s intellectual 
life and an important influence on the labour movement throughout 
Australia. The party’s weekly newspaper the Socialist maintained 
extremely high standards of journalism and circulation rapidly 
built up to many thousands. Its publication in April 1906 
quickly sparked a kindred Flame in Broken Hill, published by the 
socialist agitator R.S.Ross, and V.S.P. propaganda influenced the 
growth of socialist groupings throughout Australia. In Sydney 
the growing interest in socialism was witnessed by the publication 
in early 1 907 of the International Socialist Review, launched by 
the International Socialist Club, which had been formed on the 
initiative of immigrant members of the A.S.L. in 1898. By 1907 
the socialist movement was growing rapidly in membership and 
numerous socialist publications were feeding its ideologues and 
pushing out ideas to a wider audience.
Partly through Mann’s efforts, and partly through 
the desire of conservatives to take up the debate, socialism 
became an issue which the Labor Party could not avoid. In 1905» 
after a spate of more or less socialist statements of Labor Party 
objectives by its branches in the eastern States, the Federal 
A.L.P. Conference of that year adopted the most moderate of these 
objectives (previously adopted by the N.S.W. A.L.P.):
(a) The cultivation of an Australian sentiment based 
upon the maintenance of racial purity and the development 
in Australia of an enlightened and self-reliant community;
(b) The securing of the full results of their industry to 
all producers by the collective ownership of monopolies 
and the extension of the industrial and economic functions 
of the State and the Municipality.^
Insofar as this was socialist it was in line with Bellamy’s
suggestion that socialism would be achieved by a ’national
party” that eschewed class boundaries and worked gradually
18. L.F. Crisp, The Australian Federal Parliamentary Labour 
Party (London, 1956), p.271.
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1 9towards its goal, rather than the ideas of those behind the
Victorian and Queensland resolutions which had favoured a more
outspoken socialist goal and in some cases had raised Lane’s
old banner of ’Socialism in Our Time’.
A rationale for the A.L.P.’s approach to the question
of socialism was provided by several writers and leading Labor
parliamentarians from 1905 on. The Labor Party as it had
developed first in the various States and then Federally had
achieved great success through its advocacy of practical
reformist policies, and socialism was now seen as an extension
of this activity. W.A. Holman, who had been a prominent member
of the A.S.L. until its break with the Labor Party in 1898,
emerged as one of the leading advocates of the gradualist and
practical approach. In his famous debate on socialism with
G.H. Reid in 1906 he argued
that to-day economic tendencies and forces are clearly 
at work in the society around us which will make it 
inevitable and desirable in the course of the next few 
years that the great bulk of the industries in this, 
and other civilised countries of the world, shall be 
placed under the ’’collective ownership of the State and 
municipality". That.... in the natural history of society 
we are now passing through a stage which is paving the way 
for the introduction of Socialism.
If in the natural order of things there arose such a series of
crises in capitalism which required state socialist solutions
it followed that socialism could be achieved by the coincidence
of practical parliamentary reformism and the natural evolutionary
development of Australian society. Similar attempts to resolve
the practice of the Labor Party with a genuine commitment to
socialism were made by H.I. Jensen’s The Rising Tide (1 9 0 9),
W.G. Spence’s Aus tralia ’ s Awakening (1 9 0 9), and. (less coherently)
21by W.M. Hughes's The Case for Labor (1910). This Australian
variety of Fabianism became the official Labor ideology and
served as theoretical justification for a party which could
embrace land reformers, trade unionists, liberals and
22nationalists, as well as ideologue socialists.
19* See D.W. Rawson: "Labour, Socialism and the Working Class", 
in the Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol.7>
No.1 , May, 1 961 , p.82.
20. Socialism As Defined in the Australian Labor Party’s 
Objective and Platform.... (Syd., 19 0 6), p .5•
21. The Case for Labor, published by the Worker Trustees in
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Put to the test however the Labor Party in government
clearly showed more interest in the nationalistic first clause
in its objective than in achieving socialism. From the very
beginning of Commonwealth politics the Labor Party had
belligerently championed the White Australia policy in an
attempt to establish itself as the authentic voice of Australian 
23nationalism. Adherence to a nationalist, racialist, and even 
slightly xenophobic concept of a White Australia led on to an 
enthusiastic support for defence measures so that by the time 
Labor assumed office in the Federal sphere for a full term in 
1 9 1 0 its policies had assumed a militaristic bent which 
scandalised its left-wing critics and contrasted markedly with 
the previous anti-militarist traditions of organised labour.
The transmutation of Labor Party leaders into more or less 
conventional ’independent Australian Britons’ was even more 
marked by their accomodation with the British Empire - in 
earlier years regarded with suspicion by almost all strands of 
labour thought. As Senator Pearce explained when welcoming 
the arrival in Fremantle of the first ships of the Australian 
navy in 191 0
the party to which he belonged was trying to realise 
the high ideals of humanity. There was no surer 
guarantee for working out those ideals than the Union 
Jack, the symbol of the British Empire. They had to 
look further afield than the mere defence of Australia, 
and be prepared to defend that flag and all it 
represented.
So the A.L.P. continued to evade the challenge of 
socialist ideals. While it had accepted in modified form some 
of the ideas emanating from the left, in government it showed 
no great interest even in its own gradualist state socialism.
The powers of the state were certainly extended during this 
period and Labor established the Commonwealth Bank and later 
the Commonwealth Shipping Line. Yet for the most part such 
measures were in the tradition of Australian nation-building 
through governmental initiative, and were as much positive
1 9 1 0 , was a selection of a number of articles which had 
previously been published in the Sydney Daily Telegraph 
from 1 9 0 7 onwards.
22. See L. Ross: ’From Lane to Lang - The Evolution of Labor 
Theory”, in Australian Quarterly, Dec.14, 193^> pp.52-53.
23. See Gollan, Radical and Working Class Politics, esp. pp.193-6.
manifestations of Australian nationalism as steps towards 
socialism. Labor leaders preached not the gospel of socialist 
change but the primacy of current Australian nationalism, the 
logical outcome of which was P.P.L.P. leader Andrew Fisher’s 
famous pledge at the outbreak of war in 1914 ’to stand beside 
[^Britain^l to help and defend her to our last man and our last 
shilling’.
The trend of developments was very different on
labour’s left wing. Just as the A.L.P.’s socialism was
increasingly tempered by moderation and popular Australian
nationalism so the far left increasingly took unto itself
current overseas brands of Marxism and internationalism. The
influences were American, European, and to a lesser extent
British. America undoubtedly made the greatest impact, Marx’s
basic texts jostling beside writers such as Daniel de Leon,
Jack London, Eugene Debs and E.A. Trautmann, in a virtual cascade
25of books from the Kerr & Co. press of Chicago.
Close interest was shown in American Marxism by both
the A.S.L. and the Victorian Socialists’ League. Their interest
was aroused particularly by the theorising of Daniel de Leon,
who had emerged as the leading light of the American Socialist
Labor Party with which fraternal relations were established at
2 6about the turn of the century. De Leon at first sought to 
establish in the S.L.P. a party which could stand uncompromisingly 
for socialism and revolutionary change and thus give consistent
27and unwavering direction to the organisation of the working class. 
Then in 1905 the S.L.P. of America participated in the founding 
conference of the Industrial Workers of the World at Chicago, and 
de Leon modified his programme to accommodate the burgeoning 
movement for industrial unionism which was the primary interest 
of the militant unionists and other groups who attended this 
important event. Henceforth de Leon promoted the S.L.P. as the
24. Quoted in Gollan, Radical and Working Class Politics, p.201.
25. L.G. Churchward: "The American Influence on the Australian
Labour Movement", in Historical Studies, Vol.5, No.19> Nov.,
1952, p.266.
26. See for example H.Kuhn to J.O.Moroney, Oct.26, 1900, in E.E. 
Judd Papers, A.N.L.; U.V., July 17? 1926, p.1.
27. For a recent account of the development of de Leon’s ideas see
’shield’ of the socialist revolution, which through election
to office could neutralize the power of the state; while the
One Big Union - the I.W.W. - would be the ’sword’ of
revolution, allowing the workers to ’take and hold* the means
of production and administer the economy of the future socialist 
2 8society. At first the A.S.L. attempted to apply de Leon’s
teachings to the Australian situation in the form of the S.L.P.,
which stood on a policy of ’uncompromising Socialism" against
the A.L.P. at a number of State and Senate elections in the
29early part of the twentieth century. Then in 1907 the A.S.L.
adopted more fully the form of the American Party by dissolving
itself into the S.L.P. and setting up a series of I.W.W. Clubs
which it was hoped would provide the basis for One Big Union
of the working class in Australia.
The setting up of the I.W.W. Clubs coincided with a
growing interest in industrial unionism in the labour movement.
From about this time onwards many trade unionists were to become
increasingly disillusioned with the arbitration system and they
turned with interest to the American-derived ideas of militant
and united unionism as the basis for the growth and development
30of their organisations. Tom Mann welcomed the I.W.W. ideas
of creating a great revolutionary union to wage the class war
as endorsement of his own conviction that the working class
had been concentrating too much on politics and that its urgent
31need was to develop and perfect its industrial organisations;
while H.E. Holland, the editor of the International Socialist
Club’s newspaper the International Socialist Review, saw the
new ideas as providing a basis for militant socialists to
infiltrate the unions and assume positions of power within 
32them. This general enthusiasm for I.W.W. ideas on the part
M. Dubofsky, We Shall Be All (Chicago, 1 9 6 9 ), esp. pp.133-1^1*
28. Ibid.; I. Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics (Canb.,19 6 5 ),p.56.
29. See Socialist Labor Party of Australia Report To the 
International Socialist Congress, Stuttgart, Germany, 1907 
(Syd., 1907). S.L.P. Senate candidates in N.S.W. polled
a top vote of 6,000 in 1 9 0 0 ; 26,000 in 1903; 1 5 , 0 0 0  in 1 9 0 6 ,
30. For the development of such ideas see R.A. Gollan, The 
Coalminers of New South Wales (Canb., 1 9 6 3 ), pp.123-133»
31. Osborne, op. cit., p .159•
32. P.J. O ’Farrell, Harry Holland; militant socialist (Canb.,
1964), p.26.
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of labour's left wing was shown by endorsement of the I.W.W. 
manifesto at an Australia-wide unity conference of socialist 
bodies in June 1907.
This conference was convened in Melbourne following
initiatives by the socialists of Broken Hill to organise unity
on the left. It was an attempt to net all "known Socialist
33bodies of Australia" as guests of the largest socialist
party, the V.S.P., and aimed at "giving Socialism a considerable
impetus, and placing Australia in line with the nations of the
world from the standpoint of organised and articulate Interna-
34tional Socialism". The Socialist Labor Party seemed to 
challenge such hopes when it attempted to absorb all the other 
parties within its own structure, and its delegates walked out 
after being rebuffed. A majority of the organisations gathered 
together however found a common basis for unity and formed 
themselves into the Socialist Federation of Australasia. 
Absorbing most of the bodies represented at the conference the 
S.F.A. was later to emerge through a change of name as the 
Australasian Socialist Party.
The formation of the S.F.A.-A.S.P. marked a whole 
new direction in the socialist movement and a new era in labour 
organisation. The policies endorsed by the Federation meant a 
turning away from politics to industrial agitation. Prompted
33* The parties represented were the Socialist Labor Party
(Sydney); the Social Democratic Federation (Sydney); the 
International Socialist Club (Sydney); the Social Democratic 
Vanguard (Brisbane); the Social Democratic Club (Broken 
Hill); the Socialistic Propaganda Group (Broken Hill); the 
Social Democratic Federation (Kalgoorlie). Socialist,
April 27, 1907» p.4. Many of the groups listed lived 
continuously on the fringe of existence: the Social Democratic 
Federations from Sydney and Kalgoorlie particularly. The 
two socialist organisations from Broken Hill were practically 
identical in terms of their principal activists. On their 
own estimation the parties represented a total membership 
of 'over 2000'.
34. Socialist, May 18, 1907, p.3.
14
by the convinced anti-Labor Party doctrinaires in its ranks 
the Federation decided to ask its members to abstain from 
participation in the Labor Party, thus embarking on the political 
blind path the S.L.P. had opened up a decade before. Complementing 
this however was an enthusiastic endorsement of the I.W.W. and 
a determination to vest socialist hopes in the rising working 
class militancy and reaction against the failures of arbitration.
The turn away from politics towards syndicalism, 
though it may have been - as Mann argued - necessary in the 
wider perspective, was quite disastrous for the growing socialist 
political movement that had given birth to the S.F.A. The V.S.P. 
and many of the groups that had been inspired by it, almost 
disintegrated in the wake of the S.F.A. decision to withdraw 
from the Labor Party and attempt to compete with that party as 
a political force. The record of the S.F.A. as a force competing 
with the Labor Party for a mass political following was 
considerably worse even than the showing that had assured the 
A.S.L. obscurity ten years before. In 1912 the V.S.P., having 
lost many thousands of followers and well over one thousand 
members, and having had its relaxation of the ban on its members 
engaging in Labor politics ruled out of order by the S.F.A., 
withdrew from that organisation in a desperate attempt to 
survive as a viable movement. The A.S.P. in reply organised 
a separate branch in Melbourne to compete with the V.S.P.
On the other hand the S .F .A .-A.S .P . recorded some
successes in influencing the trade union movement towards the
ideas of industrial unionism. Despite the S .F .A .-A.S.P.’s
35endorsement of the 1905 preamble of the I.W.W. the new party 
rejected the tactic of dual unionism which had been implicit 
in American developments. In 1908 the S.F.A. specifically 
altered its endorsement of I.W.W. ideas to proclaim its belief 
that industrial unionism was a logical outcome of conventional 
trade unionism and not in conflict with it. The S.F.A.’s 
attitude infuriated the purists of the S .L .P .-I.W .W . who pointed 
out that de Leonist theory prescribed the creation of a distinct
35* See the Flame, July, 1907, pp.2-3.
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new union in the I.W.W. itself rather than the conversion of 
existing structures. The S.L.P. won its argument; after 1908 
its small I.W.W. Clubs were abandoned by those S.P.A. members 
who had joined them and they henceforth eked out a pure but
Oinsignificant existence on the fringes of the labour movement.
The doctrinal disputations of the American left had
a further impact with the formation in Australia of a branch
of the ’Chicago’ I.W.W. in 1 91 1 • This new I.W.W. had been
formed in Chicago in 1908 by a militant unionist wing of the
earlier body, which had rejected the de Leonist insistence on
37the role of the S.L.P. in emancipating the working class.
Henceforth there were two I.W.W. organisations: the Detroit
based de Leonite body which continued its association with the
S.L.P. as the ’shield’ to the I.W.W.’s emancipating ’sword’;
and the new Chicago based I.W.W. (whose members also became
known as ’Wobblies’ or ’Bummery'). In Australia, interest was
aroused in the new Chicago I.W.W. after the publication of its
preamble in 1908, and in May 1911 a meeting called in Adelaide
to form a branch of the S.L.P.-I.W.W. was taken over by
enthusiasts of the new American body and the Wobblies were
established in Australia.
The Wobblies were a regression towards anarchism
39away from the syndicalist doctrines of the de Leonite I.W.W.
At first the ideas of the Chicago I.W.W. were championed by 
members of the A.S.P. who resented the privileged position of 
the S.L.P. vis-a-vis the Detroit organisation, and many Wobblies
36. Turner, op. cit., esp. pp.56-60.
37* See Dubofsky, op. cit., pp.138-145.
38. Turner, op. cit., pp.64-5.
39. In exact terms syndicalism supposed that working-class 
emancipation could be achieved through union organisation 
and the general strike and tended to reject political action. 
Thus even the de Leonite formula might best be described as 
neo-syndicalist. This was of course even more true of the 
impure adaptations of I.W.W. doctrine that eventually 
flowered in the One Big Union movement in 1918 and faded 
into an attempt at union reorganisation. In Australia the 
doctrines which were most influential in the labour movement 
might best be described as syndicalist-socialist or Marxist- 
syndicalist.
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were associated closely with the A.S.P. throughout the
movement's history in Australia. However in 1913 a more
truly anti-political leadership emerged which was from this
time onwards to impose a distinctively neo-anarchist stamp on
the Wobbly movement. The ideology which henceforth was preached
centred on the concept of 'direct action' by the working class
on the job, 'the point where exploitation was begun’. Direct
action encompassed sabotage, go slow tactics, job control,
strikes; and any and every method of waging the class war in
direct confrontation with the wages system. In theory the
Wobblies were also committed (by the Preamble in their
constitution) to organising in the I.W.W. One Big Union of the
working class: so "forming the structure of the new society
40within the shell of the old". In practice however the
Wobblies accomplished little in the form of union organisation
and relied mainly on propaganda: there was a mystical gap
between direct action agitation and the overthrow of capitalism
which Australian Wobblies masked with the shibboleths and
slogans of the American One Big Union. In terms of world-wide
trends the Wobblies were anarcho-syndicalist in that they fused
the emotional anarchistic revulsion at organised society with
the idea of a giant industrial union emancipating the workers
ultimately by means of a general strike and seizure of the
means of production. But a dominating aspect of Wobbly agitators
41was their anarchistic rejection of society, the actual 
formation of industrial unions being for the most part forgotten.
Pervading all these left-wing groups was a strong 
sense of internationalism. Apart from importing the doctrinal 
exegesis of American Marxism Australian socialists from the 
1890s onwards also addressed themselves to the developing 
Second International in Europe. Strong links had been 
established from the start with British socialism and had been
40. D .A ., May 27, 1916, p.3.
41. See I. Bedford: "The Industrial Workers of the World in
Australia", in Labour History, No.13, Nov., 1967, pp.40-6.
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encouraged by the visits of Ben Tillett, the Webbs and H.H.
Champion in the ’nineties; in the early twentieth century
these links were strengthened by the extended presence of* Mann
and Champion, and shorter visits by Tillett, Ramsay MacDonald
42and Keir Hardie. Contacts were also established in the 1890s
43with the French and German socialist movements, and in 1893 
the A.S.L. despatched an ex-organiser of the First International 
Francis Sceusa to represent them at the International Socialist 
Congress at Zurich. Later, as the A.S.L. came increasingly 
under the influence of S.L.P. doctrines, the Australian party 
was represented at International Socialist Congresses by Daniel
44de Leon as proxy delegate from the American Party.
At the 1907 Stuttgart Congress the newly formed
S.F.A. was represented by the V.S.P. member V. Kroemer whose
eccentric prophecies as to the role of South Australia in the45world revolution proved acutely embarrassing. In 1910 the 
S.F.A. arranged for Tom Mann and H. Borax to represent them at 
the Copenhagen International Congress but when this proved 
impractical the Federation was represented only by an observer 
delegate, E. Protz.
The growth of interest in the Second International 
was paralleled by an increasing effect of the policies enunciated 
by International Congresses on the affairs of Australian 
socialists. The moves towards socialist unity which had 
culminated in the S.F.A. had been inspired from the beginning
42. For mention of some of the links established with British 
organisations see E.H. Lane to Hon. Sec. Sydney Socialist 
League, Jan. 21, 1900, in E.E. Judd Papers, A.N.L.
43. See J. Longuet to A.S.L., Mar. 25, 1899, in E.E. Judd Papers,
A. N.L. A small socialist organisation Verein Vorwärts had 
been formed in Melbourne by German immigrants as early as 
1885. This finally merged with the V.S.P. in 1910. See
B. Walker, Solidarity Forever (Melb., 1972), p.50.
44. See for example Report of the Australian Socialist League 
to the International Socialist Congress at Amsterdam,
August 14, 1904 (New York, 1904); Socialist Labor Party 
of Australia. Report to International Congress Copenhagen, 
August, 191Q~ (Syd. , 1910). In 1904 the A.S.L. was also 
represented by Charles Eyre and Claude Thompson.
45. Osborne, op. cit., pp.160-161; Walker, op. cit., pp.54-5.
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by efforts to ensure a united Australian voice at the
46International. At another level the effect of successive 
International Socialist Congress policies on the ideas of Mann 
and the V.S.P. had been very considerable also: his attitude 
towards both political and industrial questions being strongly
influenced at a number of points by developments in the Second
47International. But far more significant was the impact of 
International Congress policies and discussions on two issues 
which were to dominate the future relationship of the minority 
socialist movement to the mass organisations of Australian 
labour for many years to come. The first was the issue of 
immigration and the related problem of the White Australia 
policy. The second was the issue of militarism and the correct 
attitude for socialists to adopt towards war.
Because of the close involvement of early socialist 
groups with continental refugees to Australia it was only 
natural that questions of working class attitudes towards 
immigration would be an early topic of debate. In 1896 the 
A.S.L. proxy delegate to the London Congress of the Second 
International - Edward Aveling - succeeded in moving on 
behalf of Australian socialists a resolution calling upon
workers’ organisations to desist from pressing for restrictive
48legislation against the immigration of aliens. In 1898 many 
of the continentals who had been behind this resolution left 
the A.S.L. to form the International Socialist Club and began 
a dispute with the League over the inclusion in its programme 
of a clause opposing immigration. The I.S.C. cited the
resolution of the Second International in support of its case
49and the A.S.L. finally agreed to its deletion. Needless to 
state the repudiation of the policy of immigration restriction
46. See Cole, op. cit., Vol.3, Pt.2, p.869; E.H. Lane to Hon.
Sec. Sydney Socialist League, June 21, 1900, in E.E. Judd 
Papers, A.N.L.; T.G. Taylor £sec. S.D.F. of Western 
Australia^] to Sec. A.S.L., Mar. 6, 1903, Judd Papers.
Following the break up of the S.F.A. in 1912 the Second 
International attempted to recreate a united socialist 
movement in Australia. See the Socialist, Jan.17, 1913, p.1.
47. Osborne, op. cit., pp.76-8, 95-6, 161.
48. Cole, op. cit., Vol.3, Pt.1, p.33.
49. Ibid., Vol.3, Pt.2, p.870.
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by the A.S.L. reflected a surge towards sectarian remoteness
from the Australian working class. At the 1907 Stuttgart
Congress even the European dominated Second International
declared itself in favour of public regulation of mass
immigration to prevent the undermining of standards of living
of recipient countries, though it refused to endorse the White
Australia policy or similar measures excluding immigrants on
50grounds of race or colour.
Meanwhile in the years after 1900 a somewhat more 
equivocal position was reached by local socialists faced with 
the practical problems of relating internationalist principles 
to the Australian situation. Many radicals from the 1890s 
onwards had followed in the tradition established by William
51Lane - who had mixed racialism into his socialist creed - 
and they supported strongly the concept of a White Australia.
The explanation of this state of affairs lies in the historical 
circumstances of labour’s development: the fact that it was a
natural, valid, and extremely popular demand to exclude cheap 
and mostly indentured coloured labour from competition with 
white workers who were the core of the union movement and whom 
the socialists aspired to lead; the lack of clarity and cohesive 
thought on the part of most early socialists; and the basic 
inadequacy of Marxism and contemporary internationalist doctrines 
to deal with issues of racial division in frontier societies, 
were all important contributing reasons for this at first sight 
surprising situation. Marxist internationalism spoke of the 
brotherhood of a working class that was distinctively the 
product of industrialised European society, and for Australian 
radicals it seemed that it gave little guide for the handling 
of the problem of partly tribal Chinese labourers or remote 
Kanaka cane cutters. For all these reasons the issue of a 
clash between Marxian socialism and the White Australia policy 
was not eagerly seized upon.
On the other hand it became increasingly clear that 
there were complex issues of principle involved in the White
50. Ibid., Vol.3, Pt.1, p.7^. the
51. See L. Ross, William Lane and/Australian Labour Movement 
(syd., 1938), pp.69-70.
20
Australia idea. There was a need obvious even to members of
the socialist sects to safeguard the living standards of the
working class, and this was clearly accomplished by the White
Australia policy. What was at the same time objectionable was
the overtly racialist propaganda accompanying this policy which
- as in the case of the Labor Party - could help serve as a
basis for working class acceptance of imperialism. In these
circumstances the elevation of the White Australia policy to
first place in the A.L.P. objective in 1905 could not but
inspire some comment from the left. In A Criticism of the
Labor Party’s Socialism from A Working-Class Point of View
published in 1905» Andrew Thomson of the A.S.L. decried the
Labor Party’s accent on nationalism at the expense of working
class ideals. He declared the White Australia policy sound;
but only so far as it was promoted as an economic policy which
could defend the standards of the Australian worker:
The objection to the Chinaman was not a racial objection 
but purely an economic one, because, under existing 
conditions, the undeveloped man would undersell the 
Australian worker in the labor market, and thus the 
more highly developed section of the human race would 
be brought into keen competition with the undeveloped 
section.52
What this amounted to was a defence of the White Australia 
policy not on racialist grounds, but because of the necessity 
for social homogeneity as the basis for working class action 
in defence of living standards. It was a tacit admission that 
the living standards of the Australian workers were considerably 
above the minimum of subsistence represented by the Asians and 
that Australians had very much more to lose than their chains 
when it came to questions of applying internationalism to the 
basic life circumstances of labour.
A similar conclusion seems to have been reached by
most members of the V.S.P. when the issue of White Australia
53was raised for public discussion in 1906-7. Under Mann’s 
editorship the pages of the Socialist were opened to a lengthy
52. A. Thomson, A Criticism of the Labor Party’s Socialism from 
a Working-Class Point of View (Syd., 1905), p .3•
53* For an account of the course of the debate on White Australia 
see Osborne, op. cit., esp. pp.142-4.
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debate on the subject of White Australia, in the course of 
which a handful of V.S.P. members revealed themselves outspoken 
opponents of racialism, though a good many more favoured 
continued retention of the colour bar. Mann too committed 
himself publicly to oppose racialism, though he was acutely 
aware of the need for caution in pronouncements on the subject 
and the necessity to change Australian working-class attitudes 
by patient rational argument rather than risk purist but very 
lonely outright opposition to mainstream labour views.
Pervading the whole debate was an awareness that labour 
attitudes had been founded on a very real conflict in the 
recent past between white and coloured workers, and even the 
critics of White Australia readily accepted the necessity of 
closely restricting the entry of Asians.
Socialism then offered only a tentative challenge 
to the White Australia policy in the years before World War 
One. Unlike European socialists the radicals in Australia 
were not able simply to theorise against racial discrimination, 
for they found themselves involved in a very real practical 
measure for maintaining Australian living standards when they 
considered the White Australia question. As a result they 
compromised their internationalist principles and accepted 
White Australia as a valid working-class economic strategy, 
while nevertheless decrying the use of such a policy to promote 
race hatred. This of course left Australian socialists open to 
criticism both from the purists of internationalism on the far 
left, and those who were distinctly racialist on the right, and 
prone to point to any kind of equivocation over White Australia 
as a betrayal of the ideal which to the working class was an 
item of faith. At this stage the issue did not arise to any 
great extent but in the course of the post-war years the 
advocates of compromise were to find themselves squeezed 
between just such left and right wing extremism. White Australia 
and the extremes of sentiment it engendered proved one of the 
great obstacles on which socialist internationalism was 
eventually to founder.
More popular with the labour movement were socialist 
attacks on war and militarism. From the earliest meetings of
22
the First International socialism had been exercised with the 
question of how the workers of the world could unite to prevent 
wars; and from about the time of the 1907 Stuttgart Congress 
onwards the affairs of the Second International came to be more 
or less dominated by this issue. The complex European political 
situation which posed the main threat to peace found its reflex 
in the affairs of the International in the form of complicated 
and diverse attitudes amongst socialists as to exactly what 
action was feasible for the workers to take in the event of war. 
Some, like Gustav Herve, asserted that patriotism was a bourgeois 
lie and called on the proletariat to meet any declaration of war 
with a general strike and insurrection. Others saw such a 
stance as anarchist and childishly demonstrative and counselled 
more moderate tactics. All however laid the blame for 
militarism and war on the very nature of capitalism and advocated 
socialism as the way to eliminate these evils.
The commonly accepted programme of socialist anti­
militarism was set forth by the 1907 Stuttgart Congress in its 
famous Jaures-Vaillant resolution. This began with an assertion 
that wars were caused by capitalism’s inherent quest for world 
markets and that national prejudices and hatreds were 
deliberately fostered in the interests of the ruling capitalist 
classes. The resolution contrasted such capitalist aggressiveness 
with the proletariat: ”a natural opponent of war, which
contradicts its highest goal - the creation of an economic
order on a Socialist basis which will bring about the solidarity54of all peoples”. The proletariat’s representatives were thus 
to refuse to vote for military appropriations; advocate popular 
militias in place of standing armies; agitate in favour of 
disarmament and arbitration of international disputes; do 
"whatever seems... most effective” to prevent the outbreak of 
a war; and, if this should fail, "intercede for its speedy 
end”, making use of the ensuing crisis to arouse the masses 
towards socialist revolution. In short socialist movements
. J . Braunthal, History of the International 1864-191^
(London, 1966) pp.361-3* For discussion of the Stuttgart 
Resolution and its implications see L.C., Oct.10, 1907» 
pp.2-3; Socialist, Dec.23, 1910, p.2; Worker, Nov.12, 1910,
P.6.
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throughout the world were to take the lead in anti-war agitation 
which would mould the working class of their respective 
countries into a bulwark on which capitalist machinations would 
founder.
At Copenhagen in 1910 there were renewed attempts
by advocates of a general strike to have this adopted as a
favoured measure against war. However this proposal, which
became known as the Hardie-Vaillant resolution, was deferred
for further circulation and consideration by the world's labour
movements. As the drift to war in Europe gathered strength in
the years up to 191^ it became increasingly doubtful that the
forces of the Second International could suffice to prevent
what seemed an inevitable outburst of insanity and destruction.
Nevertheless although no further full Congresses of the
International were held after 1910 a series of 'extraordinary
congresses' and peace demonstrations were held in the vain
hope of bluffing the ruling classes of Europe out of their
53warlike designs.
In Australia socialist opposition to war blended in
well with the traditional anti-militarist sentiments of the
labour movement. Internationalist ideas had early found some
favour amongst sections of the trade unions, notably those of
Victoria, whose organisations had in the early part of the
twentieth century been affiliated with the International Trade
56Union Secretariat. In 1908 the Melbourne T.H.C. had joined
with the V.S.P. to protest against the visit to Australia of
the American fleet and the growing spirit of militarism in 
57Australia. Socialist and union pressure had also succeeded 
in committing the A.L.P. to seek affiliation with the Second 
International: resolutions to that effect were passed at both 
the 1905 and 1908 Commonwealth Conferences of the Party, though 
they were subsequently ignored by the right-wing State 
executives on whom devolved the implementation of such
55. These gatherings included the extraordinary congress at 
Basle in 1912, which was hurriedly convened in the face of 
the Balkan crisis of that year, and reaffirmed the Stuttgart 
resolution on war in the hope of dissuading Great Power 
intervention in the dispute. See Braunthal, loc. cit.,
pp. 3^2-6.
56. See [C. Legien^j, International Federation of Trade Unions 
Report For the Years 1913-1919 (Berlin, 1919)> p . 1 2 .
57. L.C,, May 7, 1908, p.8.
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5 8decisions. At the 1912 Commonwealth Conference a more
extended debate took place over the issue of affiliating with
the International. Those supporting affiliation laid great
stress on the Second International’s role in opposing militarism
and war. As the Victorian delegate D.P. Russell put it "the
congresses of Socialists did more towards preserving the peace
of the world than any other body of people.... and... if
Australia sent a delegate home it would have an influence in the
direction [of assisting peace[j.^^ Once again the Conference
agreed to the A.L.P.’s representation overseas, though, as L.F.
Crisp has observed, it "was clear from the debate, however,
that many of the ’harder-headed’ delegates were not prepared to
see the Party’s exiguous funds spent for such a purpose and
preferred merely to send off a paper to be read to the Interna-
6 0tional as a message from the A.L.P.".
Outside the A.L.P. anti-war agitation centred around 
the issue of conscription. A plank of compulsory military 
training for home defence had been adopted by the A.L.P. in 
1908, and in 1909 all three major parties in the Federal 
Parliament supported the introduction of a system of cadet
military training which was later to be extended to include
61adults up to twenty-six years of age. Though for Hughes and 
those who thought like him this was a triumph for their 
nationalist aspirations, the measure had been adopted with 
misgivings by many trade unionists, and principally as a 
precaution against the ’Yellow Peril’ which developments in 
the East appeared to be brewing up. It was thus seen as 
essentially a measure of defence against possible invasion, to 
be justified only as such, and to be accompanied by anti-war 
propaganda. This attitude was similar to the one outlined 
by the Stuttgart resolution of the International and championed
58. Crisp, The Australian Federal Parliamentary Labour Party,
p.99.
59* A.L.P. Fifth Commonwealth Conference Report, 1912, p.45.
60. Crisp, The Australian Federal Parliamentary Labour Party,
p . 1 0 0 .
61. See L.C. Jauncey, The Story of Conscription in Australia 
(London, 1935), Ch.1.
62. For this view see for example the Socialist, Jan.20, 1911 , 
p .2; Jan. 5, 1912, p . 1 ; A.L.P. Fifth Commonwealth Conference 
Report, 1912, pp.29, 45.
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in that organisation by the majority of French and German 
delegates. It was however directly in opposition to the 
extremist anti-militarist position of Herve and Keir Hardie, 
who regarded even citizen defence forces as anathema and 
totally opposed to the spirit of international socialism. 
Australia saw an echo of these debates of the International 
in vigorous left-wing socialist attacks on the A.L.P. for its 
support of the idea of conscription and citizen defence.
Left-wing opposition to conscription was encouraged 
by the visit of Keir Hardie to Australia in 1908. Admitting 
that the situation in which Australia was placed made a stance 
of total opposition to any form of defence difficult to 
maintain, Hardie nevertheless argued that the A.L.P. should 
not allow militarism to gain the slightest foothold, and he 
warned that support of compulsory military training would 
cause Labor great problems in the future. J
Similar reactions to the slightest manifestations 
of militarism were displayed by all the socialist parties 
including, at first, the V.S.P. "The Australian defence 
policy", declared the young V.S.P. lecturer John Curtin in 
1909, "was part and parcel of the international war policy 
played by the international gang of capitalists for their own
64purposes". Curtin saw looming chaos and degradation for the 
Australian working class as a result of capitalist machinations,
65and called for insurrection rather than war. Along with R.S.
Ross and other leading members of the V.S.P. Curtin pressed for
adherence to the policy of the S.F.A. which had declared itself
uncompromisingly hostile to all forms of militarism, 
recognising that whilst the present class State exists 
the armed forces will be used to buttress up capitalism, 
and to hold down the workers. The Federation further 
recognises that all the energies of the working class 
can be most profitably utilised in building up their 
industrial and political organisations, which shall 
finally render war impossible, and which organisations, 
by international affiliation and alliances between the 
working classes of all nations, are at present the chief 
guarantee of the peace of the world.66
63. Jauncey, op. cit., p.63; "W. Stewart, J. Keir Hardie 
(London, 1923), pp.255-6.
64. Socialist, Oct.15, 1909, p.1.65. Socialist, April 8, 1910, p.1; Dec.23, 1910, p.1.
66. Socialist, Dec.2, 1910, p.1.
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In 1910 the S.P.A. began organising anti-militarist 
demonstrations throughout the major capital cities, a feature 
of which were trenchant attacks on the A.L.P. for its allegedly
Z ' r y
militarist policy of citizen defence. Majority opinion in
the V.S.P. tended to support such attacks. "Quite obviously",
the Socialist commented, "Labor Party ’nationalism’ has lost
68itself in capitalistic Imperialism".
On the other hand many V.S.P. members were slowly 
reconciled to the A.L.P.’s position through the arguments
69advanced in favour of a citizen army by Maurice Blackburn.
Blackburn, who in 1911 assumed editorship of the V.S.P.’s
paper the Socialist, soon emerged as a strong defender of the
anti-militarist A.L.P. viewpoint within the V.S.P., and led a
spirited attack on the S.P.A.’s extremist stance against
conscription. Citing the Stuttgart resolution of the
International Blackburn explained the Labor Party’s approach
to compulsory military training as an attempt to ensure
military power lay not with the capitalist class but with the 
70worker. Australia’s precarious position in Asia and the
almost inevitable drift to war meant that a citizen military
army was the workers’ only safeguard against capitalist 
71repression. If the working class was not armed, reasoned
Blackburn, an army structured along traditional lines would
72stand forever as a barrier to the aims of labour in Australia.
By such argumentation Blackburn was able to turn the tide of 
opinion within the V.S.P. to the extent that by late 191 1 the 
Party had decided it would no longer officially enter into 
attacks on the A.L.P. over the issue. This infuriated the 
S.F.A., which called for unceasing opposition to the A.L.P. 
and to conscription in any form. As a result of these 
differences of opinion the V.S.P. finally withdrew from the
67. See for example Ibid.
68. Socialist, Jan.27, 1911 , p . 2.
69. For an outline of Blackburn’s ideas and his connection with 
the V.S.P. see S. Blackburn, Maurice Blackburn and the 
Australian Labor Party 193^-19^3 (Canb., 1969)•
70. Socialist, Nov.17, 1911, p.1.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
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S.F.A. in 1912, leaving the Federation to develop its
Australasian Socialist Party unhindered by advocates of any
73form of cooperation with the A.L.P.
In Sydney the socialist parties remained united
against the A.L.P. and compulsory military training. Both the
S .F.A.-A.S .P . and the S.L.P. and its I.W.W. Clubs took as their
texts the writings of Herve, whose famous speech Anti-Patriotism74was published in Sydney in 1910. As the 1909 Defence Act came
into effect the militant socialists provided the first
prosecutions of parents refusing to register conscript cadets
75in the persons of H.E. Holland and A. Giles of Broken Hill.
They were joined after 1912 by a determined resistance to the 
provisions of the Defence Act centred around the mainly 
middle-class Australian Freedom League, founded in that year
r y  s'by the Adelaide Society of Friends. Together the militant
socialist and the Freedom League agitation ensured that
compulsory military training moved from a consensus issue in
Australia to a much-questioned policy in the period immediately
preceding the outbreak of war in 1914.
The effect of continued propaganda against
conscription strengthened the anti-militarist outlook of many
trade unionists. Prominent union leaders and A.L.P. figures
joined in delegations designed to pressure the Federal Labor
government of 1910-13 into moves aimed at watering down the
77compulsory clauses of the Defence Act. In 1912, following
left-wing publicity concerning the use of conscript troops
against striking syndicalists in France, the Commonwealth
Conference of the A.L.P. resolved:-
That the Defence Act should be so amended as to set forth 
clearly that the object of creating a citizen defence 
force based upon universal compulsory military training 
and service is for the purpose of defending the Commonwealth 
against possible foreign aggression, and therefore, under
73* See Turner, op. cit., p .59•
74. G. Herve, Anti-Patriotism (Syd., 1910).
75. See O ’Farrell, Harry Ho11and, p.47. See also O ’Farrell’s
Foreword to the reissued edition of Jauncey, op. cit., 
published by the MacMillan Company of Australia (Melb., 1968).
76. For an account of the movement against conscription very much 
from the viewpoint of the Australian Freedom League and its 
successors see Jauncey, op. cit.
77. Jauncey, op. cit., Ch.3.
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no circumstances, should any person so enrolled be compelled to bear arms against any fellow-Australian 
citizen, notwithstanding anything in the oath of 
allegiance or in any other of the conditions of 
compulsory service.
However few Labor politicians could be mustered to support
the vain attempt by Senator Arthur Rae to have this resolution
79translated into law.
In addition to attempting to minimise the militarist 
aspects of citizen army training, broader anti-war measures were 
initiated amongst trade unionists. In accordance with the 
decisions of the Copenhagen Congress of the International the
V. S.P. circulated amongst Victorian unions the Hardie-Vaillant 
resolution advocating a general strike against war. Following 
lengthy consideration by individual unions in June 191^ the 
Melbourne T.H.C. declared its support of the resolution and 
pledged itself to organise unionists to make effective thisgostrategy of preventing war. When however barely two months 
later conflict broke out in Europe Australian labour proved 
no more inclined to insurrection than did those who had 
originally framed the policy of a general strike against war.
As news arrived of the total collapse of socialism in Europe 
the idea of militant and open dissent lapsed. The union 
movement made no overt challenge to the enthusiastic public 
endorsement of World War One offered by Labor leaders such as
Andrew Fisher, and by the mein who would soon succeed him,
81W. M. Hughes.
* * *
Nevertheless the enthusiasm of Labor Party leaders 
for Australia’s entry into World War One did not truly reflect 
opinion throughout the labour movement. For men of Hughes’s
78. A.L.P. Fifth Commonwealth Conference Report, 1912, p.51*
79. wP.D, , Vol.65, Aug. 1 , 1912, Pp.1550 ff.
80. See R.S. Ross Collection, A.N.L.
81. Turner, op. cit., p.69. E. Scott, Australia During the War 
J^Vol.XI of the Official History of Australia in the War
of 1914-18] (Syd., 1936), p.23.
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ilk the first world war was an opportunity to test in action 
the nationalist aspirations of young“ Australia, and the Labor 
Party had to play its part in pursuing this task wherever it 
might lead. There was at first some limited support for this 
viewpoint from the union movement, mainly from sections of the 
Australian Workers’ Union, which maintained close links with 
Labor’s political leadership. In the long run however the 
union movement could never support a costly and futile world 
war to the extent that Labor leaders demanded. In their 
moments of disappointment with the A.L.P. in government in 
pre-war years the unions had already displayed some interest 
in the ideas of industrial unionism emanating from the left. 
They had also been torn between adherence to the anti­
militarism preached by the international socialists and the 
thoroughly nationalistic outlook of Hughes. They were, in 
the course of World War One, forced to choose decisively 
between these two viewpoints. Slowly at first, but with 
increasing momentum after the conscription crisis of 1916, 
the labour movement moved away from the discredited pro­
conscription outlook, rejecting alike the leading Labor 
politicians of pre-war years and the reformist and Fabian 
methods of political activity they had championed. By the 
end of World War One the power and influence of left-wing 
groups was a dominating factor in labour affairs, and the 
unions particularly had fallen strongly under the hegemony of 
quasi-syndicalist doctrines of militant and international 
socialism.
In Sydney all left-wing organisations were from the 
start outspoken in their opposition to the first world war, and 
scathing in their denunciation of the Labor Party. The Chicago 
I.W.W. called on its tiny handful of members to "Answer the Opdeclaration of war with the call for a GENERAL STRIKE....";
82. D .A ., Aug.22, 191^? p.1. For I.W.W. agitation throughout 
the war years see E.C. Fry (ed.) Tom Barker and the I.W.W. 
(Canb., 1965)» and. I. Turner, Sydney ’ s Burning (Me lb. ,
1967).
30
but at this stage of the war such bravado could have no 
practical effect. Nor was similar agitation by the equally 
tiny A.S.P. and S.L.P. any more effective: for patriotism 
was sweeping Australia.
A different approach was taken by the V.S.P. 
Following its experience of the S.F.A. fiasco the party was 
cautious and equivocal in its first public utterances on the 
war. Though some members called for denunciation of the 
A.L.P., a majority of V.S.P. members agreed with the party 
secretary R.S. Ross that the best strategy was to redouble 
efforts to convert the Labor Party away from its patriotic 
stance rather than stand on principles and openly repudiate
Q oLabor once again. J This tactic of 'permeation' or 'boring
from within' as it became known in these years appeared to
yield some immediate results. In November 1914 the newly
elected Federal Labor Government amended the Defence Act in
accordance with the decision of the 1912 Commonwealth
Conference of the A.L.P. so as to eliminate any possibility
that the Australian army might be used to suppress unionists
84engaged in an industrial dispute. At the same time however
in discussing the proposed amendment several Government
85Senators openly doubted that it could have any legal effect.
With the progress of the war throughout 1915 and
1916 strains within the labour movement became increasingly
86apparent. The dislocation of industry caused by the war, 
and resulting sectional unemployment; the refusal of the 
Government to hold a prices referendum, and its apparent lack 
of concern for wage standards, all provided fuel to fan the 
flames of working class discontent. Direct actionist 
propaganda spread amongst many rank and file unionists 
frustrated by their failure to achieve industrial gains 
through the arbitration system. Trade union leaders too
83. See Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics, p.70.
84. Jauncey, op. cit., p.112.
85. Ibid.
86. For a thorough and detailed account of events building up 
to the conscription crisis see Turner, Industrial Labour 
and Politics, Chs.3,4.
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became increasingly resentful of the attitude of the Government 
on industrial questions. But they were even more resentful of 
the Government's obvious intention of introducing conscription 
to keep up the supply of soldiers for overseas service, as 
voluntary recruiting failed to keep pace with the manpower 
demands of Gallipoli and the Western Front. In July 1915 the 
Universal Service League was formed to agitate for the intro­
duction of conscription for overseas service and its influence 
quickly spread amongst conservatives and leading Labor 
politicians. To counter these moves socialists, trade 
unionists, and pacifists joined together to form a number of 
anti-conscription organisations including the Australian Peace 
Alliance, which was aimed at coordinating and uniting forces 
opposed to conscription throughout the Commonwealth. In May 
1916 an Interstate Trade Union Congress was convened by the 
Melbourne T.H.C. which declared its "uncompromising hostility" 
to conscription and called on the Labor Party to eschew this 
measure, though a proposal to call a general strike against
Q r y
conscription was defeated by a narrow margin. ‘ Later, in 
October 1916, an Australia-wide one day stoppage was held as 
a protest against Hughes's decision to hold a referendum on 
conscription, signifying a move towards general strike thinking 
by important sections of the trade union leadership.
By this time the split in the A.L.P. was all but 
made formal. After the defeat of the conscription referendum 
of October 1916 Hughes led his band of followers across the 
floor into coalition with the Liberals and continued on in 
government. In N.S.W. the Labor government headed by W.E. 
Holman also collapsed as the Premier joined forces with the 
former Liberal Opposition. In a series of elections which 
were held throughout early 1917 the new conservative coalition 
won seats all over the country. The Labor Party, except in 
the State of Queensland, was from now on reduced to a minority 
party consisting of moderate politicians, mostly advocating 
continuation of voluntary recruiting - but with no great
87. Australian Trade Unionism and Conscription, Report 
(Melb., 1916), p p .14-15.
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heart - and including within their ranks a small number of 
radicals who spoke a new and militant language previously 
almost unheard in parliament. Weakened and irresolute the new 
political wing of the Labor Movement provided little of the 
caucus leadership in policy making which had been the hallmark 
of the pre-war years.
Outside parliament the labour movement began to
swing rapidly to the left. From 1916 the Chicago X.W.W. had
achieved such notoriety over its determined and unscrupulous
opposition to conscription that conservatives mounted an
intense campaign for its repression, the Commonwealth Government
finally crushing it by use of the Unlawful Associations Act in
August 1917* This was easy, for the Chicago I.W.W. had not
much concerned itself with organisation, and its members
"preferred this death-by-immolation to the creation of an
88illegal organisation." What was impossible however was 
stopping the spread of militant ideas; for apart from the 
increasing interest in direct action and industrial unionism, 
the ’frame-up’ circumstances surrounding the treason trial of 
the famous I.W.W. Twelve made them a cause celebre of the 
labour movement, imprinting on working class minds suspicion 
and hostility towards capitalism and its laws. The sectarian 
conceit of the Wobblies and their ’all or nothing' approach 
whereby they sought to replace the whole pre-existing labour 
movement with their own organisation had ensured that the 
Chicago I.W.W. had not been a popular cause until its demise. 
With its failure however the persecution by the authorities 
made its exploits a powerful myth, and assisted the propagation 
of more acceptable varieties of one big unionism.
The move towards industrial unionism was hastened 
still further by the defeat of the general strike in N.S.W. 
in 1917. Growing out of a strike in the government tramway 
and railway workshops in Sydney over the introduction of the 
American Taylor system of job cards, the strike grew throughout 
August and September 1917 until it brought out a total of 
100,000 workers throughout the eastern States, though 69,000
88. Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics, fn. p.135.
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89was the peak figure for those on strike at any one time.
The strike was spontaneous, badly organised, and mostly led
by the rank and file throughout; it was a measure of working
class discontent and disappointment with the fruits of war
they had tasted on the home front, but it succeeded only in
worsening the lot of its participants. This dramatic outburst
of direct action threw the labour movement into turmoil:
discrediting alike moderate union and Labor Party leaders
(whose vacillating attitudes towards the strike were blamed
for its defeat); impoverishing almost all those union
organisations which had been dragged by their members headlong
into the fight, and leaving the whole labour movement
scandalised and aghast at the rough-house tactics employed
90against the strikers by the N.S.W. government. On top of 
the vindictive treatment meted out to the strikers was added 
a second conscription referendum in December 1917t more 
decisively won by the anti-conscriptionists this time, but 
much more bitterly fought out than the first. It was little 
wonder then that by the end of 1917 an angry temper was about 
in the labour movement, a temper which soon manifested itself 
in several interrelated movements of tremendous intensity: 
endeavours to reorganise the unions along one big union lines; 
moves towards committing all labour organisations to the 
programmes and policies of militant socialism, and efforts to 
oppose the continuation of capitalist war with the international 
solidarity of the working class.
* * *
The one big union idea had already achieved 
widespread popularity before the general strike defeat of 
1917» In the wake of the general strike however the N.S.W. 
Labor Council, which had previously been cautious and equivocal
89. Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics, p .145.
90. Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics, pp.158-61; V.G. 
Childe, How Labour Governs (Melb. , T"964) , pp.160-4; L.F. 
Crisp, Ben Chifley (Melb., 1963), pp.14-22.
34
towards the proposal, was won over to the one big union spirit, 
and took the lead in drawing up plans to give official union 
backing to this revolutionary idea. In August 1918, following 
on a suggestion from A.C. Willis of the powerful Miners’ 
Federation, the Council convened an Australia-wide conference
of trade unions at which plans for an official One Big Union
91were endorsed. The new organisation was to be known as the
Workers’ Industrial Union of Australia and its programme drew
heavily and directly on earlier I.W.W. doctrines. It adopted
a more or less de Leonite Preamble: one which called for
political as well as industrial action to effect socialist
revolution. At the same time it eschewed the narrow ’shield’
concept of de Leon in favour of a political party of the working
class which could strive on its own behalf for the emancipation
of the proletariat through the overthrow of capitalism, a
concession to those militants who were also members of the 
92A.L.P. For the rest the projected W.I.U. of A. was a fairly 
mechanical transposition of the I.W.W. one big union divided 
into six departments - 1. Building and Construction, 2.
Manufacture, 3* Transportation and Communication, 4. Agriculture 
and Fisheries, 5* Civil Service and Public Utilities, 6.
Mining - all elaborately sub-divided, but with little attempt
93at adjustment to the actual conditions in Australia. Despite 
such awkwardness, and despite the elucidation of a less 
centralised and more tenable alternative scheme by Victorian 
trade union leaders and members of the V.S.P., the plan 
adopted by the August 1918 conference gained adherents at 
first. In September 1918 a conference of Victorian unions 
accepted the Sydney scheme without alteration and support came 
also from T.H.Cs in Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania.
In 1919 the picture was to change and the O.B.U. scheme met 
concerted opposition; but this was in the future, and enthusiasm 
for the W.I.U. of A. was in 1918 quite unbounded.
91. Labor Council of N.S.W., Report, Dec. 1918, p .6.
92. [W. I . U . of A.^ j, Preamble, Classification and Rules (Melb., 
1919); Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics, p.184.
93* Childe, op. cit., pp.166-7«
35
Accompanying; moves towards organising the O.B.U.
was a strong leftward swing in the A.L.P. To a degree this
reflected the drift of opinion in the trade unions, but once
again it was given form and substance by leading socialists
within the labour movement. After 1916 the A.L.P. in N.S.W.
was controlled by a cabal of union leaders, known as the
Industrial Vigilance Council. From its ranks in 1918 and
1919 came moves to reconstitute the A.L.P. as a revolutionary
socialist reflex of the O.B.U. The leaders of this attempt
were A.C. Willis, President of the W.I.U. of A., and J.S.
Garden, the newly elected Secretary of the Labor Council of
N.S.W. Ultimately the attempt was to fail, for it aroused
the opposition of the A.W.U., whose leaders rallied the
parliamentarians and the heirarchy of the Catholic Church
behind them in a series of moves which led to the expulsion
of the left from the N.S.W. A.L.P. in late 1919* However this
bold effort to capture the most important State branch of the
Labor Party for revolutionary socialism was indicative of the
central importance that doctrinal issues had assumed in A.L.P.
affairs. In Victoria in 1919 unionists and members of the
V.S.P. succeeded in having the A.L.P. adopt a thoroughgoing
socialist objective pledged to "the peaceful overthrow of the
capitalistic system" and democratic control of industry, though
an attempt to have conference adopt the Preamble of the W.I.U.
9bof A. was defeated. Echoes of developments in the major
industrialised States were to be heard also in the advocacy
of socialist programmes and ideas by militant minorities in
outlying States including Western Australia. Thus even the
Federal Conferences of the A.L.P., traditionally dominated by
politicians and weighted in favour of the smaller and more
conservative State branches of the A.L.P., came under strong
pressures from those advocating militant socialism. At the
1918 conference at Perth, for example, leading members of
socialist and left-wing groups constituted about a quarter of
9 5the delegates in attendance.
9b. A.L.P. State of Victoria. Annual Conference Report, 1919>
p p .30-3•
95. See A.L.P. Seventh Commonwealth Conference Report, 1918,
pp.1-2.
Numerically the small parties of the radical left
had expanded considerably, though still only to the fringe of
significance. The Chicago I.W.W. had recruited most new
members throughout the war years and reached a membership
figure of at least 2 , 0 0 0  in 1 9 1 6 , though the many small
organisations which attempted to carry on the Wobbly spirit
after its suppression in 1 9 1 7 combined contained probably
9 6less than a quarter of this membership.
97In Melbourne the V.S.P. had perhaps 400-500 members;
but by 1 91 8 it had also served as a model for the creation of
similar left-wing organisations in other States. Inspired by
the success of the V.S.P. policy of cooperating with the A.L.P.
socialists in Sydney, Broken Hill, Adelaide, Brisbane and
Western Australia had formed Social Democratic Leagues to work
closely with the official trade union and A.L.P. organisations
fighting against conscription. Of all these groups the Sydney
S.D.L. was by far the most successful. Its 400 or so members
were entrenched in Labor and anti-war bodies in N.S.W., and
their activities were coordinated by constant lectures, social
gatherings, and the League’s own newspaper the Social Democrat.
The other S.D.Ls were much less important and seem to have had
98only a handful of members.
The S.L.P. had expanded its membership too and
despite its continued sectarian tendency had played a leading
role in formulating the O.B.U. programme adopted by the W.I.U.
99of A. in 1918. In 1919 the S.L.P.’s ranks were to be 
considerably enlarged by an influx of many Labor Council of
9 6 . No firm figures for any left-wing groups except the V.S.P. 
are available, and therefore guesswork figures prominently 
in every estimate. The figures I have been able to provide 
suggest a total membership for left-wing groups perhaps 
one and a half to two times that indicated by Turner, 
Industrial Labour and Politics, p.205.
97. Again I incline to a generous estimate of membership.
Exact figures for fully financial members of the V.S.P. 
can be computed from available sources (1 9 1 8 : 349; 1 9 1 9 - 
486) but these are of limited value since many of those most 
prominent in that party’s affairs from year to year were not 
necessarily financial.
98. On the formation and membership of the S.D.Ls see S .D .,
Sept.15, 1917, p .4; Dec.7, 1917, p.4; April 12, 1918, p.1; 
April 26, 1918, p.4.
99* The committee of the N.S.W. Labor Council which drew up
the O.B.U. Preamble was composed of J.S. Garden, Secretary
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N.S.W. revolutionaries who were in that year expelled from 
the State branch of the A.L.P. More aloof from the 
tergivisations of the labour movement was the A.S.P., which 
had come increasingly to place its faith in its own doctrinal 
purity, maintaining that the eventual arrival of a 
revolutionary situation would ensure that the pure would 
inherit the working class and that all other parties would 
be cast aside by a radicalised proletariat. In 1916 A.S.P. 
members in Sydney had obtained a charter from the parent body 
in America to establish a branch of the Workers' International 
Industrial Union, which was the new name of the old de Leonite 
version of the I.W.W. This organisation did expand quickly as 
interest grew in one big unionism and was later to attempt to 
compete with the official W.I.U. of A. for the allegiance of 
unionists.^^ However few new members were recruited for the 
A.S.P. through the W.I.I.U. And all together the S.L.P.; the 
A.S.P., and the various branches of the W.I.I.U. that began to 
be formed throughout Australia could hardly have had much more 
than two thousand members between them, and probably numbered 
considerably fewer.
Nowhere, then, did the far left-wing parties much 
resemble a mass movement, and the real significance of the 
socialists lay in their ideological hegemony over the wider 
labour movement. This hegemony was above all a product of 
organised labour's experiences during the war years. For 
behind the successes of left-wing groups in converting the 
unions to the O.B.U. idea, and in pushing the A.L.P. towards 
militant socialism, stood a profound change in the labour 
outlook towards the war and the course of contemporary history. 
War weariness, the battles over conscription, and the bitterness 
of protracted class conflict, had ensured that by the last 
years of the war the labour movement accepted without reserve 
the socialist interpretation of the great disaster in which 
the world was locked. What in 191^ had been a minority 
viewpoint was by 1918 the common currency of labour’s outlook 
on foreign affairs.
100. Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics, pp.186-88.
(99)* of the Council; E.E. Judd, of the S.L.P., and A. 
McPherson, an ex-Wobbly.
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The socialist attitude to the first world war was
purveyed by its spokesmen at all levels of the labour movement.
Especially useful and numerous forums were those organisations
created for the fight against conscription which had been formed
mostly on the initiative of socialist groups soon after the war 
1 01had begun. The clear message emanating from the left was
very much that of the 1907 Stuttgart resolution of the Second
International: that war was a phenomenon of capitalist society
1 02which involved not the interests of the working class.
The ultimate solution to war was the establishment of socialism,
which would eliminate the mainsprings of civil and international
conflict. It was thus necessary for socialists to lead the
working class towards a revolutionary change, and in the nature
of things that eventually the proletariat would rally to such 
1 03leadership. For the Chicago I.W.W. and the A.S.P. this was
essentially all that needed to be said on the matter. For the 
other socialist groupings however their involvement in 
practical politics drew out the implications of their beliefs 
until the labour movement in whose name they spoke evolved a 
distinctly socialist foreign policy towards the first world 
war and the issues of international affairs which it had
1 04brought in its train.
Naturally enough Australian socialists had been 
shocked and dismayed at the collapse of the Second International 
in August 1914. But as world socialism began to show signs of 
reviving, the left drew inspiration once more from developments 
in the international movement, and from the growth of militant 
anti-war sentiment amongst the workers of all the belligerent 
countries. It was increasingly difficult to obtain reliable 
information through the censorship, but the main outlines of a 
reviving international labour opposition to the war were 
obvious; besides, the very necessity to censor such news seemed
101. For a comprehensive account of socialist and left-wing 
involvement in the formation of the various anti­
conscription bodies see Turner, Industrial Labour and 
Politics, esp. Ch.4.
102. Socialist, Sept.1, 1916, p.1; Jan.12, 1917, p.1.
103. The Workers and the War. Issued by Socialist Party of 
Victoria. (Melb., 1915?); £R. Kirkpatrick^, War - What 
For? (Syd., 1914?).
104. See the Round Table, V0I.9 (1918-19)» PP.178-184; 617-19.
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a clear indication of tlie threat that socialism had begun 
to pose to the continuation of imperialist warfare. The 
Zimmerwald Conference of socialists, held in September 1915, 
was on this view the turning point for the course of World 
War One. Convened by prominent socialist opponents of the 
first world war, the Zimmerwald Conference called on the 
still pro-war majority of the Second International to take 
up an active struggle for peace without annexations or war 
indemnities. "The j^Zimmerwald^J Manifesto", declared the 
V.S.P., would prove for socialists
the last word on the controversies associated with the 
war. It is a clarion call to CLOSE UP THE RANKS, and 
(forgetting and forgiving the blunders of the war’s 
inception and since) prove the grandeur of the Socialist 
faith and cause by heeding the "task and duty" set forth 
in the... Manifesto - [i.e.] "PROLETARIANS OF ALL 
COUNTRIES, UNITE!"1°5
Despite the slow response of the mainstream socialist movement
to the call from Zimmerwald the hope continued to grow that
it was emerging as the new focus of proletarian internationalism
in Europe. Throughout 1 91 6 reported splits in the ranks of
the socialist parties which had supported the war were hailed
as evidence of the growing mass support in Europe for the
106Zimmerwald programme. Socialists drew solace from the
principled stand against the war taken up by the Independent
Labor Party in Britain and the Socialist Parties of Italy and 
1 07the U.S.A. Then suddenly in March 1917 came news of the
first Russian revolution, and the socialist anti-war movement
moved onto centre stage. In Australia, as in countries
everywhere, the left wing of labour was ecstatic: all groups
from the Chicago I.W.W. to the V.S.P. hailed the revolution
as presaging the end of the world war and the eventual
1 08collapse of the capitalist system.
By this time the left-wing outlook and its practical 
policy coneonunitants were being adopted widely by sections of 
the labour movement. In 1917 both the Victorian and N.S.W.
105. Socialists and the War. Recent Authoritative Manifesto of 
Special International Socialist Congress (Melb., 1913)»
106. See for example Socialist, Sept.1, 1916, p.1.
107. Socialist, Jan.12, 1917, pp.1,2.
108. Socialist, Mar.28, 1917, p.1; D .A ., Mar.31, 1917, P-3.
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conferences of the A.L.P. had adopted resolutions calling1
for a united effort by the world’s working class to overthrow
the capitalist system of carnage, congratulating the Russian
workers on their revolutionary overthrow of Czarism, and
declaring the necessity for an immediate international
1 09conference to negotiate peace. Later, these resolutions
were adopted by the Queensland and South Australian parties 
1 1 0as well. At the same time opinion in the unions moved
increasingly against allowing Labor politicians to continue 
to participate in programmes of voluntary recruitment, through 
which many A.L.P. spokesmen averred their loyalty to the 
British Empire for the benefit of the electorate. Already 
throughout 1917 a number of large industrial unions and the 
Melbourne T.H.C. issued calls on members of parliament to 
withdraw from recruiting, but it was in the N.S.W. Labor Council 
where the issue came to a head. When, in 1918 a number of 
aspiring Labor politicians attempted to have a motion favourable 
to recruiting passed by the Council, E.E. Judd of the S.L.P. 
succeeded in having it replaced by a resolution declaring total
opposition to any further recruitment and support for an
111immediate armistice and peace negotiations. At the same
meeting a pro-recruiting delegate was soundly defeated for the
1 1 2Secretaryship of the Council by the militant J.S. Garden, 
heralding in an era during which the N.S.W. Labor Council was 
to emerge as the most outspoken and active union support base 
for left-wing socialist groups.
109. Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics, pp.172-3* A 
correspondent in the conservative Round Table observed 
of the mood of the Victorian conference of 1917-
An inclination to pass any resolution if filled with 
phrases familiarised by frequent repetition in Labour 
newspapers was even more characteristic of this Conference 
than of its predecessors.... J^ The^ j party wirepullers, 
who have done their utmost to prevent Australia from 
fully exerting itself to defend the Empire, would.... 
if in danger of falling over a precipice... pass 
resolutions against the law of gravitation as the 
wicked work of capitalist exploiters.
See Round Table, Vol.8 (1917-18), pp.181-2.
110. Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics, p.173*
111. Labor Council of N.S.W., Report, June 1918, pp.8-11.
112. See Round Table, Vol.9 (1918-19), p.178.
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Directly after the N.S.W. Labor Council debate over 
recruiting the Seventh Commonwealth Conference of the A.L.P. 
convened in Perth in June 1918. Once again the forces 
favouring total opposition to the continuation of the war 
lined up against the more equivocal and conservative 
parliamentary spokesmen of the Labor Party. Once again the 
critical measure of opinion was the issue of recruiting, 
which crystallised at a practical level the diverse attitudes 
towards the war. The result was something of a compromise.
It was decided that further Labor support for recruiting should 
be made conditional upon a declaration by the Allies asserting 
their readiness to enter into peace negotiations on the basis 
of no annexations or indemnities, and a public enquiry into 
Australia’s own manpower needs. On the other hand the 
politicians gained time, for the decision against recruiting
was made contingent upon the outcome of a referendum of all
113members of the A.L.P. and its affiliated organisations.
The delay proved extremely valuable to the A.L.P. politicians.
When the ballot was finally held it showed an overwhelmingly
affirmative vote and a ’Yes’ majority in all States, but
without any practical action resulting, for no sooner had the
count been taken than revolution began to break out in Germany
1 1 4and the Central Powers finally collapsed.
Labour, then, was uncommonly radical and
internationalist in its outlook by the year 1918. The voices
of the politicians and practical reformers were still to be
115heard, especially in the A.L.P. But pervading a movement
113. A.L.P. Seventh Commonwealth Conference Report, 1918, p.28.
114. For the results of the ballot and the decision of the 
A.L.P. Federal Executive that the issue was redundant see 
A.W., Nov.21, 1918, p.9; Worker, No v .14, 1918, p.9>
Socialist, Nov.15, 1918, p.2. On the holding of the 
referendum amongst A.L.P. members see L.N., Oct.26,
1916, pp.4,5; L.C., Oct.10, 1918, pp.5 ,10; Oct.17, p.3;
Oct.24, p .10.
115. For example at the 1918 Perth Conference the politicians 
defeated an attempt by the Victorian left to have a 
resolution passed jettisoning support for all clauses of the 
Defence Act (including those dealing with home defence) 
which legalised compulsory military training. The 
politicians managed to defeat this move without resort to 
the compromise necessary over the A.L.P.’s attitude to 
World War One.
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dominated by the unionists and left-wing groups was a spirit 
of socialism and internationalism quite without equal in the 
whole of labour’s history. ’’Henceforth Australia can never 
be indifferent to what is happening in the world....”, declared 
H.E. Boote of the A.W.U. in that union’s newspaper the 
Australian Worker.
From this, on, the workers of Australia make 
COMMON CAUSE WITH THE WORKERS OVERSEAS, and gladly 
declare themselves to belong to an international 
confraternity, striving to break the fetters of a -\-\6 
social system imposed upon mankind by a savage past.
Naive in their new-found enthusiasm for international links,
labour spokesmen paid little heed to the problems that faced
those who sought to revive a movement so badly shattered by
the events of 1914. They were aware, to be sure, that great
differences had arisen over the issue of the first world war.
But they remained confident that the problems could be 
1 1 7overcome. The Bolshevik Revolution, which had attracted
increasing attention as 1918 progressed, was still thought 
of as a continuation of the voice of Zimmerwald, an illusion 
that was fostered by the paucity of information filtering 
through the Australian censorship. It was only as the war 
ended and a degree of reliable information was available, 
that the nature of Bolshevism gradually became more clear.
116. A .W . , Nov.28, 1918, p.10.
117. Ibid.
CHAPTER TWO
THE IMPACT OF LENINISM
I may state that the Australian workers, 
who have more political freedom, may have 
differences of opinion in estimating the Russian 
conditions, but I am sure they will not forget 
that there are many millions of workers in Russia 
who are fighting earnestly for the freedom and 
rights of manhood.*
When Lenin seized power in Russia in 1917 it was 
with one eye on Russia, the other on Europe and America; it 
was with the intention of changing society in Russia, and of 
changing also the history of the world. Lenin justified his 
actions to himself and to Marxist ideology by reference to a 
view of the world which had crystallised in his mind throughout 
the course of World War One, and several strands of thought 
connected with this world view were of great importance to 
socialist movements outside Russia. The new Soviet government 
in Russia after October 1917 stood up before the world 
proclaiming universal truth and validity for the ideology 
formulated by the man who had guided it to power. Bearing 
the imprimatur of success a new brand of socialism claiming 
direct descent from Marxism issued a call for allegiance to 
those numerous working-class movements of the world which 
subscribed to the socialist idea and hallowed the authors of 
the Communist Manifesto. In Australia the more or less direct 
impact of Leninism was felt most strongly in the period 1918-21 
as the existing socialist parties and groupings sorted 
themselves out in relation to the new ideas of socialism
V. Sviatlowsky, The Labour Movement in Russia (Melb., 1907)»
p. 1 6.
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emanating from Moscow and in relation to the morality and 
the place in history of the Russian Revolution. By 1921 there 
had been formed a Communist Party of Australia dedicated to 
emulating the Russian Bolsheviks and importing Leninism into 
Australian politics; but the picture remained somewhat unclear, 
and it was many years before a fully Leninist party was in 
operation in the Australian context.
i. Leninist doctrines of world revolution
"With the Russian Revolution we woke up", wrote
R.S. Ross of the Australian socialist movement after World
War One. "We had been asleep, and in our sleep.... Marxian
analysis, interpretation and extension had shifted from Germany 
1to Russia". As has been frequently and lengthily commented
on, the shift in thinking that Australian socialists were
awakened to - from 'classical1 Marxism to modern Communism -
involved a series of changes of emphasis, 'updating' of
concepts, and distortions and indeed complete changes of
2earlier Marxist theory. Further, Bolshevism is a complex
creed as well as an ideology. It demands empathic understanding
as well as theoretical competence, and it was not enough for
Western socialists who wished to follow Lenin to master his
major concepts alone. Nevertheless in the early days the
main challenge of Bolshevism was in the realm of ideas, and
only gradually was Communism's hard demands on the personality
and stress on political nuance made clear.
Perhaps the most basic concept of Leninism as it
3was presented to Western socialists after 1917 was the thesis
1. R.S. Ross, Revolution in Russia and Australia (Melb.,
1920), pp.29-30.
2 . For recent attempts at examining and elucidating Marxism
and its relationship with Leninism see G. Lichtheim, Marxism:
An Historical and Critical Study (London, 1967), and J. 
Plamenatz, German Marxism and Russian Communism (London, 1959).
3. That year being a seminal date in Bolshevik thinking in that 
it was marked by Lenin's conversion to the Parvus-Trotsky 
theory of 'permanent revolution' via his theory of imperialism 
referred to above. It was this conversion that made Leninism 
a world-revolutionary doctrine, though the very 'Russian'
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that the first world war had signalled an era of continuing
imperialist wars, and, ultimately, proletarian revolutions.
kFrom 1915 onwards, and with increasing clarity, Lenin
committed himself to the idea that the world had entered the
final ’imperialist stage’ of capitalism. His was an eclectic
theory of imperialism, largely derivative from the ideas of
the unconventional bourgeois economist J.A. Hobson whose book
Imperialism was published in 1901, yet also employing Marxian
concepts wherever relevant, and presenting a convincing picture
of the world as having entered a new and permanent phase of
economic and political development which could only lead to
continuing warfare such as that unleashed in 1914. He saw
the four great capitalist nations of England, France, the
United States and Germany as having reached a stage of
development where they were exporting capital (compared with
their earlier export of commodities) to the less industrialised
parts of the world; so as to ensure their fields of lucrative
investment they had set up vast rival systems of exploitation,
which had then come into conflict and brought about world war.
War would be a continuing phenomenon because the attempt by
the rich to elude the falling rate of profit - which had
driven them into the backward countries where capital was
relatively scarce - had finally run up against the finite
boundaries of the planet earth: "For the first time the world
is completely divided up, so that in the future only redivision
is possible, ie, territories can only pass from one ’owner’ to
another, instead of passing as ownerless territory to an5’owner’". Capitalism in its imperialist stage was thus a 
clearly dangerous and pernicious phenomenon which had chained 
the whole world together into aggressive competing imperialist 
blocs and was subjecting its peoples to an intolerable 
suffering and a future beyond contemplation.
flavour of Bolshevik doctrines was apparent in the incorpo­
ration of Russia into the theory of permanent revolution as 
the actual director of the world revolution, a role which no 
Marxist had previously contemplated for such a backward 
country.
4. For example in "The United States of Europe Slogan" (1915); 
"Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism" (1916); "The 
Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution" (1917)-
5. V.I. Lenin, "Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism",
As a result of this broad analysis of the world
situation he postulated that the ’laws of motion’ of
capitalist society in its imperialist epoch were uneven and
radically unstable economic and political development
throughout different nations. This had considerable relevance
to the technical aspects of the proletarian revolution that
Marxism predicted would result from the oppression of
capitalism. Classical Marxism had supposed that the
proletarian revolution, though it would be a 'world revolution'
and possibly signalled by political developments in countries 
7like Russia, was essentially a phenomenon of the industrially 
advanced nations. Through his ’law’ of uneven development 
however Lenin decided that revolution would be a more truly 
world phenomenon in which the small but politically aware 
proletariat of a country like Russia could take a leading 
part, and further that revolution could occur initially within 
just one of the national sectors of the vast capitalist world 
and work its course out from this basis. In a remarkably 
prescient sketch of such a development written in 1915 Lenin 
explained
Uneven economic and political development is an 
absolute law of capitalism. Hence the victory of 
socialism is possible first in several or even in one 
capitalist country alone. After expropriating the 
capitalists and organising their own socialist production, 
the victorious proletariat of that country will arise 
against the rest of the world - attracting to its cause 
the oppressed classes of other countries, stirring 
uprisings in those countries against the capitalists, 
and in case of need using even armed force against the 
exploiting classes and their states.®
The position of Russia was admitted to be a difficult one in
that it was a backward country economically and thus lacking
a numerically strong proletariat class, but this did not
prevent Lenin from envisaging a revolutionary Russia fulfilling
a leading role in the promotion of world proletarian revolution,
for there was an impoverished peasantry who would serve as
4 6 .
in Selected Works (London, 1946), Vol.6, p .511 •
6. The term used by Marx and Engels to describe the content of 
scientific socialism: the rules which governed social change.
7. See for example the 1882 Preface to the Russian edition of 
The Communist Manifesto.
8. "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe", Collected Works 
(Moscow, 1964), Vol.21, p.342.
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interim allies of the industrial proletariat, and if the
advanced European nations such as Germany, France, or England
were converted to communism they could tender assistance in
development to their industrially retarded neighbour. By
updating Marx with his theory of imperialism and categorising
Russian events as explicable by the law of uneven development
Lenin felt he was proposing only an efficacious adjustment to
the general programme of world proletarian revolution which
in the course of a few years would appear as a minor anomaly
in the Marxist schema. He had constructed in his mind a
world revolutionary scenario in which the taking of power in
9Russia was but the first step.
In his book The State and Revolution, written in
1917j Lenin dismissed any suggestion in Marxian writings that
a more or less ’peaceful* or orderly revolution might be
possible in democratic countries like England and America.
Lenin argued that in the era of imperialism the nature of
politics had changed towards world-wide capitalist militarism
and that a general principle had emerged that "the replacement
of the bourgeois by the proletarian state is impossible without
1 0a violent revolution". This confident belief that armed
insurrection was possible and that the Bolshevik attitude to 
revolution was applicable in the West was based on Lenin’s 
interpretation of the history of the world socialist movement 
in the years following the collapse of the Second International 
in 1914. His own sudden discovery in August 1914 of the extent 
to which socialists in Europe had become identified with their 
national governments had prompted him to attempt to build a 
wholly new international movement. At Zimmerwald in 1915 
Lenin’s idea of transforming the imperialist war into civil
9. In lieu of the scenario being played out Lenin accepted 
that the Bolsheviks of Russia could not survive against 
the hostility of the world. In such a case the Bolshevik 
revolution would presumably have attained the status of
an incident in the proletariat’s development of discipline, 
class solidarity and political experience. Only later 
was Lenin’s theory of uneven development used by Stalin as 
justification for the anti-Marxist proposition that the 
advanced political conditions of Russia could serve in 
place of world revolution as the basis of the establishment 
in that country of the economic and cultural conditions of 
socialism.10. V.I. Lenin, "The State and Revolution", in Selected Works
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war was rejected as ’childish’ and 'dangerous nonsense’ 
and he was decisively defeated on his plan to break away from 
the Second International. At Kienthal in 1916 however a 
conference representing roughly the same groups and parties 
as Zimmerwald moved distinctly to the left on the question of 
socialist anti-war activity and the minority of delegates who 
voted for a decisive break with the Second International almost 
doubled in size. In the same year as Kienthal the growing 
anti-war feeling of socialists in Germany led to a split in 
the Social Democratic party and the eventual formation at 
Gotha in April 1917 of a sizeable new Independent Social 
Democratic Party. Many members of this party had adopted an 
anti-war attitude which stopped short of fostering civil 
disorder and was contemptuously dismissed by Lenin as social 
pacifist or ’Centrist', yet on the left of the party was a 
sizeable revolutionary movement gathered around Karl Liebknecht, 
Rosa Luxemburg and the Spartakusbund. It was principally this 
German revolutionary movement, magnified in size in Lenin's 
mind, from which he derived his vision of a series of social 
earthquakes about to erupt, overthrow the old social structures 
of Europe and set up a world system of Soviets in the wake of 
the Russian Revolution. Already in early 1917? as he left 
Europe to return to Russia and prepare for the Bolshevik 
insurrection he was to lead later that year, Lenin had exalted:
The future belongs to the current that gave us Karl 
Liebknecht, that created the Spartacus Group and carried 
on its propaganda in the Bremen Arbeiterpolitik.
The objective conditions of the imperialist war 
make it certain that the revolution will not be limited 
to the first stage of the Russian revolution, that the 
revolution will not be limited to Russia.
The German proletariat is the most trustworthy and 
the most reliable ally of the Russian and the world 
revolution. ^
Precisely the same argument informed his motions submitted 
to the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party urging the 
revolution in October 1917. From the solid national base
(London, 1946), Vol.7, P-37.
11. Braunthal, op. cit., Vol.2, p.47.
12. V.I. Lenin, "Farewell Letter to the Swiss Workers", in 
Selected Works (London, 1946), Vol.6, p.19.
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provided by the success of Bolshevik revolution a Third or
Communist International was set up in Moscow in March 1919 
to foster and assist the revolutionary movements the Bolsheviks 
thought were sweeping Europe. This gathering of enthusiastic 
Russian Commissars and a tiny handful of representatives of 
Western revolutionaries confidently announced to the world 
that there was a pattern in the fall of empires and the 
instability and the social change sweeping Europe at the end 
of World War One:
The crash of the crumbling structure of the capitalist 
world is already audible. Proletarian revolution will 
stalk triumphantly from country to country. Shod with 
seven-league boots it will stride over the boundaries 
of not only one, but of two, three and more countries 
at a time. Scores of millions of toilers are taking 
their revenge for the outrages inflicted upon them 
during the four years of that mad imperialistic war. 13
If the war had continued for longer than it did it 
is surely possible that Lenin’s programme of world revolution 
might eventually have worked. But with Allied victory and a 
general - if slow - return to order in the world the policy 
of revolutionary overthrow of the perpetrators of World War One 
had little chance of success in most Western countries. Despite 
the backing of Kienthal and the growth of some revolutionary 
sentiment in Germany the great majority of socialists in the 
West were still thinking in terms of constitutional parliamentary 
conquests of power or, as in the case of Germany, a ’revolution’ 
principally to establish the environment in which the masses 
could vote socialism in according to the rules of responsible
1 4parliamentary-style government. For those socialists of the 
West who had been formed in the more or less democratic political 
environment of pre-war years political activity which aimed at 
winning the masses to their point of view through constitutional 
means came as naturally as insurrectionary activity came to a 
man like Lenin, reared in the environment of Tsarist autocracy.
13• Communist International, May 1, , col.46.
14. For example Kautsky, who was Lenin’s archetype 'Centrist' 
and 'social pacifist’, had long claimed that the socialist 
revolution would consist in the alteration of the class 
structure as the labour movement became organised and 
powerful and that the only political upheaval necessary in 
certain countries like Germany and Russia was removal of the 
autocratic, pre-bourgeois regimes. Democracy would do the rest.
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The experience of the Great War had certainly moved a 
sizeable minority in Germany to think in terms of more open 
and unremitting class warfare, though in nowhere near sufficient 
numbers to carry through a thorough-going revolution against 
determined opposition, as the easy crushing of the Spartakists 
in 1918-19 was to show. And in Britain, France, and America 
even after four years of slaughter the revolutionary groups 
were mostly very small and isolated. In short the revolutionary 
current on which Lenin relied to justify the Bolshevik 
revolution had hardly started to flow strongly and would have 
required at least several more years of warfare to ensure its 
success. Lenin had been able to win only a small number of the 
world's socialists to his plan for a new International and open 
insurrection against capitalism and the horrors of imperialist 
war.
And even amongst the enthusiastic insurgents of the
West there remained considerable differences with Lenin
concerning the nature of proletarian revolution and the way in
which it was to be carried out. Rosa Luxemburg and the leading
German revolutionaries conceived of revolution as a largely
spontaneous phenomenon, and the Spartakists were firmly committed
to the strangely difficult formula for revolution laid down by
the Communist Manifesto asking that Communists should both take
a lead in educating the masses to the ideas of Marxism and
revolutionary socialism but at the same time eschew sectarianism
or the development of party interests separate and apart from
those of the proletariat as a whole. The 1918 programme of
the Spartakus League was at pains to argue for German socialists
to press forward to the dictatorship of the proletariat: "the
use of political power for the introduction of Socialism and for
the expropriation of the capitalist class", but at the same time
promised that "the Spartakus League will never take power
except in accordance with the clearly expressed will of the
great majority of the proletarian masses of Germany consciously
1 5supporting its ideas, aims, and methods".
15. Quoted in P. Frölich, Rosa Luxemburg (London, 19^+0),
P.301.
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Lenin, on the other hand, was convinced that
revolutionary socialists could and should act independently
of the working class. ’’The history of all countries", he
wrote in the 1902 pamphlet What is to be Done?
bears witness that by its own resources alone the working 
class is in a position to generate only a trade union 
consciousness.... The theory of Socialism, however, grew 
out of the philosophic, historical and economic theories 
that were elaborated by the educated representatives of 
the propertied classes, the intellectuals.16
Lenin argued that the founders of modern scientific socialism,
Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois
intelligentsia and concluded that the proletariat could not
carry out its revolutionary tasks without the benefit of the
correct revolutionary theory brought to it ’from outside* by
an intellectual elite. It followed that the most important
and fundamental factor in revolution was the party and its
leadership. To the Spartakist leaders such ideas were
Blanquist regressions from Marxism which, they warned, could
lead to dangerous putschism and worse. Yet it was Leninism
which alone could claim success for its ideas on revolution
and after the death of Leibknecht and Luxemburg in the course
of the attempted German Spartakist uprising in 1919 it was the
Leninist theory of the nature of revolution which informed
Comintern thinking.
Following on from his ideas on the nature of 
proletarian revolution Lenin advocated a system of socialist 
party organisation designed to ensure that control was in 
the hands of its intellectual elite. Lenin’s theory of 
organisation became known as democratic centralism and operated 
on the principle that policy disputations should precede 
decision-making and that after a policy decision had been made 
by the central body of the party that policy was to command 
unquestioning obedience by all its members. More than any 
other element in Lenin’s thought his ideas on party organisation 
were opposed by Western revolutionaries, for, as Rosa Luxemburg 
pointed out, such a system of organisation must function to
16. V.I. Lenin, What is to be Done? (Moscow, 1951)? pp.51-2.
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produce a dictatorship within the party whereby the central
committee dominated the rank and file, and, when the
revolution had succeeded, the whole party dominated the
1 7proletarian masses. Such a course of events was anathema 
to the whole Western Marxist tradition but the death of 
Liebknecht and Luxemburg in 1919 deprived Western revolutionaries 
of any really formidable spokesmen to oppose the ideas emanating 
from Moscow. Though considerable (if less explicit and 
compelling) opposition to the organisational aspects of 
Leninism continued long after the demise of the German 
Spartakists, even by the Second Congress of the Third 
International the prestige of Bolshevism, and above all, its 
imprint of success ensured that that body would be organised
along Russian lines. The Second Congress of the Comintern, 
meeting in Moscow in 1920 adopted a set of twenty-one conditions 
as prerequisites for membership which included the provision 
that every affiliate would adopt democratic centralism: 
consequently making of the Third International a gigantic model 
of the Russian party, directed by an Executive Committee between 
world congresses; with decisions binding on all member parties
17. See Rosa Luxemburg, The Russian Revolution and Leninism 
or Marxism? (Michigan, 1 961) , p . 8 8 . This book contains 
Luxemburg's original criticism of Lenin's conception of a 
revolutionary party (which was published simultaneously in 
Iskra and in Die Neue Zeit in 1904) and some comments she 
made on the Russian Revolution written while she was in a 
German prison in 1918. She saw Lenin as having achieved a 
dictatorship of the minority - rather than the dictatorship 
of the majority, which was the Marxist conception of 
proletarian rule.
Luxemburg also expressed apprehension that the divorce 
between Lenin's closely organised and rigidly disciplined 
revolutionaries and the masses could lead to them sacrificing 
the interests of the international proletariat to the 
interests of the Russian state. She regarded the Comintern 
set up in 1919 as a possible disaster for the future of 
socialism because of the likelihood that in the circumstances 
it would fall under the domination of Russian Communism: 
it would be, she felt, both elitist and prone to particular 
national interests. She attempted to postpone the creation 
of a Communist International until mass parties were ready 
to affiliate and offset the Bolshevik influence.
For a full coverage of Luxemburg's ideas see J.P.Nettl, 
Rosa Luxemburg, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1966). Paul Frölich's 
Rosa Luxemburg is a somewhat more personal account by an old 
admirer and co-founder of the Bremen Arbeiter-Politik.
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and their members. The Russian Commissar and secretary of 
the Comintern Gregori Zinoviev explained of the measures being 
pressed on the Communist International at its 1920 congress 
that they were designed to make it into "the General Staff of 
the International Proletarian Army.... united, disciplined,
centralised, international fighting organization,... ["suitable"] 
to fulfil its great historic task”.
Incorporated into the decisions of the 1920 Comintern
congress was the pamphlet, Left Wing Communism, an Infantile
Disorder in which Lenin summarised his experiences and ideas
about party organisation, strategy, and tactics for the benefit
of his Western comrades. He argued that the aim of all
Communists was the creation of an international Soviet republic
and that in developed Europe as much as backward Russia the
Bolshevik type of party organisation was the model to be used
in attaining their goal. Communists should also equip themselves
with the correct doctrine and outlook, as well as the correct
party organisation, and they could do this by close study of
the doctrines, and especially the practical history, of
Bolshevism: "which in wealth of experience has no equal anywhere
1 9else in the world". This would teach them to eschew, not only 
opportunism but also the romanticism and the ’infantile disorder 
of Leftism’ presently afflicting some of the doctrinaire recruits 
of the Western world. In Germany and Britain there had emerged 
groups professing Communism who had become so concerned with the 
iniquity of all other socialists and bourgeois parties and 
institutions that they refused to work with them, and isolated 
themselves to propaganda activity and profession of ’pure’ 
principles. "It is a wonder", commented Lenin of these 
sectarian ’no compromise’ followers that the Comintern had 
attracted
that, holding... J^their^ views, these Lefts do not 
emphatically condemn Bolshevism! For... the whole 
history of Bolshevism both before and after the October 
Revolution, is full of instances of manoeuvring,
18. Communist International, June-July 1920, col.2262.
19- V.I. Lenin, " ’Left-wing’ Communism, An Infantile Disorder", 
in Selected Works (Moscow, 1952), Vol.2, Pt.2, p.3^-6.
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temporizing and compromising with other parties, 
bourgeois parties included I
In Lenin’s view the mere propagation of the truths of Communism
was a very inadequate preparation for revolution; it was also
necessary to infiltrate into all working class organisations,
manoeuvre, compromise and on occasions even collaborate with
other political forces. Communists had to mix their principles
with ’the political instinct necessary for the speedy and
21correct solution of intricate problems”; they had to decide
their revolutionary strategy and tactics always in the light of
short and long term, local and world-wide considerations of
political power. An urgent task in 1920, for example, was to
gain wider support from the working class, especially in the
trade unions. The old trade union leaders might make this task
as difficult and unpleasant as possible, but "[Communists^ must
be able to withstand all this, to agree to all and every
sacrifice, and even - if need be - to resort to various
stratagems, artifices, illegal methods, to evasions and
subterfuges, only so as to get into the trade unions, to remain
in them, and to carry on communist work within them at all 
22costs". In short, Communists all over the world had to
commit themselves not only to the ideas of Bolshevism but also 
to a very political, and power-oriented, and sometimes apparently 
unscrupulous movement.
ii. Bolshevism and socialism, 1918-21
In their early attempts to explain Russia’s red 
October Australian socialists and labour journalists placed 
great stress on the rise to power of the Soviets, and paid 
little attention to the Bolshevik party as such. Maurice 
Blackburn reflected this viewpoint in his 1918 pamphlet 
Bolshevism; What The Russian Workers Are Doing wherein he 
portrayed the Bolsheviks as tribunes of a truly working class
20. Ibid., p.395.
21. Ibid., p.394.
22. Ibid., p.379.
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revolution who were handing the power of economic and political
23self-government over to the workers themselves. Blackburn 
saw Bolshevism as an attempt to prompt the Russian proletariat 
towards a real social democracy, with worker control in industry, 
and political and economic power vested in an interrelated 
system of local and national Soviets. The pamphlet was an 
attempt to see through the veil of wartime censorship the 
essence of what the Russian Revolution had achieved, and was 
a fair analysis of developments, given the syndicalist and 
worker control imagery of Bolshevik decrees and Lenin’s own 
writings at this period. But more significantly Blackburn’s 
pamphlet reflected the extent to which Bolshevism was conceived 
as squarely in the centre of mainstream trends in working class 
thought, and it was on such an understanding that labour 
solidarity and affinity with Bolshevism was to proceed.
Bolshevism was also seen at first as the heir to
the Zimmerwald tradition. Throughout 1917 labour in Australia
had thrilled to the calls of the Moscow and Petrograd Soviets
for the convening of the Stockholm Conference of the socialist
movement to push forward the belligerent nations to a negotiated 
2kpeace, and it was taken for granted that Bolshevism would
23. M. Blackburn, Bolshevism: What The Russian Workers Are 
Doing (Melb., 1918).
2k. Throughout 1917 the call for a general socialist congress 
in Stockholm was a continuing demand of the Zimmerwald 
movement. In the event the congress never took place and 
only a gathering of militant anti-war socialists (known 
as the Third Zimmerwald Conference) similar to the earlier 
meetings at Zimmerwald and Kienthal was held. Unbeknown 
to Australian socialists Lenin was throughout 1917 
conspiring to break away from the Zimmerwald movement those 
whom he termed Left Zimmerwaldians and who for various 
(mostly non-Leninist) reasons favoured breaking with the 
remnants of the Second International. Some few members 
of this group participated in the foundation conference 
of the Comintern in 1919» though the representative of 
the only significant Left Zimmerwaldian group (the 
Spartakists) at this congress had been sent to Moscow with 
explicit instructions to oppose the formation of Lenin’s 
International. For an account of the tortuous course of 
proletarian internationalism during this period see 
Braunthal, op. cit., Vol.2, Ch.3.
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strive also for the agreed upon anti-war policies that the
25Second International had formulated. In early 1918 the
V.S.P. held a ballot to elect a delegate to represent the
Australian socialist movement at Petrograd, selecting a
Melbourne barrister A.W. Foster over Frank Anstey M.P. The
Federal Government’s refusal to allow such a delegate to leave
Australia finally vetoed this scheme, but for a time it raised
some support throughout the labour movement. A socialist
delegate in Petrograd, the V.S.P. had argued, "would be able
to gather information and to get the correct workingclass
view and interpretation of happenings of the Revolution"; he
would at the same time facilitate Australian participation
"in any working class peace gatherings and conferences which2 6may eventuate". It was thought likely that the Bolsheviks 
might help to call together the long awaited Stockholm 
Conference and organise a new International out of those 
socialists who were working for peace; when this occurred, 
Australian labour would be there.
The labour movement’s misreading of the Bolshevik 
position was understandable and in no way surprising. For 
apart from the problem of obtaining reliable information from
P 7Russia, local Bolshevik spokesmen amongst the Russian emigres
25. Socialist, Jan.11, 1918, p.1.
26. Socialist, Mar.22, 1918, p.2.
27. The Russian emigres in Australia were mostly refugees from 
the 1905 Revolution. In all they probably numbered some 
several thousand and established Russian Associations in 
Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane; as well as settling 
throughout northern Queensland, and at Broken Hill. 
Bolshevism became an influence in the affairs of the 
emigre community after the arrival in Brisbane of F.A. 
Sergeiev (better known as Artem) about 1911» Artem 
organised the Russian Workers’ Association and published 
several Bolshevik newspapers including Izvestia. He also 
played a role in local union affairs and was a prominent 
member of the A.S.P. In May 1917 he returned to Russia and 
became a member of the C.E.C. and a Commissar. Some of 
Artem’s associates in Brisbane who also returned to Russia 
in 1917 later achieved some prominence. These included 
Ubolov who was a Soviet Consular official killed in the 
Canton Commune uprising in December 1927. Artem's successor 
as leader of the Russian Workers' Association, P. Simonoff, 
continued to work closely with local labour organisations.
In 1919 he placed the newly established Russian Workers’ 
Association newspaper Knowledge and Unity at the disposal of
the Queensland Socialist League, and in 1921 it became the 
organ of the Brisbane branch of the C.P.A.
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at first openly encouraged this moderate interpretation of
what the October Revolution was about. The most important
of these spokesmen was Peter Simonoff who in early 1918 "was
appointed Bolshevik Consul-General, and became closely involved
with the V.S.P. and other socialist parties in an unsuccessful
campaign to obtain official recognition for his position from
the Australian government. Simonoff throughout 1918 agreed
completely with the prevailing socialist interpretation of
Bolshevism, stressing only the need for labour to unify its
ranks and achieve power in order to assist the Russian working
2 8class and the world revolution. He also edited a newspaper
Knowledge and Unity which as well as celebrating the Russian
Revolution became a propaganda organ for the One Big Union.
"In Australia", the paper announced, "the immediate necessity
29is to push the One Big Union scheme through to completion".
In these circumstances the October Revolution gave
a tremendous fillip to the pre-existing radical philosophy in
the labour movement. Left-wing agitators saw their aims as
twofold: to build up the O.B.U. movement, and to defend the
achievements of Bolshevism. Following the demise of the I.W.W.
for most militants this meant working within the trade unions
and the A.L.P. in which they had already assumed positions of
power and influence. There was a problem here, for the decision
to draw inspiration from the Bolshevik Revolution for increased
activity in the A.L.P. found no support in the Leninist texts,
30which were slowly beginning to appear in the socialist press.
It was clear that there was here a basis for a rift between 
militants who might want to study seriously and follow closely 
the example set by Bolshevism and the advocates of V.S.P.-S.D.L. 
policies who saw the developments of 1917 as having provided 
increased incentive for their usual political behaviour. A 
split between the V .S .P .-S.D .Ls and Bolshevism was however 
staved off for a time by the complete absorption of socialists
28. Socialist, June 21, 1918, p.4.
29. Knowledge and Unity, Jan.20, 1919, p .1 .
30. See for example I .S ., Dec.1, 1917, p.^; May 25, 1918, p.1.
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with the course of events in Europe and Russia as the Great 
War drew to a close, and the excited movements towards unity 
which swept through all Australian socialist groups in 1918 
and 1919.
Towards the end of 1918 Australian socialists turned 
their attention to Europe where they had always supposed 
working-class revolution would break out. With revolution and 
unrest rampant in Germany Liebknecht and Luxemburg began to 
edge out Lenin and Trotsky as heroes of the left-wing press; 
and the picture of a crumbling Europe and its potential for
31socialism jostled beside the achievements of Bolshevik Russia.
Capitalism at last seemed under threat and in a state of
imminent worldwide crisis. This outlook was encouraged by
the Federal government's repressive use of the War Precautions
Act throughout 1918 against left-wing spokesmen and prominent
Russians such as Peter Simonoff. In labour's struggles to
defend local Bolshevik representatives; to promote displays of
solidarity with the workers of Europe through the flying of
the red flag, and later to develop a large scale Hands Off
Russia campaign, a rare degree of unity was forged amongst
disparate socialist groups and left-wing unionists. In the
campaign against intervention in Russia, for example, the
V.S.P. cooperated with parties and groups as diverse as the
A.L.P., the Melbourne T.H.C., the W.I.I.U. and the A.S.P.^
At this time too the old schemes of re-uniting all socialist
parties throughout Australia came to be revived and by 1919
a series of talks were underway between left-wing bodies aimed
33at achieving this end.
Throughout 1919 however the left was also coming
closer to grips with the message of Bolshevism, and disunity
was the result. Still no clear understanding of Leninism had
emerged, but it seemed increasingly obvious that the Bolsheviks
counselled total opposition to 'Menshevik' parties such as the
34A.L.P. The first left-wing groups to suffer from this
31. See for example Socialist, Jan.10, 1919» p .2; People,
Feb.1, 1919, p .2.
32. V.S.P. Minutes, July 9, 1919-
33. Socialist, Nov.15, 1918, p.3; S.D., June 7, 1918, p.1.
34. I.S., June 7 , 1919, p.1; Nov.22, 1919, p.1; Socialist, Oct.3, 
1919, P-2*.
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realisation were the Social Democratic Leagues, for it acted
as a spur to resentment and impatience with the A.L.P. which
had been building up after the opposition of many Labor
politicians to the Perth Conference resolutions on peace in
1918.'^ Already by late 1918 the Adelaide S.D.L. had turned
its political allegiance to the A.S.P., and early in 1919
reconstituted itself as a branch of that party. At the same
time the Sydney S.D.L. presaged a similar move towards the
left with its Manifesto - To the Class Conscious of the
Proletariat in which it announced its aim was to achieve a
united industrial movement and a ’political reflex’ of this
movement in the form of a party which would work to abolish
itself and parliament and substitute a system of syndicalism
based on worker control.^ The manifesto declared this
objective to be "identical with that of the Bolshevik movement
37in Russia and the Spartacus movement in Germany". When
attempts to convert the N.S.W. A.L.P. to this position were
defeated in June 1919 the Sydney S.D.L. joined with the N.S.W.
Labor Party breakaways (who had meanwhile formed themselves
into the Socialist Party of Australia) and the S.L.P. and
A.S.P. in talks aimed at creating a united socialist political
party to oppose Labor at the December 1919 Federal elections.
Some S.D.L. members joined the Industrial Socialist Labor
Party formed by S.P.A. members in the course of these talks;
others joined the A.S.P., the S.L.P., or the W.I.I.U. By 1920
the S.D.L. itself had disappeared.
Meanwhile the forces which had split the S.D.Ls had
brought turmoil also to the affairs of the V.S.P. In August
1919 J. Maruschak, a Y.S.P. member also prominent in the
Russian Association, suggested that unity in the socialist
movement could best be achieved by a joint affiliation of all
3 Sparties and groupings with the Third International. Maruschak
35. Following the Perth Conference a number of N.S.W. Labor 
Party politicians campaigned against the peace ballot on 
the grounds that adoption of the conference decisions would 
amount to desertion of the Allied cause.
36. [S.D.L.]], Manifesto - To the Class Conscious of the 
Proletariat (Syd., 1919)»
37. Ibid.
38. Socialist, Aug.15, 1919, p.2.
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had long pressed for publication through the V.S.P. of
39Bolshevik propaganda including the Soviet Constitution.
In March 1919 he and another Communist C. France were elected 
to the V.S.P. executive, and with the support of L. Bakker 
(who seems to have been mainly inspired towards anti-political 
industrial unionism) and L. Aarons (who had long advocated a 
break with the A.L.P. and the launching of a de Leonite style 
socialist party) they set about questioning and trying to 
alter the V.S.P.'s name and policy. After some initial 
sparring with the V.S.P. leadership, in January 1920 Maruschak 
succeeded in having passed at a special general meeting of the 
party a resolution that committed the V.S.P. to the "esta­
blishment of a Socialist Communism" by means of "revolutionary
politics", and reorganisation as a Communist Party and a member
40of the Third International. However two weeks later a
larger special general meeting amended Maruschak's motion to
make it meaningless, and in February 1920 France, Maruschak,
and Bakker were voted off the executive. As the party general
secretary R.S. Ross observed of his victory "obviously the big
majority of the membership is in favour of old and proved ways 
41and men".
42R.S. Ross and a young V.S.P. organiser Don Cameron
emerged as the leading advocates of the V.S.P. majority
viewpoint in early 1920. They were vigorously opposed to
the idea that the A.L.P. could not be captured by the left
or that it was somehow necessarily doomed by history, and
they pointed out that exactly the same arguments had been
used by embittered radicals who had attacked the A.L.P. and
the V.S.P. before the war and had spilt out of those movements
to form politically insignificant sects like the S.L.P. and 
43the A.S.P. At the same time the V.S.P. leadership accepted
39* Among other Bolshevik documents published by the V.S.P. was 
The New Communist Manifesto of "The Third Internationale" 
(Bolshevist and Left Wing Socialists) (Melb., 1919)
40. V.S.P. Minutes, Jan.14, 1920.
41 . Socialist, Mar.5» 1920, p.3.
42. Cameron had earlier been a member of the S.D.L. in Western 
Australia who had taken up his position as V.S.P. organiser 
in 1919.
43. Socialist, June 11, 1920, p.3.
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that the political challenge they and the whole labour movement 
faced involved much more than just hostility borne of frustra­
tions and setbacks in existing labour organisations. The 
Bolshevik revolution, Ross observed, had affected militants in 
Australia so profoundly that in regard to a whole new ideology
44"advocacy has already taken the place of inquiry". In the 
debates, recriminations, and discussions that followed the 
first bid of the Communists to capture the V.S.P. Ross attempted 
an Australian synthesis of the Labor tradition, the ideas of 
industrial unionism and worker control symbolised in the O.B.U. 
plan, and the stirring environment provided by Bolshevik 
revolution and new Soviet interpretations of old socialist 
texts.
In a series of lectures and articles, and in an
important book Revolution in Russia and Australia, Ross
critically examined and assessed the relevance to Australian
conditions of Leninism and the Soviet system as it had developed
up to 1920. He accepted the Leninist thesis that the turmoil of
imperialist war and creation of a Soviet challenge to capitalism
had prompted a world crisis, and many of the ideas which Ross
put forward for future developments in Australia were premised
on this idea. However, he added,
I do... ask assent to the claim that Australia’s share 
in the sensational situation in Europe can be little 
more than as a spectator. What is to happen in the lands 
of Europe, and in other lands like Egypt and India and 
Mexico, will happen outside of and apart from us of the 
Commonwealth of Australia. It is this conclusion that 
has led me to also conclude that on present signs this 
island continent of ours is not a revolutionary arena 
in the sense that Russia is and that Germany nearly is, 
and that France, Italy and England may be.^5
In addition to this qualification as to the practical possibility
of inaugurating socialism after the Bolshevik model Ross examined
a number of features of the Russian situation that were
profoundly unsatisfactory, such as a dictatorship of the
proletariat that had all the features of a real despotism
and was quite different from what Marx had meant, and the
44. Revolution in Russia and Australia (Melb., 1920), p.5.
45. Ibid., p .9 .
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backward conditions of life in Russia that seemed to call 
forth many twists to Marxist ideas that were "somewhat
46£different^j to our English-speaking order of deduction".
The conclusion Ross drew from his critical examination of
Bolshevism was that although "for Russia, or for everywhere
in a violent revolution,.... the Soviet scheme must be crowned
47lord of all" the radically different Australian political 
environment, the high standard of material development, and the 
already evolved labour organisations meant that "our own 
industrial and Parliamentary machinery can be more rapidly 
altered or used to ensure reconstruction towards emancipation
48than beginning anew on Russian lines".
On the question of the Internationals Ross denied 
the Leninist contention that socialist change could only work 
itself out from Russia via universal civil war championed by 
doctrinaire revolutionary movements. As a representative of 
that strand of thought dismissed by Lenin as ’social pacifist’ 
he complained at the complete failure of Bolshevik leaders to 
recognise such socialists as a political force and distinguish 
them from those who had actually betrayed socialism and 
supported their governments during World War One. The forming 
of a Third International was understandable as a "protest 
against the inactivity and the apostacy of the Second Interna­
tional during the war" but the dogmatic requirements for 
membership as revealed by the British Independent Labour Party
questions and answers submitted to the Soviet government proved
49disturbing and repellent to V.S.P. ideology. To Ross any
such proletarian movement "in seeking emancipation via
50militarisation, will get - militarism".
The task Ross set for socialists in Australia was 
to forge a unified working class behind the O.B.U. and the 
A.L.P. This would be the easiest road to socialism, he 
argued, because it was precisely the Labor Movement’s
46. Ibid., p .29.
47. Ibid., p.7.
48. Ibid., p.45.
49. See V.S.P. Minutes, Oct.25, 1920; Socialist, April 8, 
1921 , p . 4 .
50. Socialist, June 24, 1921 , p.1 .
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championing of democratic rights and improved standards of
life that had so altered the Australian environment as to
51make Bolshevism inapplicable. In a time of world crisis 
the working class would naturally rally to Labor and socialists 
in Australia could quickly and most effectively move towards 
the new epoch symbolised by Russia’s red October by making 
"the industrial ’immediate aim’ the One Big Union and the 
political ’immediate aim’ nationalisation, with the further 
aim of blending them as the State on the day of the conquest 
of power by the working class, with Lenins on hand to dare 
and do”.
The V.S.P. programme outlined by Ross proved
extremely attractive to the trade union movement and provided
a guiding philosophy for the All-Australian Trade Union Congress
which met in Melbourne in 1921 to lay down a socialist objective
for the A.L.P. His ideas however did not satisfy the pro-
Communist elements in the V.S.P., who had decided that the
Bolshevik formula for social revolution was literally applicable
to Australian conditions, and who claimed they were willing to
import the entire Leninist theory into the local socialist
movement. "I do not see any difference at all ^between Russia
and Australia^, J. Maruschak wrote in reply to Ross, "unless it
be one of degree only, and there cannot be any difference of
53kind under the same capitalist system”. The V.S.P. Communists
joined forces with a group of young aspiring revolutionaries
who were organised around the Melbourne Labor College and
Andrade’s Bookshop to engage the V.S.P. leadership in public54debate. They also obtained the support of Peter Simonoff 
who labelled Ross and his followers "The Eunuchs of Also- 
Marxism". In September 1920 J. Maruschak and another Communist 
C .¥. Baker obtained seats on the V.S.P. executive and that same
51. Ross, op. cit., p.46.
52. Ibid., p.49.
53. Socialist, April 9» 1920. Cf. P.J. O ’Farrell: "The Russian 
Revolution and the Labour Movements of Australia and New 
Zealand, 1917-22", in International Review of Social History, 
Vol.8, 1963, p.189.
54. Socialist, May 14, 1920, p.3.
55. Industrial Solidarity (Melb.), Feb.7, 1920, p.3.
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month, attempted once again to have the V.S.P. constitute 
itself a Communist Party. Once again however a majority of 
V.S.P. members rallied to the old leadership and Maruschak's 
motion for Communism and the Third International was defeated. 
The Melbourne Communists thereafter focussed their attention 
on forming a party outside the V.S.P. and when a conference 
met in Sydney in October 1920 to form a Communist Party two 
delegates from Melbourne were in attendance. At that conference 
it became the declared policy of Communists to work in the 
V.S.P. only for the purpose of smashing such a "counter­
revolutionary political party" as the new C.P.A. labelled it. 
This finally elicited a strong reaction from the V.S.P. against 
its insurgent members and by the end of 1920 J. Maruschak’s 
seat on the executive was declared vacant, C.W. Baker was 
expelled from the party after "having declared himself as
being opposed to the Party and in it for the purpose of
56smashing it" and it had been decided
that owing to their declarations of enmity and their 
proclaimed disloyalty to the V.S.P. all such members 
of the Communist Party be ineligible for membership 
of the V.S.P.57
In Sydney the situation was somewhat more favourable
to the formation of a Communist Party. Following the split in
the N.S.W. A.L.P. in mid-1919 the militant socialists who had
been outmanoeuvred and expelled from that party provided a
potential reservoir of left wingers, some of whom were prepared
to toy with full blown Communism. They were a diverse group,
many of them drawn from the leadership of important unions and
the A.L.P., and naturally at home ’boring from within’ but
- unlike the V.S.P. - prevented from doing so. They included
A.C. Willis of the Miners’ Federation: a man strongly influenced
by guild socialist and worker control notions emanating from 
58Britain. Willis joined in the formation of the S.P.A. and
56. V.S.P. Minutes, Dec.2, 1920.
57. Ibid.
58. As general secretary of the Miners’ Federation (renamed in 
1920 the W.I.U. of A. Mining Department) Willis had published 
pamphlets popularising the ideas of G.D.H. Cole and the case
the I.S.L.P., but following the disappointing results of the 
1919 Federal elections began concentrating his efforts on 
getting back into the A.L.P. Other Labor Party breakaways 
such as the ex-Senator Arthur Rae went one step further in 
minority politics by amalgamating the I.S.L.P. into the S.L.P. 
and continuing on with that party for a number of years before 
eventually trying to return to the A.L.P. Others went one 
step further still, and under the influence of the Bolshevik 
myth and more particularly Lenin’s book Left Wing Communism 
attempted the difficult task of forming a local Communist 
Party and re-entering the mainstream organisations of the 
labour movement armed with the precepts of Leninism. But 
the first stop of these ’Trades Hall reds', as they were soon 
to become known, was also in the rather rarefied atmosphere of 
pure de Leonism provided by the S.L.P.
The S.L.P. had been least affected of all left-wing
groups by the Bolshevik revolution. Over the years it had
developed an orthodox Marxist-de Leonist view of the world,
and Bolshevism did little to shake it from this ideological
stance. The S.L.P. was dominated by E.E. Judd, an able but
doctrinaire disciple of de Leon, who saw the American S.L.P.
as the fount of all wisdom on questions of socialism. He
echoed the views of Arnold Petersen (who had succeeded de
Leon as National Secretary of the American S.L.P. upon the
latter’s death in 1 91 M  that Bolshevik Russia presented ’’one
59of the saddest spectacles in human history”. In Petersen's 
view the Bolsheviks deserved praise for their determined 
opposition to the first world war, but it was deemed a tragedy 
that they had been led by circumstances to seize power in 
such a backward land as Russia. The only thing that could 
save Bolshevism was socialist revolution in the leading 
capitalist countries whereby it would be ’’reasonable to suppose
65.
59.
for guild socialism. The striking resemblance of 
contemporary British thinking on questions of worker control 
and guild socialism meant that these ideas were widely 
discussed. However there was little interest in British 
ideas as coherent programmes in themselves, and ’worker 
control’ derived its main inspiration from left-wing one big 
union theorists spurred on by the thought of what had been 
achieved in Russia.
People, Feb.7) 1918» p.1.
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that countries such as Russia may finish their economic 
development under a general world regime of Socialism, and 
with the aid of the workers in the various countries"
But for this to occur it would be necessary for the working 
class of advanced countries to organise themselves into the 
one big union which could take and hold the means of production. 
Without such organisation, the S.L.P. argued, nothing positive
61could be achieved in Russia or anywhere else.
As a result of this outlook the S.L.P. continued
to concentrate its propaganda on promoting the one big union
idea. The S.L.P. refused to endorse any aspects of the
Bolshevik creed which diverged from de Leonist orthodoxy and
party propaganda over events in Russia tended to assume a
patronising air. The Bolsheviks were praised for their mastery
of political tactics in the Russian situation, but at the same
time great play was made of Lenin’s alleged indebtedness to de
Leonism in formulating plans for oganising the Russian workers
into a system of industrial unionism (through the Soviets)
after the capture of political power had been achieved.
In 1919 the S.L.P. published a pamphlet called Constructive63Revolution by S.F. Friedum which was hailed as an attempt
at "giving substance to the spirit of class consciousness
64that was awakened by the Russian Revolution". Friedum damned 
with faint praise the Bolshevik efforts to overcome the collapse 
of industry which had followed their assumption of power through 
political action alone, and she called on the Western working 
class to avoid the period of anarchy that Bolshevism had brought 
in train by organising into industrial unions - which would 
form the only basis for positive achievements in a revolutionary 
situation. The language was circumlocutory but the total 
message was clear: the experience of the Russian Revolution
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.; J~A.S.P.], Political Power - "Shield" or "Dictator­
ship". Judd-Reardon Debate. S.L.P. vs A.S.P. (Syd.,
1920), p.23.
62. R.S., Aug.1, 1920, p.3; Dec.18, 1920, p.3.
63. S.F. Friedum, Constructive Revolution: the Russian Revolution 
and Socialist Industrial U n i o n i s m (Syd., 1 9 1 9 ) . Thisessay 
had first appeared as an article in a magazine published by 
the American W.I.I.U.
64. R.S., Feb.1, 1920, p.3.
taught the workers how not to go about making socialism in
67.
countries like America and Australia. When the formation of
the Third International was announced the S.L.P.’s paper the
Revolutionary Socialist echoed the American S,L.P .-W.I .I.U.
view that the sign-post and criterion of the new organisation’s
potential would be the degree to which it supported the concept
65of socialist industrial unionism.
Within the S.L.P. opposition to this doctrinaire
attitude towards Bolshevism crystallised around J.S. Garden
following amalgamation with the I.S.L.P. in early 1920. Garden
had worked closely with Judd in formulating the official One
Big Union scheme, but in common with Willis and other S.P.A.-
I.S.L.P. members had insisted on wider scope for political
action in the proposed scheme than strict application of de
Leonism would have prescribed. At the same time he had forged
close links with a number of outspoken enthusiasts of Bolshevism
including Peter Simonoff and W.P. Earsman of the Labor College
66movement. Throughout 1920 Garden joined with Earsman in
forming a secret Communist Party which worked in the trade
unions promoting Bolshevik doctrines aimed at ’white-anting’
right-wing union leaders. Garden at first saw this party as
a tool for militant socialists to employ against opponents of
the O.B.U., but he was also increasingly impressed by the
possibilities of a regular general staff-type organisation and
while still operating secretly the party extended its membership
to include other S.L.P. members, the ex-Wobbly leader Tom Glynn
68and some of the pro-Communists operating in Melbourne. By
65. R.S., Sept.1, 1919, p .3.
66. Earsman was a prominent member of the Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers who in 1917 was a co-founder (along with Guido 
Baracchi, Maurice Blackburn and Frank Hyett) of the Labor 
College established by the Victorian Railways Union. Later 
the Labor College movement attracted support from Trades 
Hall Councils in Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane. The aim
of this movement was to impart Marxist and ’independent 
working class education’ to the masses, in opposition to 
W.E.A.-type education which was alleged to have a pro­
capitalist bias. In 1919 Earsman moved to Sydney where he 
worked with Garden in establishing a Labor College under 
the auspices of the N.S.W. Labor Council. Other leading 
personalities in the Sydney Labor College included Miss 
C. Jolly Smith (later solicitor for the C.P.A.).
67. Communist, May 20, 1921, p.5; Sept.23, 1921, p.6.
68. Ibid.
September 1920 the new party’s ’Central Executive’ had issued 
a manifesto announcing that a conference would soon be called69"to consolidate our forces and activities". The A.S.P. 
responded by adopting the secret Communist Party’s manifesto 
and inviting its authors to a unity conference on 30th October 
to inaugurate an official C.P.A. Judd on the other hand was 
not so pleased. When he discovered that a number of S.L.P. 
branches had joined the new C.P.A. he had Garden expelled 
for having "conspired with persons outside the organisation 
for the purpose of forming a party with a policy contrary to 
the interests of the working class and the principles of the 
S.L.P___ "7°
68.
From the start A.S.P. members had responded eagerly 
to the Russian Revolution. The party contained within it a 
number of ideological tendencies stressing either industrialist 
or political socialism. There were ex-Wobblies and sectarian 
de Leonists in the party who generally favoured the theories 
of industrial unionism which inspired the W.I.I.U. On the 
other hand there were also more orthodox Marxists who saw 
themselves as the vanguard party of the working class whose 
duty it was to lead the revolution in Australia. In early 
1917 a number of A.S.P. members who sought to work through 
the Labor Party had helped found the S.D.L. in Sydney; and 
those who had remained behind in the A.S.P. as advocates of 
political socialism were sectarian and doctrinaire: still 
hoping that their party could itself replace the A.L.P. as 
a mass party, but reluctant to sacrifice revolutionary purity 
to cooperation with reformist or less rigidly Marxist sectors 
of the broader labour movement. Both the industrialist- 
oriented and the pro-political groups in the A.S.P. saw in 
Bolshevism a potential solution to the dilemnas that their 
various revolutionary formulas contained. Each group sought 
to refract the experiences of Russia’s red October onto the 
causes dear to their heart and so light the path that their 
small party was to follow.
69. See I .S ., Oct.2, 1920, p.1. 
7°. R.S■, Nov.6, 1920, p.2.
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First in the field were the exponents of industrial
socialism who saw the revolution in Russia as endorsing the
programme of the W.I.I.U. Like other left-wing unionists, the
A.S.P. industrialists were particularly impressed by the widely
publicised Soviet government decrees of November, 1917» which
71had turned over control of industry to the workers therein.
This act seemed to blend in well with the W.I.I.U’s own notions
of worker control, which stressed shop floor management of the
one big union movement and sought to motivate the working class
72to assume rank and file leadership of industrial unionism.
In early 1918, J.B. Scott, a prominent figure in the A.S.P. and
<yr>in the No.2 (Melbourne) Local of the W.I.I.U. J announced that
what had clearly emerged as the critical factor in the success
of Bolshevism was not the revolutionary party itself but the
Russian workers1 Soviets: "that class conscious industrial army
74forcing the pressure". It was through the strength of this
economic organisation, Scott argued, that the Bolsheviks were
able to overthrow capitalism and establish "THE INDUSTRIAL
REPUBLIC OF LABOUR";75 it followed that the first duty of those
who sought to emulate the Russian workers’ achievement was to
establish such a revolutionary unionism in Australia. Scott
was joined by two other Melbourne W.I.I.U. militants - J.A.
Dawson and W. Harris - in writing a rambling pro-industrialist
account of developments in Russia which dominated the pages of
the International Socialist throughout 1918. After carrying
the 1918 A.S.P. annual conference to the industrialist viewpoint,
Scott and his followers assumed leadership of the W.I.I.U.
movement, throwing themselves into developing it as the main
76moving force in the overthrow of capitalism.'
71. See I.S., July 27, 1918, p.3.
72. I.S., Sept. 28, 1918, p.1.
73. No.1 Local had been established at Newtown (Sydney) in 
1916. By 1920 there were over a dozen Locals spread 
throughout N.S.W., Victoria, South Australia, and Western 
Australia.
74. I.S. , Mar. 23, 1918, p.1.
75. Ibid.
76. I.S., April 13, 1918, p.3.
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In Sydney however the success of the official O.B.U. 
movement completely overshadowed A.S.P. efforts towards 
industrial organisation of the workers and the No.1 Local of 
the W.I.I.U. failed to prosper. Increasingly too the pro­
political faction within the A.S.P, was dissatisfied with the 
essentially syndicalist and de Leonist assimilation of 
Bolshevism which had been attempted by the Melbourne W.I.I.U.
In February 1919 the A.S.P. general secretary A.S. Reardon 
launched an attack on the Scott-Dawson-Harris interpretation 
of the Bolshevik revolution in the International Socialist. 
Reardon set out "to justify the existence of the A.S.P., not 
merely as a ’shield1 for an Industrial Organisation, but as
the essential Revolutionary Organisation", basing his argument
77on the Communist Manifesto and available Leninist texts.
J.A. Dawson, who replied to Reardon on behalf of the
industrialists, sought to argue along S.L.P. lines that the
Russian experience pointed to the necessity of developing a
strong industrial unionism in order to achieve anything positive
78in the process of socialist revolution. But it was soon made
clear in the course of debate that it did not really matter
what the experience of the Russian Revolution was, the Melbourne
militants were for the moment at least busy ’building the new
society within the shell of the old’ by their activities in the
W.I.I.U., and had no time for Reardon’s "mass of abstractions
based on false premises.... £thatj] are confusing to the minds
79of the workers". As the debate progressed the Melbourne
W.I.I.U. repudiated the A.S.P., Dawson announcing that like
all political parties it was "a dead hand upon the industrial
80nucleus of £the workers’^] necessary economic organisation".
The W.I.I.U. from this time onward recognised no allegiance to
any political party though it acknowledged that Judd’s S.L.P.
stood very close to it ideologically and recommended that its
81followers consider their position in relation to that party.
77. I.s., Feb.22, 1919, p.1; Mar.15, 1919, p.3.
78. I.S., May 17, 1919, p.3.
79. Ibid.; Mar.15, 1919, p.3; April 19, 1919, p.3.
80. I .S ., Mar.3, 1919. Cf. Turner, Industrial Labour and 
Politics, p.187.
81. See for example [^W.I.I.U.], The New Democracy and the 
State (Melb., 1919), pp.110-116.
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Free of its pro-industrialist wing the A.S.P. moved
closer towards contemporary Communism. Following its December
1919 Conference the A.S.P. issued a manifesto entitled
Australia and the World Revolution announcing the party’s
allegiance to the Comintern and determination to achieve as
quickly as possible a dictatorship of the proletariat in 
82Australia. Based largely on the Third International’s New
Q OCommunist Manifesto and the American Minority Manifesto 
the A.S.P. programme stressed the immediacy of the world crisis 
facing the capitalist system and the need for a strong and 
doctrinally pure vanguard party, which would rally the Australian 
proletariat behind the banner of international Communism. 
Repeating the Leninist dictum that the Great War had ushered 
in an era of world-wide capitalist militarism and repression, 
the manifesto declared reformism was a chimera, and that the 
primary road to power was through organised mass action 
culminating in the formation of a proletarian state. In order 
to achieve the desired organisation the A.S.P. throughout 1920 
began a campaign of education and propaganda on behalf of the 
Third International; and when it was discovered the Garden- 
Earsman Communist Party was also working towards this aim the 
A.S.P. was eager to combine forces with them.
The conference to form a united Communist Party met 
at the A.S.P’s Sydney Branch Hall on the last Saturday of 
October, 1920. The gathering drew together all the significant 
pro-Communist groupings that had emerged by that date. Tom 
Glynn, a member of the famous I.W.W. Twelve, attended the 
conference as a representative of a number of ex-Wobblies 
attracted to Bolshevism by the Comintern’s Special Message...
To the I,¥,W., published in Melbourne a month or so before
82. See fA.S.P.l, Australia and the World Revolution (Syd., 
1920).
83. A foundation document of the American Communist Party 
(established in 1919).
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the conference convened. There were also delegates in
attendance from the Russian Worker’s Association, and a small
group of Queensland socialists was represented by J.G. Cahill
of Brisbane. Two representatives attended the conference
from Melbourne: C.W. Baker of the V.S.P. Communists, and Guido
85Baracchi of the Andrade’s Bookshop coterie. The secretary 
of the Seamen’s Union, Tom Walsh, and his wife Adela Pankhurst 
represented another small left-wing Communist faction, whose 
stance was similar in many respects to that concurrently being gmaintained in Great Britain by Adela’s sister, Sylvia Pankhurst. 
But by far the most important organisations represented at the 
conference were the A.S.P. and the Garden-Earsman Communists. 
Rapid progress was made at the unity conference in amalgamating 
the various factions, and at a rally on Sunday 31st October a 
new and united Communist Party was announced, all groups 
stressing their satisfaction at the spirit of unity and common 
purpose they had discovered under the banner of the Third 
International.^
iii. Australian Communism, 1921-29
By late 1920, then, the basis for an Australia-wide 
Communist Party had been laid. The party’s beginnings had been 
slow and confused, but the official founding of the C.P.A. was 
a significant event, and this for at least two reasons. Firstly,
84. See £c.I.|], To the I.W.W.: A Special Message from the 
Communist International(Melb. , 1 9 2 0 ) . In a foreword to 
this pamphlet Glynn recommended his former associates give 
the message careful attention and went on to state that 
"one proposition in the manifesto which all will endorse is 
that which embraces the idea that the capitalist system is 
marching so rapidly towards utter collapse that the old idea, 
held by the I.W.W., of ’building the new society within the 
shell of the old’, can no longer be maintained".
85. Baracchi was also at this time editor of the Proletarian, 
a Marxist monthly which was later to become the C.P.A.’s 
theoretical journal.
86. This link has been pointed out by Turner, Industrial Labour 
and Politics, p.219. Perhaps a more enduring inspiration 
for the seamen’s stance was the ultra-Marxism of a number of 
ex-members of the Socialist Party of Great Britain combined
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it formalised the beginnings of a process whereby a section 
of the Australian left were to associate their cause totally 
with that of Russia, and to import to the last details the 
principles of Bolshevism, in the belief that the Russian 
experience was valid for the Australian situation. Again, 
the C.P.A. was to develop as a completely new form of 
international socialism by forging organisational links of 
unheard of rigidity with the Comintern in Moscow. At the 
same time however the nascent Communist Party was composed 
of men with a history, and was to some extent an unstable 
amalgum of groups still wedded to the experiences and traditions 
of earlier years. For many early Communists these ideas 
- and the realities of the Australian labour movement - were 
in the last resort more compelling than slavish adaptation to 
the Bolshevik model. As a result the history of the C.P.A. 
throughout the 1920s was marked by a series of crises and 
repudiations by many of its members, and the Bolshevik icon 
grew smaller as it gradually became more pure.
Disputation amongst Communists began within weeks
of the party’s founding conference. Following a struggle for
control of the C.P.A. the A.S.P. in December 1920 withdrew
its members from the party’s Executive Committee alleging
88duplicity by the Garden-Earsman group. By January 1921 
there were two competing Communist parties and two competing 
weekly organs: the A.S.P.Ts International Communist (previously 
the International Socialist); and the Australian Communist, a 
new paper put out by the ’United’ C.P.A. and edited by Tom 
Glynn. The arguments which led up to this state of affairs 
involved clashes of personalities and an unhealthy concern by 
both sides for possession of party property and premises, but 
there were also doctrinal issues of considerable practical 
importance involved. The A.S.P. declared its intention to 
"continue the fight for Communism unfettered by the shackles
with a conviction that earlier pro-A.L.P. leaders of the 
seamen’s union had betrayed the working class to the 
interests of capital.
87. I.S., Nov.6, 1920, pp.2-3.88. The A.S.P. had only three members on the twelve man
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89of opportunism and its devotees”; the C.P.A. replied that 
A.S.P. leaders were inflexible sectarians and devoid of 
Communist discipline. As the debate progressed throughout 
1921 both parties began a scramble for Comintern endorsement 
of the attitudes and positions they were taking up.
For a time in 1921 it seemed possible that the
A.S.P. might win the battle for recognition by the Comintern.
Indeed, Reardon’s letter withdrawing A.S.P. delegates from the
executive of the United Communist Party ended with the confident
announcement that the A.S.P. was in fact already a section of
the Third International, "its Australian mouthpiece, recognised,
90listed and endorsed as such". This mixture of bluff, bluster 
and exaggeration was inspired by three things: a sincere faith 
that the Comintern would stand by its most serious and 
dogmatic adherents; an assurance that the A.S.P. had dedicated 
’friends at Court’ in Moscow in the persons of several ex- 
A.S.P. members including the Russian Central Executive member 
Artem; and the fact that it was already listed as affiliated 
with the Comintern by two influential publications, Boris
Souvarine’s La Troisieme Internationale, and Rajati Palme
91Dutt’s The Two Internationals.^
The A.S.P. had made a genuine attempt to adapt 
itself towards the doctrines emanating from Moscow. The 
Leninist theory of revolutionary seizure of state power through 
a centralised Communist Party elite seemed to justify a stress 
on zeal and doctrinal purity which came naturally to the A.S.P. 
leaders. Following the split with the United Communist Party 
the A.S.P. rationalised its position in these terms. Its 
polemicists included A.S. Reardon and his wife Marcia; A.T. 
Brodney (the secretary of the Sydney Branch of the A.S.P.), 
and Ray Everitt, the editor of the International Communist.
They vigorously attacked the ideological failings of their
provisional C.E.C. while the Garden-Earsman group had six, 
with Earsman as General Secretary.
89. I.C., Jan.1, 1921, p.4.
90. Ibid.
91. B. Souvarine, La Troisieme Internationale (Paris, 1919);
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opponents, alleging that the United Communist Party was 
bereft of sincere Communists now that the A.S.P. had withdrawn. 
It was argued that the policies of Earsman and the United C.P.A. 
in the union movement showed a surfeit of opportunism that
would inevitably lead to economism rather than increased
92revolutionary consciousness amongst the workers. An even 
greater weakness alleged of the United Communist Party was 
its tolerance of ex-Wobblies, and the A.S.P. spelt out bluntly 
the Leninist position towards such groups "that their virility
would certainly be a desirable asset to the Communist Movement,
93but that they are greatly in need of education". Yet despite
its purity of vision the A.S.P. could boast little achievement
beside a small (though well organised) party based in the
94Sydney area. The party's union influence can be judged by 
the fact that even on the N.S.W. Labor Council it had no more 
than four representatives, while its broader influence amongst 
the working class was severely inhibited by the doctrinaire 
approach adopted towards industrial questions. This was not 
of itself so important, for the A.S.P. believed with Lenin 
that capitalism in Europe was at the point of collapse, and 
it was in the era of chaos and turmoil about to descend on 
Australia that the proletariat would warm to the revolutionary 
message. Unfortunately for the A.S.P. however by 1921 Lenin 
himself no longer believed that world revolution was an 
immediate possibility.
The A.S.P. was also confident of Comintern support 
because of the party's close links with the emigres and 
revolutionary enthusiasts who had flocked to Moscow after the 
1917 revolution. The A.S.P. had been the favoured party of 
the most radical Russian emigres and a number of those who 
had returned to their homeland in 1917 had held membership in 
the party. The most important of these Russians was Artem,
R. Palme Dutt, The Two Internationals (London, 1920).
92. I.C., April 16, 1921, p .2.
93. I.C., Feb.5, 1921, p .2.
94. Only the Broken Hill branch of the A.S.P. seems to have 
remained loyal to the Sydney leadership after 1921. Most 
A.S.P. members in other States stayed with the United 
Communist Party once it had been formed.
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by 1919 one of the dozen or so most powerful men in the 
Soviet government. Artem was a keen supporter and an active 
member of the A.S.P. while in Australia. An A.S.P. claim 
that he left Australia in 1917 as its credentialled representa­
tive seems highly implausible, but there is no doubt that he 
remained friendly to the cause of the A.S.P. on his return to 
Russia. It seems possible that it was through information 
supplied by Artem that the A.S.P. appeared as the recognized 
Australian section of the Third International by the author 
Souvarine, and he was a confidant and companion of Paul Freeman: 
an open and enthusiastic champion of the A.S.P., who had arrived 
in Russia in 1920 to attend the Second Congress of the Comintern.
Freeman had been a member of both the A.S.P. and
the Chicago I.W.W. who was deported from Australia in 1919
95for his anti-war activities. He made his way to Russia, 
assisted by anarchist groups in Germany, and presented himself 
at the Second Congress of the Comintern as a delegate of the 
Australian I.W.W., but was refused voting rights as he could 
provide no credentials. Nevertheless he soon attracted 
attention from Bolshevik leaders including Artem, Karl Radek 
and Simon Lozovsky, and he was entrusted with a secret mission 
to Australia in early 1921 to arrange for Australian union 
delegates to go to Moscow to attend the inaugural congress of 
the Red International of Labor Unions (or Profintern) set up 
by the Comintern as a rival to the International Federation of 
Trade Unions. The Comintern believed the I.F.T.U. was acting 
as a brake on the expansion of the world revolution and
95. A man of obscure origins Freeman was probably born to
German parents in America. He arrived in Australia sometime 
before World War One and emerged as a prominent I.W.W. 
speaker during the conscription campaigns. When deported 
from Australia under the War Precautions Act he claimed 
American citizenship, but was prevented from landing in 
that country by U.S. authorities on the grounds that no 
record of his birth could be found. In 1919 he returned 
to Sydney on the Sonoma and news spread to waterside workers 
of his predicament. He became a cause celebre of the 
socialist movement. Large protest meetings were addressed 
by E.E. Judd and P.J. Brookfield M.L.A. and following these 
demonstrations the secretary of the Social Democratic League, 
Vance Marshall, was sentenced to three months hard labour
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96restraining the revolutionary impulses of the workers.
Anticipating the united front policy announced by the Third
Congress of the Comintern later in 1921 however, recruitment
to the first congress of the R.I.L.U. was wide, and some of
97the delegates approached by Freeman were simply militant 
union leaders with no strong ties with either of the Communist 
Parties. The aim was to recruit new followers to Communism 
and demonstrate the viability and correctness of the 
revolutionary outlook.
As a result a diverse group of Australians were
contacted and sent off to attend the first congress of the
R.T.L.U. From Adelaide Freeman recruited the militants F.
Wilkinson and F. Bowers, and whilst in Melbourne he persuaded
W. Smith, then Secretary of the Victorian Railways Union, to
go also. Wilkinson and Bowers had earlier been associated
with the I.W.W., while Smith was a member of the V.S.P. The
Seamen’s Union despatched two ex-Wobblies W. Casey and P.
Kelly as delegates to the R.I.L.U. and subsequent transport
workers meetings, and the N.S.W. Labor Council sent its
President J. Howie (at this stage still a member of the S.L.P.)
to attend. The United C.P.A. was represented by its general
secretary W.P. Earsman. Freeman however invited three A.S.P.
members to go to Moscow: P. Lamb from Broken Hill, and A. Rees
98and J. Quinton from Sydney.
During his stay in Sydney Freeman attempted several 
times to intervene in the disputes between the divided 
Communist parties. The main thrust of his effort was directed 
against the United C.P.A. Throughout March and April 1921 
Freeman exerted pressure on the C.P.A. to agree to unite with
for inciting to riot. Eventually Freeman was deported 
to Germany where he arrived in early 1920.
96. See Communist International, June-July, 1920, col.2122.
97. During his Australian visit in 1921 Freeman was known by 
various names including ’Miller’ and ’Cox’.
98. In the event few delegates managed to arrive in Moscow in 
time for the R.I.L.U. congress and Australia was represented 
by Rees, Earsman and Howie who were accorded voting rights 
of the important second section of the congress (slightly 
behind the voting power of first section countries such as 
England, France, Germany and Russia).
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the A.S.P. on the latter’s terms but was rebuffed. Making
no progress he finally left Australia as a credentialled
representative of the A.S.P. at the Third Congress of the
99Comintern.
Earsman arrived in Moscow ten days ahead of Freeman
and used this lead to cultivate powerful friends for the
United C.P.A. He made friends amongst several visiting
trade union delegations and impressed Kobetsky, Secretary of
the E.C.C.I., who had Earsman appointed to Comintern commissions
on the world economic situation, tactics in Russia, organisation
and trade unions. Earsman used the commissions "to place the
colonial position before these Comrades and by the way to
1 01place Australia on the Revolutionary Map". According to
Earsman he even won Trotsky to his cause, and he succeeded in
obtaining full voting rights for the United C.P.A. at the
Comintern Third Congress. However Earsman’s achievements were
overshadowed by the eventual arrival of Freeman and Lamb, who
1 02with Rees composed the A.S.P. delegation in Moscow.
Following Freeman’s arrival Earsman found there was a hardening 
of attitudes towards him amongst Comintern leaders who were 
open to A.S.P. influence. The A.S.P., it appears, was clearly 
in the ascendant.
Then chance dealt a hand in events and the influence 
of the A.S.P. declined. Soon after the opening of the Third 
Congress of the Comintern Artem was entertaining the three 
A.S.P. delegates when the train in which they were travelling 
crashed, and Artem and Freeman were both killed, while Lamb 
was badly injured. With this sudden development the likelihood 
that the A.S.P. would obtain clear and official recognition 
disappeared and the Comintern called both the A.S.P. delegates 
and the United C.P.A. delegates to an E.C.C.I. meeting chaired
99* See £w.P. Earsman], Report to the CE of the CP (Confidential), 
in Hancock Collection, M.L.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. With the assistance of the Seamen’s Union Rees was 
credentialled to represent the A.S.P. at any Moscow unity 
talks after Quinton was arrested in London and prevented 
from travelling to Russia. The other A.S.P. delegate Lamb 
was also arrested in London whilst returning to Australia 
from Moscow.
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by Michael Borodin who peremptorily ordered them both to 
1 03amalgamate. At the meeting three of the four Australian
delegates voted to accept the decision, only Lamb opposing 
104i t .
When news arrived of the E.C.C.I. decision the 
A.S.P. promptly protested. The A.S.P.’s protest began by 
claiming that up to Freeman’s death the party was "definitely 
affiliated to the Comintern and fully recognized as the 
Australian section" having in Freeman a permanent representa­
tive on the E.C.C.I. "In view of these facts", the Reardon 
Party’s protest continued
We are of the opinion that the attitude of the Small 
Bureau should have been to instruct the group represented 
by Earsman to apply for membership in the already 
affiliated Australian Section. If our viewpoint on this 
matter is held to be incorrect, the Small Bureau will 
perhaps inform us what is to be gained by affiliation 
to the Comintern, and also whether the Comintern owes 
any duty to its Sections.^05
The A.S.P.’s protest concluded with an attack on Earsman’s
1 06activities in Moscow and suggested that the Third 
International should eschew such men "who, by their machinations, 
tend to make it a thing of scorn and contumely to the working 
class of Australia". The E.C.C.I. however was not impressed
103. The decision of the Comintern on the problem presented 
by Australia’s divided Communists was as follows:
1. - In view of the fact that there is no difference 
in principle, programme, or tactics, excepting 
differences arising out of local trouble, this meeting 
to-day proposes to the Commission of the Small Bureau 
to recommend an immediate unity of the two parties 
before the end of January, 1922, this unity to take place 
at a general conference representing both parties.
2. - That a Committee of Action be set up, composed of 
three delegates from each organization, whose work shall 
be to prepare the agenda for the Unity Conference.
3. - That the basis for representation for the Conference 
be one delegate for every fifty members of the party.
4. - All representation at Moscow to be suspended until 
unity is achieved and one United Communist Party for 
Australia is formed. [^E.C.C.I., Moscow, August 20, 1921^ J.
At the conference with Borodin Earsman and W. Smith 
represented the United C.P.A. and Rees and Lamb the A.S.P.
104. I.C., Jan.28, 1922, p.4.
105. Cf. Reardon to C.W. Baker, Dec.21 , 1921 , in Hancock 
Collection, M.L.
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by the protest or the gratuitous advice it contained. In 
April 1922 the E.C.C.I. communicated with both Garden and 
Reardon as follows:
We urgently request you to inform us how matters stand 
with regard to unification. At the same time we ask 
you for a report on the activity of the Party up to the 
present time attaching special interest to the following 
questions: What is the attitude of the Party towards the 
Australian Labour Party? How does the Party work in the 
Trade Unions? How does the Party take part in the 
elections? Has the Party gained an increase of membership? 
Does the Party receive literature, appeals, theses from 
the Executive of the Communist International.^7
Reardon well knew that he could furnish few satisfactory or
inspiring answers to any questions like these. For at the
Third Congress of the Comintern the policies which the A.S.P.
had embraced so willingly had been altered from the exciting
one of preparing for immediate revolution in open hostility
to all other political bodies of the organized labour movement
to one which in effect meant cooperation with many present
leaders of the trade union movement and with the A.L.P., a
course totally opposed by Reardon and his followers on the
executive of the A.S.P.
The Third Congress of the Comintern in June-July 
1921 had marked a substantial policy change by the Moscow-based 
general staff of the world revolution. Continuing victories 
of anti-Communist forces in Hungary, Italy, and Germany brought 
home to Bolshevik leaders in Russia just how exposed and weak 
was the world Communist movement which their own revolution 
had set in motion. Their first response to the reverses in 
Europe had been to force onto the Comintern Russian ideas of 
organisation and military efficiency, but in the ten months 
that divided the Second and Third Congress they came to accept 
as reality the fact that the world working class had generally 
failed to rally to the self-styled vanguard of the masses.
106. Embarrassed by the numerical superiority of the A.S.P. 
delegation Earsman had presented W. Smith of the V.R.U.
to the Comintern as a credentialled delegate of the C.P.A. 
when in fact this man had apparently never formally joined 
any section of the Australian Communists.
107. E.C.C.I. (Moscow) to J.S. Garden (A.S. Reardon), April 10, 
1922, in Hancock Collection, M.L.
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In the face of manifest signs of temporary capitalist
stabilization Lenin and the Russian delegation at the Third
Congress championed an abrupt change in tactics which was
accepted only after considerable debate and spirited opposition
from many Western Communists. Reversing the earlier approach
to fostering world revolution in independence of and in
hostility to all previously existing institutions of the
Western labour movements Communists were now ordered to go
to the masses and to join with the existing unions and mass
parties of labour. Communists had to transform themselves
from minor sects into mass parties, and they could only do
this by proving their worth as leaders of the masses and winning
over mass organisations - or significantly splitting them, in
preparation for the occurrence of the next revolutionary
situation. Politically this united front policy meant that
Communists were now to concentrate their activities on parties
like the A.L.P. in the manner Lenin had already suggested in
Left Wing Communism in 1920. In the unions a similar approach
was to be used and the sectarian aspects of the R.I.L.U. were
toned down by 1921 and those who were gathered in Moscow at
the Profintern’s first congress were told above all to
concentrate their activities on gaining positions of leadership
1 08and power in their respective trade union movements.
The declaration of the united front policy placed
a very great strain on the leadership of the A.S.P. They had
made it a point of principle that boring from within was a
dangerous policy for Communists to follow and that it would
inevitably lead to the dilution of the revolutionary purity
of the working-class vanguard. On the other hand the
necessity for a flexible approach to the existing labour
movement had been canvassed by the Garden-Earsman Communists
1 09consistently throughout 1921. Garden had seized upon
108. See J. Howie, Reds in Congress (Syd., n.d.).
109. For a discussion of Communist moves towards a united front
policy throughout 1920 and 1921 and its impact on the 
early C.P.A. see M. Dixson: "The First Communist ’United
Front' in Australia", in Labour History, No.10, May, 1966, 
esp. pp.25-31.
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Left Wing Communism as his fundamental text, and had
frequently attacked the A.S.P. leaders as victims of the
1 1 0’infantile sickness’ Lenin had described. From an issue
which had sparked resentment against the allegedly opportunist 
Garden-Earsman leadership from the more sectarian groups 
within the C.P.A. the united front approach had reverberated 
in favour of its exponents once it was clear that the Comintern 
favoured such a tactic. When news arrived of the Moscow's 
endorsement of the united front policy the A.S.P.’s vitriolic 
sectarianism was too plainly exposed for meaningful debate to 
continue and the A.S.P. fell silent on its relations with the 
Comintern, the pages of the International Communist being 
filled with attacks on local aspects of the activities of the 
United C.P.A., or with out of date texts or ideologically 
innocuous Comintern news.
The different modes of operation of the A.S.P. and 
the United C.P.A. showed through clearly in relation to the 
All-Australian Trades Union Congress held in Melbourne in 
1921. The A.S.P. declared that this 'Labor Bleeders' Congress' 
had been called by the A.L.P. in an attempt to induce the 
workers to rely on that party rather than mass action, and 
declared that no matter what were the decisions of the
conference "no scheme can bridge the chasm between Communist
111and Opportunist". In contrast to the A.S.P., the Trades
Hall reds participated enthusiastically in the Melbourne
Congress and threw their weight behind its decisions. These
decisions were not for Communist policies - a crucial vote to
use Parliament only for exposing and hampering capitalism
polled thirty three per cent while a straight-out call for
the Dictatorship of the Proletariat got only fifteen per
1 1 2cent of delegate votes; but nevertheless the Congress clearly 
marked a turn to the left by the labour movement as a whole.
110. See for example Communist, July 8, 1921, p .6. In reply 
to this attack Reardon made the strange allegation that 
Garden was plagiarising Lenin's book (see I ,C ,, Aug.6,
1921 , p . 2 ) .
111. I.C. , July 16, 1921, p.1.
112. Letter From the United Communist Party of Australia to the 
E.C.C.I. (n.d., but about mid-1922), in Hancock Collection,
M.L.
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In addition to the adoption of a plan of socialization for
Labor, a range of militant motions were passed which included
calls for the unity of all working class political parties on
the basis of affiliation to the A.L.P., positive moves against
militarism and against imperialist wars, and the setting up of
an internationalist-oriented Council of Action to coordinate
activity to achieve all these objectives. These motions were
to serve as the basis of significant Communist activity for the
next decade and their legitimate and solidly-based association
with a range of aspirations widely held in the Australian labour
movement. By their activity at the Melbourne Congress, and by
temporizing their aims to coalesce with the large proportion of
Australian unionists prepared to go as far left as the Melbourne
Congress decisions, the Garden Communists were able to boast
considerable achievements in the direction of converting
Australian labour to policies advocated by the C.P.A., and to
hold out the promise of further progress in translating the
Melbourne decisions into action. The Trades Hall Communists,
of course, also lost no opportunity in pointing out the results
of their practical and compromising approach to a Comintern
recently decided on a united front policy on a world wide scale,
113and hungry for news of success.
The publication of Left Wing Communism had served as
a warning to the A.S.P. that they must be prepared to temporize
their principles with the realities of politics; the decisions
of the Third Congress of the Comintern made it mandatory that
they should do so. But the deeply ingrained habits of
sectarianism and the deep personal antipathy which had built
11 4up in the course of local dispute proved impossible to
113. Ibid.
114. Doctrinal differences were considerably strengthened by 
personality clashes between leading members of the two 
competing parties. Garden and Reardon had first crossed 
swords at an attempted ’unity’ conference between the 
A.S.P., S.L.P., S.P.A. and S.D.L. in Sydney in 1919 where 
Reardon launched an attack on Garden for alleged underhand 
activities. By 1921 Garden had declared that he would 
never have anything to do with a Communist Party that was 
effectively controlled by Reardon. In 1921 Reardon alleged 
that Garden had informed Commonwealth authorities of 
Freeman’s illegal presence in Australia, in an attempt to
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overcome, and the A.S.P. leadership refused to unite with 
the C.P.A., and break out of their self-imposed trap of 
political isolation. The dispute dragged on into 1922 with 
no sign of the A.S.P. answering any calls for unity and, as 
far as can be ascertained, making no attempt to communicate 
with the Comintern after lodging a protest against the 
decisions of the Small Bureau of the E.C.C.I. Finally, the 
Comintern lost patience, and in August 1922 recognised the 
United C.P.A. as the Communist Party of Australia. Already 
in June 1922 some A.S.P. members had rebelled against the 
leaderships stand and had carried off Party property to the 
United C.P.A. With official recognition of the C.P.A. the 
A.S.P. totally collapsed and the Reardon leadership was left 
without any party following. "Honest men are not wanted in 
the movement", Reardon counselled Brodney as the A.S.P. began 
its rapid decline, "... our little world has crumbled to dust 
about our ears"
The Communist Party which won the battle for 
recognition as the Australian Section of the Third International 
was a curious mixture of groupings with its strengths and 
interests mainly on the industrial side of the labour movement. 
In Sydney ex-A.S.P. members gained access to positions of rank
in the party, but the most powerful positions were retained by
11 6Garden’s followers from Trades Hall. The membership of the
delay his return to Moscow. In 1922 Reardon seized on 
an accounting discrepancy of f17 to allege that Garden, 
as Secretary of the N.S.W. Labor Council, had misappro­
priated funds from the Russian Famine Relief Committee.
In reply Garden had Reardon expelled from Trades Hall as 
a union representative. See I ,C ., Feb.11, 1922, p.2;
March 11, 1922, pp.1, 4; Labor Council of N.S.W., Report, 
Dec. 1922, pp.11-12.
115. Reardon to A.T. Brodney, June 18, 1922, in the papers of J. 
Normington-Rawling. Menzies Library, A.N.U.
116. After 1922 the other major figures who had worked with 
Garden in founding the early C.P.A. drifted out of its 
affairs. Peter Simonoff was deported in that year, 
apparently out of favour with Soviet authorities and 
fearful of returning to Russia. The C.P.A.’s first 
general secretary W.P. Earsman visited Australia briefly 
in December 1921 following the Third Comintern Congress
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11 7party was estimated at up to 1500, the overwhelming 
majority of that membership residing in the Sydney and 
Newcastle area and mostly militant unionists. Through the 
leadership of the Trades Hall reds the policies and practices 
of early Australian Communists were closely adapted to the 
industrial environment and the mood of important elements of 
the labour movement, bringing the C.P.A. face to face with 
both the restrictions and opportunities that real political 
activity entails. On the other hand the party recruits from 
the A.S.P. and the other smaller socialist groups kept alive 
a sense of party identity, and a certain sectarianism and 
spirit of criticism of the existing labour movement, which at 
times appeared to be lacking amongst members of the Labor 
Council of N.S.W. Both these trends were able to work 
together - though not in much harmony - in the early years 
of the 1920s.
At the N.S.W. Labor Council almost the entire
executive joined the Communist Party including its President
and first R.I.L.U. delegate J. Howie. Both the secretaries
of the Sydney Council and the Newcastle Industrial Council
1 18were members of the C.P.A.: Garden’s post meant he
controlled the allocation of positions on Council, coordinated 
(without controlling) the operations of affiliated unions in 
the Sydney area, and was in charge of distributing strike 
funds and similar finances on a State-wide basis; while the 
C.P.A.’s strategic representation on the Newcastle Council 
spread party influence to the second largest industrial centre 
in N.S.W. The N.S.W. Labor Council's size and its general 
coordinating role gave its executive considerable prestige and 
moral influence, not only in relation to its affiliates, but
but then returned to Russia. He became a serving officer 
in the Red Army and at various times throughout the 1920s 
appeared in Germany and England probably on Comintern 
missions. Earsman’s ardour for Communism apparently 
declined following the ouster of the Trotsky faction from 
the C.P.S.U.(B.) and about 1931 he settled in Scotland 
and later became a member of the Scottish Labour Party.
117. Communist, Feb.3> 1922, p.7. These figures are from
Pravda. Nov.13> 1921. By the end of 1922 membership was 
down to between 750 and 900. See Fourth Congress of the 
Communist International. Abridged Report of Meetings held 
at Petrograd and Moscow, November 7 - December 3> 1922
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also vis-a-vis the Trades Halls in other States and the 
Australian union movement generally. In turn, as the 1921 
Melbourne conference demonstrated, the union movement could 
at times powerfully influence the A.L.P. From their 
positions in the mass labour organisations the leaders of 
the Australian Communist Party were quickly able to notch 
up some easy and spectacular gains. In the meantime however 
- and partly as a result of their policies and activities in 
the existing organisations of the labour movement - the C.P.A. 
apparatus as such suffered a number of setbacks and reverses.
During 1921 Tom Glynn and a number of ex-Wobblies 
in the United C.P.A. began to drift away from the Trades Hall 
reds and set up their own Industrial Union Propaganda League, 
Glynn editing a resuscitated Direct Action. Glynn was 
representative of those revolutionary union militants who had 
progressed beyond the simple anti-political 'direct action' of 
the I.W.W. to glimpse in the achievements of the Russian
Revolution a positive workers' programme and organisation.
119Deeply influenced by Lenin's State and Revolution Glynn
was yet neither politically inclined nor sophisticated enough
to accept the apparent turnaround involved in the united front
policy of the Third Congress of the Comintern and it was as a
result of such a policy development and its enthusiastic
application by the Trades Hall reds that Glynn joined with
J.B. King and other ex-I.W.Ws to launch the I.U.P.L. In
February 1922 however the C.P.A. reached an agreement with
Glynn's group by rescinding their summary expulsion of Glynn
and J.B. King for the turn back to I.W.Wism, in return
obtaining endorsement from the renamed Industrial Union
1 20Propaganda Group of the R.I.L.U. and its programme. The
(London, n.d.), p.291.
118. Letter From the United Communist Party of Australia to 
the E.C.C.I., in Hancock Collection, M.L.
119. See for example the first editorial written by Glynn 
for the Australian Communist, Dec.24, 1920, p.1.
120. See Communist, Feb.10, 1922, p.1; D.A., Mar., 1922, p.1.
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alliance between the C.P.A. and the X.U.P.G. was a stormy 
one from the start and faded as Garden continued to develop 
his links with the A.L.P. and other organisations anathema 
to the I.W.W. Henceforth the Wobblies attempted to revive 
once again the I.W.W., and were not attracted back to the 
C.P.A. till its adoption of third period policies made it 
abandon and eschew its links with the established organisa­
tions of the labour movement.
In areas outside N.S.W. the C.P.A. had also made
a halting start often largely because of ex-Wobbly equivocation
towards the new party. In far-off Western Australia the
novelist Katherine Susannah Prichard - who had earlier been
associated with both W.P. Earsman and the Communist group
at Andrade's Bookshop in Melbourne - attempted to form a
branch of the Communist Party in Perth by joining forces with
1 21an ex-I.W.W. named Ryce; but this association did not
outlast Ryce's frequent attacks on local Labor leader John
Curtin over industrial issues, and general Wobbly chagrin
over the united front policy, and the party effectively ceased
1 22to function by 1922. The party in Western Australia revived
in 1925 but thereafter grew very slowly and was never important 
in political or industrial affairs. Similarly in South 
Australia many leading figures in setting up the first branch 
of the C.P.A. were half-hearted followers of Communism strongly 
influenced by I.W.W. ideas and the Adelaide branch of the 
C.P.A. had faded out of existence by 1923. In its place 
sprouted several organisations including branches of the 
W.I.I.U. and the I.W.W., the latter proving particularly 
attractive to the militant left in South Australia. The 
C.P.A. was unable to revive in Adelaide till 1929.
121. Notes of Interview with Katherine Susannah Prichard at 
Canberra, Feb.29, i960, (interviewer, Ian Turner), in
L.T.L.
122. Ryce does appear at a C.P.A. Conference in Sydney in 
1923 as a delegate from a Western Australian branch of 
the party, but from correspondence in Workers' Weekly, 
July 3) 1923, p.^ and July 31 > 1923? p.2. it seems 
unlikely that Ryce actually represented a functioning 
organisation.
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In Melbourne too the early C.P.A. soon disappeared,
though the causes of its collapse were more complex. The
party was a congeries of groups either new to the labour
movement and ignorant of its affairs, or doctrinaire and
sectarian in their commitment to Communism. As it became
increasingly clear that the C.P.A. intended to work within
the labour movement so their ardour faded. Norman Rancie
led a number of ex-Wobblies out of the party to join Glynn's
1 23I.U.P.L. as soon as it was formed. Pro-A.S.P. factions
within the Melbourne party spread tales denigrating the Trades
11Hall reds for allegedly glorying in the death of Paul Freeman.'
Resentment of the Garden Communists was also fostered by
Sydney’s insistence that the ex-members of the V.S.P. should
attempt a reconciliation with that party, and considerable
friction was generated in 1921 when Garden snubbed his
recalcitrant party members by ignoring the C.P.A. and speaking
at a meeting organised by H. Scott Bennett. Left without
leadership following the sudden transfer of secretary C.W.
1 25Baker to Sydney the Melbourne branch effectively collapsed
towards the end of 1921. A far more successful organisation
was then set up in the Trades Hall-based Labor Propaganda
Group, which had several pro-Communist members and acted as
126a ginger group within the Victorian labour movement, 
cooperating with the V.S.P., W.I.I.U. and A.L.P. In 1924 
however a branch of the C.P.A. was revived and the L.P.G. 
was dissolved. The new party was small, sectarian, and 
isolated from the union movement, and composed mainly of the 
ex-members of the A.S.P. and embittered breakaways from the 
V.S.P.
The small Brisbane branch of the C.P.A. was the 
only one outside N.S.W. to maintain a more or less continuous 
existence after 1921, though it too was not without its
123. Communist, Nov.11, 1921, p.2.
124. See £S. Merrif ield^]: "Interview with May Brodney (nee 
Francis), 9/7/62", in Sam Merrifield Collection of Tape 
Recordings, L.T.L.
125. Baker replaced Glynn as editor of the Communist following 
the split over the I.U.P.L.
126. For an account of the L.P.G. see B. Walker Solidarity 
Forever (Melb., 1972), pp.197-207-
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problems and disputes. Originally formed out of the Queensland
branch of the A.S.P. it soon gathered in a number of militant
unionists and members of the failing Queensland Socialist
League and was throughout 1921 wracked by disputes over the
relative merits of the A.S.P. and the Trades Hall reds: its
secretary J.B. Miles declaring for the A.S.P.; the rest of
the party favouring the C.P.A. With the Comintern’s
recognition of the Garden group however there was a 
1 27reconciliation, and, assisted financially and organisa­
tionally by the Russian Association the C.P.A. branch in
Queensland soon became active in Brisbane, Townsville, and 
1 28Cairns. At the Queensland Trades and Labor Council the
C.P.A. managed to be well represented, with a C.P.A. member
as secretary to the Council, and several party members
1 29supporting him on the executive.
Thus it was clearly Garden and the Trades Hall reds 
who composed the backbone of the early Communist Party and 
supplied it with gains in the early 1920s. The Trades Hall 
reds followed up their 1921 Melbourne trade union congress 
success at a similar conference held in N.S.W., and a reconvened 
Melbourne congress in 1922, both of which endorsed socialist 
policies for the labour movement and called for the affiliation 
of the C.P.A. with the Labor Party. In 1922 also the N.S.W. 
Labor Council was affiliated to the R.I.L.U. and throughout 
that year meetings held under Labor Council auspices raised 
large sums of money for the Russian Famine Relief fund. 
Intoxicated by his achievements and confusing voluntary 
submission to Communist policies by other unionists for real 
control over events Garden went so far as to inform the Fourth 
Congress of the Comintern in 1922 that "The Communist Party of 
Australia.... has found the key-note to organization so far as 
the Anglo-Saxon movement is concerned" and boasted to his 
audience that through its control of the N.S.W. and Queensland
127. See Communist, Jan.5» 1923» p.3.
128. Communist, Sept.22, 1922, p.4.
129. See Letter from the United Communist Party of Australia 
to the E.C.C.I., in Hancock Collection, M.L.
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Labor Councils the C.P.A. was "able to direct just close
1 10on 400,000 workers". Such boastful enthusiasm possibly
1 31bemused the Bolshevik leaders, but nevertheless the union
connectionsof the Trades Hall reds were for a long time after
greatly valued by Moscow. While in Moscow Garden was elected
1 32to the E.C.C.I. and was thereafter very much allowed to
run his own ship in the C.P.A. It was perhaps a sad commentary 
that the International set up to direct a world revolution saw 
the C.P.A. as one of its more successful sections.
The policy of the Garden Communists from the time 
of the formation of the C.P.A. had been to influence all 
available institutions of the Australian labour movement, 
including the A.L.P. itself, as well as the trade unions. 
Within the C.P.A. however the policy of the Trades Hall reds 
met with some considerable opposition and their attempts at 
forming alliances and reaching compromises were a major factor 
in the disaffection of the ex-Wobblies in 1921. For in that 
year Garden had made overtures to the A.W.U. - long the 
bete-noire of the I.W.W., and he had come to an arrangement 
whereby the much vaunted One Big Union became acceptable to 
the A.W.U. Garden’s flirtation with the A.W.U. not only had 
significance in union affairs generally and at the 1921 
Melbourne congress of trade unions, but was also aimed at 
ingratiating Communists directly into the A.L.P.: which the 
A.W.U. virtually ran in Queensland, and held precarious 
control of in N.S.W. through the party's State Executive.
This plan to enter the A.L.P. had aroused deep hostility and 
suspicion, not only amongst ex-Wobblies and some rank and 
file of the C.P.A., but also amongst several of the more 
highly placed party members like C.W. Baker, editor of the 
Communist from 1921 to 1923« Although Garden on occasion 
throughout this period defended his views on infiltrating the 
A.L.P.he desisted from forcing the issue until he obtained
130. Inprecorr N o .116, 1922.
131. See T. Payne: "As A Young Australian Met Him", in Lenin
Through Australian Eyes (Syd., 1970), p.12. As an
ex-A.S.P. member, Payne accompanied Garden to the Fourth 
Congress of the Comintern.
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explicit approval of his policy from the Comintern in 
1 331922. With this support the Trades Hall reds were able
to persuade the C.P.A. annual conference at the end of 1922 
to recognise
that as the policy of the Communist International was 
for party affiliation to and membership in the Labor 
Party, the conference was bound to accept the same and 
work for its realisation. 1
Following this explicit approval of the policy of the Garden 
Communists the campaign to affiliate the C.P.A. to the A.L.P. 
gained increased momentum and by 1923 almost all Communist 
party members had joined Labor Party branches. At the June 
1923 conference of the A.L.P. in N.S.W. three C.P.A. members: 
Garden, J. Graves and, J. Beasley, were elected to the State 
Executive, and a motion to affiliate the C.P.A. to the A.L.P. 
was passed on the casting vote of the chairman, A.C. Willis, 
the militant secretary of the Miners' Federation.
Within weeks of this success however the Communist 
policy of leading the labour movement via the Labor Councils 
and infiltrating into and affiliating with the A.L.P. met 
some serious reverses. For in July 1923 the C.P.A. intervened 
in a lockout on the northern N.S.W. coalfields in a way which 
brought a head-on clash over union strategy with A.C. Willis. 
On top of this mistake came the so-called Weaver-Thomas case 
in which a C.P.A. member claimed he had been approached by 
mine owners to produce evidence of Communist involvement in 
the dispute, and in the resulting furore the C.P.A. and the
1 35Miners' Federation again crossed swords. As a result of
C.P.A. involvement in the affairs of the Miners' Federation 
A.C. Willis, who may loosely be described as a left-wing
132. B. Lazitch, A Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern 
(Stanford, 1973), P P •114-5.
133. See Communist, Feb.23, 1923, p.4, for the text of E.C.C.I
instructions to the C.P.A. Earlier Comintern approval
of the Garden policy towards the A.L.P. came in June 1922 
though a quite unreal approach had been adopted, the 
E.C.C.I. suggesting that a formal proposal be forwarded 
to the Labor Party for a conference to arrange a united 
front at which the A.L.P. was to have five delegates, 
the C.P.A. three delegates, and the N.S.W. Labor Council 
five delegates. Not surprisingly the A.L.P. showed no 
interest (see Communist, Sept.15, 1922, p.1.).
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guild socialist, turned from being a supporter to become a 
savage opponent of Communism, and the generally wide support 
which the policies of the N.S.W. Labor Council had previously 
commanded came to an abrupt end. Seizing on the opportunity 
afforded by the split in the forces of the left, Labor 
conservatives in N.S.W. united to reverse the previous trend 
towards affiliating the C.P.A. to the A.L.P., and by the end 
of 1923 had begun the expulsion of all Communists from their 
State branch of the Labor Party. Prompted by these moves in 
N.S.W. the October 1924 Federal Conference of the A.L.P. 
declared itself definitely against affiliation of the C.P.A. 
and all Communists ineligible for Labor Party membership, 
and after this each State branch of Labor neatly disposed of 
any further serious discussion of the question by adapting 
to the Federal ruling.
A further aspect of the decline of Communist
influence at this time was the C.P.A.’s loss of control of
the Seamen’s Union, which had earlier been one of the most
enthusiastic supporters of the new party. At the time of
the formation of the C.P.A. the Seamen’s Union had played an
important role both in organising the party and in operating
as an advocate of Communist policies amongst other trade
u n i o n s . F o l l o w i n g  the first R.I.L.U. Congress in 1921
delegates from the Seamen’s Union and the Australian Railways
Union had also assisted in establishing the International
Revolutionary Transport Workers' Propaganda Committee in
Moscow, an organisation intended to provide the basis for
Communist penetration of transport unions throughout the 
1 37world. Yet as it became increasingly clear that Communism
134. Communist, Jan.3, 1923> p.3.
133. On the so-called Weaver-Thomas case see W.W,, Aug.3»
1923, p .1; W. Thomas, A Red Revolution for £300 (Syd.,
1923).
136. See All-Australian Trade Union Congress. Report. 1921, 
pp.2 , 28-9*
137. The delegates representing the Seamen's Union in Moscow 
in 1921 were W. Casey and P. Kelly. The railwaymen were 
represented at the First Conference of the I.R.T.W.P.C. 
by W. Smith of Victoria. In 1923 O. Rymer represented 
the Queensland railwaymen in follow up discussions with 
the I.R.T.W.P.C. in Moscow.
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stood for a united front politically with the A.L.P. and less 
than outright revolutionary policies and tactics enthusiasm 
waned amongst seamen, and many dropped out of the C.P.A. The 
culmination of this trend was the formation in Melbourne in 
1924 of a Socialist Party of Australia whose early members 
consisted almost entirely of leading figures in the affairs 
of the Seamen’s Union including W. Clarke, ¥. Casey, J. Temple 
and J. Johnson. Following the policies of the Socialist Party 
of Great Britain the new S.P.A. concentrated on Marxian 
propaganda asserting simply that political power could only be 
transferred to revolutionaries when the masses wholeheartedly 
supported their ideas.
At the same time the C.P.A. lost influence amongst 
many other officials of the Seamen’s Union through its direct 
intervention in the intricacies of the union’s industrial 
affairs. In early 1923 the C.P.A. had become involved in an 
attack on the management of a strike involving seamen and 
other waterside workers in North Queensland and engaged in 
trenchant attacks on a number of officials including the
1 n QCommunist Party foundation member T. Walsh. As a result
of this intervention and the attacks of the S.P.A. and C.P.A. 
members on the united front policies of Walsh and other 
officials, many unionists turned against the Communist Party 
and came to regard the bulk of its remaining members as 
mischievous. In this process Walsh increasingly sought allies 
from the right-wing factions in the union. The tensions 
within the Seamen’s Union were abated slightly by the gaoling 
of Walsh and Johnson in the course of the British seamen’s 
strike in 1925, but shortly after this the union splintered 
into factionalism. Eventually Walsh moved over to Havelock 
Wilson’s extreme right-wing National Union of Sailors and by 
the 1930s was to emerge as a professional anti-Communist 
scribe. It was quite atypical for a left-wing unionist to 
move so far across the political spectrum; it was however 
common for union leaders to react against the carping
138. As well as angering many of the ex-A.S.P. members of the 
C.P.A. by his attitude towards the Labor Party Walsh had 
angered the Garden leadership of the Communist Party by 
assisting the A.S.P. in obtaining representation in 
Moscow in 1921.
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critiques of the C.P.A. In the course of its early
interventions in industrial disputes the C.P.A. quickly
acquired a reputation as a burden for unionists to carry,
and was frequently dismissed even by left-wing unions as a
1 39hindrance and disruption.
To counter A.L.P. attempts to repudiate the C.P.A.
affiliation Garden launched an appeal to rank and file A.L.P.
and union members to reverse the expulsion moves. Some
support was at first forthcoming, and by the end of 1 9 2 3
some fifty unions, A.L.P. branches and Electorate Councils
had called for a Special Conference to consider the matter
1 40of C.P.A. affiliation to the Labor Party. The argument
utilised by the Labor Council of N.S.W. was that the A.L.P.
in expelling the Communist Party was repudiating the decisions
of the 1921 Melbourne trade union congress; and the Council
held a special meeting in an attempt to rally unionists
1 41behind the C.P.A. campaign. Opinion in the labour movement
however had swung too far against the acrimonious C.P.A. and
the 1924 N.S.W. A.L.P. Conference endorsed the Executive's
decision in favour of expulsion. Furthermore the campaign of
Labor Party conservative forces against the influence of
Communism on the labour movement was increasingly stepped up
and moves were undertaken in the N.S.W. A.L.P. to refuse
142affiliation to unions connected with the Labor Council. 
Throughout 1923 and 1926 it became increasingly clear that 
the Labor Council of N.S.W. itself had been manoeuvred onto 
the ropes and would either have to tone down its policies or 
risk isolation from A.L.P. affiliated unions and a disastrous 
turn against it in the internal labour movement power struggles.
The defeats of 1923 and 1924 shook the C.P.A. to a 
more realistic appreciation of its position. By its own
139. On the developing tensions in the Seamen's Union over
united front tactics and C.P.A. intervention in industrial 
disputes see Australasian Seamen's Journal, Aug.1, 1923»
pp.10-12, 14 5 Sept.1 , 1923> pp.12-14; Nov.1 , 1923» pp.12-
13; F e b . 1 , 1925, pp.6-7; July 20, 1925, PP.5-6; Aug.20,
1925, p .13. See also A. and T. Walsh Collection, A.N.L.
140. Labor Council of N.S.W, Report, 1923, P.31«
141. See Ibid., 1924. pp.4-8.
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ill-considered intervention in the affairs of the mining 
industry and the Seamen's Union it had broken the powerful 
trade union alliance of left-wing forces and exposed the 
N.S.W. Labor Council’s weakness and dependence on the goodwill 
of other union bodies. Politically it had been completely 
defeated and humiliated by the conservative forces in the 
A.L.P. and it had also lost many of its members, as it was 
abandoned by most militant unionists who were forced to 
choose between it and the Labor Party. From a position of 
some power and influence in the Australian labour movement 
the C.P.A. had suddenly declined to a minor sect with its 
trade union leaders thrown completely onto the defensive.
The C.P.A.’s first answer to its dilemma was a 
twofold attempt to build up its strength in the unions and 
to enter the political field as a party clearly independent 
of the A.L.P. Though the I.U.P.G. had continued a desultory 
functioning after 1922,^^ in 1924 the C.P.A. began renewed 
and vigorous efforts to put into practice the policy 
recommended by R.I.L.U. of developing rank and file cells of 
Communists throughout the union movement, and in November of 
that year the party amalgamated various militant groups into 
the New South Wales Left Wing Movement. This organisation 
sought "to destroy the workers' faith in the capitalist 
system and to turn their eyes towards a communist society 
through the dictatorship of the proletariat", but it also 
pursued a range of immediate goals: a Federal basic wage of
£5 .15.0 a week; travelling time to and from work; an eight 
hour day and a five day week; unemployment and accident 
insurance; the abolition of ’scab’ labour, and the
144establishment of shop committees. Such a programme
appealed to a wide body of unionists and the N.S.W.L.W.M. 
achieved some success as a propaganda body; but the old 
problems of the C.P.A. remained, the party by 1925 admitting
142. A.W., Nov.25, 1925, P.5; Dec.2, 1925, p.3.
143. See for example Communist, Mar.9, 1923, p.1. For C.P.A.
intentions regarding the I.U.P.G. see Garden in the 
Communist, Feb.10, 1922, p.1.
144. W,W., Nov.14, 1924, p .4.
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"that the main obstacle in the way of speedier development
of the movement was the unreadiness of militants to accustom
145themselves to organised effort".
Following efforts in the direction of rebuilding 
its power in the union movement the C.P.A. made a bid to 
expand politically by entering a team of six Communist 
candidates to stand in working class electorates in the 1925 
parliamentary elections in N.S.W. Garden was the architect 
of this scheme, and he headed the team, the Communist press 
devoting considerable publicity to his candidature for the
146seat of Sydney. The rationale of the Communist candidature
at the elections was as a propaganda and publicity exercise
for the C.P.A. which would re-kindle and re-invigorate the
united front, and expose "Mr Lang and his friends", who were
1 47blamed for forcing Communists outside the A.L.P. The
C.P.A. candidates were portrayed as running, not in opposition
1 48to true Labor candidates, but in conjuction with them, and
Garden at least was supremely confident that Communists would
win some seats under the multi-member constituency system
operating at the time. He was quite stunned to find that
instead all six candidates lost their deposit money, and that
149he himself received only 317 votes.
The C.P.A.'s 1925 venture into parliamentary 
elections starkly revealed the complete isolation of 
Communists in the Australian labour movement, and as a result 
the very existence of the party as an overt political body 
came to be questioned. Guido Baracchi, on the eve of the 
December 1925 C.P.A. conference, suggested that the party 
be liquidated and its members join the A.L.P. Baracchi found 
no support for his proposal and felt forced to resign from 
the C.P.A., but there were many who came to the same conclusion,
1 4 5 .  W . ¥ . , J a n . 9 ,  1 9 2 5 ,  p . 3 •
146. See for example W.W., April 10, 1925» p.1.
1 4 7 .  W . W . t J a n . 9 ,  1 9 2 5 ,  p . 1 .
148. Ibid.
149» See J.D. Blake: "The Australian Communist Party and the
Comintern in the early 1930s", in Labour History, No.23» 
November 1972, p.40.
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including Garden and the whole group of N.S.W. Labor Council
officials whom he led. Throughout 1926 Garden started moving
away from C.P.A. activities and entering into collaboration
with the Lang-controlled Labor Party in N.S.W. In opposition
to C.P.A. policies Garden came out in support of the breakaway
Industrial Labor Party formed in Queensland; and by the end
of 1 9 2 6 he had reached the stage of refusing to deny press
1 50reports that he was no longer a Communist. For this he
was expelled from the C.P.A., and the Party and the N.S.W.
Labor Council parted ways.
Despite Garden's abandonment of Communism however
the N.S.W. Labor Council retained its affiliation to the
R.I.L.U. and these links were increasingly strengthened as
the 1 9 2 0 s progressed. From 1925 onwards the R.I.L.U. showed
1 51close interest in the pan-Pacific trade union movement
and provided organisational support to Garden when Australian
trade unionists attempted to organise a Pan-Pacific Congress
in Sydney. In addition closer organisational links were
forged between R.I.L.U. sections in the Far East and the
1 52Labor Council of N.S.W., and an increased flow of
information and propaganda activities on behalf of the 
R.I.L.U. was undertaken in Australia. And despite the fact 
that Garden was no longer a Communist the Fourth Profintern 
Congress in 1928 elected him to the R.I.L.U. Executive. 
Lozovsky, it seems, mixed his formal adherence to the 
sectarian notions of the Comintern's 'third period' (announced 
that same year) with a realistic understanding of the way to 
maintain influence in the Australian labour movement.
The policy of liquidationism advocated by Baracchi 
and followed by Garden and his confreres was defended mainly 
in terms of its efficacy. The set of circumstances which
150. L.D., Dec.6 , 1926, p.1. Cf. Sixth Annual Conference of
C.P.A.. Report (Syd., 1 9 2 6 ).
151. See ' J .P.' £John Pepper?]: "Asiatic and Pacific Ocean
Labour Conferences" in Communist International, Nos.18 
-I9 (Special Double Number), pp .172-175•
152. For example J. Ryan in 1928 was sent to India to attend 
the Ninth All-India Trade Union Congress as a representa­
tive of the P.P.T.U.S. and to work as an organiser for 
the P.P.T.U.S. in India.
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had governed C.P.A. history in the 1920s had made
liquidationism the only obviously viable course of action
if Communists were to have any influence on the course of
events. Already in the early 1920s the Trades Hall reds
had come to the realisation that loose declarations about
the course of world history, and overt statements in favour
of Communist principles were a considerable hindrance to
their influence in the trade unions, and they gradually came
to concentrate on developing working class consciousness and
internationalism on specific issues of some general appeal
or in areas of very clear importance for the achievement of
Communist objectives. This course of action was sanctified
by the advice of the Comintern on the application of the
1 53united front policy and it worked: decreasing affiliation
to the N.S.W. Labor Council was gradually reversed as 
moderate unions were reassured that the Council was still
1 54interested in the everyday affairs of the union movement.
But it was not favoured by many C.P.A. rank and file, and
the Labor Council leaders were treated to many sniping
attacks on their alliances and corrections to their quietism
in articles and correspondence in the party press, and at
party forums. In 1927 Garden gave as his major reason for
finally abandoning the C.P.A. the stubborn failure of its
remaining membership to understand the need for caution and
plasticity in advancing the cause of Communism, and he charged
that "the political line of the Party is not in harmony with
the decisions of the Comintern, but... merely a conglomeration
15 5of ’ultra-left* slogans". Retaining their links with the
R.I.L.U., the leaders of the N.S.W. Labor Council were - even 
in the latter part of the twenties, immeasurably more effective 
as advocates of Communist policies than the C.P.A. itself, and 
were valued as such by Moscow. Yet the dictates of the 
Comintern had also decreed that in entering the united front
153. Theses on Tactics Adopted by the Third World Congress
June/July 1921 (Syd., 1921), p.4 ff.
154. See Secretary's initial comments in the annual Labor 
Council of New South Wales, Report, for the years
1921-26.
155. W.W., May 27, 1927, P-3.
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with the A.L.P. that C.P.A. identity be maintained and in
order for the Trades Hall reds to have remained Communist
this would have required constitution of an all-out illegal
party organisation, an idea which Garden did not publicly
1 56advocate, or apparently carry out. By his failure to
maintain party identity Garden had deviated from Comintern 
policies and was to incur the wrath and displeasure both of 
his old comrades in the C.P.A., and, later on, of the 
Comintern itself, after it had entered its adventurist third 
period of intransigent independence of the early depression 
years.
After Garden a new leadership emerged for the C.P.A.,
chief amongst whom was J. Kavanagh, a Canadian who had arrived
in Australia in 1925. The C.P.A. conference of 1925 had
scorned the liquidationists as representative of opportunist 
1 57tendencies in the party, and Kavanagh was able to rally
successfully this handful of avowed Australian Communists to
the defence of the existence of the Communist Party and to
begin again to attempt to apply the Leninist revolutionary
formula to the local situation. From 1926 Kavanagh assumed
editorship of the Workers' Weekly and in the following year
he came to dominate the C.P.A. Central Executive after his
close supporter H. Moxon gathered enough votes in that year's
conference to eliminate a wide range of possible competitors
whom he labelled as tainted by 'Gardenism'. Kavanagh's
main concentration was in propagandising C.P.A. members and
developing a real sense of party identity amongst the small
band of the devoted: whose numbers had shrunk very
1 58considerably by the mid-1920s. Communist 'Sunday schools'
156. Cf. W.W,, July 15, 1927, p.4.
157. W.W., Jan.8, 1926, p.2.
158. Otherwise reliable sources yield conflicting estimates
(ranging from 250 to 550) for party membership in the 
years from 1925 to 1928. All however agree that 
membership of the party was at its lowest point in these 
years. A study of the reports of the various District 
Groups submitted to the eighth annual conference of the 
C.P.A. suggests that membership for 1928 had fallen as 
low as 250-300. The circulation of the Workers' Weekly 
in 1928 was approximately 5,000. See Eighth Annual 
Conference of C.P.A,, Report (Syd., 1928).
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and a Young Comrades Club were set up to indoctrinate the 
Party youth. From 1926 onwards a number of promising young 
cadres were sent off to Moscow to attend the Lenin School, 
and at home compulsory training classes in Marxist-Leninist 
doctrines were initiated for all party members. Through his 
concentration on education and indoctrination Kavanagh helped 
the tiny C.P.A. to survive the bleak years after 1925 and to 
improve its morale, its spirit of corporate identity, and the 
general level of understanding of Leninism amongst its 
members.
The C.P.A. under Kavanagh however was not noticeably 
successful in expanding its influence much beyond that of a 
minor sect. The party took part in the agitation over 
’international class war prisoners’ such as Sacco and 
Vanzetti, but the considerable working-class solidarity which 
was shown for these unfortunate Americans was due more to the 
activities of Garden’s N.S.W. Labor Council and the fact that 
they had long been a cause celebre of the I.W.W. and other 
left wing groups than the weight added to the campaign by 
Kavanagh’s tiny C.P.A. Similarly, although the C.P.A. was 
able to undertake a considerable amount of ’Hands Off China' 
propaganda it was far from the most significant participant 
in that agitation, which had the support of all left-wing 
bodies as well as most T.H.Cs and the newly formed 
Australasian Council of Trade Unions. The C.P.A. itself 
also ventured into the union movement once again by setting
1 59up Trade Union Educational Leagues in N.S.W. and Queensland.
The aims of the T.U.E.L. were at first mainly educational but
in 1928 the T.U.E.L. was merged into a Militant Minority
Movement: an organisation which was to achieve some rapid
gains for the C.P.A. with the onset of the Great Depression.
Progress however was at first very slow, partly due to the
"1 6 0hostility to the organisation shown by Garden, and partly
through the resistance of rank and file union militants to
159. W.W., April 15, 1927, P.4.
160. W,W., July 15, 1927» p.4. The N.S.W. Labor Council's
affiliation with the R.I.L.U. debarred the formation of 
separate party-controlled M.M.M. groups in the Sydney 
metropolitan area.
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the extension of party control over their activities.
Shorn of the compromising Garden Communists, and
increasingly sectarian in its general attitudes, the C.P.A.
rump soon began to despair of the possibilities for success
in applying the united front policy to the Australian labour
movement. Increasingly articles vehemently attacking the
A.L.P. appeared in the C.P.A. press, as those with a long-
162standing repugnance of Labor were given a more free hand.
Furthermore the powerful Labor militants and industrialists
in Queensland - who were toying with measures to employ
against their parliamentary leaders ranging from reforming
the A.L.P. from within to setting up a rival Industrial
Labor Party, were also attacked in the Workers * Weekly and
at C.P.A. c o n f e r e n c e s , D e s p i t e  the fact that nearly every
ploy envisaged by the militants in Queensland could possibly
have led to some form of affiliation of the C.P.A. with the
A.L.P. in that State, they were all repudiated, in the hope
that fully Communist controlled organisations would capture
164the discontented. Such increasingly sectarian attitudes
towards the A.L.P. were probably conveyed to Moscow by a 
number of visiting cadres: H. Ross in 1926, and H. Moxon and 
N. Jeffery in 1928. In any case following E.C.C.I. consider­
ation of Australian problems in 1926 and a visit to Moscow by 
the Party secretary Tom Wright in the following year a 
Comintern representative R.W. Robson was assigned to the 
C.P.A. for the purpose of clarifying the political and 
organisational problems then confronting the Australian 
party. Robson, a London District organiser of the C.P.G.B., 
was present at the 1927 C.P.A. conference where the party 
formulated a first draft of what became known as the 
’Queensland Resolution' which declared that the McCormack
161 . See £J . Kavanagh:] 'Trade Union Report' , in Eighth Annual 
Conference of C.P.A., Report (Syd., 1928), p.3. Much to
Kavanagh's chagrin in Queensland militants found it more 
convenient to form an M.M.M. under the control of the 
Plebs League than the C.P.A.
162. See for example W.W., Nov.13» 1925» p.3» April 7» 1926, 
p.3; April 29, 1927, p.3.
163. W.W., Jan.8, 1926, p.2; Jan.15» 1926, p.2.
164. See Sixth Annual Conference of C.P.A., Report (Syd., 1926).
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Labor government in Queensland had become an open policeman 
of the capitalist class and that Communists would henceforth 
take the lead in opposition to the A.L.P. in that State's 
forthcoming elections. This resolution was taken back to 
Moscow by Robson and H. Moxon, and after discussion by the 
Comintern was finally published by the Workers' Weekly in 
August 1928.^^
Within a few months of the E.C.C.I's return of 
the Queensland Resolution to the C.P.A., news arrived of a 
far more significant and widespread swing to the left and 
repudiation of the united front policy by the Comintern 
itself at its Sixth World Congress, which had begun in July 
1928. Basically the disputes which invaded this Comintern 
congress were a carry-over of the disputes over power and 
ideas which had characterised developments in the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik) throughout the twenties. 
Already in 1924 pressure from the triumvirate of Kamenev, 
Zinoviev, and Stalin had induced the Fifth Congress of the 
Comintern to issue a pronouncement against the Russian 
opposition and thus take sides against Trotsky in the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) faction fights which followed Lenin's death.
By 1928 Trotsky and his somewhat belated supporters Zinoviev, 
and Kamenev, had all been formally expelled from the Soviet 
party, and the Sixth Congress of the Comintern was to be the 
arena in which Stalin finally defeated the only remaining 
faction (led by N. Bukharin) in the C,P.S,U.(B.), and came 
to control completely the world Communist movement, making 
the Comintern itself no more than an auxiliary of the Russian
165. Robson was known in Australia as 'comrade Murray'.
An apposite summary of the formulation of the 
interesting Queensland Resolution has been given by 
E.M. Higgins:
This "Queensland Resolution" had a double origin 
- in the Australian Communist belief that the 
Queensland Labour Government had by now become 
generally discredited among the workers, and in the 
Communist International discussions on the world 
situation generally, which were leading to its 
adoption of the "Third Period" policy of open attack 
on "Social Fascism".
103
Foreign Office. After Stalin's victory at its Sixth Congress 
the Comintern became but a shadow of its former self, run 
more or less totally by selected appointees to the E.C.C.I. 
and the R.I.L.U. Executive, and completely subservient to the 
diplomatic manoeuvrings of the monolithic and bureaucratic 
Russian state. Nevertheless, in the course of factional 
manoeuvre, and because of the inchoate fashion in which 
Stalin's essentially Russian nationalist ideas had to be put 
into practice in a movement dedicated to the assumption that 
the world had entered an era of socialist revolution, the 
Sixth Congress of the Comintern formally enunciated a leftist 
policy and inaugurated its 'third' or 'social fascist' 
period.
revolutionary doctrines of Lenin, and his formulation of the
basic premises which were later to guide Soviet foreign
policy under his leadership, were first set out in the course
of disputations with Trotsky and in explicit opposition to
the theory of 'permanent revolution' which Lenin had in all
1 66essentials accepted in 1917- In his Problems of Leninism,
written in 1924, Stalin floated the idea of creating 'socialism 
in one country', the view that Russia alone and in isolation 
from the rest of the world could build a socialist society, 
thus downgrading the importance of the Comintern and making 
of the revolution in the advanced Western countries not that 
fundamental criterion of the success of Communism, which 
Trotsky and Lenin had made it, but merely a possible bonus 
to the far more important work of building up Russia itself. 
This fundamental change of outlook which accompanied the 
rise of Stalin to the leadership of the world Communist 
movement was only fleetingly stated in more or less explicit 
terms in the years following 1924. As Isaac Deutscher has 
explained:
E.M. Higgins, The Queensland Labour Governments, 1915- 
1929 (M.A. thesis, Melb. Univ., 1954), fn. p .124.
166. See section one of this chapter, footnote 3»
Stalin's fundamental break with the world
The peculiar point to be considered is that he 
ini was never free to lay bare his main premiss • • • •
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The need for Stalin to pay lip-service to the 
expectation of revolution was the more pressing the 
more he was involved in the fight against the left 
Bolsheviks, who charged him with abandoning the 
Leninist heritage. It was mainly in the first phases 
of that struggle, in 1 9 2 5 and 1 9 2 6 , that he could 
allow himself to argue publicly from the assumption 
that no Socialist upheaval in the West would occur for 
about twenty years. Then, pressed by his opponents, 
he either sought refuge in ambiguity or vied with them 
in prophesying the nearness of revolutionary events.
Such prophecies represented the exoteric aspect of his 
policy, the coating without which a large section of the 
party would not have consented to swallow his ideas.
His esoteric view he kept to himself: at the most, he 
discussed it with the leaders of his own faction; but 
it was always implied in what he did.1^7
The Sixth Congress of the Comintern represented the fullest 
expression of one of the exoteric aspects of Stalin's inter­
war policies of which Deutscher speaks. Immediately after 
expelling what had become known as the Trotskyite or left 
Bolshevik opposition Stalin announced at the Fifteenth Party 
Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B.) in December 1927 that the 
period of world capitalist stabilisation was over and a 
period of depression and revolution was about to begin.
This whole policy line would reasonably appear to have 
originated as part of a plan aimed explicitly at eliminating 
Bukharin, Tomsky and Rykov and their followers (who had been 
Stalin's principal right-wing allies in the fight against 
the left Bolsheviks) from their positions of power in the 
Comintern and in the Soviet Government. And it worked: the
huge Russian delegation composed mostly of machine yes-men, 
plus the appeal of a leftist policy to foreign delegates 
frustrated by the general failures of the united front policy, 
ensured the overwhelming disavowel by the 1928 congress of 
the Russian 'right' and adoption of Stalin's policies, 
allowing him later to depose Bukharin from presidency of the 
Comintern, and abolish that post, turning over the major 
tasks of administration to his trusty lieutenant Molotov, a
1 6 7 . I. Deutscher, Stalin, a Political Biography (Harmonds- 
worth, 1 9 6 6 ), pp.3 8 9 -9 0 .
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man who - indicatively - had never been abroad. The
Congress declared that imperialism had entered a period of 
extreme contradictions and economic depressions in which 
the bourgeoisie would become so threatened that they would 
have to turn to the social democrats to dupe the workers 
and so prop up their regimes. This move was doomed to 
failure and the bourgeoisie would eventually turn to fascist 
measures of outright armed suppression as the workers 
deserted the socialists in the face of continuing capitalist 
economic disarray, but there was to be no interim alliances 
with socialists, for they could never be trusted and would 
always renege on the revolution. This complex scenario based 
on a mixture of prophecy and the recent experiences of the 
world Communist movement inspired calls from the Sixth Congress 
of the Comintern for increased Bolshevization and discipline. 
The more specific programme for Communist parties working 
within a given political arena was always to place their own 
party at the head of dissidence and revolution and immediately 
to break all alliances and ties with other socialist and 
labour parties, who were soon to be described as ’social 
fascist’, in signification of the trend and tendency set out 
for them in the predictions of the Sixth Congress.
As Trotsky pointed out in letters he addressed to 
1 69the Sixth Congress, the third period programme of the
Comintern was ’specially made to spread illusions and promote 
dangerous adventurism throughout its sections". Though 
Trotsky had himself long championed the general assessment 
of the world situation on which Stalin had ostensibly based 
his analysis he also saw that by isolating Comintern sections 
from social democracy, and above all by concentrating the 
efforts of Communism on developing and protecting the 
interests of the Soviet Union, the world revolution would 
be betrayed. Stalin's policy of socialism in one country 
would ensure that Soviet Russia would never really make 
decisive practical moves for revolution in the West or
168. F. Borkenau, The Communist International (London, 1938)»
P.339.169. See L. Trotsky, The Draft Programme of The Communist 
International. A Criticism of Fundamentals(London, n.d.).
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throw its full weight behind the various bids made by the 
Comintern sections for the conquest of power; and so it 
proved. Caught between the flatly contradictory notions 
of concentrating on developing socialism in one country, 
while at the same time advocating Communist revolution 
abroad, the various sections of the Comintern throughout 
the world were ground into political insignificance in an 
emery paste of contradictory instructions, venemous epithets, 
and impossible political tasks. In Germany the strenuous 
efforts of the K.P.D. to implement the dictates of the Sixth 
Congress of the Comintern opened up a breach in the forces 
of the left wide enough to allow Hitler to gain power; world 
wide, the years after 1928 saw an overall weakening in the 
position of socialist movements and the strengthening of 
conservatism even in the face of the Great Depression; and 
in the Australian context, though the C.P.A. itself gained 
considerably in numbers, the overall impact of these years 
was to spread confusion and suspicion amongst both leftists 
and moderates in the labour movement, inspire anew fears of 
sinister Moscow-directed revolutionary plots, and provoke 
near hysterical responses from the right of the political 
spectrum.
The inauguration of the Comintern's third period 
strengthened the hands of the ultra-sectarians in the C.P.A. 
who were beginning to emerge as the fruits of Kavanagh's 
policy of propagandizing and indoctrinating members in party 
identity. The Queensland Resolution had been returned to 
Australia by J. Ryan and N. Jeffery, who had been N.S.W.
Labor Council delegates to the Fourth Conference of the 
R.I.L.U. held in March 1928, and who during their stay in 
Moscow had learnt of the disputes within the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
and of the likelihood of a swing to the left by the Comintern, 
Already in 1927 Jeffery had spearheaded a campaign for 
increased Bolshevisation of the C.P.A. and had criticised the 
operation of measures already introduced by the C.P.A. towards
1 0 7
1 7 0this end. On his return from the R.I.L.U. conference
in 1928 Jeffery joined with H. Moxon and J.B. Miles of
Brisbane in arguing that the policy adopted in the Queensland
Resolution of standing Communist candidates against the
A.L.P. should be extended to include outright C.P.A. opposition
to the Labor Party on an Australia-wide basis in the October
1928 Federal elections. This brought Jeffery, Moxon and Miles
into conflict with Kavanagh who championed support for the
171A.L.P. against the Bruce Government. Then at the end of
the year E.M. Higgins arrived back in Australia with the full
report and instructions of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern
and these were discussed at the C.P.A's 1928 conference.
There Kavanagh and his Central Executive Committee majority
carried a decision to apply the third period decisions of the
Comintern only to Queensland and Victoria and for tactical
1 72reasons ignore its application to N.S.W. By the 1928
conference however an opposition group to Kavanagh had 
clearly begun to crystallise with the election of N. Jeffery 
to join L.L. Sharkey and Moscow-trained H. Ross and H. Moxon 
as Central Executive Committee advocates of more extreme 
policies for the C.P.A.
Kavanagh’s reason for advocating what became known 
as 'exceptionalism’ in his attitude to the third period 
policies were due to his rapprochement with Garden and the 
Trades Hall reds. In 1928 Kavanagh, along with Tom Wright,
1 7 0 .  In 1 9 2 6  the C.P.A. had adopted a new constitution with 
an. elaborate system of departments along the Russian 
model. This was in keeping with the growing stress on 
discipline in the international Communist movement. At 
the Fifth Congress of the Comintern in 1925 a campaign 
was launched to eradicate "old Social Democratic 
principles" of organisation which were said to be still 
operating in most Comintern sections. Formalised 
training of Comintern section members in Moscow was 
instituted as part of the Bolshevisation campaign thus 
initiated and the first graduate of this scheme was 
Hector Ross, who was sent over to Russia in 1 9 2 6 .
. W . W . , O c t . 1 9 ,  1 9 2 8 ,  p . 1 .
. W . W ., Jan.11, 1929, p.4.
171
1 7 2
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was elected to office in the N.S.W. Labor Council under
Garden's patronage, and this elevation of the previously
sectarian leader of the C.P.A. to a position of responsibility
had brought him face to face with the absolute necessity of
retaining the support of institutions such as the Labor Council
of N.S.W. for the practical achievement of any Communist aims,
whether they be the fostering of mass action, or the
maintenance and extension of Australian links with the
P.P.T.U.S.: so recently set up with the assistance of the
R.I.L.U. By what seemed a reasonable and undemanding alliance
with the Trades Hall reds, Kavanagh and Wright - along with
the assistant editor of the Pan-Pacific Worker, J. Ryan,
could make the voice of the C.P.A. once more relatively
effective in the counsels of labour. To avoid descending
again to a position of political and industrial irrelevance
Kavanagh stuck by Garden and refused to attack Labor in
N.S.W. except in general terms. When a surprise Federal
election was announced in 1929 the Central Committee of the
C.P.A. decided to stand no candidates and conduct an election
1 73campaign essentially against the Nationalist Government.
Kavanagh's alliance with Garden did not however 
appeal to Ross or Moxon, who dissented from the announced 
C.P.A. policy on the 1929 Federal election, and who combined 
with Sharkey to send off a cable to the E.C.C.I. accusing the 
Central Committee majority of failing to institute third 
period policies in Australia. As a result the opposition 
group to Kavanagh obtained Comintern endorsement of 'the 
third period' position and the Central Committee majority 
received a telegram from the E.C.C.I. instructing them to 
participate in the Federal elections and to oppose the Labor 
Party social fascists. Kavanagh did not carry out these 
Comintern instructions but following the defeat of the Bruce 
Government he opened up the pages of the Workers' Weekly to 
a general discussion of the applicability of the third period 
policies to the situation of the C.P.A. In the debate which 
ensued Tom Wright and E.M. Higgins supported Kavanagh in
173. See Blake, op. cit., p.44.
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arguing the case for 'exceptionalism' in order to retain the
C.P.A's voice in the labour movement, while Moxon and Sharkey
charged that the C.P.A. leadership was subservient to the
Garden Communists and that they had openly and deliberately
1 74ignored instructions from the Comintern. The debate was
decisively decided in favour of the opposition group by the
arrival in December 1929 of a long letter from the E.C.C.I.
accusing Kavanagh of ’rightist deviation' and severely
1 7 5criticising his actions. At the Christmas conference
of that year Kavanagh and his followers were voted off the 
Central Committee of the C.P.A. and Sharkey, Moxon, and 
J.B. Miles assumed leadership of the party, announcing their 
intention to break all alliances with the Labor movement and 
to institute fully third period policies in the Australian 
context.  ^^
The changes of 1929 had strong roots in the 
doctrinaire and sectarian traditions which had flowed from 
the socialist movement into the early C.P.A. It was by no 
means an accident that Moxon and Miles (the two leading 
engineers of the 1929 leadership changes) had both once 
been members of the old A.S.P.; their 'pure' Leninism and 
total hostility to the organised labour movement obviously 
possessed considerable appeal to the bulk of the party 
membership, and it was Kavanagh's own turn towards compromise 
that had proved his undoing. Overshadowed in the early 1920s 
by the flexible policies of the Garden Communists the 
doctrinaire outlook had in the end proved the most enduring 
characteristic of the C.P.A.
At another level of course this element of 
sectarian resentment towards the existing labour movement 
was given form and direction by the Comintern's apparent
174. See W.W., Oct.25, 1929, pp.3-4.
175. W.W.t Dec.6, 1929, p.3.
176. W.W., Jan.10, 1930, p.3.
1 10
return to the earlier tenets of Bolshevism and abandonment 
of the united front policies of the twenties. In the 
circumstances of 1929 these two trends - one part of an 
established tradition on the extreme left of Australian 
labour, the other part of a tragedy on a world-wide scale - 
were to coalesce in producing a particularly narrow and 
sectarian C.P.A. As the Moxon-Sharkey-Miles leadership was 
installed in power a vigorous campaign against left, right, 
and centre 'social fascists' ranging from Garden to Prime 
Minister Scullin was launched, and soon all C.P.A. members 
were thrown out of office at the Labor Council of N.S.W., 
the A.C.T.U. broke its links with the P.P.T.U.S., and a 
great inquietude descended on the mainstream Australian left 
as the options of socialists outside the Communist Party were 
narrowed and they were forced into coalition with moderate 
and right wing forces in the labour movement on domestic 
questions, and into isolationist stances on foreign affairs. 
Making the field of Marxist revolutionary agitation their own, 
and basing their operations on a full-blown Bolshevik quasi­
military structure and organisation, the C.P.A. developed 
a distinctively Communist internationalism, narrowly focussed 
on the Soviet Union and on related Comintern sections, and 
steadfastly opposed to the whole organised labour movement 
in Australia.
CHAPTER THREE
THE LEFT-WING WORLD OUTLOOK 1918-29
j^W^ithin the Australian movement there are 
Tierce champions oT every viewpoint.... And 
yet, of Australia's social experimentation a 
critic... could write... that Australian 
Socialism has been... a 'socialism without 
doctrines'.... Since £this criticj] wrote, 
things have moved with hurricane swiftness. 
Mechanisation has made all things once more 
new; now rationalisation is here with a second 
industrial revolution. Sovietism is on the 
spot also. Wonderful indeed if all thought 
and theories were not in the melting pot I
The socialists of the labour movement, though 
disappointed in the content of Bolshevism as it emerged with 
increasing clarity by the early 1920s, nevertheless continued 
to be immensely influenced by the vision of international 
change which had appeared before them at the end of World War 
One. Like the new C.P.A., socialists generally stressed the 
need for labour to develop an international outlook, and to 
prepare itself for the next crisis of capitalism, which was 
thought of as only temporarily stabilised. And though still 
differing on many points, the Marxian left imparted to the 
labour movement a view of the world that was distinctively 
internationalist in flavour, and they succeeded in making a 
very live issue of foreign affairs in the post-war period. 
This chapter aims at delineating some of the major features 
of the world outlook that was propagated in these years by 
the labour movement's left wing.
* R.S. Ross: "A Labour View of Pacific Problems", in P.
Campbell, R.C. Mills and G.V. Portus, Studies in Australian 
Affairs (Melb., 1928), pp.216-217.
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i. The inevitability of capitalist war
One point of unanimous agreement amongst the
socialist left was the belief in the likelihood of a second
world war. For some this idea stemmed from their acceptance
of the Leninist thesis that the world had entered an entirely
1new era of continuous warfare; for others it derived from 
their belief in the inherent instability of capitalism and 
the likelihood that the forces which had conjoined to bring 
about the Great War could repeat themselves in the near 
future. All looked first to central Europe and Russia as 
the scene of armed conflict as Allied intervention against 
Bolshevism looked likely in the immediate post-war years. 
Increasingly however attention was focussed on the Pacific 
as the theatre of the next world conflict, and socialists 
urged on the labour movement the necessity of taking measures 
against a conflagration in which Australia could not avoid 
becoming totally involved.
Allied intervention in Russia at the end of World
War One was proof abundant to the labour left that the
international class war had been consciously joined and that
the world faced a generalised conflict involving capitalist
2versus socialist nation states. Thus they saw the very
survival of Bolshevism as an immense victory for socialism
and a defeat for the leading capitalist powers. First the
widespread British campaigns in Russia had met defeat; then,
following Poland’s invasion of Russia in 1920, French designs
had met a likewise fate. At the same time it was recognised
that the full force of capitalism was not arrayed against
Bolshevism, a fact which was explained by the left as due to
3intra-capitalist jealousy and rivalry. In particular
1. This belief had been put forward by some socialists in 
Australia in advance of it being popularised by Lenin.
S e e f o r e x a m p l e , I.S. , M a r .8, 1917, p.4
2. S e e C h a p t e r  F o u r , s e c t i o n  ii.
3. S e e f o r e x a m p l e , D . S . , J a n .6, 1 9 2 0 , P.4
the Siberian interventionists America and Japan had been 
restrained from entertaining full-scale hostilities, and 
there remained a strong suspicion amongst socialists that 
these countries were still entertaining plans to attack the 
first workers’ state despite the failure of the earlier
leaders of world imperialism to put down the Bolshevik regime.
America and Japan were thus quickly perceived as
the most dynamic and emergent capitalist powers who could
challenge the status quo in the post-war years. As Frank
Anstey put it in his book Red Europe:
England is the indebted vassal of the American Money 
Power. England, in common with all Western Europe, is 
faced with the competition of the new Imperialisms - 
America and Japan. They not only seize their foreign 
trade - they assail them in their home markets. Europe 
has no longer its pre-war advantages. Its industries 
are shattered, loaded with debt, and its workers not 
only refusing to go back to old conditions, but asking 
for quick delivery of the promised paradise.5
"Capitalism”, Anstey had added over-confidently, "has no way
of solving the problems produced by the war"; yet even as the
likelihood of revolution in Europe receded it remained clear
that the initiative in capitalist affairs had shifted to Japan
and America and that the power politics of capitalism had
found their centre of gravity in the Pacific. "The next war"
- commented R.S. Ross in the pages of the Socialist - "so
glibly... registered for the Pacific, carries with its menace
the wiping off the map of Australia as we know it, politically
and industrially".^
In the years which followed prophecies of a Pacific 
war that would embroil Australia represented a constant theme 
in socialist propaganda. There were many different crises 
predicted as heralding the onset of this holocaust as 
circumstances changed throughout the 1920s. At first the
4
4. Ibid.; Socialist, Feb.2 4, 1922, p .1; O.B.U.H., Nov., 1920,
P. 3.
5. F. Anstey, Red Europe (Melb., 1919)» p.188.
6. Socialist, Aug.5» 1921, p.3»
focii of instability were seen as the great Pacific markets
for goods and investments, particularly Siberia, China and 7 vauntedAustralasia. With the/ renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
competition for these markets was said to involve three 
players, with England tied to Japan's expansionist plans forgthe Far East and the Pacific islands. Increasingly however
much was also made of England's own clash of interests with
QAmerica over control of events in Europe; and the colossal
war debts, which would push England to imperialist adventurism
and prompt her to fight America rather than continue to repay 
1 0her loans. Basically then the predicted scenarios envisaged
were America versus England or Japan, with the latter two
nations almost certainly allied. Whether war began directly
over the Eastern markets or through a clash of interests in
Europe the Pacific area would be closely involved. As time
1 1passed some variations were made upon these themes but
always in left-wing propaganda the Pacific theatre figured
as critically important in the playing out of the armed
conflicts which were seen as an inevitable result of rivalry
1 2between the major capitalist powers.
Following France's occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 
some interest was shown by Communists and other socialists 
in the position in Europe. French ambitions in Europe had
7. See for example Communist, Oct.14, 1921, p.2; L .C ., Nov.3»
1 9 2 1 ,  p . 6 .
8. Socialist, Dec.9, 1921, p.2; Communist, Nov.18, 1921, p.4.
9. Socialist, Oct.28, 1921, p.2.
10. J. McLean, The Coming War With America [[Foreword by R.S. 
Ross] (Melb., 1920)7
11. An article reprinted in the Socialist, Dec.9> 1921, p.2, 
suggested some of the more picturesque variations of 
scenario when it declared that
It is easy to see what position the world is in.
It is either another world war between Britain and 
Japan versus America; or an amalgamation of Britain 
and America to control the world, with a resultant 
war between the awakened Capitalistic Powers of Japan, 
China and India, i.e., colored nations versus Britain, 
America and other countries, as white nations; or the 
conquest of the world by the United States of America 
with a consequent world rebellion of workers and the 
establishment of a world Soviet Republic.
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1 3earlier attracted comment from the left-wing press, and 
there was continuing interest in the phenomenon of fascism 
in Italy, whose European and world wide significance was
1 4quickly recognised. However it was the invasion of the
Ruhr which seemed to signal a real return to the European
turmoil of the immediate post-war years. The left saw the
invasion of the Ruhr as facilitated by the Treaty of
Versailles, which had long been considered merely an
arrangement for keeping Germany subservient and bleeding
her profits, and had now become a shield for French capitalists
1 5to assume total control over their competitor’s industries. 
Initially the C.P.A’s Communist greeted the news of the
invasion as signalling a workers’ revolt in the two protagonist
1 6nations and accused the capitalist press of suppressing this 
1 7fact. Other socialist organs were less sanguine as to the
possibilities of such a turn of events and accepted more
readily that for many years to come developments in Europe
could only make for widespread misery and suppression of the
hopes of the proletariat. There was a general expression of
gloom as to the future facing the European workers, a
conviction strengthened by the institution of the Dawes Plan
and the disastrous results of the miners’ struggle and
1 8General Strike in Britain in 1926.
Attention shifted back to the Far East following 
the spectacular rise of the Kuomintang movement in China in 
the mid-1920s. The Chinese situation as it emerged by about 
1925 brought forth the spectre of united action by imperialist
12. Socialist, Feb.24, 1922, p .15 Communist, Jan.12, 1923»
p .3, 0,B ,U .H ,t Oct.2, 1923, p .3.
13. A X ,  Feb.11, 1921, p . 3 •
14. Communist, April 20, 1923» P»2; Socialist, March-April,
1923, p.2. See also Fascism, Capitalism’s Bloody Defender 
(Syd., 1928).
15. W.W., Nov.23, 1923, p.1.
16. Communist, Jan.19» 1923» p.2 .
17. W.W., June 29, 1923, P .3.
18. U.V., Dec.15, 1924, p.3; W.W., Mar.4, 1927, p.1.
powers in putting down the nationalist and socialist movement 
of that country, and the analogy with earlier Allied inter-
1 9vention in Russia was quickly drawn by the socialist press.
An imperialist war on China, it was contended by the left
wing, would constitute both a neat answer to the falling
profits of capitalist countries and at the same time strike
a direct blow at the labour movement's development on a
20world-wide scale. To the socialist left the conflict in
China was a focus of all the forces of instability that had
descended on the Pacific in the post-war era, and they
displayed acute apprehension that Australia would be drawn
into the fighting and combined with trade unionists in 1926-7
21to set on foot a Hands off China campaign. Their enthusiasm
however waned and the Hands off China movement collapsed when,
in 1927> war broke out between the Kuomintang and their
erstwhile allies of the Chinese Communist Party. Henceforth
socialists continued to forecast war as the lot of Australians
yet with a distinct note of resignation permeating their
propaganda. Their propaganda had come full circle, for far
from a clash between the imperialist powers in the Pacific
the most likely threat to peace now was the possibility of
capitalism following up its victories in China with a direct
22attack on the U.S.S.R.
The effect of the socialist belief in an imminent 
war in the Pacific was to stand them apart from the great 
majority of Australians, who showed little concern for the 
issues involved. Convinced that the stability of capitalism 
was only a temporary phenomenon socialists tended to assume 
a certain minority sect-like righteousness in their attempts 
to influence mass labour organisations to retain the militant
19. W .W .t June 12, 1925, p.3; U.V., Sept.12, 1925, p.1.
20. W.W., Feb.18, 1927, p.1; Railways Union Gazette, Nov.10, 
1926, p.9; U.V., March 19, 1927, p.1.
21. See Chapter Four, section iii.
22. P,P.¥., Dec.15, 1928, p.14; W.W.t Dec.6 , 1929, P.2.
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values and policies which the left prescribed. "I am told
that Labor audiences are tired of ’war talk'", complained
R.S. Ross in a front page article entitled ’Warl Wari WarJ’
in the Union Voice in 1925.
That this is said with truth to be the case with the 
masses, we may not deny. The masses prefer racing, 
football and amusements as a pleasant sort of 
chloroforming - a preference itself the fruit of war.... 
But that as distinct from the masses, the Labor movement 
- in the sense of the movement being essentially those 
who carry on its work - should also be falling victims 
to the despair... is a symptom tragically disturbing.
I have fought shy of admitting it to be true, but...
I must face the fact. One seems to sense a feeling as 
of audiences overwhelmed by the gigantic complexity and 
size of the problem - as though it were too big for 
them - and with this a realisation of the hopelessness 
of a solution. The audiences would rather forget that 
they stand on a volcano.... Alasi to feel helpless is 
to be already conquered.... War-talk must be familiar 
in our mouths as household words.^3
Aware that the mood of the country was against them socialists 
nevertheless insisted on the need for organised labour to 
maintain its radical stance in order to meet a war situation 
which might any day recur. Socialists and those who were 
influenced by their propaganda spent these years in a sub­
culture of concern that each new week might see the outbreak 
of a Second World War.
What the left throughout the 1920s had critically 
failed to take into account was the force of diplomacy in 
modifying the clash of interests between England, Japan and 
America on which they based their forecast of a Pacific War. 
This complete rejection of diplomacy as an operative factor 
in dampening down the clashes of rival imperialisms was to be 
seen in socialist reactions to the Washington Treaties of 
1921, which were one of the critical factors in freezing power 
relationships in the Pacific region and preventing an armed 
clash between Japan and America until the changed situation 
of the 1930s released these forces once more. The Washington 
disarmament talks and the treaties which resulted from it 
engendered immense optimism amongst Australians generally:
23. U.V., Jan.15, 1925, p.1
even so hardy a war-horse as W.M. Hughes declaring it was an
24assurance of peace in the Pacific for many years to come.
Yet the socialist and left-wing press was united in decrying
the Washington agreements as a sham and subterfuge and having
no effect on the trend to open warfare that the continued
existence of capitalism made inevitable. "The Washington
Conference had agreed to scrap useless ships which the nations
did not want", the V.S.P. lecturer Professor W.T. Goode 
25argued, reflecting the cynicism and suspicion towards the
2 6agreements which in the labour movement was widespread.
"The pact - to be broken at will - for the nations to hold
off from war for ten years.... was merely to give the nations
breathing time to prepare for the next war".
In place of capitalist diplomacy socialists argued
that the only really hopeful force for peace in world affairs
was the organised strength of the working class. Acutely
aware of the failure of the European socialists in the face
of the Great War in 1914 the left was nevertheless confident
that the working class movement had progressed far through
the cleansing of its ranks of outright class traitors and
the increased radicalisation of the masses in the course of
World War One. Socialists pointed to the united working
class action against Allied intervention in Russia in 1920
as an example of what had already been achieved by organised
labour in preventing war, and they looked towards the
development of a determination amongst labour movements to
take similar concerted action against all such capitalist
wars in the future. As E.J. Holloway put it when commenting
upon a Melbourne T.H.C. resolution to that effect:
we must be prepared to help our fellow-workers in the 
other countries to continue this good work, for if Labor 
desires to emancipate society from war, it must not only 
rely upon peace societies, but it must weld itself into 
a firm and indivisible whole, and nationally and inter­
nationally it must wage an undying war against war.^7
24. See P. Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939-41 
(Canb., 1952), p.14.
25. Socialist f Feb.24, 1922, p.1.
26. For similar opinions see for example Socialist, Dec.9» 
1921, p.2; L.N., Dec.24, 1921, p.1; Communist, Sept.30, 
1921, p.3. See also £w.I.I.U.] Disarmament a Dream 
(Melb., 1921).
So much was fairly clear in the left-wing world 
outlook, and was the basis for a powerful united front of 
socialists who urged Australian labour towards establishing 
links with the international labour movement throughout the 
1920s. And yet there were also significant differences 
between socialists when it came to formulating practical 
measures to prevent war and to counter imperialist 
machinations with socialist change. For purist Leninism too 
sought to promote ’war against war', but it had bestowed on 
that notion a novel and very exacting twist of meaning.
ii. Revolution - in a changing perspective
In the years before Bolshevism almost all left-wing
socialists had seen themselves as revolutionaries, in contrast
to the 'reformists' of the labour movement who were content
with limited change and the boundaries of practical everyday
politics. This habit of mind continued amongst leftists for
many years after World War One. Despite their differences
over tactics a wide spectrum of socialists - including many
union leaders and members of the A.L.P. - continued to see
themselves as revolutionaries by virtue of their seeking a
2 8rapid and complete change in society. There was little 
credence given to Leninism's audacious claim that Communism 
represented the only true revolutionary brand of socialism.
A large part of the explanation for this attitude 
lies in the way in which the Russian Revolution was conceived 
of by the left as an augur of world revolution rather than as 
an isolated phenomenon. The Bolsheviks were seen by most 
socialists as a kindred movement to their own and related 
also to the many different labour organisations working against
27. U.V., Sept.15, 1924, p .3.
28. Cf. the definition set forth by the 1921 All-Australian 
Trade Union Congress:
"Revolutionary action" means action to secure a 
complete change, namely, the abolition of capitalistic 
ownership of the means of production - whether privately 
or through the State - and the establishment in its place 
of social ownership by the whole community.
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war and capitalism throughout the world. Nor was Bolshevism
thought of initially as the only successful socialist movement,
for great hopes were held out for revolution in Germany even
after the crushing of the Spartakists; the socialist republic
2Qin Hungary attracted close attention and scrutiny, and even
into the early 1920s it seemed possible that Italy might join
30Russia as a socialist state. Even Mexico was reputed to
have established a strong ’communist* state called Zapataland
and this was extolled by some as providing a model of socialist
31change as valid and exciting as the Russian model.
Consequently in the early post-war years left-wing
socialists of all hues tended to see themselves as part of a
world revolutionary movement. The Sydney-based S.L.P. in
1919 renamed its newspaper the Revolutionary Socialist and
continued to promote the idea of One Big Union of workers
conjoined to a de Leonist political party as the way to
achieve rapid socialist change. The W.I.I.U. continued its
attempts to create the One Big Union from the shop floor level
upwards and its leadership was aghast at any suggestion that
32Lenin did not endorse their position. The remnants of the
29. R.S., Aug.2, 1919, P •2.
30. L.C,, April 8, 1920, p.1.
31. The interest in Zapataland demonstrates more clearly than 
any other example the powerful element of romance and myth 
in left-wing ideas about world revolution. Emeliano 
Zapata was leader of a peasant socialist movement which 
had seized control of the State of Morelos and surrounding 
territories in Mexico and imposed communal ownership on 
land. After maintaining a defiant existence against a 
series of Mexican central governments the movement Zapata 
led collapsed following his assassination in 1919»
Several propagandists of industrial unionism in Australia 
claimed that Zapataland was ruled by a One Big Union 
organisation. The lack of detailed information concerning 
the achievements of this fictitious One Big Union was 
adduced as proof of its existence: it being alleged that 
’capitalist press censorship' was deliberately obscuring 
the true course of events overseas. Zapataland proved 
particularly interesting to many members of the W.I.I.U. 
and the V.S.P. and developments in Mexico were followed 
into the 1920s in the pages of the Socialist. For an 
outline of the Zapataland myth see E . B i r d ( e d . ), 
Zapataland (Melb., 1919)» H.E. Langridge, All Australian 
Political Conference of Unionists. An Open Letter To The 
Delegates At The First Congress... 20th June 1921 (Melb., 
1921).
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I.W.W. believed that they too were the Australian equivalent
33of the Bolsheviks, and following their disillusionment with 
the C.P.A. turned back in the 1920s to attempts to revive 
their old organisations. All these groups refused to see 
Communism as the only road to revolution and felt justified 
in drawing on the Russian experience principally to bolster 
their own ideological positions.
At the same time a far more important group on the 
left wing of the A.L.P. adopted a revolutionary stance in 
these years that made militant socialism a real practical 
force in labour affairs. This was the position adopted by 
the majority who rallied behind R.S. Ross in the debates 
over Bolshevism in the V.S.P.; but in N.S.W. also many drew 
almost identical conclusions to those of the V.S.P., and 
there were strong echoes of this viewpoint in several other 
States too. Practical men, holding positions of power within 
the Labor Party or in A.L.P. affiliated unions, it was the 
pro-A.L.P. revolutionaries who posed the most serious threat 
to the status-quo.
The forces for and against avowed revolution first
came into open conflict in the disputes involving control of
the N.S.W. A.L.P. in 1919* The bid to capture control of
the A.L.P. in that State came from the diverse group of
radicals within the Party leadership led by A.C. Willis and 
34J. Garden. They rallied behind them the great bulk of
O.B.U. supporters and began a campaign to convert the A.L.P.
to an outright advocacy of militant socialism which would,
in Arthur Rae's words, weld the Labor Movement into "one
body... making for the emancipation and regeneration of 
3 5mankind". Against them were arrayed the powerful A.W.U.
32. On this see the extensive correspondence between P.
Simonoff and members of the W.I.I.U. contained in the 
J.B. Scott Papers, in L.T.L.
33» Solidarity. Mar.23, 1918, p.2.
34. For a detailed account of the 1919 N.S.W. A.L.P. Confer­
ence and the events leading up to it see Turner, Indus­
trial Labour and Politics, pp.188-192.
35. L.N., Dec.7, 1918, p .7.
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and the Labor Party politicians who launched a public 
campaign against this alleged attempt to import Bolshevism 
and direct action I.W.Wism into the affairs of the A.L.P. 
Finding themselves narrowly outnumbered the left abandoned 
the 1919 N.S.W. Party Conference en masse to form the 
Socialist Party of Australia. After renaming themselves the 
Industrial Socialist Labor Party the dissidents contested the 
December 1919 Federal elections but fared badly. Following 
this electoral defeat some of the A.L.P, breakaways 
concentrated their efforts on getting back into the A.L.P., 
while the rump of the I.S.L.P. in January 1920 amalgamated
Q  (1
with Judd's S.L.P. Some of these followed Garden out of 
the S.L.P. into the Communist Party when it was founded 
later in that year.
The glaring and obvious lesson of the I.S.L.P. 
venture was the lack of electoral support for an openly 
revolutionary political party. In the months between the 
split in the N.S.W. A.L.P. and the 1919 elections the press 
and the right-wing forces in control of the Labor Party 
launched a bitter campaign against Communism and attempted 
to associate the breakaways with advocacy of terrorism and
37every atrocity alleged of the Bolsheviks in Russia. The
electoral liability under which they thus laboured was 
immediately recognised by some of the more experienced 
amongst the I.S.L.P. leadership and they tried to present a 
more moderate face to the electors by avoiding attempts to 
foist the title Revolutionary Socialist Party of Australia
O Oupon them. In the event the title did not matter: the
I.S.L.P. breakaways from the Labor Party were judged as far 
beyond the pale by most voters.
36. R.S., Feb.1, 1920, p .2.
37. See L.N., Sept.6 , 1919, P-7; Argus, July 5, 1919; Aug.2,
1919.38. This title was proposed by the A.S.P. at a series of 
unity conferences with the I.S.L.P., the S.D.L., and the 
S.L.P. The title Revolutionary Socialist Party of 
Australia was particularly opposed at these discussions 
by the veteran socialist S.A. Rosa. The unity conferen­
ces broke down in September 1919 following insistence by 
the three smaller parties that the I.S.L.P. adopt the 
'Revolutionary' name. See I .S ., Aug.16, 1919, p.1.
There were further lessons too in the conflicts 
in the labour movement during this period. The disputes in 
the N.S.W. A.L.P. came hard upon the turbulent discussions 
over the meaning of Bolshevism in the Sydney socialist 
parties and the V.S.P. During the course of these debates 
it became increasingly clear that Bolshevism provided no 
basis for unity of the left, but was in fact a new and 
divisive issue. From this time onwards the left was to 
divide three ways: firstly, into the minority sects
attempting to maintain their old ideas in opposition to 
Communism; secondly, into those willing to experiment with 
the C.P.A. and import as much as possible the Bolshevik 
model into Australia; thirdly, those who agreed with R.S.
Ross that to begin again the fight for labour emancipation 
would be foolhardy and that the existing union movement, the 
A.L.P., and the institutions of democracy offered the most 
likely vehicles of socialist change in the Australian context. 
This third group came to a realisation that Bolshevism was a 
basically Russian phenomenon that meant by revolution a 
process and technology widely at variance with local 
conditions. Such declared ’revolutionaries’ though they 
continued to admire Bolshevism were increasingly unprepared 
to endorse its methods. Unlike Garden and the Trades Hall 
reds they sought to return as quickly as possible to 
membership of the A.L.P.
Yet by any embracing definition this left wing of 
the Labor Party remained revolutionary in its aims and its 
commitment to widespread and rapid socialist change. The 
programme of the 1921 Melbourne trade union congress, which 
they were instrumental in having adopted, looked to the almost 
immediate supersession of capitalism, and it prescribed 
quasi-syndicalist methods as well as utilisation of parliament 
by the A.L.P. y Though the left compromised with the A.L.P. 
to the extent of accepting the Labor Party as an equal partner 
with the Council of Action in implementing socialism it was 
clear that they looked beyond the conventional parliamentary
39» See Chapter Four for a full account of the ideals of the 
1921 Melbourne Congress.
system to the operation of* nationalised industries through 
the worker-controlled Supreme Economic Council. In short, 
the mainstream left looked to an Australian path to socialism 
that was at once revolutionary and attainable through the 
existing institutions of the labour movement.
Following R.S. Ross's statement of the left-wing 
A.L.P. viewpoint in his book Revolution in Russia and 
Australia some further attempts were made to define a 
position that was both revolutionary and easily differentiated
40from Bolshevism. In the face of right-wing criticism of
the 1921 socialisation objective as basically Bolshevik in 
its proposals to transfer power to the Supreme Economic 
Council it was suggested that such a body had its intellec­
tual roots in guild socialism and was in any case a logical
4 1development of all ideas of worker control. And the
argument on which the greatest stress was laid by the A.L.P. 
left in defence of the 1921 objective was that it offered 
the opportunity for a peaceful revolution to a socialist
42system. In Australia, it was contended, violence was
unnecessary, and if it was initiated by the proletariat it
could only rebound against their interests and lead to a
43fascist repression. In most cases this did not amount to
a pacifist condemnation of violence in toto, and many
members of the left wing of the A.L.P. were prepared to
suggest that under certain conditions it was correct and
justified to utilise force in order to achieve socialist 
44goals. In Russia violence and terrorism were unavoidable
because of the environment of repression under which
45socialists had been forced to operate. However it was 
illogical and anti-Marxist to suggest that what was true of 
Russia was applicable in an industrially developed and
40. For Ross's own development see particularly What Next? 
Building the Industrial State (Australian Labor's Next 
Step) (Melb., 1921).
41. L.C., Nov.23, 1922, p .2.
42. L.C., Nov.16, 1922, p .2.
43. Socialist, June 24, 1921, p.1.
44. Ibid. See also D. Cameron in the Socialist, Jan.20,
1922, p.1; Mar.17, 1922, p.1. For suggestions that such
a situation could arise in Australia see the Socialist, 
March-April, 1923> p.2.
45. Socialist, June 24, 1921, p.1.
democratic country like Australia. Given the Australian
situation socialist revolution would be a phenomenon of the 
aroused masses who would rally to their traditional political 
expression - the Labor Party 'assisted1 by the Council of 
Action - permitting and indeed forcing labour leaders towards
47socialist change through existing institutions. Such in
outline was the programme of 'peaceful revolution' that
continued to be advocated by the V.S.P. and leading trade
48unionists such as A.C. Willis and E.J. Holloway.
As the 1920s progressed however the question of
revolution in any form became increasingly academic and
remote. All the ideas of revolution which had been so
heatedly discussed in the atmosphere of the early post-war
years had assumed that the turmoil of those years would
continue and that the capitalist system could neither
stabilise economically for any prolonged period nor retain
the allegiance of the working class. As the tide of
international radicalism and world revolution ebbed much
more immediate considerations came to dominate the affairs
of the labour movement. Revolution was no longer a serious
issue and the only real scope for radical agitation was in
united front activities in defence of gains already made
49and positions won. Revolutionary theorising came to be
seen as not only a handicap in the struggle for power and
influence in the labour movement but a diversion and waste
of time when the working class were clearly unready to
50support such change. Debate and discussion over the 
question slipped from the centre of the stage and it was 
left to the ideologues of the C.P.A. and the sectaries of 
the S.L.P. and I.W.W. to hone up their revolutionary 
formulae away from the mainstream of the labour movement.
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46. Ibid.; Socialist, Sept.1, 1922, p.2.
47. Ross's Monthly, Mar.10, 1923» P»3» See also Chapter Four.
48. Socialist, July 1, 1922, p .1; L.C., Sept.7» 1922, p.1; 
cf. Communist, Dec.9» 1921, p.5.
49. L.C., Oct.5, 1922, p.1; Oct.12, 1922, p.9.
50. U.V., Dec.12, 1925, p.4; Feb.13, 1926, p.4.
By this process of desuetude the title of revolutionary 
slowly slipped to the extreme left and the C.P.A. Within 
the A.L.P. there was no concerted attempt to return to the 
revolutionary socialism of 1921 until the Great Depression 
years.
iii. Marxism and the White Australia policy
One of the greatest problems facing left-wing
internationalism was working class adherence to the White
Australia policy. Two aspects of this great shibboleth of
the labour movement dominated discussion of the matter at
every turn: White Australia as an economic policy safeguarding
working class living standards; and White Australia as a
reflection of racialism and nationalism, a conception dear
to the heart of many A.L.P. leaders and A.W.U. officials.
To the first aspect of the question socialists and trade
unionists occupying responsible positions in the labour
movement could raise no serious objections, but with the
racialist aspects of the White Australia policy they could
51on principle have no truck. Already in pre-war years the
debates over White Australia had resulted in left-wing 
criticism of the racialist overtones that advocacy of this 
policy had assumed. Slowly, confusedly - and with 
equivocation on the part of some - in the years after World
51. In discussing the White Australia question it will be 
noticed that I have chosen the word racialism (ie. 
ethnical=colour bias) in preference to 'racism* in an 
attempt to recapture something of the historical context 
in which the debates took place and to avoid a confusing 
word which is quite devoid of meaning in that context.
The word 'racism' has been used very loosely in recent 
discussion of White Australia and related questions to 
mean both colour bias and socio-economic bias and 
discrimination. The use of the modern double-barreled 
word 'racism' (notwithstanding its possibly laudable 
contemporary efficacy) is quite meaningless when employed 
in discussing 'socialists': ie. those committed to the
belief in the superiority of socialism to all other forms 
of society. A conscious commitment to 'socialism', 
'Communism' (or for that matter 'capitalism') I£> socio­
economic bias par excellence.
War One the left pressed further forward with its attempts 
to seek a diminution of the racialist aspects of labour’s 
traditional policy of immigration restriction.
The most extreme internationalist stance on the
White Australia policy was that adopted by the Wobblies
during the first world war. For Wobbly leaders the White
Australia policy was part of a capitalist plot to ensnare
the working class in capitalist society: it also was useful
for attacking the Chicago I.W.W’s bete noire, the A.W.U.
Along with a tirade of propaganda of a similar nature in the
pages of the I.W.W. paper Direct Action the Wobblies
published in 1915 a pamphlet which included in its attacks
on the A.W.U. its refusal "to enrol within its ranks all
52Asiatic workers and natives of the South Sea Islands".
The pamphlet contrasted the A.W.U. - "composed of cockroach
business men, publicans, cockles,... and the rest of the
riff-raff that comprise the undesirable middle class" - with
the "rebellious Asiatic worker, who is up against the boss on
the job", and went on to proclaim the I.W.W. as the only
industrial organisation to transcend completely the barriers
53of nationality, creed or colour. Direct Action accused
the A.W.U. of attempting to "manufacture scabs" by excluding 
coloured workers and announced that the I.W.W. would make a 
special effort to establish itself in areas such as the 
Northern Territory where it was alleged there existed a 
reservoir of non-white workers waiting to be unionised. In 
a masterly underlining of the Wobbly differences with the 
A.W.U. over this issue their pamphlets included a manifesto 
of the I.W.W. translated into Chinese.
In answer to the charge that abandoning the 
immigration colour bar would lead to a flood of cheap labour 
into Australia the Wobblies accepted this development with
52. A. George, Why the A.W.U. cannot become an Industrial 
Union (Syd., 1915)> p .9.
53» Ibid.; see also D.A,, April 1, 1915» p.2; May Day,
1915, p.4.
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a strange and perverse enthusiasm. It was suggested that
even in the face of attempts to utilise mass importation of
coloured labour to break down living standards the only
correct working class strategy was to enrol the new arrivals
into the structure of industrial unionism rather than exclude
them from the country. Some even went so far as to suggest
that the new arrivals would be a positive asset, who would
"add to the movement that touch of barbarism necessary to
54meet the unscrupulous tactics of capitalism". By thus
totally rejecting all the benefits of nationalism the 
Wobblies had resolved the problem of applying internationalism 
to the Australian situation, but in a way that no one in the 
mainstream labour movement could possibly accept. Their 
approach was crude, emotional, irresponsible and escapist; 
but it apparently possessed a compulsion and extreme 
simplicity that proved attractive to some ideologue minds. 
Following the Chicago I.W.W's demise echoes of such beliefs 
were heard from members of the A.S.P. and later from certain 
sections of the C.P.A., much to the embarrassment of the 
more responsible critics of racialism.
The totally impractical nature of the Wobbly 
approach to the White Australia question was demonstrated 
by their own miserably unsuccessful attempts at organising 
the one big union amongst Australian workers. More poignant 
still was the complete failure of Wobbly efforts to organise, 
in opposition to the A.W.U., those Asians already within 
Australia, Though a full-time organiser was provided for the 
project and thousands of Chinese language I.W.W. Preambles 
were distributed the 'rebellious Asiatic worker' of northern 
Australia failed to materialize. No viable Local of the 
I.W.W. was ever established in the Northern Territory.
54. D.A., July 15, 1915, p.1. See also D.A., April 15,
1915» p.3; P.J. Rushton, The Industrial Workers of the 
World in Sydney, 1913-1917# A Study in Revolutionary 
Ideology and Practice (M.A. thesis, S y d . U n i v . , 1 969)» 
pp.198-199.55. The Wobblies however had greater success with European 
minorities in Australia. The I.W.W. proved attractive 
to many Germans and by 1917 all-Russian Local was 
established in Cairns.
But quite apart from the irapracticality of I.W.W. 
strategy towards immigration, the Wobblies betrayed an 
unwillingness to come to grips with the solid working class 
adherence to racialist ideas which alone would have made 
abandonment of the White Australia policy quite impossible. 
Their escapism was in fact symptomatic of the enormous problem 
faced by parties dedicated to dogmatic internationalist purity 
but operating in an environment in which racialism was strong­
ly entrenched and closely intertwined with the basic 
aspirations of the working class. The A.W.U., in championing 
racialism and exclusionism was simply continuing to reflect a 
popular and primitive creed sanctioned by the labour 
movement's entire history and experience in this country; in 
openly opposing racialism the I.W.W. had issued to the labour 
movement a frontal challenge which in 1915 had very 
little appeal to the working masses.
Neither did the problems facing internationalists
diminish as the influence of the I.W.W. and other socialist
parties grew. The conscription referendum of October 1916
was marked not only by increasing militancy on the part of
the Australian working class and the growth in influence and
power of socialist groups, but by charges and counter-charges
involving the 'Yellow Peril' and the alleged intention of the
government led by Hughes to relax the White Australia policy
in order to flood the country with cheap labour to replace
Australians conscripted overseas. One racialist argument of
particular importance to the success of the anti-conscription
campaign concerned the fortuitous arrival of two batches of
Maltese immigrants who, anti-conscriptionists alleged, were
the vanguard of a massive importation of indentured labour
into this country which would replace as rapidly as they
could be called up the white Australians who were to be
56conscripted overseas. Such arguments certainly influenced
the outcome of voting in the referendum; there is even 
evidence that despite warnings in the pages of Direct Action
56. Scott, Australia During The War, p p .35^-356
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against its readers engaging in the encouragement of the 
considerable race hatred that as a result was built up, not 
even the thoroughgoing internationalist I.W.W. cadres could 
resist alluding to the Maltese in the course of their anti­
conscription agitation. "There is little doubt that many of 
our speakers used that bogey as a weapon to fight conscrip­
tion", an article in Direct Action reflected wistfully, "and
57... with a fair measure of success".
Thus the basic undertones of racialist awareness 
in the Australian working class posed a serious conundrum for 
the internationalist left. So intertwined with the economic 
demand for immigration restriction was the White Australia 
policy that its racialist aspects were taken for granted in 
almost every discussion of issues impinging on that subject. 
So ingrained were racialist habits of thinking that even the 
most extreme internationalists could be caught out appealing 
to race prejudice and paranoia in order to enrol working 
class support for their stance on other issues. The White 
Australia concept was so pervasive that on the issue of 
racial equality there was an almost inevitable confutation 
of purist Marxian doctrine whenever its influence expanded, 
and some acceptance by the would-be leaders of the lingua 
franca of the led.
However, wider acceptance of internationalist 
ideals in the wake of the Russian Revolution did lead to 
increasing interest in the problem of racialism on the part 
of large segments of the labour movement. An important 
factor in this increasing interest in racialism was the 
remarkable and pronounced success of Bolshevism in Eastern 
countries, and the consequent focussing of socialist interest 
on the problems of working-class movements in the Asiatic 
zone,^ There was also particular interest taken in
57. D.A ., Dec.1 6 , 1 9 1 6 ,  p . 4 .
58. I.S., June 1 2 ,  1 9 2 0 ,  p . 2 ;  A.C., Jan.2 8 ,  1921 , p.3;
R.S,. May 3 1 ,  1 9 1 9 ,  p.3; Sept.1, 1 9 1 9 ,  p.3.
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developments in South Africa, a nation beset by economic
turmoil and serious racial division in the years after World
War One. The Communist press paid close attention to the
colour question in South Africa and how it affected white
and black workers respectively. Though admitting the
enormous problems racial divisions posed for the growth of
class consciousness the Proletarian described the situation
as one in which the 'artificial* barriers erected by white
workers against coloureds were bound to be broken down by
advancing capitalism and that this 'inevitable' repudiation
of colour bars by employers would then allow Communists to
organise and educate a 'real South African proletarian' to
59whom colour was of no consequence. When in 1922 armed
conflict broke out between the miners on the Rand and the 
South African government over the issue of increasing the 
number of coloured labourers vis-ä-vis white labour in the 
mines, it seemed that at least the first part of the 
Proletarian's analysis was correct. In passing a resolution 
of support for the Rand strikers "in their courageous fight 
against the armed forces of Capitalism" the Labor Council of 
N.S.W. could not resist the comment that it was time also 
for the miners to begin organising the black labourers who 
the capitalists were able to use as a tool in breaking down 
conditions. "It makes no difference what your color is", 
declared Garden in summing up discussion of the question.
"If you are being exploited by the ruling class, then the 
exploited class should organise, irrespective of color, for 
the purpose of freeing themselves from their exploiters"
Criticism was directed at this time also towards 
the continuing racial prejudice of the Australian Workers' 
Union, following that body's obtuse attempts to include in 
the proposed O.B.U. constitution the A.W.U. clause concerning 
racialist exclusionism, over which the I.W.W. had taken
59» Proletarian, Sept.7» 1921, p.8.
60. Labor Council of N.S.W., Report, 1922, p.12.
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umbrage in 1915. In March 1921 a conference of A.W.U. 
leaders and O.B.U. enthusiasts, held to draw up a 
constitution for the 'Australasian Workers' Union' which 
would unite both groups in the much talked of single 
industrial union, passed a clause specifying that membership 
was to exclude as of old "Chinese, Japanese, Kanakas, or 
Afghans, or colored aliens other than Maoris, American 
Negroes, and issue of mixed parentage born in Australasia''^ 
Seizing on this insult to the spirit of internationalism, 
purist and sectarian elements in the C.P.A. urged the 
breaking off of negotiations with the A.W.U. over the issue, 
arguing that O.B.U. leaders
would have shown a more proper appreciation and respect 
for the principles laid down in the preamble to the 
constitution of their own organisation, had they walked 
out of the Conference when such a rule was proposed, 
instead of remaining to insult the most intelligent and 
class-conscious members of their own unions by asking 
them to vote on such a scabby proposition. ^
As a result of this agitation against the A.W.U. the Seamen's 
Union later declined to take part in the tentative amalgama­
tions for the formation of an O.B.U. which followed the
decisions of the Melbourne Trade Union Congress of 1921. 63
61. Australasian Workers' Union, Constitution and General
Rules, 1922-1923« p.1.
62. A .C ., Mar.18, 1921, p.4. As with the I.W.W. however
Communists could not always reconcile their principles 
with the wish to influence events. Shortly before the 
attack on the A.W.U. appeared in the Australian Communist 
the International Socialist published an article by E.D. 
Morel entitled "Sexual Horrors / Let Loose by France on 
the Rhine" which was designed to discredit France, 
doubtless because of the important role France had played 
in marshalling interventionary forces against the U.S.S.R. 
This virulently racialist article alleged that the French 
army was using black troops to occupy the Rhine and thus 
"perpetrating an abominable outrage on womanhood, upon 
the white race, and upon civilization". The article was 
featured in a wide range of left-wing publications; in 
the International Socialist it appeared twice: "Reprinted
by Request".
63. V.G. Childe, How Labour Governs (Melb., 1964), p .180; 
Australasian Seamen's Journal, Mar.1, 1924, pp.6-7,
1 0- 1 2 .
133
Yet there were few attempts on the part of the 
Garden leadership of the C.P.A. to make an issue of
64racialism. Acutely aware of the need for alliances with
the A.W.U. in order to make a success of the 1921 All- 
Australian Trade Union Congress, the Trades Hall reds refused 
to be drawn into controversy over what seemed essentially a 
non-issue given the paucity of coloured workers in Australia. 
Furthermore as the 1920s progressed the importance Garden 
attached to Communists being allowed to enter the Labor Party 
meant that silence had to be maintained on the question of 
racialism for fear of embarrassing that party electorally.
At each succeeding election the A.L.P. and the conservative 
parties campaigned with increasing fervour to establish their 
right to pose as champions of the White Australia policy, and 
vied with each other in producing the crudest displays of 
political xenophobia and arrant racialism. In conservative 
propaganda even the slightest hint of criticism of the White 
Australia policy by Marxists in the labour movement was 
seized on and paraded before the electorate as proof of the 
A.L.P*s equivocation on the issue.
The arguments and debates over White Australia 
became increasingly intense as the 1920s progressed, and were 
pursued almost to the point of high comedy at the 1925 Federal 
elections. The conservative press in that year gave great 
publicity to a pamphlet produced by the Nationalist Party 
which sought to link Garden with Asian Communists and by so 
doing embarrass the A.L.P. and 'prove* that it was not sincere 
in its support for a White Australia. A critical piece of 
evidence in this specious and emotive propaganda was a 
photograph of Garden, Earsman and Tom Payne with other members 
of the Eastern Bureau of the Fourth Comintern Congress in
64. The issue of the A.W.U*s racialist exclusion clause seems 
to have been handled by the A.W.U. dropping its insistence 
on the need for the clause at the 1921 All-Australian 
Trade Union Congress, but including it in the proposed 
O.B.U. constitution circulated to its own members in 1922. 
Garden maintained a public silence on these changes.
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Moscow in 1922. Its authenticity was of course beyond
doubt, but it was deemed an electoral danger by the A.L.P.,
and the Labor Daily capped the Nationalist propaganda by
doctoring the offending photograph to excise the wayward
Australians from the Asians’ midst, and then accusing the
Nationalist Party of producing a forgery in the original
photograph they had used. This manoeuvre on the part of the
Willis-Lang alliance in control of the Labor Daily and the
N.S.W. Labor Party machine had the twofold purpose of
countering Nationalist Party propaganda, whilst at the same
time forcing Garden into either an embarrassing position of
total opposition to the A.L.P., or virtual silence for the
duration of the 1925 elections. Despite pressure from the
rank and file of the C.P.A. Garden chose to maintain silence
on the question, and it was not until after the Federal
election had been held that he was prepared to engage in
criticism of the A.L.P's tactics in forging the photograph.
Even then for the most part he directed his criticism towards
the extremist anti-Communists of the N.S.W. Parliamentary
Labor Party whom he blamed for the whole photography farce,
and he avoided lengthy comment on the broader issues over
65which the incident had originally arisen. Garden well
realised the impossibility of maintaining a position of 
influence vis-a-vis the A.L.P. and at the same time openly 
repudiating the White Australia policy. Whenever possible 
he chose to be vague and equivocal when it came to the White 
Australia issue.
A more positive attempt at reconciling internation­
alism with the White Australia concept was made by R.S. Ross. 
In answer to rank and file C.P.A. urgings that no Marxist 
could countenance supporting the White Australia policy 
because of its racialist basis he contended that it was a 
necessary practical policy to maintain Australian living 
standards and a viable and strong labour movement. In a 
cascade of arguments, many of which betrayed the strong 
influence of William Lane on his thinking, Ross set out
Jan.29, 1926, p.3»65. See for example the W.W.,
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throughout the 1920s to defend the White Australia policy 
as one which internationalists could wholeheartedly support, 
as he put it, "whilever capitalism lasts". To Ross, the
White Australia policy was a prudent programme of immigration 
restriction, and its racialist restrictiveness was necessary 
given the tremendous differences in living standards to which 
inhabitants of white nations and those of the various
coloured countries were accustomed.
Wherever colored labor enters into competition with 
white it undercuts, undersells, and underlives the white. 
Economically, white and color are as far apart as the 
Poles. The standard of subsistence is socially the 
Plimsoll mark of advancement and progress. I am too 
jealous of the world’s highest standard of subsistence 
- our Australian standard - to rightly allow it to be 
threatened by cheap colored labor marshalled or 
indentured as the catspaw of capitalism. I anticipate 
a jibe by insisting that this appears to me to be a 
loftier brotherhood than the preparedness to sink our 
gains and our wives into an abyss of bottomless misery 
because such misery is, by circumstances beyond our 
control, the lot or fate of the colored workers we ought 
to love. This method, I beg to observe, is not loving 
him so much as lowering us. I do not favor such 
equality.67
Ross further predicted social and political calamities
6 8reminiscent of William Lane's novel White or Yellow if
coloured immigrants were allowed into Australia. These social 
and political divisions, together with the enormous economic
impact of coloured labour, would forever defeat the labour 
movement’s attempts at emancipating the workers and any hope 
of bringing to a successful resolution the class struggle in 
Aus tralia.
66. Daily Herald (Melb.), August 31» 1921.
67. Ibid.
68. Lane's novel White or Yellow? A Story of Race War in 
A.D. 1908 was first serialised in the Brisbane Boomerang 
of the late 1880s. It portrayed a war in Queensland 
between a cabal of European and Chinese capitalists and 
the forces of White Australian democracy. The likelihood 
of an influx of non-European labour being utilised to 
smash the Australian labour movement and end democracy 
represented a constant theme in many subsequent 
discussions of the White Australia issue.
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At the same time Ross was acutely aware that the 
White Australia policy had harmful implications for inter­
nationalism and was a factor in the growth of Labor Party 
isolationism. It was necessary for Australian Labor to 
explain its peculiar situation to the working class of other 
countries, particularly their neighbours in Asia, and to 
promote international conferences which would examine the
"economic and ethical tangle" of questions involved in
6 9working class attitudes to immigration restriction. Such
gatherings, Ross confidently maintained, would fully endorse 
the White Australia policy "as things are, as the lesser of 
two evils".^
As the 1920s progressed however even Ross himself
was forced to admit that this was not the case. Neither the
Second nor the Third Internationals, he admitted ruefully in
1928, were willing to acquiesce in the White Australia policy
and even the British labour movement had expressed its 
71opposition. "In the circumstances of its peculiar
development", he unhappily concluded, "the Labour movement
of Australia... finds itself almost as much at variance with
its own people overseas as with the forces of the economic
72system it seeks to end".
A majority of opinion in the V.S.P. broadly
supported Ross’s position despite the increasingly obvious
dissonance with international socialism. Throughout the
1920s the V.S.P. announced that it stood for ’A White
73Australia Until A League of Workers Governs', and despite 
occasional criticism in the Union Voice that the Party's 
stance on this question was based on doubtful premises as to 
the economic impact of coloured labour and was ethically
69. Daily Herald (Melb.), Aug.31, 1921.
70. Ibid. See also Socialist, June 17, 1921, p.1.
71. R.S. Ross: "A Labour View of Pacific Problems", in
Campbell et al., Studies in Australian Affairs, p.2l6.
72. Ibid., pp.216-217.
73. U.V., June 17, 1926, p .3•
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7kwrong, most left-wing Victorian unionists continued to
favour retention of the White Australia policy in essence
if not in name to ensure a relatively homogeneous society
that would not be divided and complicated even further than
the class struggle already ensured. "It is not a matter of
who's best or who's worst among the different races", Don
Cameron explained in an editorial on the subject in the
Union Voice, "it is the fact that they will not live and
work together in peace where they have to compete with one
another for jobs and where their numbers are sufficient to
7 5put up a fight against one another".
The White Australia question, then, continued to 
confuse and confound the left in the 1920s as it had from 
the early days of organised labour. Though there was a 
growing awareness of a clash between the ideals of interna­
tionalism and the racialist aspects of the White Australia 
concept no single credible socialist critique was arrived 
at and the policy drew continued support from those who were 
at the same time professed Marxists and internationalists.
For Garden and other militants who were worried by the clash 
between Marxist principles and racialist exclusionism the 
need to temporize with the intransigently pro-White Australia 
A.W.U. and A.L.P. meant silence, vagueness, or equivocation 
on the matter. The V.S.P., whilst generally opposed to 
giving its essentially practical stance an overtly racialist 
bias, at the same time was prepared to defend White Australia 
as a prudent and useful measure through which labour 
organisations in this country could avoid the entangling 
complications of internal race hatred and division. Only
74. See for example U.V., Feb.18, 1928, p.4. The critic in 
this case was Lloyd Ross, R.S. Ross's son, and at the time 
a young academic at Melbourne University. A younger son, 
Edgar Ross - who was a journalist with the Barrier Daily 
Truth - was also in the late 1920s occasionally active in 
the affairs of the V.S.P. Both Lloyd and Edgar joined the 
C.P.A. in the late 1930s after the V.S.P's demise.
75. U.V., Sept.15, 1928, p.6.
the small C.P.A., and the even less significant I.W.W. were 
prepared to engage in continuous and unrestrained criticism 
of the White Australia policy as inherently racialist and 
therefore impossible to reconcile with socialism,^ As 
usual there was a tendency for these extreme denunciations 
- mostly cast in vague and passing terms and offering no 
positive alternative to the White Australia concept of 
immigration restriction - to be counterproductive in the 
suspicion they aroused that the far left intended flooding 
Australia with coloured labour to bring the country’s living 
standards crashing down around the ears of organised labour.
Nevertheless the sum of this doubt, equivocation, 
and criticism on the part of the left led to a challenge to 
the White Australia policy in the late 1920s. For in 1928 
the newly formed A.C.T.U. became embroiled in disputes with 
the A.L.P. and the A.W.U. over the implications of its links 
with the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, a body which 
had announced its intention to fight against racial 
prejudice amongst the working class of the Pacific region.
In the ensuing debates the various socialist groups and 
left-wing industrialists in the A.C.T.U. proposed to alter 
the basis of immigration exclusion in a way which would have 
meant the effective abandonment of the White Australia 
policy. In the face of considerable A.L.P. pressure the 
A.C.T.U. altered this stance to that of simultaneous support 
for 'the White Australia policy' whilst at the same time 
reserving the right to criticise the racialist overtones 
that many Labor Party adherents and supporters of the idea 
in the polity at large were apt to maintain. In the end 
these arguments were crowned by the defeat of the left and
76 . D .A ., Sept.8, 1928, p.1; W.W., July 9, 1926, p.1.
The factional, turmoil in the C.P.A. ensured that both 
under the Garden leadership, and later under Kavanagh, 
sweeping denunciations of the White Australia policy and 
suggestions that it be totally abandoned were frequently 
heard. Indeed in 1928 the visiting P.P.T.U.S. journalist 
S. Stolen accused C.P.A. leaders of 'hushing up' the 
White Australia issue and proposed that - like the 
Wobblies - the Communists should declare themselves against 
all governmental restrictions on immigration and rely on
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abandonment by the A.C.T.U. of the P.P.T.U.S. in 1930; a 
defeat not unrelated to growing recognition by many erstwhile 
internationalists of the difficulty of maintaining working 
class solidarity with overseas organisations whilst at the 
same time demanding a programme of virtual immigration 
exclusion which the White Australia policy so readily and 
easily guaranteed.
iv. The Internationals question
Of all the dilemmas, disappointments and problems 
which faced the socialist movement in the 1920s, no single 
issue was as important as the failure to achieve a world 
unity comparable to that of the old pre-war Internationals. 
The Second International itself had collapsed in August 191^ - 
and could never be revived in its old form, though a rump 
mainly consisting of European parliamentary socialists and 
those utterly compromised by their national chauvinism 
attempted a fiction of existence for a few years following 
World War One. On the other hand from soon after its 
founding the Third International suffered from what was 
considered by its Russian masters an embarrassing super­
abundance of would-be affiliates, which however the screening 
process of Bolshevisation soon overcame, ensuring for that 
body too a minimum of significance for Western socialists by 
1 921 .
the class solidarity of prospective immigrant workers. 
In place of governmental restrictions on immigration 
Stolen suggested that the C.P.A. could address a 
propaganda campaign to the workers who were prospective 
immigrants telling them "stay where you are and make it 
as hot for your own bourgeoisie as possible". His 
arguments were rejected, and C.P.A. leaders cooperated 
with Garden in framing a more moderate policy (see 
Chapter Four). They had previously ignored an E.C.C.I. 
resolution which demanded a similar stance towards the 
White Australia question to that outlined by Stolen.
For debates within the Central Executive of the C.P.A. 
over Stolen’s proposals see Eighth Annual Conference of 
C.P.A., Report (Syd., 1928).
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Between these two polar extremes stood important 
sections of the world labour movement. Radicalised by the 
events of World War One this Centre bloc believed that 
socialism in the West had no meaning if it repudiated the 
working-class government in Russia, but that at the same 
time the Comintern was the Soviet Union's own worst enemy 
in its refusal to countenance national differences facing 
socialist parties and admit the obvious efficacy of 
utilising methods appropriate to the democratic countries 
of the West. This very widespread Centrist stance manifested 
itself in attempts by a number of socialist parties to create 
an International which could mediate and merge the two 
feuding extremes, and it was also reflected in attempts by 
trade unionists to work with the R.I.L.U. and urge unity 
with the I.F.T.U. of Amsterdam. These efforts however were 
doomed to failure and the Centrist tendency of what had once 
been a developing world working-class movement disappeared by 
the early depression years to become completely insignificant 
as a political force. Australian socialists and trade 
unionists for the most part fell into this Centre category of 
ill-fated prophets of international unity.
Following the Berne Conference of early 1919 two 
further attempts were made by right-wing socialist parties 
to revive the Second International: at Lucerne in August
1919» and at Geneva in August 1920. These meetings were 
marked by an increasing outspokenness on the question of 
Bolshevism and an open opposition to the Russian government 
that disgusted and repelled the majority of working class 
parties throughout the world and ensured that body's failure 
as a rallying point for the left in the post-World War One 
years. A number of socialist and labour parties in Europe 
however were unprepared to accept the drift into apathy and 
away from internationalism that both the Second and Third 
International seemed determined to force upon them and 
initiated a preliminary conference at Berne in December 1920
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to discuss the basis on which an all-embracing International
77should be founded. The British Independent Labor Party, 
the Austrian Social Democratic Party, the German Independent 
Social Democratic Party and the French Socialist Party were 
the leading forces behind this movement, and together with 
sixteen other mostly European parties they formed at a 
further conference at Vienna in February 1921 an International 
Working Union of Socialist parties. This Working Union 
rejected both the narrow parliamentary reformism of the Second 
International and the equally narrow and dogmatic insurrec­
tionary fetish of the Comintern, and denied that a single 
valid doctrine of socialist change could be laid down for all 
countries and every situation. The Vienna International 
announced that it had taken upon itself the task of uniting 
the whole of the world's proletariat into an organisation 
which would allow for the use of both the tactics and methods
of Communism and reformism as they seemed appropriate to the
circumstances of each country and region, and in this way
revive the sense of socialist purpose and duty in the fight
against capitalism, which since the days of Marx it had been 
the function of the workers' international organisations to 
fulfil.78
The developments which led up to the founding of 
the Vienna International were followed closely by a number 
of Australian socialist parties, and particularly by the 
V.S.P. The similarity of the V.S.P's attitude towards 
Bolshevism and that of the British I.L.P. and other parties 
involved in the Vienna Conference had long been remarked 
upon, and in early 1921 the V.S.P. leadership had published 
in pamphlet form the Third International's famous letter to 
the I.L.P. which made clear that affiliation to the Comintern 
meant unequivocal commitment to minority Communist dictator-
77» For the full text of 'The Berne Manifesto' as adopted by 
this conference see the Socialist, Feb.11, 1921, p.3»
78. For a detailed account of the formation of the Vienna
International and its subsequent history see Braunthal, 
History of the International 191^-19^3» esp. Pt.3»
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ship and outright civil war as the only possible path to
79power in Great Britain. The V.S.P. regarded the I.L.P's
subsequent rejection of affiliation to the Comintern as an
endorsement of its own position vis-a-vis that organisation
and as constituting further evidence of the inapplicability
of Bolshevik methods outside Russia or countries clearly in
80similar straits. Furthermore following the V.S.P's own 
recent experience of the splitting tactics of Communism the 
Socialist turned its attention to the response of the Soviet 
Union to the Vienna International's plea for unity, and it 
found good cause for the new and critical edge that its 
reportage of Russia as a consequence assumed.
For the Comintern Executive's reply to the Vienna 
Conference was to issue a bitter manifesto denouncing this 
"pretended new International, which will neither be the
81Second, nor the Third, but the International Two-and-a-Half". 
The Comintern branded the Vienna Conference as no more than 
an underhand attempt by 'social-traitors' and 'social-democra­
tic counter-revolutionaries' to maintain a hold on a world 
working class which was allegedly passing in ever-greater 
numbers into the ranks of the Third International. The 
Comintern manifesto stated that the Third International would 
not accept organisational unity with these Centrist 'agents 
of the bourgeoisie':
The class-conscious workers of the whole world 
must cover the... conference of Vienna, the conference 
of liars and traitors, with all the contempt that it 
merits. They must boycott the "International Two- 
and-a-Half" exactly as they have boycotted the Second 
International.82
For those Communists who counselled remorseless opposition
to every other brand of socialism it seemed that the
Executive of the Third International had given the clearest
8 2support for their stance.
79» Socialist, April 8, 1921, p.1.
80. See for example V.S.P. Minutes, Oct.25, 1920; Socialist,
May 20, 1921, p.3.
81. See A .C .t April 29, 1921, p .6.
82. Ibid.
83« Communist, May 6, 1921, p.5, May 27, 1921, p.4.
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Yet by mid-1922 the changed united front policy 
of the Comintern had brought about a softening of attitudes 
towards the 'Two-and-a-Half Internationalists'. Following 
lengthy negotiations the Comintern and the rump of the 
Second International agreed to join representatives of the 
Vienna Conference in preliminary talks to establish a 
practical united front of workers in Europe to fight against 
capitalist reaction which was so clearly in the ascendant.
As a result in Berlin in April 1922 the three Internationals 
agreed to form a united front against capitalism, to bring 
about negotiations between the I.F.T.U. and the R.I.L.U. for 
a similar united front in the trade unions, and to work 
immediately towards fulfilment of a practical programme of 
common aims in the hope of extending the united front to
84every sphere of working-class activity. In addition a
permanent committee was set up consisting of three represen­
tatives from each of the Internationals which was to be 
responsible for calling future conferences and promoting 
harmony and entente in the united front. Not surprisingly 
Centrists throughout the world hailed the Berlin Conference 
as a victory for their ideas and the basis on which a wider 
and embracing socialist organisation could easily be built. 
"The formation of the new International", Don Cameron wrote 
in premature assurance of the trend of events, "is clearly 
a vindication of the attitude taken up by the Victorian
Socialist Party during the past few years.... Long live the
85United International!"
Once again however the twists and turns of Soviet 
politics and Comintern policy proved fatal to the plans of 
Centrist socialists, and the Berlin agreements and the 
permanent committee they had given rise to soon broke down
84. See The Second and Third Internationals and The Vienna 
Union. Official Report of the Conference between the 
Executives, held at the Reichstag, Berlin, on the 2nd 
April, 1922, and following days. (London, 1922).
85. Socialist, June 1, 1922, p.1.
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in a war of words and mutual recriminations. The causes of
this collapse were complex and difficult to assess, but
clearly the initiative lay largely with Moscow. At the Fourth
Comintern Congress in November 1922 the collapse of the
Berlin entente was hailed as a conscious achievement of
Soviet diplomacy, and Bolshevik leaders went to great lengths
to assure overseas Communist parties that far from
contemplating organic union with the other Internationals
Comintern participation at the Berlin Conference was, as Radek
put it, "but a first attempt to drive the Social Democrats to
86the wall...." In the face of a barrage of Comintern attacks 
and threats the proponents of a wider International were 
forced to abandon their project, and finally in May 1923 many 
of the parties of the Vienna International agreed to join the 
Second International in forming a new Labour and Socialist 
International. This development Moscow's Comintern applauded
The yawning gulf between revolution and reformism, 
which the centre forces had apparently bridged, is now 
visible to all. Now there is our side and the other 
side, and only these two sides....87
Within the ambit of Marxist traditions there was 
little choice, given the failure of world revolution to 
spread outside Russia, for the Comintern to have merged into 
a wider movement. This would have meant of course a relative 
downgrading by Moscow of the importance of its own Communist 
parties in many advanced countries and an admission of 
Comintern naivety and ignorance of the overall mechanics of 
politics in the West even at the time of the most acute 
crises in those countries in the twentieth century. Such an 
admission would have been an immense blow to the egos of 
Bolshevik leaders, yet the potential for real gains in 
international working-class power, not to mention the 
importance of such an admission for the whole future of 
international socialism, could reasonably have been expected 
to elicit a response from those who so ardently professed
86. Quoted in Braunthal, History of the International 1914-
1943, p.252.
87. J. Degras, The Communist International 1919-1943«
Documents (London, 1956), Vol.2, p p .30-1.
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themselves disciples of* Marx. Instead, Moscow chose to 
elevate the Comintern's right to dictate to its sections 
and the tactics devised for the Russian situation and the 
specific crisis of capitalism at the end of World War One 
into an issue of principle that would forever preclude 
reconciliation with other brands of socialism. Lenin's 
reticence in merging with the class traitors on the right 
wing of the Second International can easily be understood, 
but his continued and quite irrational attitude of hostility 
towards the Centrists, and his general reluctance to act on 
the most pressing question facing Marxist socialism in the 
1920s marks him forever as the great enigma of that movement. 
Of the failure to form a wider International one can only 
conclude of Lenin - charitably, with Julius Braunthal that
It was a tragedy of the first order that Lenin 
lost his working capacity by a serious illness in 1922 
and died at the beginning of 1924. He possessed the 
greatness of stature and the moral authority to solve 
the most intricate problem of working-class unity.88
Or uncharitably with Borkenau that
Lenin had simply clung to the traditional national 
Russian concept of revolution.... The bolshevik 
leaders, all of them shrewd politicians, were not 
unaware, to be sure, that they were building up a 
Russian despotism inside the communist international. 
They did it quite consciously, though they did not say 
so publicly. But they were sincerely convinced that 
this was the only safeguard against deviations from 
orthodox revolutionism. Russia alone had the secret 
of revolutionary purity. It had the task of imposing, 
if necessary of inflicting, it upon the rest of the 
world. Nationalism, however, does not become less but 
more penetrating by being identified with some fanatical 
orthodoxy.89
Certainly the weight of public evidence on Lenin's attitudes 
towards the Vienna International tend in the main to support 
Borkenau.
For some Centrists the failure to revive any form 
of broad International made them despair of ever successfully
88. J. Braunthal, In Search of the Millenium (London, 1945)»
p.275.89. Borkenau, Socialism: National or International?, p.138.
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working with the Comintern, but many in their ranks 
continued to look to a future unity of working class organi­
sations and to cooperate with Communists with that end in 
view. These different trends were represented in the V.S.P. 
throughout the 1920s by R.S. Ross and Don Cameron. Deeply 
affected by Communist splitting tactics in the V.S.P. and
the continued harassment of that party by the Melbourne
90representatives of the C.P.A., Ross grew increasingly
suspicious of cooperating either locally with the C.P.A. or
internationally with bodies associated with the Comintern,
and eventually he came to support right-wing Labor Party
forces determined to minimise Communist activity and influence
in the labour movement. On the other hand Don Cameron
continued to advocate a united front policy with the
Communists right throughout the 1920s till their third period
policies finally drove him too to despair. Cameron’s own
libertarian and critical cast of mind meant that the
Socialist followed closely the growth of totalitarianism and
91repression in the Soviet Union from early on in the 1920s, 
but he continued consistently to maintain the belief that 
Lenin and the top Bolsheviks were basically sincere in their 
united front policies. On this premise Cameron and a number 
of other trade unionists and V.S.P. members entered 
enthusiastically into united front projects with the Garden 
Communists which ostensibly aimed at developing that militant
90. The fully paid-up membership of the V.S.P. fell from 
486 in 1919 to under 200 by 1922, bringing on a 
financial crisis, and leading to temporary suspension of 
publication of the Socialist. Though this was of course 
principally due to other factors the V.S.P. Minutes 
report numerous instances of Communist sabotage of fund­
raising activities and attempts to hinder and prevent 
sales of the Socialist, and there is no doubt that Ross 
believed the C.P.A. was to blame for many of the problems 
which beset the socialist left.
91. See for example Socialist, Mar.31» 1922, p.3> Aug.1,
1922, p .2.
but tolerant and flexible working class unity which Two-and- 
a-Half Internationalists held so dear, but which the 
Comintern deep in its heart refused to believe in.
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The Sydney-based S.L.P. was much less prepared to 
work with Communists than were the Centrists of the V.S.P. 
Throughout the world the small parties connected with S.L.P. 
headquarters in America had all been split or their members 
had decamped en masse to join the new Communist parties, and 
de Leonism was on the decline as an influence on organised 
labour. In 1919 the American S.L.P. had broken with the 
Second International and joined in the call for a new 
formation of world working-class organisations cleansed of 
the right-wing nationalists who had so consistently betrayed 
socialist principles throughout the war years. In 1921 
however a delegation from the American S.L.P. which attended 
the Third Comintern Congress reported that the 'Twenty-One 
Points' of conditions of affiliation made it impossible for
their party to join an International which clearly "reflects
92Russian conditions and has a peculiar Russian psychology".
From this time onwards the remnants of the S.L.P. and its 
¥.1.1.Us in various countries maintained a sect-like 
existence with steadily declining membership until only the 
North American organisations remained.
In Australia this process was aided considerably 
by the personality decline of S.L.P. General Secretary, E.E. 
Judd. As an able and energetic propagandist in the cause of 
de Leonism Judd had participated in framing the constitution 
of the official O.B.U. scheme in 1918 but had thereafter 
assumed a stance of uncompromising opposition to Leninism and 
its local supporters which undercut his influence on the trade 
union left. Following the expulsion of Garden and a number 
of other S.L.P. members who attended the founding congress of
92. Cited in E. Hass, The S.L.P. and the Internationals
(New York, 1949)» p.l68. See also R .S ., Nov.18, 1921,
PP »2,3*
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the C.P.A. in October 1920, Judd proceeded to embark on a
course of expulsions and disputations that eventually
resulted in his subservient Sydney Central branch emerging
as the sole remaining voice of de Leonism. Initially the
disputes within the S.L.P. revolved around continuous
attempts by party branches and individual members to raise
the question of merger with the C.P.A. In the course of
these disputes whole branches were expelled, and the S.L.P.
lost all its main branches on the northern N.S.W. coalfields;
in addition Judd succeeded in forcing out of the S.L.P. all
the remaining figures of influence on the Labor Council of
93N.S.W. including J. Howie and ex-Senator Arthur Rae.
Cushioned from the financial implications of the membership 
decline by income derived from a rich estate which had been 
bequeathed to the S.L.P., Judd and his supporters then turned 
to petty squabbling amongst themselves, with Judd's foibles 
and diverse moral and financial lapses a continuous cause of 
complaint. By the mid-1920s the S.L.P. had become almost 
totally insignificant as a force in labour politics, though 
Judd's trenchant attacks on Communism and his penchant for 
libel suits and counter-suits kept him occasionally before 
the public, mainly as a figure of hilarity and entertainment.
In early 1923 however the S.L.P. was resuscitated
by an infusion of membership from the W.I.I.U. Originally
formed out of the industrialists of the Melbourne branch of
the Australian Socialist Party, the W.I.I.U. had experienced
some moderate success in organising its own One Big Union
movement in opposition to the official W.I.U. of A. By June
1920 the W.I.I.U. boasted eleven branches and locals mainly
94throughout Victoria and maintained a number of organisers 
including J.B. Scott and the ex-Wobbly A.W. Wilson as far 
afield as Adelaide and Western Australia. The W.I.I.U. 
agitators argued that the official O.B.U. suffered from the
93. On these disputes see E.E. Judd Collection: Folders 7»
8, 9; S.L.P. Central Branch Minutes, Mar.14, 1922;
Dec.4, 1923•
94. O.B.U.H., June, 1920, p.4.
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critical fault that it was being built from the top down
and they carried out important rank and file propaganda
which made itself felt in pressure on W.I.U. of A. organisers
for more concentration on workshop committees in the design
95of the O.B.U. plan. The W.I.I.U. however proved quite 
unequal to the task of establishing itself as a viable union 
body catering for the everyday needs of the not inconsiderable 
number of militants who were initially attracted to its 
doctrines, and in the few strikes which its organisers led 
its members were ignominiously defeated. Beginning with a 
circulation of over 10,000 copies per issue in 1919 the 
W.I.I.U's organ the One Big Union Herald entered into decline 
as the 1920s progressed, coming out only fitfully by 1 9 2 3 » 
and finally ceasing publication altogether in early 1 9 2 5 »
For the W.I.I.U. activists who remained, their failure to 
create the revolutionary industrial union which in 191 9 had 
seemed so near meant either absorption into the official union 
movement, abandonment of their belief in the foremost efficacy 
of industrial unionism, or rapprochement with the S.L.P.
Their dilemna was given point by the absorption of the American 
W.I.I.U. by S.L.P. headquarters in late 1924.
A few W.I.I.U. activists abandoned de Leonism 
to join the newly re-formed Melbourne branch of the C.P.A., 
but the majority attempted an accommodation with Judd's 
S.L.P. There were good reasons for this reticence towards 
the C.P.A., for although the W.I.I.U. had adopted a less 
dogmatic critique of Communism than had Judd's S.L.P., their 
relations with the Australian representatives of the 
Comintern had been marked by mutual recriminations and 
distaste. The W.I.I.U. continued to support the Russian 
Revolution, but they rejected the key concept of party 
dictatorship, which was considered fundamentally at odds 
with their own idea of a self-activated rank and file which 
could itself create the institutions which would be the
95» Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics, p.187
true and only basis on which socialism could be built. 
W.I.I.U. members were prepared to join in united front work 
with the C.P.A. on issues of general importance to the 
working class, yet basically they remained de Leonists, and 
their attitude towards Communism maintained a note of 
patronising remove:
The W.I.I.U. as an organisation, and in their official 
organ, endorse the dictatorship of the proletaire in 
Russia. No other course was open to the Russian workers 
It is really the backwardness of machine production, 
which is dictating the policy which must be carried out 
by the Russian workers and peasants....
But we of the W.I.I.U. will celebrate the Russian 
Revolution by urging the workers of Australia to 
organise in the factory and workshop, on the job 
committee basis.... The reflex of such industrial 
organisation will be the true political party of the 
working class.9^
With such a continued faith in the correctness of de Leonism 
it was not surprising that the S.L.P. was the first stopover 
of most W.I.I.U. members as their own organisation collapsed.
Consequently in early 1925 branches of the W.I.I.U.
in all States became branches of the S.L.P., and for a brief
period the S.L.P. began again to take an active part in union
affairs and left wing agitation on working-class issues. In
short order however Judd began to disrupt the affairs of the
new S.L.P. branches: by various ploys embezzling their funds,
97and arbitrarily expelling their members. In the course of
the disputes that resulted Judd himself was expelled from the 
S.L.P. by Arnold Petersen at American headquarters, but he 
continued to hold sway with his small band of followers at 
Sydney Central Branch and his tiny party managed to continue 
to survive. The Melbourne and Adelaide branches of the S.L.P 
however slowly faded. In South Australia the S.L.P. was 
broken up by a pro-Judd faction and some of its members 
joined the newly re-established Adelaide branch of the 
C.P.A.; subsequent efforts by the former W.I.I.U. organiser
96 . O.B.U.H., Dec.1, 1922, p.2.
97. On the history of the S.L.P. in these years see the 
S.L.P. Central Branch Minutes and the numerous pamphlets 
and handbills in the E.E. Judd Collection, A.N.L.
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A.W. Wilson to revive the S.L.P. proved fruitless. In 
Melbourne the most prominent figures in the S.L.P. became 
increasingly absorbed in trade union affairs and either
98drifted into apathy or joined the A.L.P. Few of these 
demoralised sectaries of de Leonism showed any interest 
in the C.P.A.
The I.W.W. too turned away from Communism
throughout the 1920s. The first party of ex-I.W.W. members
to emerge following the banning of that organisation in 1917
99was the Industrial Labor Party, whose leading figures 
included Betsy Matthias and Douglas Sinclair. However 
personal differences and arguments over the efficacy of 
cooperating with other socialist bodies in the campaign to 
release the I.W.W. Twelve soon led to organisation of a 
rival party called the International Industrial Workers, 
which centred around a diverse group whose numbers included 
Norman Rancie and George Washington. ^  Both these Sydney 
parties however were failures. The I.I.W. did extend its 
organisation temporarily to Adelaide and Melbourne, but the 
leading activists from all these Wobbly groups were drawn 
into the Communist Party when it was founded in October 
1920. Disillusioned with the temporising policies of the 
Garden C.P.A. the Wobblies soon broke off into the Industrial 
Union Propaganda League, which under Tom Glynn’s guidance 
nominally retained links with the C.P.A. and the R.I.L.U. as 
a rank and file movement of militants dedicated to the 
initiation of R.I.L.U. policies in the union movement. As
98. Two such W.I.I.U. figures who abandoned the S.L.P. for 
the Labor Party were M. Feinberg and T. Audley. Audley 
had been General Secretary of the W.I.I.U. from 1918 
until its final demise in 1925» and subsequently 
Secretary of the Melbourne branch of the S.L.P.
99 * Not to be confused with Percy Brookfield's Broken Hill- 
based Industrial Labor Party - a remnant of the 1919 
N.S.W. Labor Party split, which had some followers in 
Sydney, notably T.W. McCristal the printer and publisher 
of the Industrial News.
100.For an account of the split see the I.L.P's Solidarity, 
Feb.15» 1919« For the attitudes of the dissidents see
the I.I.W's Proletariat, Feb.1, 1919»
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increasing illness forced Glynn to retire from active 
1 01agitation however even the tenuous links between I.U.P.L. 
members and the R.I.L.U. faded, and some Wobblies turned 
their attention to attempts at reviving the I.W.W. just as 
it had been before the heavy hand of the War Precautions Act 
and the confusing influence of Moscow had made themselves 
f elt.
The small groups of Wobblies who sought to revive
the I.W.W. established locals in Sydney in 1925» and in
Melbourne and Adelaide soon afterwards. In all these cities
they added their voice to socialist agitation on a variety
of issues, and took a prominent part in campaigns for the
release of I.W.W. prisoners in America and in the Sacco and
Vanzetti agitation of the later 1920s. And no longer did
the I.W.W. seek to remain completely outside the labour
movement. Several I.W.W. members attained office on the
Labor Council of N.S.W. and their influence on that body
was surprisingly strong. In 1926, for example, they were
able to stifle a campaign of criticism that the I.W.W. was
a passe organisation which the editor of the Council's
1 0 2Labor Monthly J. Ryan had attempted to promote. Yet
103despite their Labor Council successes the Wobblies were 
quite unable to recapture the spirit of earlier days, and 
their organisation continued to remain extremely weak, the 
partial exception being in Adelaide, where there was no 
C.P.A. to compete for the adherence of new recruits to the 
far left of the political spectrum. There a number of 
agitators led by J. Zwolsman and E.A. Dickenson were able 
to establish a viable local which was prosperous enough to 
resume in May 1928 publication of Direct Action, and to act 
as an organising centre for the I.W.W. in other States.
By mid-1928 this 'official Australian Administration of the 
I.W.W.' boasted of four other branches in towns and cities
101. By 1923 Glynn was totally incapacitated by illness.
102. Labor Monthly, Jan.1, 1927» p.13»
103. Members of the I.W.W. were also union representatives 
on the Adelaide T.H.C.
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throughout Australia including the Sydney and Melbourne 
locals.1°^
In many ways the course of the I.W.W. in 
Australia paralleled developments in the parent body in 
the United States, the membership of each organisation 
splitting in several directions after World War One. The 
great majority of I.W.W. members were either absorbed into 
the more orthodox unions or drifted into relative apathy as 
the 1920s progressed, while those who remained activists 
found themselves in a love-hate relationship with Communism 
which was marked by professions of conversion by almost all 
prominent Wobblies, followed in a large number of cases by 
bitter disillusionment and a re-assertion of separateness in 
attempts to revive the old I.W.W. organisation. The sense 
of common disappoinment and disillusionment in both 
Australia and America was marked by reversion to the jargon 
of earlier years, and the I.W.W. once again was seen by 
many of its members as a world-wide organisation as separate 
and independent of Communism as it was of the 'yellow*
105unionists and socialists of the I.F.T.U. in Amsterdam.
As late as 1930 the pages of Direct Action filled with 
discussion of the negotiations undertaken by Chicago General 
Administration with various small syndicalist unions in 
Germany in the hope of "creating a real working class 
International: the One Big Union of the World".
Yet there were important differences in the 
motivation of the majority of I.W.W. adherents in Australia 
from those who clung to the Wobbly tradition in America. 
There was in Australia a continued affection for Russia and 
an absence of that doctrinal inclination and autochthonous 
pride which so early led those who remained in the I.W.W. 
in America to castigate and reject the U.S.S.R. and 
Communism in toto. In Australia only rarely did a criticism
104. D.A., July 7, 1 928, p. 1
105. D.A., Aug.11, 1 928, p. 1
106. D . A . , Nov.29, 1930, P.4
1930, P.3.
See also D.A., Nov.10,
of Russia itself pass the lips of members of the I.W.W.,
and for them the U.S.S.R. was a country where a real
workers’ government was struggling against adversity "along
107the road of progress". Any temporary aberrations in the
U.S.S.R. could be forgiven in the minds of the Australian
I.W.W. just so long as adequate attention was being given
to promoting rank and file militancy and class consciousness
and the evidence, as the Wobblies read it, all pointed to
1 0 8this being the case in that country. In the long term
the Soviets would emerge as an acceptable social and
political order through which the working class of Russia
109would fully mould their own destiny.
Consequently it was the C.P.A. which for the most
part bore the brunt of the Australian I.W.W's chagrin and
disillusionment. The Wobblies alleged that Garden, and
later Kavanagh too, were misleading the Comintern as to the
nature of their alliances in Australia, and they attacked
the local Communists for what was considered an uncritical
1 10support of the Labor Party. Despite the apparent
support tendered to C.P.A. policies by the Comintern’s
announced united front policies, Wobblies insisted that
local Communists were wilfully misreading Moscow's pro- 
1 1 1nouncements. They simply refused to believe that the
Bolshevik leaders would condone Communist alliances with
1 1 2the reactionary A.W.U., or with the A.L.P. Such an
attitude of mind allowed the Australian I.W.W. to view 
very favourably the inauguration of third period policies 
in the Communist Party after 1930» and the main body of 
Wobblies were reconciled with the Comintern in the early 
depression years, constituting some of the most vigorous 
new recruits to the C.P.A, and its M.M.M. For example
107. D .A ., Oct.20, 1928, p .3.
108. See for example D .A. , July 7> 1928, p.3»
109. Ibid.
110. D.A., Aug.11, 1928, p.1.
111. See for example N. Lyons in Labor Monthly, Jan.1, 
1927, p.20.
112. Ibid.
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J. Zwolsman, the Secretary of the I.W.W. and editor of 
Direct Action, became State Secretary of the M.M.M. in 
South Australia.
There was some truth in the I.W.W’s claim that 
the C.P.A. was representing the Comintern only in name, for 
by the mid-1920s there were very sparse links between the 
Third International and its official Australian section.
It is likely too that had there been a closer relationship 
with the Comintern the difficulties experienced by local 
Communists in pursuing the united front line laid down by 
Moscow would have increased to the point of total failure 
as in most other Western countries. In fact however a most 
moderate and apparently genuine united front policy was 
undertaken in Australia by Moscow through R.I.L.U. 
endorsement and support of Garden and the Trades Hall reds 
in their alliances with various Labor Party factions and 
official trade union leaders. This ensured that Communist 
influence remained considerable, and if it could not reverse 
the effect of intermittent Comintern attacks on the logical 
potential political allies of the C.P.A., the R.I.L.U’s 
policy did provide a basis for unionists to work with Moscow 
in a number of ways, and to coalesce in promoting socialist 
and internationalist projects in the Australian labour 
movement.
Early Comintern links with the C.P.A. were forged
at the First R.I.L.U. and Third Comintern Congresses, held
conjointly in Moscow during 1921. The two most important
Australian delegates to these Congresses, Earsman and Howie,
in the course of their visits established liaison with a
number of British Communists including Tom Mann and C.P.G.B.
Chairman Arthur MacManus, and arrangements were made for
transmission of directives, information and any other
1 1 3necessary assistance through London to Sydney. These
113» [W.P. Earsman^], Report to the CE of the CP (Confiden­
tial) . in Hancock Collection, M.L.; House of Commons: 
Communist Papers, in Parliamentary Publications, 192, 
Vol.23 (Accounts and Papers) Cmd.2682 (London, 1926),
P.57.
links remained the standard lines of communication between
1 1 4Australia and the Comintern for most of the 1920s and
were formalised by the setting up under MacManus of a
Colonial Department of the C.P.G.B. charged with developing
closer contacts between Comintern sections within the
British Empire. By 1925 direct and regular contacts were
established between the Colonial Department and the C.P.A.,
the lines of communication heavily reliant on using
1 1 5Communist seamen as envoys and couriers.
However these links with the Comintern proved 
unsatisfactory and in the late 1920s attempts were made to 
improve communications between the Comintern and its 
Australian section. Following E.C.C.I. discussion of the 
problems of the C.P.A. during the visit of H. Ross to 
Moscow in 1926 advice and assistance was tendered to the 
Australian party on a number of matters and R.W. Robson was 
sent out to Australia to represent the C.P.G.B. Colonial 
Department at the 1927 C.P.A. conference and to convey a 
report on the state of affairs here back to Moscow. The 
next year, whilst in Moscow for the Sixth Comintern Congress 
E.M. Higgins pressed for more direct contact with the 
E.C.C.I. By this time the British Communist Party was 
unwilling to continue as liaison for the Australian party 
and the C.P.A. was placed under the direct control of the 
Comintern's Anglo-American Secretariat. Preparations were
114. In addition to these formal links the Russian community 
occasionally provided some liaison between Australia 
and Moscow. About 1922 Alexander Zuzenko (who had been 
deported from Australia after playing a leading role in 
the Red Flag disturbances in Brisbane in 19^9) returned 
to Australia, probably on an errand concerning the 
affairs of the Russian community. Using assumed names 
he travelled throughout several States and may have 
visited Broken Hill. Eventually he was apprehended by 
Commonwealth authorities and deported for a second 
time. Soon after this another Russian named Herscovici 
appeared briefly in Australia and addressed a number of 
Trades Hall Councils on the Workers' International 
Russian Reconstruction scheme. In 1928 L.Brodsky, who 
had earlier been a member of the Russian community in 
Australia, returned from a stay in Russia to manage the 
International Seamen's Club which he helped establish 
in Sydney.
115. House of Commons: Communist Papers, esp. pp.96, 98» 118
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also made for the Australian party to maintain an official 
representative on the Secretariat, and J. Kavanagh was 
elected as a candidate member of the E.C.C.I. in preparation 
for his assuming this role,
Yet Australia was simply not in the forefront of 
Comintern concerns, and for the most part E.C.C.I. consi­
deration of C.P.A. affairs was occasional and removed. 
Following Garden’s visit to the Fourth Comintern Congress 
in 1922 the E.C.C.I. placed considerable trust in the Trades 
Hall reds and their leadership of the Australian Communist 
Party. The E.C.C.I’s detailed instructions to Australian 
Communists in late 1922 was for the most part a strong
endorsement of the policies that Garden had long advocated
1 1 7and carried out, and although some divergence from
strict application of Comintern tactics was subsequently
noted, the C.P.A. was most often commended for its progress
118and handed only gentle reprimands. The Comintern saw
the Trades Hall reds and Australian unionists generally as
"the most organised and revolutionary in the Far East" and
apparently deemed it unlikely that any unresolvable conflict
1 1 9of interest would arise with the C.P.A. Some closer
interest was shown in Australia in 1927» quite likely 
because of the similarity of local C.P.A. thinking and the 
third period policies which the Comintern was at that time 
itself beginning to debate, but it was not until 1930» 
following the spate of expulsions of key party personnel by 
the new Miles-Moxon-Sharkey leadership that the Comintern 
finally despatched a senior agent to direct an on the spot 
re-orientation of the C.P.A’s affairs. There must have 
been very few countries in the Western world that were to 
wait so long for their affairs to be set right by a 
Comintern emissary.
116. See W.W., Oct.19, 1928, p.1.
117» Communist, Feb. 23» 1923» p.4.
118. See for example From the Fourth to the Fifth World 
Congress. Report of the Executive Committee of the 
Communist International (London, 1924), esp. pp.83-4.
119* 'J.P.' [[John Pepper?^]: "Asiatic and Pacific Ocean Labour
Conferences", in Communist International, Nos 18-19»P»173«
The most probable explanation of the Comintern's 
lack of concern for the C.P.A. was that Moscow considered 
Australia principally a province of the R.I.L.U. Under its 
adopted constitution and rules the R.I.L.U. was committed 
to "close and unbreakable connections" with the Comintern 
and there was representation from each of these
1 20Internationals upon the executive committee of the other.
In practice however the R.I.L.U. was a very different
organisation to the Comintern, and in a number of countries
pursued policies which diverged widely from those of the
Third International, and which on occasions subordinated
the interests of local Communist Parties to the maintenance
1 21of links with important left wing trade union centres.
Australia was a case in point, and the weight of Moscow's
efforts towards influencing labour affairs in this country
was exerted through the R.I.L.U. and its affiliated Labor
Council of N.S.W. In the years from 1920 to 1931 the
Comintern despatched only two or three emissaries to 
1 22Australia; in the same period the R.I.L.U. sent at least
123four or five. In association with the pan-Pacific trade
120. See Howie, Reds in Congress, esp. pp.32-3* Also 
regarding the R.I.L.U. see L.L. Lorwin, Labor and 
Internationalism (New York, 1929).
121. An early example of this occurred in France when the 
C.G.T.U. broke away from the C.G.T. to affiliate with 
the R.I.L.U., but then decided that the conditions of 
affiliation were too onerous, as they would effectively 
subordinate the new union to the French Communist Party 
In deference to the syndicalist elements in the C.G.T.U 
the Second R.I.L.U. Congress of November 1922 changed 
its rules to allow for wider trade union independence 
of Communist parties, thus ensuring the allegiance of 
most C.G.T.U. members to the R.I.L.U., whilst at the 
same time depriving the French Communists of formal 
control over union policy.
122. Definite Comintern emissaries and their dates of 
arrival in Australia were: R.W. Robson (1927)»
H.M. Wicks (1930). Wicks
was accompanied by his wife. The status of Alexander 
Zuzenko's visit in 1922 is unclear. Herscovici (1923) 
apparently only represented the W.I.R.R.
123. Definite R.I.L.U. emisaries and their dates of arrival
in Australia were: Paul Freeman, 1921;
C. Rubanoff (Rubinstein?), 1926;
William Janequette ('Harrison 
George'), 1927;
Sydor Stoler, 1928. Stoler was
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union movement the R.I.L.U. in the late 1920s developed 
its own separate communications system linking Sydney with
1 24other ports throughout the Pacific. Australia was also
chosen by R.I.L.U. agents as the editorial headquarters of
the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat following that
1 25body's ouster from China in late 1927. Thus from a
purely organisational viewpoint alone Moscow's main
interest in Australia seems to have been represented by the
trade union arm of the world Communist movement.
At a policy level the differences between the
R.I.L.U. and the Comintern were even more marked. From its
very beginning the R.I.L.U. was acutely aware of its lack
of effective backing from established trade union movements,
1 26and under its General Secretary A. Lozovsky it pursued a
accompanied by his wife. L. Brodsky's work in esta­
blishing the International Seamen's Club in Sydney 
immediately following Stoler's arrival in Australia was 
also apparently connected with R.I.L.U. activities.
About four years earlier George Hardy or some other 
prominent British R.I.L.U. emissary visited Australia 
in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the Seamen’s 
Union to take the initiative in establishing an 
International Seamen's Club.
124. The International Seamen's Club, established in Sydney 
in 1928, would appear to have played a central role in 
the R.I.L.U. communications network. See esp.
Inprecorr, No.65, Sept.11, 1924, p.705; S .M.H., April 
20, 1928; April 24, 1928; July 5, 1928; July 10, 1928.
125. G. Hardy, Those Stormy Years (London, 1956), p.198.
126. Lozovsky (born Solomon Abramovich and also known by 
the pseudonym Dridzo) was an old Bolshevik with a long 
history of disagreements with Lenin over the latter's 
sectarianism. One of the few leading Bolsheviks with 
experience of the Western labour movement he was 
chairman of a hatters' union in France at the time of 
the March Revolution of 1917« After returning to Russia 
he emerged as secretary to the third all-Russian 
conference of trade unions in July 1917 but following 
the Bolshevik Revolution he was expelled from the party 
for opposing Lenin over trade union policy. Lozovsky 
rejoined the C.P.S.U.(B.) in December 1919 and served
as a Comintern emissary in Germany before becoming 
General Secretary of the R.I.L.U. in 1921, a post he 
held until the final dissolution of that body in 1937» 
Under Stalin Lozovsky rose steadily in the Comintern 
and C.P.S.U.(B.) heirarchy. His particularly rapid 
rise to power during the years 1928-32 is of some
broad united front policy which aimed at the very merger
of the competing trade union Internationals and the
absorption of organisations not affiliated to either that
the Comintern had seen fit to reject vis-ci-vis the Two-
1 27and-a-Half International. Consequently while the
Comintern degenerated in the 1920s into an insignificant 
offshoot of the C.P.S.U.(B.) the R.I.L.U. presented itself 
to trade unionists as Moscow’s more reasonable and 
conciliatory face. As Lozovsky put it in a letter to 
Australian unionists which sought to dissociate the 
R.I.L.U. from Comintern domination:
The R.I.L.U., while feeling it a bounden duty 
to expose the theories of social democracy which lead 
to collaboration with Capitalism and the inevitable 
defeat of the worker, is convinced that national and 
international working-class solidarity are the first 
essentials for successful proletarian struggle against 
Capitalism in all its forms.... The R.I.L.U. recognises 
that the international proletariat are helpless unless 
the highest degree of solidarity is attained.... A 
recognition of these simple truths convinces the 
R.I.L.U. that it is pursuing a correct policy in 
fighting for national and international Trade Union 
unity.128
By eschewing the dogmatic, equivocal, and fractious attitude 
which pervaded the Comintern's united front initiatives the 
R.I.L.U. was able to achieve some substantial success in 
extending Communist influence amongst the organised working 
class of a number of countries. In Australia the R.I.L.U. 
was able to persuade the majority of left-wing unionists of
interest given the policies he appears to have pursued 
at this period in relation to the P.P.T.U.S. (see 
Chapters Four and Six). In 1939 Lozovsky was appointed 
as the Soviet government's deputy minister for foreign 
affairs; in 1949 he was arrested. He died in gaol in 
1932 at the age of 74. For further details of 
Lozovsky's life see Lazitch, A Biographical Dictionary 
of the Comintern, pp.239-241.
127. The resulting policy dissonance did not of course go 
unnoticed by Comintern sections and raised heated 
objections from some overseas Communists. At the Fifth 
Comintern Congress in 1924 E.C.C.I. members felt it 
necessary to state publicly - with not a little 
casuistry - that the R.I.L.U's policy of merger with 
the I.F.T.U. did not really mean merger but was simply 
fighting the Social Democrats "more slowly, by more 
difficult, roundabout means". See for example G.
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Moscow's genuine interest in international unity and thus 
divert their chagrin at the lack of tangible results in 
this area against the I.F.T.U.; to cooperate with the union 
movement in raising funds through the Labor Council of 
N.S.W. for a number of causes, and to work closely with a 
variety of Australian unionists in promoting a pan-Pacific 
trade union movement dedicated to anti-war activities and 
unification of the world trade union organisations.
In terms of its overall policies and world
revolutionary strategy the pan-Pacific trade union movement
would appear to have been highly valued by Moscow. The
movement fulfilled a role directly analogous to the Anglo-
Russian Advisory Committee, in that it provided an
opportunity in the Eastern hemisphere to turn the world union
1 29movement away from the I.F.T.U. and into alliance with
Moscow. At the same time the pan-Pacific trade union 
movement brought the R.I.L.U. into contact with the Left 
Kuomintang unionists of China and the important left-wing 
elements in the organised working class movements of India, 
the Philippines, Japan and Australia, as well as smaller 
Communist groups throughout the rest of Asia. It was thus 
seized upon eagerly as a vehicle for extending Communist 
influence throughout Asia and the Pacific region. Increasing­
ly too, as the Communist-Kuomintang alliance in China 
collapsed Pacific trade unionists were encouraged to promote 
anti-war movements against possible intervention by 
imperialist powers to crush the Chinese Communist Party or 
to mount an attack through the East on the U.S.S.R. For 
all these reasons Moscow proved very keen to encourage a 
real united front with Australian trade unionists, and 
through the R.I.L.U. to endorse and encourage the broad
Zinoviev, Towards Trade Union Unity (London, 1924)
128. A. Lozovsky"! "United Front" (Sydney, 1926), p.2.
129. Ibid., p .4.
and flexible policies pursued by Garden and the Trades 
Hall reds of the Labor Council of N.S.W.
Communism, then, presented two different faces 
to the Australian left throughout the 1920s. The Comintern’ 
aggressive refusal to amalgamate with a wider International 
stood as a barrier to the pursuit of a united front with the 
small Marxist socialist parties such as the S.L.P. and the 
V.S.P., whilst at the very same time the R.I.L.U’s active 
propaganda amongst trade unionists in general contradicted 
fractious Comintern pronouncements and the policies so 
beloved of the sectarian elements in the C.P.A. In the 
event the considerable goodwill towards Bolshevism which 
existed amongst organised workers sufficed to overcome 
reservations about Moscow's intentions on the part of most 
Australian trade unionists, and they joined readily enough 
in united front projects and alliances in which the hand of 
the R.I.L.U. and sometimes too the C.P.A. could easily be 
seen. In pursuing these broad united front projects Moscow 
and the R.I.L.U. had lost their more sectarian adherents in 
the A.S.P. and the I.W.W., but gained in exchange an 
influence probably greater than in any other Western labour 
movement outside France and Germany. For through the 
R.I.L.U. Moscow's more moderate policies struck chords of 
sympathy in a trade union movement convinced of the need for 
unity and prone to the illusion that working-class interna­
tionalism could, despite all the barriers to its achievement 
become a real practical force in world affairs.
CHAPTER FOUR
ECHOES AND REVERBERATIONS IN THE LABOUR MOVEMENT
Now what has been the history of the 
Industrial Movement since the £1921]] June 
Conference? At that time it was predicted 
that we were on the eve of an organised 
attack from the leaders of the capitalist 
class... on the workers' standard of living. 
And because of our lack of unity and of the 
absence of any permanent well-ordered 
machine... we have been slowly, but surely, 
retreating ever since. Now this debacle 
must stop, and it could be stopped by real 
solidarity and unity, and this can only be 
achieved by the leaders, if they teach the 
rank and file by example. That, in my 
opinion, is the crux of the whole case.
The ideological developments amongst socialists, 
and their interpretations of world events, were of marginal 
significance on their own account. They did however assume 
importance in the affairs of the labour movement through 
the wide and continuing support accorded their views by 
militant unionists. From 1918 to 1921 as events in Europe 
seemed to confirm their prognosis of history, and as an 
aroused and militant working class turned away from 
traditional methods and policies, it was the revolutionary 
socialists who made the running in the labour movement, a 
fact openly acknowledged by the Labor Party Executive when 
it convened the 1921 Melbourne Congress of trade unions.
From that date on the hegemony of militant socialism declined
* j^E.J. Holloway: opening address^], All-Australian Trade
Union Congress Report, 1922, in L.C., July 6, 1922, p.2
164
and the A.L.P. politicians gradually regained their 
confidence and the leadership of organised labour.
Even so, amongst union leaders and rank and file 
activists there was considerable and sustained resistance 
to this trend. Often in the face of pronounced A.L.P. 
opposition, unionists proceeded steadily throughout the 
1920s to strengthen their connections with international 
working-class organisations, and to combine with other 
left-wing bodies to demonstrate their solidarity with 
various overseas socialist movements and causes. Thus 
the history of the labour movement in the 1920s is marked 
by divergence and conflict between the cautious, moderate, 
and essentially isolationist views of the A.L.P. politicians 
and their supporters, and the radical working-class 
internationalism purveyed by left-wing socialists and 
supported by a number of important and powerful militant 
unions. Through that support in the union movement the 
socialist groups gained the necessary political muscle to 
continue to make themselves felt.
i. Socialism and the trade unions
Following the split in the N.S.W. Labor Party in 
1919 the O.B.U. movement amongst unionists had temporarily 
slowed to a halt as the A.W.U. and the Sydney Labor Council
fought tenaciously to undermine each others industrial
1power bases. Throughout 1920 however a more conciliatory 
spirit slowly prevailed and moves towards the formation of 
the O.B.U. revived once more. Early in that year the
1. The A.W.U. and their right-wing supporters in N.S.W. in 
1920 convened a conference of Labor Council-affiliated 
unions in an attempt to oust the Trades Hall reds from 
the Council executive, but met with only a limited 
response to their call. The A.W.U. leaders on the other 
hand found themselves seriously challenged both in the 
Sydney area by a Labor Council-backed rank and file 
committee, and in the Western Branch by a revolt led by 
the W.I.U. of A. supporter J. Cullinan.
Melbourne Trades Hall Council entered into a series of 
lengthy debates on the socialisation issue, and although 
finally a series of O.B.U. proposals were defeated by the 
Council in favour of a rather more moderate plan, this was 
principally intended to serve as a basis for further 
discussion by the labour movement in order to overcome
2the hiatus which had developed over the One Big Union.
The Melbourne moves succeeded in attracting the interest 
of both major protagonists in the N.S.W. dispute. For the 
A.W.U. leaders the moves offered an opportunity to mollify 
rank and file sympathisers of the O.B.U. plan who had 
already sparked off serious internal revolts within that 
union, while for the Trades Hall reds and militant 
industrialists the possibilities of rapprochement with the 
A.W.U. meant removal of a powerful and unscrupulous opponent 
blocking the path to the growth of radicalism within the 
organised labour movement. Clearly the time seemed ripe 
for a formulation by radicals and trade unionists of a 
programme which could serve as a basis for unity, and 
following preparatory talks between the main unions in 
N.S.W. the A.L.P. Federal Executive arranged for a congress 
of all Australian unions aimed at a full discussion of the 
questions at issue.
For the A.L.P. the summoning of a trade union 
congress was a brave act, for dissatisfaction with the 
traditional political expression of the labour movement 
was by now widespread. The years 1919-20 had witnessed 
industrial turmoil and strike action on a scale unprecedented 
since the general strike of 1917. The results of this 
outburst of direct action had been mixed, in many cases 
yielding some improvements in conditions of work, but rarely 
compensating for the galloping inflation and industrial
165.
2. The plan reflected contemporary guild-socialist notions 
in its call for an immediate aim of joint government, 
community and worker control of industry. For the T.H.C. 
debates see L.C., Feb.5, 1920, p .1; Mar.25, 1920, p.7; 
April 1, 1920, p.7.
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dislocation which buffeted the working class in the 
immediate post-war years. In early 1920 a Labor government 
had been elected in N.S.W. but it had achieved little in 
the face of an oncoming recession which denuded both State 
and Federal budgets and brought on widespread unemployment 
and an employer offensive to whittle back any hard-won 
working class gains. For trade unionists the conclusions 
to be drawn from the trend of events seemed clear. 
Capitalism was totally bankrupt; reformist methods were 
passe, and the left-wing minority parties were correct in 
their contention that Australia was caught in a process of 
worldwide collapse and economic change which would make 
socialism the order of the day. A trade union congress 
held in such circumstances was bound to demand a radical 
reappraisal of the nature and role of the A.L.P.
The All-Australian Trade Union Congress met in
Melbourne from 20-25th June, 1921. Its proceedings were
a microcosm of the ideas and influences at work in the
labour movement in the early post-war years. Opening the3Congress the chairman E.J. Holloway surveyed "the mental 
revolution which had taken place among the workers 
throughout the world" and set the task of the conference 
as the definition of a programme which would unite the 
left and "make the next decade the transition period from
4Capitalism to Socialism". From early on it was obvious 
that a synthesis of left-wing ideas similar to that 
outlined by R.S. Ross in his book Revolution in Russia and 
Australia held sway over the large majority of delegates 
who attended the Congress. On the right were a number of 
A.W.U. delegates who were nevertheless prepared to remain 
silent on most of the questions at issue, or who, like
3. Formerly prominent in the V.S.P. Holloway was also at 
this time Secretary of the Melbourne T.H.C. and President 
of the Federal Executive of the Labor Party. Through 
his official positions in the labour movement Holloway 
was able to play a critical role in translating the 
Melbourne T.H.C. initiatives into the Australia-wide 
trade union congress.
4. All-Australian Trade Union Congress Report, 1921, p.3*
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J.H. Scullin and E.H. Lane, actually spoke in favour of 
the left-wing consensus. On the far left were a number 
of declared Communist delegates, led by Garden's Trades 
Hall reds, who expressed reservations about the alleged 
'reformist illusions' of the majority left-wing opinion, 
but who also were mostly eager to cooperate in swinging 
the A.L.P. towards a position of militant socialism.
Almost unanimously the Congress adopted a long and detailed 
programme+to bring about socialisation in Australia by a
+ The basic socialisation programme outlined by the congress 
revolved around the recommendations that "the socialisa­
tion of industry, production, distribution and exchange be 
the objective of the Australian Labor Party", and the 
adoption of the report of the ways and means committee:
1. That, for the purpose of achieving the Objective, 
industrial and Parliamentary machinery shall be 
utilised.
2. That, in recognition of the fact that this is an 
era of social production, this Conference declares that 
craft organisation, as a working-class weapon, is 
obsolete, and pledges itself, and all its future 
representatives, to organisation of the workers along 
the lines of industry, as shall be decided by the 
Organisation Committee of this Conference.
3. The nationalisation of banking and all principal 
industries, and the municipalisation of such services 
and supplies as can best be operated in limited areas; 
adult franchise and extended powers to be granted 
municipalities for this purpose.
4. The government of nationalised industries by 
boards, upon which the workers in the industry and the 
community shall have representation.
5. The establishment of an elective Supreme Economic 
Council by all nationalised industries.
6. The setting up of Labor Research and Information 
Bureaux and of Labor Educational Institutions, in which 
the workers shall be trained in the management of 
nationalised industries.
7. That the foregoing be sent to the Australian and 
New Zealand Labor Parties, as a recommendation that it 
be the fighting plank of the platform, believing that 
only by the abolition of the capitalist system can 
working-class emancipation be achieved.
8. That all Parliamentary representatives be required 
to function as active propagandists of the Objective 
and methods of the Movement.
9. That this Congress expresses the earnest hope that, 
just as all schools of working-class thought have been 
usefully represented at this Congress, to the advantage 
of the Movement as a whole, the Labor Party immediately
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pincer movement of industrial and political measures 
along the lines Ross had earlier advocated. The One 
Big Union (now renamed the Australasian Workers' Union 
in place of the earlier W.I.U. of A. title) was endorsed 
as the immediate aim of all trade unionists who were 
assembled at the Congress and demands were made upon the 
A.L.P. that it open its doors to "all schools of working- 
class thought" and instruct its parliamentary representa­
tives to become active propagandists for socialism. Plans 
were also formulated for nationalisation of banking and 
all principal industries, and for a Soviet-model Supreme 
Economic Council to run the economy once nationalisation 
had been accomplished. Other resolutions dealt with a 
range of local and international questions and with the 
development of links with working-class organisations 
overseas•
As well as formulating a socialisation programme 
the Congress set up a thirteen man Council of Action 
composed of leading labour and trade union spokesmen from 
the six States in Australia and from New Zealand. Modelled 
on British labour's successful attempts to prevent 
government intervention in Russia against the Bolsheviks
endeavor to unite politically all the said elements in 
the common fight, and that all men, who have been 
officially disconnected with the A.L.P., but who have 
continued fighting for working-class interests, be 
included, if they desire, in the A.L.P. without loss of 
continuity of membership.
5. A qualification to V.S.P. attitudes towards the
Melbourne Congress decisions was Don Cameron's criticism 
in the Socialist that too much power was vested in 
bureaucratic bodies and that "no elected body... should 
be armed with power to enforce its decisions. It should 
function always in an advisory capacity only". Under 
pressure Cameron later modified his criticism of the 
Congress: "Although this is disappointing, it must be
expected when men mostly reason by proxy".
6. The delegates elected to the Council of Action were:- 
(N.S.W.) J.S. Garden, A.C. Willis, J.M. Baddeley, A. 
Blakeley; (Vic.) E.J. Holloway, R.S. Ross, J.H. Scullin, 
J. Barnes; (Qld.) T. Moroney; (S.A.) F.W. Burrell; (W.A.) 
J. Curtin; (Tas.) A. Higgins; (n .Z.) H.E. Holland.
the Council of Action was allocated the key role in 
implementing Congress decisions. It was charged with the 
tasks of giving effect to industrial reorganisation and 
cooperating with the Labor Party in regard to all other
7resolutions "for the purpose of putting into operation 
the principles adopted by ^the] Congress". The Council 
was also armed with the power to convene another All- 
Australian Trade Union Congress should the A.L.P. demur.
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Not surprisingly the Council of Action faced 
bitter opposition from the moderates and politicians of 
the Labor Party. From its birth the Council of Action 
struggled against a variety of challenges to its authority 
and finally faded from the scene in late 1922 after failing 
to retain the support of unionists during a large-scale 
industrial dispute centred on N.S.W. Already by this time 
differences had begun to erupt between the Council’s leading 
members which were to make it impossible to hold that body 
together or to implement the O.B.U. scheme.
There were numerous reasons for the Council of 
Action's failure. Though the 1921 Melbourne Congress 
decisions had united the mainstream of radical forces, 
dissidents on the left still remained amongst the socialist 
groups. The W.I.I.U., the S.L.P. and the A.S.P. Communists 
all denounced the Congress as a Labor Party stunt. Tom 
Glynn and the ex-Wobbly members of the C.P.A. were so 
alarmed at Garden’s compromises with the A.W.U. and the 
Labor Party that they mostly dropped out of Communist 
activities, and devoted their energies to the I.U.P.L., 
formed in November, 1921. More serious still were the 
groups of dissidents who remained within the C.P.A. and 
with the assistance of editor C.W. Baker conducted a 
campaign of guerrilla warfare against Garden's alliances
7. All-Australian Trade Union Congress Report, 1921, p.19*
and united front policies through the pages of the 
Communist. After Baker's removal as editor of the 
Communist in 1923 the voices of dissent were more muted, 
but powerful still. These recalcitrant C.P.A. members 
focussed their attention on criticising the V.S.P., on 
issuing blanket condemnations of all factions in the 
Labor Party, and on advocating and independently carrying 
out adventurist policies in industrial affairs. Their 
great triumph came when the C.P.A. adopted a policy of 
calling a general strike in opposition to the strategy 
adopted by the Miners' Federation of containing the lockout 
on the northern N.S.W. coalfields in 1923» Compounding the 
resultant split between the Trades Hall reds and perhaps 
the most powerful militant union in Australia, sectarian 
C.P.A. members supported the ex-A.S.P. member W.J. Thomas 
in his claims of bribery against the mine-owners: claims
which had further repercussions in the affairs of the 
Miners' Federation and resulted in A.C. Willis turning 
decisively against the Communists. The Central Council of 
the Coal Miners' Federation summed up militant opinion 
generally on this issue when it commented in an official 
statement in 1923s
We say without hesitation, that the "Communist", 
now known as the "Workers' Weekly", has done more to 
create dissension than all the capitalist papers put 
together, and we find it hard to believe that some of 
the persons now masquerading as Communists are not 
pimps, tools, and spies for certain interests 
diametrically opposed to the best interests of the 
working class.^
The O.B.U. plan also fell foul of union power 
struggles, divisions of craft and temperament, and the 
empire-building obsession of the leadership of the A.W.U. 
The enthusiasts of the O.B.U. were composed of three 
disparate groups in the union movement: the newly
developing unions organised already on an industrial basis 
such as the Miners' Federation and the Waterside Workers' 
Federation; the State Labor Councils, which despite their
8. D.T.t July 10, 1923
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basically craft union support were inspired by radical 
ideas to work towards fusion into larger and more industrial 
forms of organisation; and the A.W.U., whose leaders had 
from 1919 to 1920 opposed the O.B.U. as too much influenced 
by Bolshevik and I.W.W. ideas, but who had changed their 
attitude in the face of enthusiasm for the project from 
sections of their own rank and file, and of the possibili­
ties they perceived of gobbling up smaller unions and 
placing them under A.W.U. control. Such a coalition of 
unionists could not long sustain the O.B.U. in the face of 
the industrial dislocation and sectional change brought on 
by post-World War One economic developments. The fateful 
test of O.B.U. authority over unionists came in late 1922 
when the Council of Action was drawn into an industrial 
dispute centreing on the Iron Trades group of unions in
N. S.W. and formulated a policy to be adopted by all unions
involved. As the dispute progressed however the earlier
unity broke down completely and the plan for united action
9in the dispute collapsed. Following this rebuff the
Council of Action fell into disuse, and the occasional
meetings of O.B.U. promoters bogged down in factional
manoeuvre and legalistic quibblings. In 1924 the O.B.U.
was laid to rest by a Commonwealth Arbitration Court refusal
to grant it registration, a refusal facilitated by the
terms of application to the Court. The A.W.U., which had
won control of the organising body for the O.B.U., had
included provisions in the One Big Union plan presented to
the Arbitration Court which both ensured rejection by the
Registrar and that objection would be lodged by other
unionists including several generally in favour of the 
1 0O. B.U. After 1924 the main advocates of the O.B.U. fell 
into warring camps, with the A.W.U. occasionally asserting 
that it was the only legitimate champion of the project; 
the more radical T.lI.Cs and many of the mass industrial
9 . See Labor Council of N.S.W. Report, 1 9 2 2 , p p . 1 7 - 1 8 .
10.See O.B.U., Why It Failed! (Syd., 1924). Cf. E.H. Lane,
Dawn to Dusk; Reminiscences of a Rebel (Brisb., 1939)» 
esp. P p . 2 7 1 - 2 7 2 .
unions working towards a compromise on the O.B.U. idea 
with the creation in the Australasian Council of Trade 
Unions of what amounted to a loose federation of individual 
unions and Trades Hall Councils. The A.C.T.U. retained the 
1 9 2 1 socialisation objective, but adopted a more restrained
set of methods, aimed at reconciling the aspirations of the
1 1left with both craft unionists and the A.L.P.
The discord amongst proponents of the O.B.U. was 
facilitated and encouraged by the fact that there was 
declining mass support for the project. The militant 
atmosphere amongst workers that had marked the anti­
conscription struggles and had extended into 1 9 1 9 and 1 9 2 0  
was soon dissipated as the 'twenties progressed. When the 
All-Australian Trade Union Congress was reconvened in 
Melbourne in June-July 1922 to consider progress towards 
the objectives outlined the year before, and to re-endorse 
and strengthen the Council of Action, the gathering was 
already marked by revelations of both the internal 
wrangling which had begun to erupt amongst labour leaders,
and of the lack of interest of rank and file unionists in
1 2the outcome of these disputes. Though in all their
arguments, campaigns, and lobbying throughout the 1 9 2 0 s 
those who represented themselves as the spokesmen for the
ideals of 1 9 2 1 made great play of speaking on behalf of
1 3their steadily growing union memberships, this was for 
the most part bluff and exaggeration. There were few signs 
of mass socialist consciousness amongst the working-class 
masses. The militant syndrome continued to manifest itself 
in maritime and transport, mining, and metal unions, in 
whose industries the class struggle was fought rough and 
tumble, but it was not until the beginnings of the 
depression in the later 1 9 2 0 s that these attitudes came to 
be shared again by the rank and file of many unions. By and
11. All-Australian Trade Union Congress Report, 1927* p .20.
12. L.C., July 6, 1922, p .2.
13. See for example O.B.U,, Why It Failed!, p p .13-20
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large it was left to the factions and groupings and 
leading figures and activists of the organised labour 
movement to do what they would with the socialist ideals 
of 1921.
A critical factor in such a situation was the 
complete opposition to the Council of Action's political 
pretensions by the Labor Party. At the Brisbane Federal 
Conference of the A.L.P. in October 1921 the politicians 
had converted the programme for socialist change from the 
fighting platform intended by the Melbourne Congress into 
a Labor Party 'Objective', allowing for the old Fabian 
approach to the question of socialism to be used in wooing
1 4the electorate. The Brisbane Conference went even
further in its total rejection of the Council of Action as
having any place at all in its deliberations, and shut out
of its proceedings all Council members who were not
conference delegates. In 1922 when the newly re-elected
and re-endorsed Council of Action suggested that unions
affiliated with the A.L.P. should instead affiliate with
State Councils of Action which would in turn affiliate with
the Labor Party the proposal was greeted by the A.L.P. with
1 5a combination of extreme silence and legalistic evasion.
By May 1927 an A.L.P. Federal Conference held at Canberra 
was busy disassembling the socialisation objective and 
removing the prescribed methods which had perforce to be 
accepted under union pressure in 1921, and from this time 
on Labor's socialism was a vague but clearly parliamentary 
Party aim in the achievement of which the militant unions 
were to play no part. The setting up of a more modest 
successor to the Council of Action in the A.C.T.U. - whose 
very name underlined the abandonment of an overt and 
aggressive challenge to the traditional political voice of 
organised labour, was a measure of the A.L.P's victory by
14. See for example E.G. Theodore, Socialisation. What It 
Means (Brisb., 1922).
15. L.N,, Nov.4, 1922, p .4.
1927» By this time the days had passed when radicals of 
the industrial movement were determined and confident 
enough to contemplate complete reorganisation of labour's 
mass political organisations through a body aimed at 
rapid socialist change.
Integrally involved with the disputations over 
the Council of Action and the fate of the 1921 socialisation 
programme were the bitter and prolonged power struggles in 
the A.L.P. in N.S.W. Labor politics in that State in the 
1920s was a confusing whirligig of groups and factions 
struggling for control of the A.L.P. machine. In 1919 the 
A.W.U., the moderate unionists, and the politicians in 
N.S.W. had combined to defeat narrowly and then force out 
of the A.L.P. the enthusiasts of the One Big Union movement 
led by Garden and A.C. Willis. Within a short while of 
their victory however the A.W.U. and an important section 
of the N.S.W. Parliamentary Party fell out over the 
dictatorial policies of the A.W.U. N.S.W. Branch President 
J. Bailey. As a result of this factional strife, and the 
return of Willis and a number of other radicals to A.L.P. 
politics, the A.W.U. lost control of the N.S.W. Labor Party 
in 1923> and an alliance of J.T. Lang as leader of the 
Parliamentary Party and A.C. Willis as President of the 
A.L.P. was installed in power. Willis then proceeded to 
expel Bailey and his confreres from the A.L.P. after an 
enquiry found that they had rigged elections by the use of 
ballot boxes containing sliding panels; the A.W.U. countered 
this manoeuvre with appeals to the Federal Executive of the 
Labor Party, and when this failed embarked on an unremitting 
vendetta against all who had ousted them from power. As 
the power struggle continued and the requirements of 
factional alliance expanded, Lang was induced to soften 
his extreme hostility towards Garden and the Trades Hall 
reds, and in late 1926 after their abandonment of the C.P.A. 
they joined Willis as the power behind the Lang government 
of N.S.W. Earlier in that year the A.W.U. had succeeded in 
temporarily regaining control of the State Executive, but
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in March 1927 the newly elected N.S.W. Branch President 
W.H. Seale joined forces with Lang, Garden and Willis to 
call a conference which adopted a set of rules effectively 
shutting out the A.W.U. from the State Labor machine.
The A.W.U. was left with an insignificant pretender 
Executive headed by F. Conroy which was unable to gain 
much influence or support either electorally or from A.L.P. 
Branches in other States, but which nevertheless allowed 
Bailey to mount some rearguard spoiling actions against 
the union militants in control of the N.S.W. Labor Movement.
The significance of the political struggles over 
the Labor machine in N.S.W. lay in the extension of these 
disputes to the Federal sphere and the invasion of all 
policy issues by considerations of factional intrigue. Few 
Federal A.L.P. politicians avoided involvement in the 
disputes in one way or another, and the careers of some
F.P.L.P. leaders were made or lost by the position they
1 6adopted vis-ct-vis the battles in that State. The intense 
fighting amongst unionists in Sydney spilled over to the 
affairs of the Melbourne T.H.C., two of its leading figures 
(and sometime Federal Presidents of the A.L.P.) E.J. 
Holloway and J.F. Hannan taking up the causes of disputants 
in N.S.W., the former on the side of Willis and Garden, the
1 7latter on the side of the A.W.U. Moreover, with the
resolution of the struggles in N.S.W. in favour of the 
Seale-Willis-Lang combination in 1927 the A.W.U. seized 
upon the socialist and internationalist policies of the 
industrialist section of that alliance to argue that these 
were a danger to the Labor Movement, and took upon itself 
the task of eradicating these influences from the Labor 
Party. Henceforth the A.W.U. leadership and their minions 
throughout Australia began a concerted campaign against 
the A.C.T.U., labelling it as a disguised attempt to impose
16. See I.E. Young, Theodore: His Life and Times (Syd., 1971)
17. Annual Conference" of A.L.P, (N.S.W.)... July 1927« Report 
See also U.V., Nov.13» 1926, p.3.
a Council of Action upon Labor politicians and union 
moderates, and an unbearable electoral liability to the
A.L.P.
Yet despite the powerful opposition to their 
ideas and outbursts of internal dissension the union left 
remained a significant influence in the labour movement. 
Moderated in tone by the failure of the Council of Action 
and the O.B.U., union radicalism throughout the 1920s was 
at the same time a critical factor in the formation of the 
A.C.T.U. In addition various left-wing unions established 
other innovative institutions such as the Labour Research 
and Information Bureau and the Labor Daily newspaper in 
N.S.W.+ The core of the labour left wing consisted of
+ The 1921 All-Australian Trade Union Congress had called 
for the establishment of both these institutions as urgent 
necessities for the labour movement.
The Labor Research and Information Bureau was established 
by the Labor Council of N.S.W. in 1921. Its first Director 
was E.R. Voigt, previously of the Labor Research Depart­
ment, London. After 1926 its Director was J. Ryan. The 
Bureau aimed both to assist in the more efficient day-to- 
day management of union affairs and to provide news and 
information for and about labour movements overseas. Its 
publications included the Labor Monthly, which in 1929 
was incorporated into the Pan-Pacific Worker: official
organ of the A.C.T.U.-affiliated Pan-Pacific Trade Union 
Secretariat.
The Labor Daily scheme had a history long pre-dating 
the 1921 trade union congress. Before World War One the 
A.W.U. had already begun to plan for an Australia-wide 
chain of daily newspapers, and in 1918 had established 
the World in Hobart. Other daily newspapers had been 
established by unions and State branches of the A.L.P. in 
Adelaide and Brisbane. The All-Australian Trade Union 
Congress recommended the amalgamation of all existing 
Labor dailies and the immediate launching of a Sydney 
newspaper. The faction fights amongst rival O.B.U. 
groups meant that little was achieved. Finally however 
in 1924 a union consortium led by the Miners’ Federation 
launched the Sydney Labor Daily.
In 1925 the movement to establish a working-class 
propaganda apparatus took another turn with the setting 
up of the Sydney radio station 2KY by the Labor Council 
of N.S.W. In 1926 the Third All-Australian Trade Union 
Congress recommended such union-controlled radio 
stations be set up throughout Australia.
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important union figures who were strongly influenced by
socialism and who attempted to keep alive the spirit and
ideals that had activated the 1921 Melbourne trade union
congress. They represented a mainstream leftism which
although in some cases it assumed a noticeably more
moderate bent as the years passed nevertheless remained
intensely anti-war, anti-capitalist, and internationalist
in thought and opinion. Such an outlook continued to
pervade each of the All-Australian Trade Union Congresses
and gatherings which succeeded the 1921 Melbourne congress;
1 8and the A.C.T.U. after its formation in 1927»
This brand of radicalism drew its strength from
the spectrum of Australian unions representing blue collar
and unskilled industrial workers. For bodies such as the
Australian Railways Union and the Miners* Federation
(W.I.U. of A. - Mining Section) such doctrines stood at
the very basis of attempts at welding constituent unions
1 9and State branches into an industry-wide organisation.
At the same time the ideals of the 1921 Melbourne Congress 
were a strong influence on many of the smaller unions and 
in the central Trades Hall Councils of the eastern States. 
In Victoria the Melbourne T.H.C. figures E.J. Holloway,
Don Cameron, C. Crofts and A. Wallis were amongst its more 
prominent spokesmen. In South Australia the Trades and
18. The more significant interstate trade union gatherings 
after the 1921 Melbourne congress were as follows:
June-July, 1922, All-Australian Trade Union Congress,
held in Melbourne;
September-October, 1922, Council of Action Conference
in Sydney;
June, 1925> Preliminary Conference of Commonwealth 
Industrial Disputes Committee in Adelaide;
August, 1926, Third All-Australian Trade Union Congress 
in Sydney (held in conduction with the Preliminary 
Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference);
May, 1927, All-Australian Trade Union Congress in
Melbourne (the founding congress of the A.C.T.U.).
. For the importance of the O.B.U. movement in the affairs 
of the Miners' Federation see Gollan, The Coalminers of 
New South Wales« esp. Ch.8.
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Labor Council president F. Walsh, (and to a lesser 
extent) its secretary T.P. Howard, and the editor of the 
Adelaide Daily Herald H. Kneebone also fitted into this 
grouping. In Queensland the militant railway union 
leaders T. Moroney and G. Rymer and the incongruous A.W.U. 
delegate E.H. Lane (’Jack Cade’ of the Brisbane Daily 
Standard) were fair representatives of union left-wing 
thought. A.C. Willis and J.M. Baddeley of the Miners' 
Federation and J. Kilburn of the Trades Hall reds also 
were classifiable as prominent mainstream leftists, though 
as a whole the powerful N.S.W. Labor Council with its 
direct R.I.L.U. affiliation represented a far left element 
in the union movement. Counterbalancing the uncritical 
advocacy of the Communist model engaged in by Garden and 
the Trades Hall reds in the early part of the 1920s, and 
later by the tiny C.P.A., was a more right-wing viewpoint 
strongly tinged with pacifism and affected by A.L.P. 
electoral considerations, and tending to water down 
militant unionist ideas when they appeared too disruptive 
of social harmony. This more cautious aspect of left-wing 
unionist thought was represented by, amongst others, R.S. 
Ross in his declining years.
Together the mainstream leftists, the Communists, 
and the pacifist left represented a powerful voice in the 
labour movement. For trade unionists militant socialism 
served to define an independent and distinctly working 
class position on all social questions ranging from wage 
claims to a citizen's obligation to the state in time of 
war. Though mostly outnumbered at Labor Party conferences, 
left-wing unionists provided the most vociferous and 
consistent anti-capitalist element in the Labor Party, and 
attempted to act as guardians of the party’s Socialisation 
Objective adopted in 1921. Following the 1927 A.L.P. 
Federal Conference the left-controlled N.S.W. Labor Party 
protested vigorously against the watering down of the 
socialisation plank, and further protests were lodged by 
left-wing Victorian unionists and militants in other
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States. Connected with this advocacy of a militant
anti-capitalism in domestic policy was a strident anti­
imperialism, a contempt for the politics of capitalist 
nation states, and a disregard of the force of interna­
tional diplomacy in the existing world political setting.
On all such issues union leaders echoed more or less 
exactly the world outlook and propaganda of the socialist 
and Communist groups to which many of their number belonged.
Following on from their anti-war and anti­
imperialist beliefs was a firm adherence to internationalism. 
For left-wing trade unionists internationalism could act as 
a counter to the alliances of the capitalist nation states, 
and could if developed enough nullify their aggressive 
intent. In addition of course internationalism was 
considered desirable from the point of view of socialist 
theory, and sought after as morally and ultimately desirable 
from that point of view. Yet the problem which had invaded 
the affairs of the international socialist parties had to be 
faced by trade union internationalists also: which set of 
international organisations to join? The Moscow-controlled
R.I.L.U. beckoned unionists on the left, but the I.F.T.U.
21of Amsterdam had its champions too.
In the event relatively few unions decided on 
direct affiliation with either body, but instead adopted 
a stance identical to the 'Two-and-a-Half' internationalism 
of the V.S.P. When J. Howie attended the first R.I.L.U. 
congress in 1921 he was credentialled by a range of T.H.Cs
20. L. C . , June 2, 1927, p.6; Railways Union Gazette,
Aug.31, 1927, p.1.
21. Although suspicious of the League of Nations the trade 
union movement was eventually induced to send delegates 
to the International Labour Organisation, established 
under the League's Charter in 1919. Federal government 
attempts in 1922 to send its own 'labour' nominees to 
the I.L.O. conference the next year galvanised all 
T.H.Cs into electing E.J. Holloway as their only 
accredited representative. Thereafter a series of 
prominent labour figures attended I.L.O. conferences 
throughout the 1920s including J. Beasley, C. Crofts 
and John Curtin.
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throughout Australia, but subsequently the enthusiasm
for this organisation declined and only the Sydney Trades
Hall reds were prepared to develop formal links with
Moscow. Following the affiliation of the N.S.W. Labor
Council to the R.I.L.U. in 1922 Moscow issued an invitation
to the All-Australian Trade Union Congress of that year to 
23join, but the invitation was quietly declined. In 1927 a 
number of moderate Victorian unionists moved to have the 
A.C.T.U. affiliate with the I.F.T.U., but this move too was 
rejected. Instead, throughout the 1920s Australian 
unionists issued a number of calls for the convening of a 
new International which could embrace the constituents of 
both the I.F.T.U. and the R.I.L.U., and of union movements 
previously unattached to either. Wedded to the idea of a 
united front of working-class organisations the mainstream 
left was convinced that such an approach was the only one
24that could prove efficacious. However as a practical
alternative to a united world trade union movement 
Australian unions played a leading role in attempts to form 
an international organisation in the Pacific region which 
would enshrine their united front ideas. These initiatives 
were eventually to lead to the formation in China in May, 
1927» of a permanent Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat 
to which the newly established A.C.T.U. was affiliated 
later the same year.
Plainly, socialism continued to mould the 
attitudes and ideas of an important section of the 
Australian union movement throughout the 1920s, Notwith­
standing the failure of the Council of Action to live up 
to the expectations of its militant supporters, the ideals
22. Howie, Reds in Congress, p.7*
23. See L.C,, Sept.14, 1922, p.2.
24. S .M.H., Aug.9) 1926; All-Australian Trade Union Congress
Report, 1927, PP.17, 19-20, 30.
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which had inspired the 1921 All-Australian Trade Union 
Congress remained alive and effective amongst a wide 
spectrum of union opinion. Notwithstanding the disputes 
between socialists over the strategy and tactics of 
political change, and acrimony over industrial matters, 
a united front operated amongst leftists when it came to 
broad questions of internationalism, anti-capitalism, and 
opposition to war and imperialism. The strength of these 
shared dispositions and viewpoints was demonstrated in 
concerted activism on behalf of a number of causes thrown 
up by developments on the post-World War One scene: 
notably in the various solidarity protests and demonstra­
tions which revolved around the Hands Off Russia agitation 
from 1918 to 1920; in the Hands Off China campaign from 
1 9 2 5 to 1 9 2 7 » in the strike actions and demonstrations on 
behalf of Sacco and Vanzetti in 1927» and in the consistent 
pressure to organise a viable and militant pan-Pacific trade 
union movement from 1921 on.
ii. ’Hands Off Russia' agitation
Allied intervention in Russia began in mid-1918,
for a variety of reasons, all of which aimed at crippling
25or eliminating Bolshevik rule. In the next three years
Britain, France, Japan and the United States all maintained 
intermittent anti-Bolshevik military activities on Russian
25. Naturally enough motives varied considerably according 
to the personalities and the interests involved. For 
a detailed account of British intentions towards Russia 
from 1917-21 see the unfinished trilogy by R.H. Ullman, 
Anglo-Soviet Relations, 19^7-21 (Princeton U.P., New 
Jersey). Vol.1: "Intervention and the War" (1 9 6 1 );
Vol,2: "Britain and the Russian Civil War" (19 6 8 ). For
a similarly intense study of perhaps the least bellige­
rent of the Allies see G.F. Kennan, Soviet-American 
Relations, 1917-1920 (Princeton U . P ~  New Jersey). 
Vol.1: "Russia Leaves the War" (1956); Vol.2: "The
Decision to Intervene" (1958).
territory. At the same time these nations, and particularly 
Britain and France, extended considerable military and 
logistical assistance to a variety of dissident forces 
fighting the Red Army all over Russia: the wandering
Czechoslovak Corps, and the armies of Denikin, Kolchak, 
Yudenich and Wrangel all benefitting greatly from Allied 
help. When these endeavours faltered in the face of an 
apparently invincible Red Army, Britain and France in 1920 
openly encouraged and assisted a military escapade by the 
new cordon sanitaire government of Poland against Russia.
From the start Labor and socialist papers alike
greeted the news of Allied intervention in Russia as an
reactionary attempt to protect the interests of Russian
and international capitalists. To Australian labour,
as to socialist and working-class movements all over the
world, intervention clearly manifested the intention of
international capitalism to crush the world's first
socialist experiment in its infancy and before its
27example could inspire workers in other countries. Far
from the conflict and with no Australian troops committed 
there was little enough in practical terms that labour in 
this country could do in such a situation. Hands Off 
Russia agitation thus took the form of symbolic applause 
for the anti-war efforts of workers in other countries 
more directly involved and attempts to ensure that under 
no circumstances would Australian forces be committed to 
the Allied intervention.
Early displays of solidarity with the Bolsheviks 
focussed on flying the red flag, which was forbidden under 
wartime regulations. In late 19*18 the V.S.P. began a 
campaign for the right to fly the flag which was taken 
up by radical groups and trade unionists in other States
26. See for example D. S . , Aug. 5, 19*18; I. S . , July 27, 1918, 
p .3; Worker, Aug.15, 1918, p.9.
27. Ibid.; F. Anstey, Red Europe.
throughout 1919* The campaign led to many arrests and
clashes with police, including the spectacular riots in
Brisbane in March of that year.
In April 1919 the issue of Allied intervention
in Russia was brought before the Annual Conference of the
Victorian A.L.P. by Michael Considine M.P., with the aim
of there formulating a policy which would "swing organised
28Labor.... heart and soul behind the Russian movement".
Discussion however centred around the problem of expressing
sympathy with the Russian working class and abhorrence of
Allied intervention, while at the same time sidestepping
the electorally damaging charge that the A.L.P. was
identical with Bolshevism. In place of a far-left motion
expressing "wholehearted sympathy with the Russian
revolutionists, the Bolsheviki" the Conference adopted a
more restrained statement, put forward by Maurice Blackburn,
That this Conference strongly protests against 
the use of any forces to interfere with the internal 
government of Russia, and objects to the allied policy 
of starvation by blockade, and urges the Government to 
do all in its power to enable the Russian people to 
work out their own destinies.29
This resolution became the basic statement of Labor's
position in relation to the questions posed by Allied
intervention in Russia and was adopted unaltered by the
30Federal Conference of the A.L.P. in June 1919«
In parliament the Labor Party concentrated on
the issue of Australian army involvement in the intervention
in Russia. Following press reports that Australian troops
were serving in the interventionary armies Labor spokesmen
charged that there had been official encouragement of those
31men who had enlisted with the British expeditionary forces. 
Despite assurances by the government that there was no 
official Australian participation in the Russian venture,
28. A.L.P. State of Victoria Annual Conference Report,
1219, P.5.
29. Ibid., p.7.
30. A.L.P. Eighth Commonwealth Conference Report, June,
1919, pp.81-2.
3 1. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (C.P.D.), Vol.91,
Mar.3 , 1920, p .8 2.
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and an increasingly obvious coolness by Prime Minister
32Hughes towards the whole exercise, suspicion as to the
government's intentions remained strong. Labor papers
continued to accuse the government of participating in
recruiting campaigns to induce Australian soldiers to
enlist in the interventionary forces, and of conniving
33in attempts to overthrow Bolshevism. Such dogmatic
appreciation of the motivations of all capitalist
governments towards Bolshevism was encouraged by the
publication in September 1919 of Frank Anstey's book Red
Europe, which portrayed a massive and concerted conspiracy
by world capitalism to encircle Russia and extinguish its
revolution. To A.L.P. spokesmen Australian involvement in
such an escapade was abhorrent both on class lines and in
34terms of the national interest.
More unequivocally pro-Bolshevik were the
militant trade unionists. Following the dramatic riots
over Bolshevism in March, 1919 > the Brisbane Industrial
Council protested vigorously against the severity of the
sentences meted out to arrested emigre and pro-Bolshevik
demonstrators, and issued a manifesto urging Queensland's
Acting Labor Premier E.G. Theodore to take decisive action
3 5against the conservative forces involved in the riots.
At this time too the idea was mooted of undertaking strike
action in Australia in protest against the Allied inter- 
26ventionists. Though these moves apparently bore no fruit,
32. Hughes was consistently opposed to the intervention in 
Russia on the grounds that the Bolsheviks enjoyed too 
much popular support for them to be easily dislodged in 
favour of any of their opponents. See Ullman, op. cit., 
Vol.2, pp.102-103.
33* See for example, D.S,, Oct.21, 1919» p.4.
34. C.P.D,, vol.89, Aug.8 , 1919, p.11438; Vol.9 1 , Mar.3, 
1 9 2 0 , pp.81-87.
35. See Worker, April 24, 1919» P.9» May 1, 1919» p.19> 
Young, Theodore, pp.32-3.
36. V.S.P. Minutes, July 9» 1919»
1919 did see some work stoppages for the release of 
imprisoned aliens threatened with deportation, most 
notably those carried out by the Waterside Workers' 
Federation in Sydney on behalf of Paul Freeman.
The majority of unionists however accepted that 
the critical working class agitation had to be undertaken 
in Europe, for it was there that the power base of the 
interventionary armies lay. In mid-1919 as the position 
looked grave in Russia the labour press followed closely 
the moves towards strike action in Europe. Then from 
August 1919 onwards news began to arrive of impressive 
Bolshevik victories against the White armies, and the mood 
of left-wing unionists became increasingly optimistic.
In early 1920, after news arrived of defeats administered 
to both Kolchak and Denikin by the Red Army, the N.S.W.
11Labor Council passed a resolution j^viewingj with approval
the failure of international Capitalism to destroy the
Russian Soviet Republic", and despatched a congratulatory
37message to that effect off to Moscow.
In April of 1920 Poland launched an offensive 
against Russia which was quickly turned back and in the 
space of three months brought the Red Army to the gates 
of Warsaw and inspired the British government to threaten 
open warfare against the Bolsheviks on beleaguered Poland's 
behalf. Reaction in Britain was immediate, the timid 
British Labour Party leaders uniting with aggressive rank 
and file union militants to prevent arms supplies reaching 
Poland, and to frustrate any plans for direct intervention 
which the government headed by Lloyd George may have 
entertained. Within days of the Polish offensive opening, 
London dockers refused to load the Jolly George with
ammunition and other supplies for Poland, a move which
attracted support from prominent trade union leaders such
38as Ernest Bevin. Then in August 1920 a Council of Action
37. Labor Council of N.S.W., Report, 1920, p.7.
38. See A. Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin 
(London, i960), pp.133-139.
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was set up by the trade unions and the Labour Party in
the face of which Lloyd George publicly backed down and
promised that British troops would in no circumstances
intervene. The dramatic and united action of the British
workers was decisive in holding back wholesale Allied
39intervention against Russia, and brought to a successful 
and spectacular conclusion the world-wide Hands Off Russia 
agitation which had been waged with varying intensity from 
the time intervention had begun in August 1918.
Even before the crisis in Britain had fully 
developed Australian labour spokesmen were confident that 
the united and decisive working class action they had looked 
for on the European scene was at hand. "The workers of the 
world have made up their minds that Russia shall be given 
a chance to demonstrate the all-sufficiency of Labor", 
wrote H.E. Boote, editor of the A.W.U's Australian Worker:
There'll be no war against Russia for the simple 
yet astounding reason that the workers of the world 
will not permit it I
The war with Germany has brought into existence 
a new Power, greater than all the Great Powers put 
together - the Organised Working Class, thinking 
internationally. And at any moment, under the impact 
of some precipitate event, that international thought 
may be fused into international action.
The political rulers of Europe and America 
probably recognise this, and may, therefore, be 
expected to behave with the caution of capitalist 
representatives who know that a single false step will 
spell disaster for the whole capitalist system.40
Similarly confident that intervention in Russia could be
stopped by the Council of Action the N.S.W. Labor Council
issued a Hands Off Russia manifesto in which it pledged
itself to take any action necessary to assist the British
41workers in their struggle; further resolutions declaring
solidarity came from each of the major Trades Hall Councils
in other States, and public meetings were held in capital
42cities where further motions of support were passed. Not
39* Though doubtless the eventual failure of the Bolsheviks 
to take Warsaw greatly eased the acceptance by conserva­
tives of a restrained stance on the questions involved.
40. A,W., Aug.12, 1920, p.3.
41. Labor Council of N.S.W., Report, 1920, pp.7-8*
42. See for example Daily Herald (Adel.), Aug.23, 1920,pp.2,6.
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to be outdone even the right-wing dominated N.S.W. Branch
of the A.L.P. also cabled off a message of support for
43the Council of Action. As it became clear that the
Council was succeeding and that the British government
was abandoning its previously bellicose stance the
Australian left hailed the victory as an event which, in
the words of H. Kneebone, "must open up a new era among
men and women, the chief text of which shall be universal
44peace and goodwill". For Australian labour a myth was
born that militant and concerted industrial and political 
action was the safeguard against imperialist war, and that 
Councils of Action were the panacea for the achievement of 
those united aims which radicals conceived of as being 
those of the working class. The force of this myth was to 
be seen in the creation of an Australian Council of Action 
in June 1921 to implement the programme of the Melbourne 
trade union congress.
As in Britain the Hands Off Russia agitation had 
focussed the demands of labour for the right to self- 
determination of any working class regime. Conditioned by 
its World War One experiences to accept socialist interpre­
tations of the motivations and intentions behind interven­
tion in Russia, the labour movement was scandalised and 
disgusted by the actions of the Allies, and was united in 
voicing its opposition. The agitation demonstrated clearly 
how the widespread anti-capitalism and opposition to 
imperialism in the ranks of those who constituted the labour 
movement could lead on readily to manifestations of inter­
nationalism and solidarity with working class movements 
overseas. Already the caution of A.L.P. politicians with 
their concern for the electoral repercussions of such 
displays of sympathy was evidenced in the deliberately 
vague wording of official Labor policy statements on the
43* A.W., Aug.26, 1920, p.6.
44. Daily Herald (Adel.), Aug.23, 1920, p.4.
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Russian question and the suggestions by parliamentarians 
that their opposition to intervention was designed to 
safeguard both class and national interests. This pressure 
towards moderation was to grow as the conservative political 
environment of the 1920s increasingly made itself felt. In 
the case of Russia too the widespread feelings of sympathy 
and solidarity were to be contracted by the acrimonious 
debate over applying Bolshevik methods in Australia which 
had already begun to erupt as an issue in the labour 
movement and was to become increasingly divisive as the 
1920s progressed. Yet nevertheless for important sections 
of Labor Party opinion, and for militant unionists 
generally, firm support for the Soviet Union and concern 
for its continued existence were long to remain items of 
faith in their system of beliefs.
iii. The ’Hands Off China’ campaign
The issues raised by Allied intervention in 
Russia arose again in relation to developments in China 
in the mid-1920s. The background to the Chinese situation 
was the collaboration from 1923 onwards of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's 
Kuomintang Party with the Chinese Communist Party and the 
Comintern. In short order Comintern assistance and military 
aid welded the Kuomintang into an efficient political and 
military machine expressing Chinese nationalist aspirations, 
and made it the strongest single factor in a polity divided 
by rival warlords and satrapies. At the same time the 
period of Comintern-Kuomintang alliance saw the growth of 
the C.C.P. from a tiny intellectual coterie into an important 
mass party albeit as a constituent of the Kuomintang. In 
spite of strong criticism from within the C.C.P. , and later 
by Leon Trotsky, this policy of alliance was continued after 
Sun Yat-sen’s death in 1925 when the leadership of the 
Kuomintang passed to Chiang Kai-shek. Thus the impression 
presented to the outside world from 1923 to 1927 (when Chiang
Kai-shek turned on the Communists and left trade unionists 
and slaughtered them most brutally) was of an increasingly 
popular nationalist movement in China, of a decidedly 
socialist and working class inclination, and embodying a 
good example of united front principles at work. When, in 
the course of the Kuomintang's military and political 
expansion throughout China clashes occurred with the forces 
of imperial powers, particularly those of Great Britain, 
the Australian left was roused once again to angry protes­
tations on behalf of a foreign cause.
The C.P.A. had begun championing the cause of
the Nationalist Party in China from 1923 onwards, but it
was not until 1925 that the Australian left as a whole
showed close interest in events there. In early 1925
massive strikes occurred in Canton and later also in
Shanghai which caught the interest of most of the left-wing
and trade union press. Great interest was shown in the
incredibly bad labour conditions under which the Chinese
45worker suffered, and when Chinese unionists issued appeals 
to labour organisations throughout the world for aid in 
their struggles against imperialism and foreign capitalism
46Australian unions gave wide publicity to their appeal. 
Articles appeared in the labour press on the nature and 
growth of unionism in Shanghai and the militants engaged 
in the strike struggles became known as the "Chinese 
industrialists" underlining unionist sympathy with their47cause. On the basis of this growing sympathy with the
unionists of China an intense interest and anger were 
aroused throughout the labour movement when it was learned 
that Australian forces were involved in the military 
repression by which the strikes were being put down.
45. U.V., Mar.20, 1925, p.3.
46. See for example Railways Union Gazette, Aug.20, 1925,
p .4. The Chinese Railway Workers' Federation was a 
prominent signatory of the appeal.
47. L.C., July 16, 1925, P .15 U.V., July 20, 1925, p.3.
Concern over Australian involvement in Chinese
affairs followed press disclosures that the cruiser 
H.M.A.S. Brisbane, on exchange service with the Royal 
Navy, had been despatched to China waters for use in 
repulsing the attacks of rioters upon the European
48quarter of Canton. Prime Minister Bruce's statements
that while vessels were on exchange they were under the
control of the governments to which they were transferred,
and that in the case of the Brisbane the Australian
government consented to that ship being used in action
"to safeguard the lives and the property of British
49subjects and of the European community in China", did
nothing to allay apprehension throughout the labour
movement that Australians were about to become directly
involved in a war against Chinese nationalism. Unionists
angrily denounced the Australian government's attitude,
while in Federal Parliament Labor leader M. Charlton
moved for a debate over the possible involvement of the
50Brisbane in suppressing the Canton rioters.
In the ensuing debate the Labor Party's 
abhorrence of war and united opposition to imperialism 
showed through strongly, though there was less than 
wholehearted support of unionist sentiments associating 
labour's cause with that of the Chinese working class. 
Frank Anstey adopted the most radical position in 
Parliament with an outright endorsement of the left-wing 
position. "Under the pretence of defending our own 
nationals", Anstey argued, "the cruiser is to help foreign 
capitalists to crush the Chinese workers. We should 
sympathize with these unfortunate people in their efforts 
to improve their lot rather than use the forces of
51militarism to assist in destroying them". This view
was not fully shared by Labor leader Charlton however who
48. C.P.D., Vol.110, June 25, 1925, p.463.
49. Ibid., p.466.
50. Worker, July 2, 1925, p.15j L.C., July 16, 1925, p.1.
51. C.P.D., Vol.110. July 3, 1925, pp.710-711.
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strove to make clear that the A.L.P's position in 
relation to the Chinese nationalists was much more 
equivocal than Anstey would have led the House to believe.
To Charlton it was essentially a matter of Australia’s 
national interest being at stake. Though accepting that 
the genesis of the trouble in China lay in industrial 
disputes, there was a noticeable lack of concern for the 
rights or wrongs of the situation in Charlton's speech, 
and a stress on the argument that Australia should totally 
avoid becoming involved in Asian affairs. "Our interference 
in foreign affairs has already proceeded too far", argued 
Charlton,
The mere fact that Australia participated in the 
great war is no reason why we should be involved 
every time Great Britain moves in foreign affairs.
If we consent to be dragged at Britain's heels, we 
shall bring trouble upon ourselves in the near 
future.52
Labor speakers who followed Charlton and Anstey in the
debate supported either nationalistic isolationism or
working-class internationalism as the principle behind
their stance. Nevertheless despite the differences of
detail concerning A.L.P. attitudes Labor spoke with one
voice against existing Australian government involvement
in the hostilities in China. Labor members continued to
harry the government with requests to withdraw the
Brisbane from China waters until the issue resolved itself
with a general return of order in Canton and the expiration
of the period of Brisbane's service with the British China 
53Squadron.
However the debate revived in late 1926 following 
the continued expansion of Kuomintang influence throughout 
China. In October of that year Kuomintang forces achieved 
striking victories in a movement beyond their power base
52. Ibid., p.706.
53. C.P.D., Vol.111, Sept.2, 1925, p.2143.
in the Canton area, and captured the Wuhan province cities
54of Wuchang, Hanyang and Hankow. The next six months
were marked by increasing friction between Britain and the 
newly installed Left Kuomintang government in Wuhan. During 
this period Britain began a massive deployment of troops to 
Hong Kong and Shanghai and war increasingly seemed to 
threaten. As tension continued to develop the labour 
movement revealed its trepidation and dissent.
In November 1926 demonstrations were held in 
Sydney to protest against threatened British intervention 
in China. The Labor Council of N.S.W. issued a Hands Off 
China manifesto which accused Britain of having subsidised 
the war lords of China in an attempt to put down the 
Kuomintang in the same way they had previously subsidised 
"Koltchak, Denikin, Wrangel and others in their attempts 
to overthrow the people’s Government of R u s s i a " W a r n i n g  
that a decisive conflict in China was nigh and that 
Australia would inevitably be drawn into such a war the 
Labor Council appealed to the working class "not only to 
refuse to go to China but... as far as possible [jto^ j 
prevent... anyone else going."^^
A similar campaign against intervention developed 
at this time also amongst Victorian unionists. In early 
November the Victorian Branch Council of the Australian 
Railways Union passed a resolution declaring its complete 
opposition to any imperialist attack on the Kuomintang 
movement and urging
on the Labor Movement of Australia the necessity for 
forming a "Hands Off China" League to propagate the 
truth of the Chinese question and to endeavor, by 
every means, to prevent the Federal Government from 
committing Australia to another war against a people 
who are striving for self-government and national 
development.57
The A.R.U's resolution was soon taken up by other left-wing
54. For a detailed account of the position in China from the 
time of the establishment of the Wuhan Left Kuomintang 
Government until the complete break-up of the Kuomintang- 
Comintern alliance in mid-1927 see R.C. North and X.J. 
Eudin, M.N. Roy's Mission to China: The Communist- 
Kuomintang Split of 1927 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1963)
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58unions in Victoria and in January 1927 the Melbourne
T.H.C. agreed "that any proposal to send Australian
troops or warships for imperialistic service in China
» 59should be strenuously resisted.
In February 1927 the N.S.W. Labor Council
called a meeting in Sydney to form an official body to
coordinate trade union anti-war activities. The meeting
attracted representatives from a number of unions not
affiliated with the Council including the Miners'
Federation and the Federated Ironworkers' Association, as
well as the C.P.A., the S.L.P. and the I.W.W. A second
Hands Off China manifesto was adopted which blamed the
current hostilities on the machinations of a group of
British financiers interested in pressing foreign loans
6 0onto the Chinese. A Committee was elected to ensure 
maximum union opposition to the raising of any 
expeditionary forces, or the handling or supply of 
munitions or foodstuffs for such a force. Following the 
setting up of the Hands Off China Committee the cooperation 
of other Trades Hall Councils was obtained for the 
dissemination of publicity and propaganda on an Australia­
wide basis. In Sydney, Broken Hill, Newcastle and other 
centres demonstrations and public protest meetings were 
held which provoked a spirited response from returned 
servicemen and jingoes and led to the setting up of a
volunteer Labor Army "to protect the various speakers
61against the organised force of Capitalism".
The atmosphere of crisis over the Chinese 
situation continued into March, April and May, 1927» and 
the Hands Off China demonstrations in N.S.W. found their
55* Labor Council of N.S.W., Report, 1926, p.19.
56. Ibid. , p .20.
57. Railways Union Gazette, Nov.10, 1926, p.9.
58. And by the Australian Executive of the A.R.U. which
pledged itself to "do all in its power to prevent the 
transport of troops and war material to China". See 
Railroad, Feb.10, 1927» p.1.
59» Melbourne T.H.C. Minutes, Jan.27, 1927«
60. Labor Council of N.S.W., Report, 1927« pp.52-4.
61. Ibid., p.55.
In March theechoes in Melbourne, Brisbane and Adelaide.
Federal Parliamentary Labor Party announced that it was
"against any intervention £in China^] by outside powers"
and promised to "strenuously oppose any action which may
be taken to commit Australia to a Foreign wa r " , ^  The
visit to Australia in March and April of the Duke and
Duchess of York was interpreted by many militants as an
attempt to promote further the jingo spirit, and
demonstrations were organised against the Duke's landing.
In May the All-Australian Trade Union Congress meeting in
Melbourne to establish the A.C.T.U. announced its
"solidarity with.... the working masses of China.... in
their struggle to throw off the unbearable yoke of the
imperialist and foreign powers and the Chinese militarist
tools of those powers". The Congress went on to pledge
its members "to foster the 'Hands Off China' movement in
this country by every means in their power, and to give
all other practical aid to the realisation of the
liberative aims of the Chinese people". In addition the
A.C.T.U. congress expressed its anger at the Federal
government's refusal to allow Australian unionists to
attend the Pan-Pacific Congress which it was planned
64would meet in Canton later in May.
Then slowly by mid-1927 it became increasingly 
apparent that the position in China was changing and that 
the Kuomintang movement was in a state of collapse. In 
April Chiang Kai-shek dissolved all Communist and left-wing 
organisations in Shanghai and Nanking, and made his peace 
with the imperial powers in those cities by executing 
thousands of trade union militants and agitators.
Throughout June and July further splits occurred between 
the Left Kuomintang Government at Wuhan and the Communists,
62. See A.L.P. Eleventh Commonwealth Conference Report,
1927, p.37.63. All-Australian Trade Union Congress Report, 1927t P.36.
64. Ibid.
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leading to the almost complete suppression of the C.C.P., 
the expulsion of the key Comintern representatives Michael 
Borodin and M.N. Roy even from the revolutionary stronghold 
of Hankow, and the arrangement of a peace settlement 
between the Left Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek. In this 
series of events the threats previously posed to the 
interests of the imperial powers and world capitalism faded 
as quickly as did the spectre of a united front in China, 
and the Australian left and its Hands Off China campaign 
faced a difficult hiatus.
The developments in China in mid-1927 led to an
abrupt decline in interest in the politics of that country
by the Australian left. The C.P.A., which had played only
a small part in initiating the protest and agitation in
the labour movement in early 1927 but which had nevertheless
found an outlet for its own propaganda in the Hands Off
China campaign, fought hard to keep interest alive. In
C.P.A. propaganda, attempts were made to minimise the
importance of the split between the Kuomintang and the
Comintern, and insofar as reverses were admitted in China
they were blamed on a concerted world capitalist offensive
in the East which had as its object an attack on Russia in
65the near future. Even the C.P.A. however found it hard 
to discern consistent or immediate war dangers which could 
serve as a rallying point for internationalist and anti-war 
forces. Finally in October 1927 the Workers 1 Weekly 
acknowledged that there had indeed been a split between 
the Kuomintang and the C.C.P., and henceforth the only 
progressive elements identified in reportage of Chinese 
events in that paper were the Communists, who after the 
spectacular failure of the Canton Commune in December 
1927 were left to their hapless task of attempting to set 
up Soviets deep in the Chinese hinterland.
65. See for example the pamphlet by C. Irwin, No War On 
Soviet Russia (Syd., 1927).
For other more important left-wing groups the 
turn of" events in China was even more embarrassing, for 
it heralded an offensive by conservative forces in the 
labour movement towards isolationism. The left had based 
its Hands Off China campaign on the twin premises that 
there was an immediate threat of an interventionary war 
and that this would involve the working class in an attempt 
to put down a government with a legitimate claim to speak 
for the people of China and of a political flavour in some 
respects similar to Australian labour. With the collapse 
of the united front in China representatives of Labor's 
right wing began to argue that the threat of interventionary 
war had been exaggerated, and that the Hands Off China 
campaign had been unnecessarily offensive to the British 
Empire and electorally embarrassing for the A.L.P. Right 
wingers ridiculed the claim that Australian labour had 
anything in common whatever with what N.S.W. Labor leader 
J.T. Lang characterised as "the brutal and maniacal hordes... 
busy exterminating each other in C h i n a " T h e  left 
negotiated as best they could a tactical retreat on the 
question, and fell into silence or vague generality.
Besides, other issues of labour internationalism arose to 
absorb their interest, such as the world-wide agitation 
on behalf of the dubiously convicted anarchists Sacco and 
Vanzetti in America. In August, 1927» just as details of 
the total collapse of the Kuomintang-Communist alliance 
reached Australia, the Hands Off China Committee was merged 
into the International Labor Defence Committee, and began 
concentrating on organising support and protest opinion on 
behalf of the famous case involving these two Italians.
196.
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iv. Causes celebres and international solidarity with 
class war prisoners
As much as anything else the spirit of
radicalism and militancy which swept the labour movement
in the course of the Great War was fostered by a sense of
the injustice of instituting conscription under capitalism,
and by forebodings of the repressive penchant of the
government of W.M. Hughes. This aspect of working class
radical protest was manifest in many causes celebres of
the conscription era, ranging from the case of 'Gunner'
Ozanne^ to the trial of the I.W.W. Twelve, and from union
protests over early victims of wartime regulations (such
68as the anti-war agitator Percy Mandeno ) to the street 
demonstrations and strike action for the release of Paul 
Freeman in 1919» Furthermore, by the last years of the 
War this sense of solidarity with the victims of capitalist 
repression had become an internationalist concern, with 
wide interest aroused in the persecution of the American 
unionist Tom Mooney by a corrupt Californian court. In 
post-war years this concern for the corruption and 
legalised savagery blamed on international capitalism 
continued. Protests and demonstrations against 'class 
justice' were to become an important barometer of working- 
class consciousness in the 1920s.
Labour interest in the international aspects of 
class justice was aroused by the case of Tom Mooney. A 
union organiser on the American Pacific coast, Mooney - 
along with Warren K. Billings and several accomplices
67. A.T. Ozanne, Labor M.H.R. for the Victorian seat of 
Corio, volunteered for service in the A.I.F. in 191^ + 
but later was prominent in opposition to conscription. 
During the 1916 conscription referendum the Hughes 
government conducted a campaign of vilification against 
Ozanne accusing him of deserting his army unit whilst 
in London. He denied the charge. In the Federal 
elections of 1917 Ozanne lost Corio to a recruiting 
sergeant. Subsequently Labor members of Parliament 
called for a Royal Commission into the Ozanne case.
. A socialist anti-war speaker in Brisbane, Mandeno was 
arrested in 1915 and sentenced to three months gaol for 
prejudicing recruiting. During his imprisonment the
68
including Mooney’s wife - were charged with planning 
and executing a fatal bombing incident during a pro-war 
'Preparedness Day' parade in San Francisco in July, 1916. 
Billings got life imprisonment, while Mooney was sentenced 
to death. During the court trials involved, which dragged 
on into 1918, evidence was produced that the convictions 
were a miscarriage of justice inspired by anti-union biases 
on the part of the prosecution and blindness or malevolence 
on the part of the Californian judiciary. Mooney's case 
was taken up by a number of labour organisations throughout 
the U.S.A. and a Tom Mooney Defence Fund was set up. In 
May 1917 the Petrograd workers demonstrated on Mooney's 
behalf, and a few days after the October Revolution Lenin 
personally led a further protest demonstration. Other 
protests on Mooney's behalf came from labour organisations 
in Holland, Great Britain, Australia and South America; 
and on July 28, 1918» 'Mooney Day' demonstrations were
held throughout the U.S.A. and a number of American unions 
addressed a petition to President Wilson asking him to 
intervene in the case. As a result of these demonstrations 
Wilson set up a Presidential Mediation Commission which 
recommended a re-trial of Mooney and Billings. Instead a 
compromise was worked out between Wilson and Governor 
Stephens of California, who in December 1918 commuted 
Mooney's sentence to life imprisonment. Mooney and Billings 
were kept in gaol until 1939 when they were finally pardoned 
and released.
The Mooney case was first brought before the 
labour movement by Direct Action as part of its hair-raising 
reportage of the American scene, but it was not until 
sometime after suppression of the I.W.W. that Australian 
protests began to be organised on Mooney's behalf. In 
April, 1918, in response to an urgent direct appeal from 
Mooney, the Labor Council of N.S.W. passed a resolution 
expressing its belief in Mooney's innocence, and requesting
Brisbane Industrial Council conducted an unsuccessful 
campaign for remission of his sentence but the Federal 
Labor government resisted all appeals.
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President Wilson to secure a release. The Council 
also urged all labour organisations to forward similar 
resolutions to President Wilson and Governor Stephens. 
Mooney's plight was given considerable publicity by the 
socialist press and response to the Labor Council's 
appeal was considerable: some eighty two unions acceding
69to the Council's request. Mooney Defence Committees 
were also established by a number of unions, and protest 
meetings were held in capital cities of the eastern 
States.^
As with the campaign for the release of the
I.W.W. Twelve union opinion was virtually unanimous
concerning the Mooney case. The A.W.U. organs the
Australian Worker (Sydney) and the Worker (Brisbane) quickly
71joined in the Mooney campaign. In September 1918 the
Australian Worker issued a call for renewed and more
vigorous efforts from every labour organisation to obtain
72Mooney's release. Soon after this a conference of
seventy one Victorian unions, meeting in Melbourne to
consider the O.B.U. plan, unanimously protested to
President Wilson over Mooney's continued incarcaration,
adding for good measure protests on the gaoling of the
leader of the American Socialist Party Eugene Debs, and
73the General Secretary of the I.W.W. Bill Haywood.
The news that Governor Stephens had commuted 
his death sentence brought an end to the sense of urgency 
of Mooney's plight in the minds of workers throughout the 
world, and in Australia, as elsewhere, organised political 
protest over his case lapsed after December 1918» The 
Australian Worker announced confidently that Mooney would 
be pardoned, and that in the face of the world-wide 
campaign on Mooney's behalf a clean up of the Californian
69» Labor Council of N.S.W., Report, Dec.31 1 1918, p.13*
70. P.T. Thorne, Free Mooney (Syd., 1936), p.9»
71. A,W., Sept.26, 1918, p.15; Worker, Oct.3» 1918, p.15.
72. A.W., Sept.26, 1918, p.15.
73. L.C., Oct.3, 1918, p.4.
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74judicature was underway. Suspicion of the intentions
of American capitalism in relation to Mooney remained,
but, intoxicated by the show of strength through
international working-class solidarity with Mooney, the labour movement showedlittle comprehension of the bleak future that man was
75to suffer for another twenty odd years. Though through­
out the whole period of Mooney's imprisonment his Defence 
Fund was able to rely on Australian unionists for a steady 
flow of funds and general sympathy,^ his plight was not 
able to arouse again anything like the intensity of feeling 
that swept the labour movement in 1918.
The working-class solidarity which Mooney's case 
had aroused however was eventually transferred to a number 
of similar cases, the most famous being that of the Italo- 
American anarchists Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti. 
Once again there was evidence of spurious testimony and 
bias; ignorance and malevolence, on the part of many who 
participated in the prosecution, judging and sentencing 
of these two immigrant agitators. Sacco and Vanzetti were 
nominally charged with what became known as the 'Braintree 
hold-up murder' involving the fatal shooting of a paymaster 
and his assistant in the course of a robbery at South 
Braintree in the State of Massachusetts in 1920. But in 
the course of their trial it appeared to many that they 
were really being tried for their radical activities, and 
especially their opposition to American participation in 
World War One. The trial and the post-trial proceedings 
dragged on for almost seven years, but despite the accretion 
of evidence of a possible miscarriage of justice Judge 
Webster Thayer steadfastly resisted all attempts by defence
74. A.W., Jan.30, 1919, P •2.
75. See for example the article by N.R. Freeberg in the
Worker, Dec.12, 1918» p.11.
76. L.D., Oct.20, 1931. See also the pamphlet "Assist in
the Struggle to Free Tom Mooneyi" issued by the Trades 
and Labor Council of Queensland in 1935 to raise funds 
for Mooney's re-trial. In 1935 a group of Mooney 
supporters in Sydney established 'Mooney's Club' as a 
venue to gather socially and to serve as a centre for
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counsel to obtain a new trial, and insisted that his 
sentence of death be carried out. In the face of world­
wide protests on a scale far larger than aroused even by 
the Mooney case, and despite pleas for a re-trial by every 
spectrum of American labour opinion and by a number of 
American jurists, the Governor of Massachusetts refused
to intervene, and Sacco and Vanzetti were finally
77electrocuted in August 1927»
Sacco and Vanzetti*s plight first attracted
attention in Australia late in 1921 in the wake of protests
emanating from America over the trial, and as worker
demonstrations over the case spread to Europe, suggesting
7 8a similarity with the Mooney affair.' In December 1921 
the newly revived Direct Action suggested that it was time 
working class organisations in Australia joined in the 
international campaign in solidarity with these "two 
Italian 'Reds'" who were "the latest victims of American 
'Justice' as... interpreted by the bloodhounds of 
Capitalism in the land of the Almighty Dollar".^  This 
suggestion was soon supported by the C.P.A’s Communist 
which published a manifesto issued on the subject by the 
E.C.C.I. urging a united front of all working class bodies 
to save Sacco and Vanzetti. The climate of opinion in the 
Australian labour movement however was not conducive to a 
campaign on Sacco and Vanzetti's behalf at this time.
Though the A.S.P. echoed the Communist's call for a Sacco- 
Vanzetti campaign the V.S.P's Socialist showed more concern 
with the cases of the American radicals Alexander Berkman 
and Emma Goldman who had been peremptorily arrested in the
carrying out campaigns on behalf of the imprisoned 
Californian.
77. For the case as briefly outlined above see F .Frankfurter, 
The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti (Boston, 1927). The most 
recent and comprehensive treatment of the case is H.B. 
Ehrmann, The Case That Will Not Die (London, 1970).
As the title of Ehrmann's book suggests the case is still 
a subject of debate amongst the American intelligentsia.
78. Socialist, Oct.14, 1921, p.2; D.A., Dec.1, 1921, p.4;
R.S., J an.1, 1922, p.2.
79. D.A., Dec.1, 1921, p.4.
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Soviet Union, and in the persecution and shooting ofgoanarchists in that country. As vigorous judicial moves 
got underway in Massachusetts which seemed likely to result 
in the granting of a new trial, the early nomination of 
this case as a world working-class cause was allowed to 
1 ap s e .
In the years which followed radicalism was on
the defensive. With Australia experiencing an economic
boom into the mid-1 9 2 0s interest in socialism faded amongst
the trade union rank and file. In 1922 moves were initiated
to import Tom Mann in an attempt to revive and unify the
socialist movement, but the Federal government refused to
81visa his passport. A campaign was begun on Mann's behalf
by the N.S.W. Labor Council, the V.S.P. and left-wing 
Victorian unions, but the government would not relent. Nor 
did this campaign evoke great enthusiasm in the labour 
movement as a whole. A similar response greeted attempts 
to protest against the deportation of the Irish republican 
envoys O'Kelly and O'Flanagan in 1923» The Catholic 
community in Australia, confused by the civil war which 
had broken out in Ireland and divided the forces which 
had fought so long and hard against the British Empire, 
was not prepared to rally behind the envoys of a cause
82which seemed to be most to blame in starting the disunity. 
Like the labour movement the Catholics were cautious and 
wary towards radical causes in the high twenties atmosphere.
However some continuing interest was shown in 
the repressive treatment meted out to radicals and members
80. Socialist, Jan.27, 1 9 2 2 , p.2; Mar.31, 1 9 2 2 , p.3.
81. Mann had also attempted to return to Australia in 1918 
but had been refused permission.
82. For an account of the impact of events in Ireland on
Australian Catholicism see P.J. O'Farrell, The Catholic 
Church in Australia. A Short History: 1788-19^7 (Melb.,
1 9 6 8), esp. pp.232-235*
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of the I.W.W. in America. In this way earlier interest 
in the case of Sacco and Vanzetti was merged with protests 
over the injustices perpetrated on hundreds of members of 
the I.W.W. imprisoned under notorious 'Criminal Syndicalist' 
laws enacted by various States towards the end of World War 
One, and used particularly in California in an attempt to 
break the back of labour agitation on the West Coast. The 
protests over these multitudinous victims of anti-radical 
repression spurred a widespread and frequently intense 
feeling of anti-Americanism amongst many members of the 
Australian labour movement, and promoted an image of that 
country as the world's leading example of capitalist 
corruption and iniquity.
The anti-American protest movement was given 
impetus by the arrival in Australia in 1923 of a delegate 
from the American Marine Transport Workers' Industrial 
Union, sent to plead the case of the several hundred 
Californian I.W.W. victims of the Criminal Syndicalist Law. 
As a result of his address before the N.S.W. Labor Council 
each State Trades Hall was circularised on the matter, and 
all Councils lodged protests against America's treatment of
O  Othe I.W.W. with the American Consul and President Harding.
In addition the plight of class war prisoners in America was 
given increased prominence by the left-wing and union press 
to the extent that it became a focus of much reportage of 
the American scene. As a result, the announcement in 1925 
of the proposed visit of the American Fleet to Australian 
ports was immediately greeted by execrations from the left. 
The Workers' Weekly greeted the visit as an attempt "to 
stimulate in Australia a frenzy of pro-American and anti- 
Japanese feeling" as a prelude to war, and warned that 
America's treatment of radicals made "that Government an
84object of hatred to all militant workers". A large range
of labour opinion was prepared to go along with this
83. Labor Council of N.S.W., Report, 1923» pp.32-33»
84. W.W., May 15, 1925, p.2.
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assessment. The Trades Hall Councils of Melbourne,
Sydney, Adelaide, and Brisbane all decided to associate
themselves with the agitation against the American Fleet’s
8 5visit, and the Commonwealth Industrial Disputes Committee
which met in Adelaide in June 1925 denounced the visit as a
dangerous portent of a war in the PaciFic. In Sydney the
Labor caucus of the City Council decided to ’go slow' on
civic receptions arranged Tor the visit, a tactic which
Labor Call suggested could be profitably employed by the
86Victorian left.
On the eve of the American visit to Sydney the
N.S.W. Labor Council issued a public declaration addressed
to Australian workers. The Council announced that the
Fleet represents, internationally, an instrumentality 
oT murderous and rapacious imperialist war, and, 
nationally, an integral part oT the machinery oT 
oppression oT a capitalist State, by means of which 
the American capitalist class enslaves our American 
fellow-workers.°7
The declaration went on to regret the fact that both the
newly installed N.S.W. Labor government and the Labor-
controlled Sydney City Council (despite its earlier caucus
decision) were participating in welcoming the Fleet, and
suggested that the money proposed to be spent "for the
purpose of feting an instrument of imperialist mass murder
and capitalist oppression" would be better devoted to the
relief of the unemployed. The Council also issued an
appeal to the U.S. sailors which outlined the position
adopted by militant unionists towards American capitalism
and to its navy and invited them to join "the far greater
fighting body" of the class-conscious proletariat of the
world, and to make their first stop in Sydney the Labor
88Council offices at Trades Hall. The mixture of rancour 
and wonderment with which this appeal was greeted by both
85. Ibid.; Queensland T. and L.C. Minutes, Mar.11, 1925*
86. During the American visit (July 23 to August 2, 1925)
the Fleet was divided, one portion going to Melbourne, 
another to Sydney, a few smaller vessels briefly 
visiting Hobart.
87. Labor Council of N.S.W., Report, 1925» p .20.
88. Ibid., pp.20-1.
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the Australian and American press ensured wide currency 
for the Labor Council viewpoint, but the visit passed off 
largely without incident. Some small demonstrations did 
go ahead as planned in Sydney and Melbourne but for the 
labour movement as a whole the question of the class war 
in America was overshadowed by the development of a crisis 
situation over an issue far closer at hand.
In 1917 and again in 1919 the Seamen’s Union had 
engaged in bitter strike actions which had infuriated 
conservatives and inspired a firm and repressive stance by 
the government of W.M. Hughes. In 1925 the seamen and the 
government again entered wholehearted into the fray. The 
seamen throughout the 1920s had laid increasing stress on 
the old direct action tactic of ’job control’ in their 
disputes with employers and this led to deregistration of 
the Seamen’s Union by the Federal arbitration court in 
June, 1925> a move answered in turn by strike action on 
the ships. To further complicate matters in August 1925 
British seamen began to walk off their ships in Australian 
ports in spontaneous protest at an agreement reached by 
their union leader Havelock Wilson with shipowners in 
London which left the rank and file with a wage reduction 
of £1 per month. Although the Australasian Seamen's Union 
had little to do with inspiring the worldwide British 
strike it soon enough assumed leadership of the men 
affected, a leadership enhanced in the public's mind by 
Havelock Wilson's charge that the Australian union was 
'interfering'. To many Australians it thus seemed that 
the maritime industry was being deliberately plunged into 
continuing and growing turmoil by the left-wing seamen's 
union and their leading officials T. Walsh and J. Johnson.
The conservative Federal government of S.M.
Bruce reacted accordingly. In June, 1925» it brought down 
an Immigration Act which included sections specifically 
designed to allow the deportation of Walsh and Johnson 
(who had both been born overseas). In August a supplementary
206
peace officers bill to expand the Commonwealth police
force was pushed through parliament following the refusal
of the Labor government in New South Wales to provide
assistance to Federal authorities in deportation proceedings.
In September police began to round up and arrest striking
British seamen in ports throughout Australia and in
November a snap Federal election was held and duly won byPartythe Nationalist and Country/coalition on the promise to
smash the hold of Communism on industrial life and expel
the ’foreign* agitators. Soon after this Walsh and
Johnson were taken into custody by the Commonwealth and
lodged in a navy prison pending deportation.
For Labor the 1925 election was a debacle.
After painfully dissociating the Labor Party from the
C.P.A. by ruling out affiliation with that party at its
1924 Federal Conference the A.L.P. was nevertheless now
placed in a position of appearing to condone Communist-
inspired disruption, for it could hardly repudiate the
'right to strike' held as sacred by its most ardent union
supporters. Donald Grant of the I.W.W. Twelve was
endorsed as Labor's number two Senate candidate for N.S.W.
Garden caught the spotlight quite as well with his promises
of Communist support for the Labor Party; assurances which
were naturally seized on with glee by conservative 
89propagandists. Following feeble and inept opposition
to Bruce in parliament an internally divided A.L.P. turned 
to an election campaign with faint heart and little hope, 
losing seats Australia-wide to the non-Labor parties. In 
the course of the election and in the months which followed 
right-wing forces within the A.L.P. responded to Bruce's 
propaganda by mounting an intense campaign aimed at finally 
expelling all Communists from the labour movement.
89. For an account of the 1925 election campaign and its 
results see Round Table, V0I.I6, No.62 (March, 1926), 
pp.387-404.
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Yet the events of 1925 and their aftermath
also served to swing many trade unionists leftward. The
British seamen, influenced by extremists in the C.P.A. and
the local seamen’s union set their wage demands too high
and were eventually forced to return to work on the
employers’ terms. However the labour movement rallied to
their cause and a conference composed of Labor Councils in
every State attempted to mediate in the dispute. In
addition the Walsh-Johnson case galvanised the union movement
into threats of strike action to prevent the deportations.
These men quickly became the most famous local cause celebre
since the conscription era, and labour was ecstatic when
a legal appeal was upheld by the High Court and Walsh and
Johnson were released. Hard upon the heels of the Walsh-
Johnson case the Bruce government passed a Crimes Act which
explicitly aimed to outlaw organisations advocating the
violent overthrow of the state, but also included provisions
restricting the right of unionists to strike. On top of this
in May 1926 the Federal government announced a referendum
which proposed greatly increased powers of ’’regulation and
determination” be given to the Commonwealth parliament with
90respect to industrial matters. Part of the Bruce
government’s continuing attempts at manipulating and 
’tidying’ the Australian arbitration system, the referendum 
had important repercussions in the affairs of the labour 
movement. To some Labor politicians, including the Federal 
leader M. Charlton, the referendum offered powers to the 
Commonwealth which would in future be of benefit in 
instituting Labor policies when the A.L.P. came into 
government. To militant labour these possible long-term 
advantages were far outweighed by the danger of vesting 
such powers in the hands of the anti-union Bruce regime.
Thus the referendum and Federal Labor's equivocation 
sparked widespread anger and apprehension throughout the 
union movement which now turned back towards an active
90. For an account of the 1926 referendum see A. Wildavsky 
and D. Carboch, Studies in Australian Politics (Melb., 
1958).
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interest in political affairs in order to deal with the 
wayward politicians. In the months following the 
announcement of the referendum a majority of unions 
rallied to the successful ’NO' campaign and an All- 
Australian Trade Union Congress was convened in Sydney
with one of its objects the pressuring of recalcitrant
91Federal Labor Party leaders into a similar stance.
Thus by late 1926 there was at least a partial 
return to radical militancy in the ranks of trade unionists. 
In the next three years the militant spirit was to develop 
further under the impact of economic decline and industrial 
turmoil and bitterness. In mid-1927 this increasingly class 
conscious bloc of opinion came to focus its attention on 
the case of Sacco and Vanzetti, whose cause was at this time 
being taken up again worldwide.
The Sacco-Vanzetti case revived following 
exhaustion of the legal manoeuvres which had begun after 
their trial in 1921. Despite the involvement of some of 
America’s most eminent lawyers in the case, defence counsel 
for Sacco and Vanzetti was unable to persuade the 
Massachusetts judicature of the need for a re-trial and in 
April 1927 a final date was set for carrying out the death 
sentence on these two men. Immediately a movement began 
in America, spearheaded by liberals and left-wing 
organisations to extend the case into the political arena 
and obtain a pardon for Sacco and Vanzetti from State 
Governor A.T. Fuller. Very soon this movement to bring 
political pressure for the release of Sacco and Vanzetti 
found its echo in Europe, Britain, Latin America and many 
other countries.
91. The 1926 All-Australian Trade Union Congress was hastily 
summonsed by A.C. Willis on his rather doubtful authority 
as Secretary of the moribund Council of Action. It was 
dominated by N.S.W. unions though it attracted a number 
of delegates from the ’NO' committee in Victoria (a
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May Day 1927 saw demonstrations on behalf of
92Sacco and Vanzetti in both Sydney and Adelaide. In
Sydney the Labor Council of N.S.W. and the Hands Off China
Committee joined in issuing an appeal calling on Australian
workers "to help swell a chorus of protest against their
murder which will girdle the earth... and make the year 1927
93forever memorable in Labor's annals". Further demonstra­
tions were organised in Melbourne by the V.S.P., and the 
entire radical and left-wing press joined in urging action 
to save Sacco and Vanzetti. The Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane 
and Adelaide T.H.Cs all cabled protests off to Washington 
and the Governor of Massachusetts, and the May 1927 All- 
Australian Trade Union Congress protested to President 
Coolidge against "the proposed judicial murder of the two 
American working class fighters, Sacco and Vanzetti". To 
these remonstrances were added numerous resolutions of 
A.L.P. branches and individual unions, and as the campaign 
proceeded an ad hoc coordinating organisation to save Sacco 
and Vanzetti gathered around the Hands Off China Committee,
slight majority of Victorian unions had backed the 
Federal parliamentary leadership in support of the 
referendum). Despite its limited success in attracting 
representation from the labour movement outside N.S.W. 
the 1926 congress successfully laid the basis for the 
1927 all-Australian founding congress of the A.C.T.U.
92. W.W., May 6, 1927» p.2. A prominent part was played in
street demonstrations over Sacco and Vanzetti by a number 
of Italians who had become associated with the radical 
movements. In Sydney (and more particularly the 
coalmining/steelworks centre of Lithgow) many Italian 
and other Southern European immigrants were members of 
the Communist T.U.E.L. In Melbourne Dr. Omero Schiassi 
(a socialist refugee from Mussolini who had arrived in 
Australia in 1924) had long conducted a campaign against 
fascism which attracted support from the trade union and 
radical movement as well as many anti-fascist Italians. 
Schiassi also had close links with the V.S.P.
93. See Labor Council of N.S.W,, Report, 1927« P*9*
210
a development later formalised by the setting up of the
International Labor Defence Committee by the Labor Council
of N.S.W. Then from America came news that a temporary
reprieve had been granted to Sacco and Vanzetti whilst
their case was once again reviewed, and those who had
championed the cause of two Italians began to suppose they 
94had won.
Sacco and Vanzetti were killed quite suddenly in 
the end. The postponement of their death sentence led not 
to a more permanent reprieve but a quick decision by the 
State Governor and the Massachusetts judicature to despatch 
the hapless Italians post-haste. This obdurate rebuttal of 
world opinion left only a few days for the organisation of 
last-minute protests on Sacco and Vanzetti's behalf, yet 
the fury and anger it aroused partly made up for the 
difficulties of organisation, and resulted in a spate of 
half-organised but largely spontaneous demonstrations and 
strikes on and around the day of execution.
When news arrived in Australia that the Italians 
were about to be electrocuted Sunday demonstrations were 
held in Sydney, Newcastle, Brisbane, Melbourne and 
Adelaide. In Sydney a Domain meeting was followed by an 
evening demonstration at the Town Hall where several 
thousand people were addressed by speakers from the Labor 
Council, the N.S.W. A.L.P., the I.W.W. and the C.P.A. At 
the meeting it was decided to hold further protests on 
Tuesday the 23rd August, following Sacco and Vanzetti's 
execution. Throughout Sydney between seven and eight 
thousand men stopped work and a large demonstration held 
at Belmore Park was addressed by speakers from the
95International Labor Defence Committee. Following this
94. L.C., Aug.18, 1927, p .10.
93. This was the Labor Daily's estimate, which seems not 
unreasonable given the supporting photographs of the 
crowd in Belmore Park (see L,D., Aug.24, 1927» p.5)*
The great bulk of strikers were building, construction 
and transport workers. Garden (in his Labor Council of 
N.S.W,t Report, 1927) claimed it was "the best mass 
demonstration ever held by the workers of this State",
a procession death-marched to the Cenotaph at Martin Place 
where two minutes' silence was observed "in memory of 
Sacco and Vanzetti and the glorious dead who suffered for 
the working-class", and later, demonstrations were held 
outside the American Consulate and in the Domain. Further 
union protests were registered by strike actions on the 
northern and southern coalfields, almost all mines lying 
idle on either Monday the 22nd August or the day following. 
Several hundred employees at Hoskins' steelworks at Port 
Kembla also went on strike in sympathy with Sacco and 
Vanzetti.^
Working-class solidarity with Sacco and Vanzetti
was not only intense enough to induce strike action from
the very militant, but was also widespread amongst members
of the labour movement as a whole. The Labor-controlled
Sydney City Council began considering boycotting American
goods and equipment as a gesture against the electrocution
of Sacco and Vanzetti, and the N.S.W. Executive of the
A.L.P. weighed in with a strongly-worded protest note to
97President Coolidge. Following the execution the A.C.T.U.
announced that it planned to involve its affiliated unions 
in a boycott of American imports, and even the A.W.U. 
leadership promised to abandon their war on the A.C.T.U. if 
it were possible to make the boycott on American goods an
98"effective protest". However this gesture proved no more 
than an overture to the A.W.U. rank and file sections which 
had shown concern over the Sacco-Vanzetti case and 
insuperable difficulties were duly discovered which made 
cooperation with the A.C.T.U. out of the question. And 
as tempers cooled over the issue the A.C.T.U. too found 
the boycott impractical, and difficult to implement, and 
the plan was eventually dropped.
9 6 . L.D. , Aug.23, 1927, p. 1 ; Aug.24
97. L.D. , Aug.23, 1927, p. 5.•0••00ON Aug.25, 1927, p-7; L. D. ,
1927, p.1.
Aug.25, 1927, P.1
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Yet the Sacco-Vanzetti case had clearly emerged
as a critical cause celebre capable of generating protests
and demonstrations comparable with the conscription era,
and strenuous efforts were made by the militant left to
keep alive the spirit of working-class solidarity so
generated. From 1923 the C.P.A. had attempted to promote
99the Comintern front organisation International Red Aid 
in Australia and had managed to interest the V.S.P. and 
other left-wing organisations including the I.W.W. in 
various Red Aid causes to the extent of holding a number of 
protests and demonstrations. The C.P.A. had also 
attempted to give publicity to and promote the Workers' 
International Relief organisation in Australia (a Comintern 
front with confusingly similar objects to the Red Aid), 
though with little success beyond the collection of funds 
and the dissemination of propaganda on behalf of the German 
workers in 1923-4, and British trade unionists during the 
Miners' struggle and the General Strike of 1926. It was 
with the more or less spontaneous interest of working-class 
militants in the Sacco-Vanzetti case however that a 
significant united front vehicle of working-class interna­
tional aid emerged: the International Labor Defence.
Originally a delicate creation of the American Communist 
Party threading together the W.I.R., the I.R.A. and lesser 
known organisations, the International Labor Defence had 
ridden quickly to fame during the Sacco-Vanzetti affair, 
and had been imported almost as a matter of course by the 
motley group of left-wing unionists who had taken the lead
99» An organisation devoted to promoting international
working-class solidarity and awareness originally set 
up in Moscow in September 1922 at the instigation of 
the Society of Old Bolsheviks and Former Political 
Exiles and Prisoners. See T. Draper, American Communism 
and Soviet Russia (New York, i960), p.180; W.W.,
April 21, 1926, p .2.
. Draper, American Communism, pp.180-181.100
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in championing the cause of the two Italians. As interest 
in international class war prisoners waned, efforts were 
made to keep the issue before the labour movement, and to 
maintain the interest of those who had come together in the 
fight to save Sacco and Vanzetti through the I.L.D.
The opportunity to form a united front organisa­
tion capable of capturing and stimulating working class 
consciousness came with the increasingly militant atmosphere 
after 1928. Throughout 1926 and 1927 strikes in maritime, 
coal, transport and engineering industries had prompted the 
Bruce government to a further fling at changing the 
arbitration system. In June 1928 after angry opposition 
from Labor and union spokesmen a bill was passed into law 
to amend Federal arbitration awards by greatly strengthening 
penal provisions and taking into account industry's capacity 
to pay. This was interpreted by the labour movement as a 
whole as yet another attempt to break the unions. Then in 
September 1928 waterside workers went on strike against a 
new arbitration award. Despite growing unemployment further 
bitter strikes and lockouts followed in the timber and 
coal-mining industries. From its concern with the aftermath 
of the Sacco-Vanzetti case, and then with the plight of 
striking Colorado miners, the International Labor Defence 
throughout 1928 and 1929 became increasingly concerned with 
free speech fights within Australia and with the numerous 
cases of arrested trade unionists resulting from the bitter 
strikes and industrial struggles of that period.
Both the timber strike and the coalminers'
102lockout provided cases of legal oppression aplenty.
Beginning in January the timber workers' strike festered 
on month after month throughout 1929 till a Federal Labor 
government was elected in October. In March a massive crowd
101. The International Labor Defence Committee initially 
comprised A. Rae, N. Lyons, W. Paton, A.E. Bennett,
J.S. Garden, J. Howie and J. Kavanagh. The Committee 
was later expanded by the addition of more members from 
the Sydney Labor Council.
102. For an account of the industrial turmoil of this period 
see Wildavsky and Carboch, Studies in Australian Politics.
214
of timber workers and supporters in Sydney showed their
defiance of arbitration by ceremonially burning the voting
papers in a court-ordered secret ballot, and added to the
flames an effigy of Judge Lukin, who had presided over the
arbitration award. An estimated 75>000 people took part
in this demonstration. In the face of such displays of
militancy the government arrested dozens of rank and file
activists and an assortment of union leaders including
J.S. Garden, and the Secretary of the Melbourne T.H.C.,
E.J. Holloway. Soon after these arrests another sensational
court case involving J. Johnson, leader of the militant
seamen, provided evidence of government use of dubious means
to obtain an arrest and conviction. At the same time the
Bruce government refused to pursue a case against the
wealthy industrialists John Brown and Company for the
lockout of the northern N.S.W. coalminers in apparent
contravention of the very laws which were being used to
103bludgeon the unions. Organised labour drew the lessons
which seemed inescapable. It seemed only too clear that a 
widespread capitalist offensive against the workers was 
being spearheaded by the Bruce government and that a 
prominent weapon in their armoury was the class-biased 
legal and judicial system operating in Australia.
Left-wing labour responded to the growing crisis 
by establishing an Australian branch of the International 
Class War Prisoners' Aid. This organisation was a British- 
based version of the Comintern's International Red Aid and 
resulted from a meeting in Sydney in July 1929 convened by 
the International Labor Defence and the Labor Council.
The I.C.W.P.A. inaugural conference was attended by a range 
of labour figures including many members of the A.L.P. and 
prominent Labor parliamentarians such as Senator Arthur 
Rae. A National Executive Committee was elected with Rae
103* Cf. G. Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law 
1901-1929 (Melb., 1956), pp.315-316.
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as President; a national headquarters was set up in
Sydney, and communications established with the I.C.W.P.A. 
in Britain and I.R.A. headquarters in Berlin. With strong- 
support from a wide range of unions and a number of 
branches of the N.S.W. Labor Party the I.C.W.P.A. was able 
to play a prominent part in publicising the cause of union 
militants and in raising funds on behalf of those who fell 
foul of the law in the torrid industrial climate of the 
early depression period.
No sooner was the I.C.W.P.A. underway however 
than it foundered on Communist abandonment of the united 
front, and it rapidly degenerated into an insignificant 
appendage of the C.P.A. Like so many projects nurtured 
by left-wing unionists throughout the 1920s and finally 
given institutional form by the early depression years 
I.C.W.P.A. was a victim of the 'social fascist' policy 
of the post-1930 C.P.A. leadership, a policy which was to 
make working class unity impossible.
v. The pan-Pacific trade union movement
The idea of organising unionists into a Pacific 
regional organisation to counter the threat of a new 
imperialist war first made its debut at the All-Australian 
Trade Union Congress of 1921. The proposal was a direct 
response to the war rumours then current in Australia, and
104. The seventeen man Committee included Arthur Rae;
Rowley James, M.H.R.; J.A. Beasley, M.H.R.; J. Kilburn, 
M.L.C.; E.A. Chapman, N.S.W. Secretary of the A.R.U.; 
R.J. Heffron, Secretary of the Federated Marine Stewards 
and Pantrymen's Association; D.J. Davies, Miners' 
Federation; M.P. Ryan, then vice-president of the N.S.W. 
A.L.P.; J.S. Garden and H.L. Denford, of the Labor 
Council; Charles Reeve, of the I.W.W. Of the rest four 
were identifiable as Communists. For the full list of 
members see M.H. Ellis, The Garden Path (Syd., 19^9)»
pp.209-210. Though in a small minority, C.P.A. members 
were strategically placed and active in the running of 
the I.C.W.P.A., making it possible for Communists to 
capture the organisation later in 1929«
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clearly demonstrated the radical consensus amongst
10 5unionists on the subjects of war and imperialism.
After declaring its belief that "the Pacific is likely to
be the cock-pit of the next great war" the congress
instructed the Council of Action to begin negotiations
with labour organisations of all countries bordering on
the Pacific for the purpose of setting in motion an
international movement to prevent the outbreak of war,^^
The pan-Pacific idea was one of the most radical
and ambitious aspects of the Melbourne congress's decisions.
At a time when labour movements throughout the world were
dividing irreconcilably over the issue of Communism the
pan-Pacific proposal sought to unite workers without
distinction of doctrines except that they be firmly anti-war.
The military committee report which contained the plan was
moved by Don Cameron and was representative of the Two-and-
a-Half Internationalist stance on foreign affairs which
pervaded the congress. Though the Council of Action in the
Australian context was given a more or less preventative
role in relation to warfare, there was no specification as
to the role of affiliates overseas, and a Communist-supported
amendment which specified secret 'white-anting' of the army
and navy was only very narrowly defeated, and then after
this option was said to have been "taken into consideration"
1 07in the adopted report. It is hardly surprising that the
proposal for a pan-Pacific trade union movement mooted at 
the Melbourne Congress was not enthusiastically endorsed 
by the cautious or the conservative in the Labor Movement. 
After a series of unsuccessful attempts to institute a 
pan-Pacific International it fell to the world Communist
105. In particular suspicion was aroused by the vaunted renewal 
of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. Previous to formulating 
plans for the pan-Pacific trade union movement the
Trade Union Congress passed a motion specifically 
protesting "against any renewal of the Anglo-Japanese 
treaty (or any other secret treaty), which is a purely 
military treaty containing the germs of warfare in the 
immediate future".
106. All-Australian Trade Union Congress Report, 1921, p.3k.
107. Ibid., pp.33-3^.
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movement to get a successful regional organisation 
going, and to receive the kudos of the union left wing 
for so doing.
In its first year of operation the Council of
Action entered into communication with overseas labour
organisations and began attempts to popularise the idea
of a Pacific anti-war organisation amongst peace groups
1 0 8and worker bodies in the United States. In December
1921 the Council issued a denunciation of the Washington
Conference as unlikely to have any effect on the drift to
war in the Pacific, and it called attention to the urgent
need for a pan-Pacific Conference in the "belief that the
best way to prevent wars will be for the Australian workers
to arrive at a common understanding with Labor organisations
109in other countries". But little was in fact achieved.
In 1922 the second All-Australian Trade Union Congress once 
again instructed the Council of Action to convene a regional 
anti-war conference in Australia, but there was little 
response to the pan-Pacific idea from labour movements 
overseas. In addition the Council of Action itself was by 
this time in difficulties and hardly able to operate as a 
practical tool for pan-Pacific organisation.
As hopes for the Council of Action faded a 
campaign was begun to involve the Labor Party in interna­
tional working-class action against war. In August 1924 
the Melbourne Trades Hall Council carried an anti-war 
resolution moved jointly by R.S. Ross and P. Laidler which
sought to press the A.L.P. Federal Conference of that year
1 10to take action on the matter. Unions in N.S.W. also had 
by now lost faith in the Council of Action and gave some
108. Socialist« Aug.5» 1921, p.3. See also A.L.P. Ninth
Commonwealth Conference Report, 1921, p.31«
109. L.N,, Dec.24, 1921, p.1.
110. Melbourne T.H.C. Minutes, Aug.14, 1924.
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support to the Ross-Laidler proposal. More significant 
was the interest aroused in T.H.Cs in other capital cities 
and State branches of the A.L.P. which had the result that 
the 1924 Conference of the A.L.P. voted unanimously in 
favour of saddling the party's P'ederal Executive with the
task of organising for an international working-class
1 1 1regional conference.
Right from the beginning the A.L.P. machine had
been cool on the pan-Pacific idea. At the 1921 Federal
Conference of the A.L.P. in Brisbane a Victorian delegate
J.F. Hannan launched an attack on the proposal as utopian,
and totally discredited by the failure of the Second
International to prevent war in 1914, and the plan only
1 1 2narrowly missed being repudiated. With Hannan elected
Federal President of the A.L.P. in 1924 there was little 
chance that the ex-Council of Action project would be taken 
up with any enthusiasm. To the cynical indifference of 
most members of the Federal Executive was added the threat 
of an international labour conference proving an 
embarrassment to the A.L.P. as White Australia and anti- 
Bolshevik paranoia blossomed into an issue at the 1925 
Federal election. As time passed it became increasingly 
apparent that despite its Conference resolution the Labor 
Party was in no hurry whatever to implement the pan-Pacific 
proposal and some of the more radical unionists began to 
move once more on their own behalf.
Impatient with the Labor Party's lack of activity 
over the matter, a meeting of the trade union Commonwealth 
Industrial Disputes Committee in Adelaide in June, 1925» 
called on State T.H.Cs to take the initiative in convening 
a pan-Pacific conference in Australia for January 1926.
The meeting also endorsed the R.I.L.TJ's policy of calling a
111. A.L.P. Tenth Commonwealth Conference Report, 1924. 
p.69; cf. p.5 8 .
112. A.L.P. Ninth Commonwealth Conference Report, 1921, p.31-
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comprehensive conference of the world trade union movement
1 1 3aimed at uniting the Profintern with the I.F.T.U.
Little progress was made however on the pan-Pacific scheme 
until in February 1926 the Labor Council of N.S.W. sent out 
invitations to unions in the Pacific area to attend a 
proposed congress in Sydney in the last week of July. The 
invitations were forwarded to trade unions in South America, 
the U.S.A., Canada, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., Japan, 
China, the Dutch East Indies, South Africa and to several 
islands in the South Seas. In addition an organiser was 
appointed to visit several Asian countries to promote
1 1 4interest in the project.
The results were disappointing and the planned
congress did not eventuate. A range of organisations
expressed enthusiasm for the proposal, and the British
Minority Movement, the All-China Labour Federation, the
Soviet trade unions and the R.I.L.U. endorsed delegates,
but in the event only a single Russian was able to arrive
in Australia by the scheduled date. The Russian - known
as Comrade Rubanoff - carried credentials from the R.I.L.U.
and the Soviet trade unions. Despite the poor response a
’preliminary’ pan-Pacific conference went ahead in
conjunction with the Third All-Australian Trade Union
Congress in Sydney in August 1926. The preliminary
conference resolved to persist in working for a united
Pacific trade union movement and to cooperate with the
R.I.L.U. and the All-China Labour Federation in organising
a full pan-Pacific conference to be held in May 1927 in 
1 1 5Canton. The Third All-Australian Trade Union Congress
also agreed to continue to support the pan-Pacific movement 
and to issue a spe^cial appeal ”to all workers of the 
Pacific”, pointing out "the necessity of unification of 
their forces against international capitalism and its war
113» Advertiser (Adel.), June 13» 1925*
114. Third All-Australian Trade Union Congress Report, 1926,
pp .11- 12.
115* Preliminary Pacific Conference Report (Syd., 1926),
p.27.
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preparations”. Later, in early 1927» a number
of Australian unions selected delegates to attend the 
projected Canton conference. Meanwhile the organising 
force of the R.I.L.U. had been set to work in other countries 
also in an attempt to make the Canton meeting a success.
Moscow's interest in the pan-Pacific trade union
movement had begun in 1922. At the Fourth Comintern Congress
in November of that year the Australian Communist delegation
led by J.S. Garden and W.P. Earsman had echoed the call of
the second All-Australian Trade Union Congress for the
immediate convening of a pan-Pacific organisation of militant
workers. W.P. Earsman, who was thereafter a Comintern
functionary and apparently an adviser on Pacific affairs,for
some time after remained confident that the Australian
left-wing unionists would be able to hold their pan-Pacific
1 1 7congress in 1923» but as the Australian initiatives
showed signs of fading with the moribund Council of Action,
the world Communist movement itself had begun to organise
on its own behalf. In 1924, following the development of
the Kuomintang-Comintern coalition in China, a Conference
of Transport Workers of the Pacific was held in Canton,
attended by representatives from organisations in China,
the Philippines and Indonesia, The conference was convened
by the R.I.L.U. and resulted in a manifesto calling for a
united front of anti-imperialist forces in Eastern and
Western countries. The conference also laid the basis for
the setting up of a R.I.L.U. communications network
118throughout the Pacific including Australian ports.
Following the preliminary pan-Pacific meeting 
in Sydney the R.I.L.U. enrolled strong support for the 
Canton conference from Eastern left-wing labour organisa-
116 . Third All-Australian Trade Union Congress Report,
1926. pp.13-14.
117. See W.P. Earsman: "The Pacific in World Politics",
in Labour Monthly (London), Vol.4, No.4, April, 
1923, P.2V 3 .
118. Inprecorr, No.6 5 , Sept.11, 1924, p.705> S .M .M ,,
April 20, 1928.
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tions and from R.I.L.U. affiliates in the West. A. Lozovsky 
travelled to China at the head of a powerful delegation of 
R.I.L.U. functionaries and Russian trade unionists; Tom Mann 
was nominated as a delegate from the British National 
Minority Movement; the French C.G.T.U. was represented by J. 
Racamond; the small Communist-controlled Trade Union 
Educational League of the U.S.A. sent two delegates: Earl 
Browder (later head of the American Communist Party) and 
William Janequette (better known as the ex-I.W.W. figure 
Harrison George). A large Chinese delegation was led by 
Su Chao-jen, chairman of the host All-China Labour Federa­
tion. The Japanese left was also represented, though only 
two delegations actually arrived in China, one from the 
R.I.L.U.-affiliated Trade Union Unity League and one from 
the anarcho-syndicalist Federation of Free Trade Unions. 
Other delegates attended from Java and Korea. In addition 
to the above, labour organisations in Australia, the 
Philippines, India and Mexico arranged delegations for the 
Canton conference which were unable to attend due to 
passport or travel difficulties.
The date set for the Canton conference coincided
with the eruption of hostilities between Chiang Kai-shek
and the Chinese Communists and at the last moment it was
decided to change the venue of the conference to the Left-
Kuomintang controlled city of Hankow. There on the 20th
May 1927 the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference was opened
by the chairman of the All-China Labour Federation Su
Chao-jen. After noting the failure of many delegations
to arrive Su expressed the hope that the conference could
nevertheless crystallise the aspirations of those who had
previously worked towards a united front against the twin
1 1 9evils of war and imperialism. The Hankow Conference
119« Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference. Bulletin of 
Proceedings (Hankow, 1927), N o .1, p p .1-3•
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went on to discuss in great detail the progress of the 
revolution in China, and labour affairs in all the countries 
represented at the conference, and a series of resolutions 
were adopted which ranged from an attack on Dutch 
imperialism in Indonesia to a plea to all organised workers 
to support the campaign for the release of Sacco and 
Vanzetti in America, By far the most important decision of 
the gathering however was the creation of a permanent 
machinery to continue the work begun at Hankow, and make 
the necessary preparations for the next Pan-Pacific 
Conference, To be known as the Pan-Pacific Trade Union 
Secretariat, this body was to be based in Shanghai, and it 
was instructed to meet every six months and to convene a 
full Pan-Pacific Conference within two years of its 
foundation. The Secretariat was described vaguely as 
"an organ of connections, propaganda and action" to carry 
out the aims of the pan-Pacific movement. In a Preamble 
to the P.P.T.U.S. constitution the Hankow Conference set 
the aims of this ongoing pan-Pacific movement as follows:
1) to carry on a joint struggle against the dangers 
of war between the Powers of the Pacific;
2) to counteract the Imperialist dangers that menace 
the Chinese Revolution;
3) to help all the oppressed peoples of the Pacific
to liberate themselves from the yoke of Imperialism;
4) to fight against and remove all racial and national 
barriers and prejudices which still divide the 
exploited classes and oppressed peoples to the 
advantage of the exploiters and oppressors;
5) to cement and to maintain a real fraternal united 
front of the exploited classes in the countries of 
the Pacific;
6) to organize and to carry out joint actions of the 
exploited classes and oppressed peoples against 
the oppressing Powers;
7) to fight for World Trade Union Unity and for the 
creation of a single United Trade Union Interna­
tional , 120
The P.P.T.U.S. elected at Hankow was composed of ten 
delegates from those organisations represented at the 
Conference, but provision was made for the automatic
120. Resolutions and Decisions of the Pan-Pacific Trade 
Union Conference (Hankow, 1927)» pp .21-22.
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addition of representatives from trade unions in other
countries should they wish to affiliate. An invitation
was also extended to those union movements which had
organised delegations but missed attending the Hankow
1 21Conference to take their place on the Secretariat.
Clearly, the Hankow Conference and the P.P.T.U.S.
that it gave birth to were both strongly influenced by
Communist doctrines, and closely associated with openly
revolutionary movements such as the Left Kuomintang-
Communist coalition in China. The Hankow Conference had
declared support for left-wing combatants in a number of
armed struggles in process from Korea to Chile, and had
voiced concern at the Arcos raids in London and events in
China in terms of their possible implications for the
1 22security of the U.S.S.R. In constituting the P.P.T.U.S.
the Soviet trade unions and the largely Communist-controlled 
A 11-China Labour Federation were each given twice the number 
of delegates allocated to other countries: "because of their
relative strength and importance and also because of their 
great experiences", and this, together with the representa­
tion afforded the fringe Communist front organisations from 
America and Britain, had ensured from the start an over­
whelming Communist majority on that body. In addition the 
P.P.T.U.S. was carried on in its day-to-day activities by 
full-time R.I.L.U. agents such as Earl Browder and later 
George Hardy who undertook the dangerous tasks of trying to 
maintain the operations of the Secretariat in Shanghai as
anti-Communist repression mounted in China after late 
1 231927. Thus viewed from the organisational point of
view the P.P.T.U.S. was little more than an elaborately 
contrived Communist front.
At the same time however the Hankow Conference 
had taken great care to preserve the united front character 
of the pan-Pacific movement with resolutions of praise for
121. Ibid., p.28.
122. Ibid., p .4.
123. See Hardy, Those Stormy Years, Ch.2.
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Centrist trade union organisations, and with an outline 
of an economic programme aimed at encouraging trade union 
activity in pursuit of immediate and popular industrial
1 24goals. Further appeals to united front leftism were
contained in resolutions advocating militant trade union 
activity as an antidote to a new imperialist war; an 
apparently unbiased programme advocating a new trade union 
international combining both the R.I.L.U. and the I.F.T.U., 
and, above all, the formation for the first time of an 
obviously active and viable organising machinery through 
which the workers of the Pacific could combine. Together, 
these aspects of the Hankow Conference policies and its 
Secretariat proved appealing enough to draw renewed 
interest from trade unions in India, the Philippines and 
Latin America. And in the minds of many united front 
leftists of the Australian trade union movement these 
policies stamped the Hankow Conference and the P.P.T.U.S. 
as legitimate successors of their own militant initiatives 
dating back to 1921.
In the same month as the Hankow Conference an 
All-Australian Trade Union Congress met in Melbourne to 
launch the A.C.T.U. The Congress protested against the 
Federal government's refusal to allow those delegates 
selected to attend the Hankow Conference to leave Australia, 
and called for the convening in Australia of a Pan-Pacific 
Conference in 1928.^^ Pursuant to this the A.C.T.U. 
Executive in August 1927 announced its affiliation to the 
P.P.T.U.S. apparently after hearing a report on the Hankow 
Conference from the American substitute member of the
124. Resolutions and Decisions of the Pan-Pacific Trade
Union Conference, pp.2-3* 5-8> 12, 16— 18.
125. All-Australian Trade Union Congress Report, 1927»
pp .17 t 36. The Bruce government had refused to issue 
passports to Australian delegates to the Hankow 
conference and they had been forced to cancel their 
trip at the last moment.
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Secretariat William Janequette, The Executive also
elected a Pan-Pacific Relations Committee composed of 
W.J. Duggan, C. Crofts, H. Kneebone, D.J. Davies, J. Garden 
and J. Ryan to liaise with the Secretariat and to make the 
necessary preparations to hold the next Pan-Pacific 
Conference in Australia. Later J. Ryan was chosen to 
represent the A.C.T.U. on the Secretariat at its first 
meeting in Shanghai in February 1928.
The Shanghai meeting of the P.P.T.U.S. gathered 
together the full complement of labour movements which had 
affiliated to the Secretariat. As well as the A.C.T.U. 
representative J. Ryan delegates were in attendance from 
the Philippines Labor Congress and the Philippines National 
Confederation of Tenant Farmers and Agricultural Labourers. 
The P.P.T.U.S. at its Shanghai meeting thus boasted a
1 27membership of around 15,000,000 workers in ten countries,
126. See Labor Council of N.S.W. Bulletin, No.66, Feb.27,
1930, p .4. Janequette apparently came straight to 
Australia from Hankow. The Minutes of the N.S.W. Labor 
Council Executive note a report on the Pan-Pacific 
Conference was delivered on 26th July, 1927, presumably 
also by Janequette. Following his visit to Australia 
Janequette returned to Moscow.
127. See A. Lozovsky, The Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference 
(Moscow, 1927), pp.13-14. Lozovsky listed the membership 
of P.P.T.U.S. affiliates as follows:
China ...........  2,800,000 workers represented
U.S.S.R...........  9,500,000 " "
J a p a n ...........  100,000 " "
Java ...........  250,000 " "
K o r e a ...........  123,000 " "
France ............  550,000 ” M
U.S.A.............. 250,000 " "
England (N.M.M.) . 1,000,000 " "
Almost all the figures listed inflate the real strength 
of the organisations affiliated with the P.P.T.U.S.
The A.C.T.U. claimed to represent 500,000 trade 
unionists though in fact it exercised loose control 
over about 400,000. The Philippines Labor Congress 
and the peasants' union probably had less that 100,000 
members.
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but it was mainly a paper strength. The great bulk of 
the membership was provided by the Russian trade unions, 
which meant little in terms of the Secretariat's stated 
aims. The second most powerful affiliate was the All-China 
Labour Federation, whose precipitous condition was underlined 
by the need to hold P.P.T.U.S. meetings in secret in order 
to protect the Chinese delegates from being captured by the 
Kuomintang. Still no formal contact had been made with the 
Indian labour movement.+
Not surprisingly the Shanghai meeting of the 
Secretariat paid considerable attention to the course of 
events in China. Other topics included the threat of war 
against the U.S.S.R., and the alleged growing signs of war 
danger in the Pacific as seen in the development of unrest 
in Japan, the Philippines, India and China. At the same 
time some detailed consideration was given to the situation 
in Australia. The increasing level of militancy and class 
consciousness was noted with approval and the P.P.T.U.S. 
declared its support for efforts to build up industrial 
unionism through the A.C.T.U. and to develop a system of 
shop committees. The Shanghai meeting agreed to a motion 
moved by Ryan that the next Pan-Pacific Conference should 
be held in Australia in 1929 and. reponsibility for
128convening the conference was handed over to the A.C.T.U.
The Secretariat also decided to transfer the editorial 
headquarters of the P.P.T.U.S's journal the Pan-Pacific 
Worker from Shanghai to Sydney. First published in Hankow 
following the Pan-Pacific Conference the Pan-Pacific Worker 
had been published in Shanghai since the final eclipse of 
the Left Kuomintang government in Wuhan in October 1927« 
Sydney was seen as offering an escape from the restraints 
imposed on P.P.T.U.S. propaganda by the attempts of Imperial
+ Once again British Imperial authorities refused to issue 
passports to Indian delegates to the P.P.T.U.S. However 
later in 1928 the chairman of the Shanghai meeting of 
the Secretariat J. Ryan attended the All-India Trade 
Union Congress as a representative of the P.P.T.U.S.
128. P.P,W., April 15, 1928, p.1.
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authorities and Kuomintang agents in Shanghai to track
1 29down and suppress the Pan-Pacific Worker.
Shortly after this decision was taken the P.P.T.U.S.
journalist Sydor Stoler arrived in Australia and was given
offices and secretarial assistance at the Sydney Trades 
1 30Hall. Working mainly with J. Garden, Stoler produced
and assisted Garden in editing a bi-weekly Pan-Pacific Worker:
official organ of the P.P.T.U.S. (Australian edition), the
first issue of which appeared on April 2, 1928. The new
Pan-Pacific Worker was published by the Pan-Pacific Relations
Committee of the A.C.T.U. and the first issue contained a
message from A.C.T.U. President W.J. Duggan and General
Secretary C. Crofte to the workers of all Pacific countries:
A sincere wish that the day is not far distant when 
we shall be closely allied with each other, not only 
in order to prevent devastating imperialist and 
capitalist wars, but bound together in a solid working 
class phalanx, to ensure to all workers the full 
product of their labor. ”*31
The journal’s aims were stated to be to popularise the
resolutions and decisions of the Hankow Conference, and to
prepare for a new Pan-Pacific Conference for 1929» to
prepare for militant working class action against the danger
of a new world war; to support liberation movements
throughout the Pacific region; to internationalise the
outlook of the workers through trade union propaganda -
so as to break down national and racial barriers between
1 32them, and to work towards a world trade union unity.
The Australian edition of the Pan-Pacific Worker also served 
as the basis for similar publications in other countries 
affiliated with the P.P.T.U.S.
The Pan-Pacific Worker was a high quality journal 
ranging in subject matter widely across its mandate.
Detailed articles appeared on the labour and Marxist movements
129. Hardy, Those Stormy Years, p.198.
130. Stoler had been a member of Lozovsky's entourage at 
the Hankow Conference and had later worked with Earl 
Browder as a P.P.T.U.S. functionary and adviser to the 
trade union movement in China. He was a clese rela­
tive of Lozovsky. During his twelve month stay in Austra-
131. P.P,W.. April 2, 1928, p.2./ lia Stoler lived mostly under
132. Ibid. the pseudonym 'S. Carpenter'.
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in China, Indonesia, Korea, India, Japan, the Philippines,
Indo-China, North America, and Latin America, as well as
the U.S.S.R. Consistently the pages of the Pan-Pacific
Worker stressed the effects of imperialism on all the
Pacific countries, the imminent dangers of a new imperialist
war in the region, and the interrelated interests of the
working class of both the exploited and the exploiting
nations. Theories of racialism were examined and attacked
and the White Australia policy was denigrated as erroneously
based on racialist ideas and in itself inadequate as a
1 33practical economic measure for workers in Australia.
Strenuous efforts were made to engage the interests of a 
wide range of left-wing unionists with personal appeals for 
support of the P.P.T.U.S. project addressed to readers by a 
spectrum of writers ranging from American ex-I.W.W. figures 
to Tom Mann. In April 1929 the Pan-Pacific Worker became a 
monthly, when it incorporated the magazine Labor Monthly, 
and in that year reached a peak circulation amongst unionists
1 34of perhaps between three and six thousand copies per issue.
At first however some of the Pan-Pacific Worker's 
most avid readers were its enemies. The P.P.T.U.S. 
affiliation of the A.C.T.U. had first hit the headlines in 
early 1928 with the selection of J. Ryan as Australian 
representative on the Secretariat, Ryan's C.P.A. membership 
had previously been little known but now the news was gloried 
in by the Communist press and gratefully acknowledged by 
conservatives. As part of the continuing struggle between 
the A.W.U. and the militant industrialists associated with
133» See for example P .P .W. , Aug.1, 1928, pp.6-9; Sept.15> 
1928, pp.8-11; June 1, 1929» pp.20-7.
134. As with nearly all the left-wing publications of the 
1920s no reliable data on circulation figures are 
available. However the Pan-Pacific Worker claimed 
circulation doubled after incorporation with the Labor 
Monthly. The Labor Monthly circulation would appear 
to have been in excess of three thousand (see L.M,, 
June 1, 1927» p.3; Labor Council of N.S.W., Report,
1928. pp.55-57; 1929. p p .42-43).
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the A.C.T.U., that body’s affiliation to the P.P.T.U.S. 
was seized upon as a stick with which to beat the newly 
formed organisation. Throughout 1928 the Australian Worker 
launched a concerted attack on the P.P.T.U.S. as a Communist- 
controlled front aimed at undermining the A.L.P., and this 
was advanced as an explanation of the A.W.U’s obstinate 
refusal to have anything to do with the A.C.T.U. The 
conservative government of S.M. Bruce very quickly sensed 
an election issue in this struggle and the P.P.T.U.S’s 
influence on the Australian labour movement became the centre 
of a raging controversy.
For the Bruce government the issues at stake
were large indeed. Australian conservatives viewed the
development of radical industrial and political movements
in the Far East as apocalyptical happenings threatening
the integrity of the British Empire, the stability of the
region, and the strategic position of Australia. Active
participation by Australian unionists in fostering these
movements was considered tantamount to treason, and
certainly deserving of strong counter action as well as
1 35public condemnation. When confronted with applications
for entry to Australia by Japanese and Chinese delegates 
wishing to attend the 1926 pan-Pacific conference in Sydney 
the Bruce government had declined to issue visas and it 
maintained a consistent opposition to the entry of overseas 
unionists which was to frustrate all attempts at holding a 
pan-Pacific conference in Australia while the conservatives 
held office in the federal sphere. In 1927 it had refused 
to issue passports to Australian unionists wishing to attend 
the Hankow Conference and later conservative parliamentarians 
fulminated loudly against J. Ryan’s attendance at the 
Shanghai meeting of the Pan-Pacific Secretariat,^^ As the
135. See C.P.D., Vol.118, May 17, 1928, pp.4942-4956
136. Ibid.
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November 1928 elections approached the government placed 
increasing emphasis on its policy of suppressing Communism 
and labour internationalism, and appealed to the electorate 
to allow it to continue to govern in this way.
The A.W.U. viewed the P.P.T.U.S. differently but 
in an equally hostile light. Despite an expanding city- 
based membership the A.W.U, remained basically a reflection 
of the rural labour force in Australia. Many such workers 
in their own or their family's lifetime had found themselves 
undercut in the labour market by cheaper Asian or 'coloured' 
labour and they could not find it in their hearts to forget 
nor forgive. Even in the 1920s there was a developing 
antagonism (particularly in the sugar industry of Northern 
Queensland) between A.W.U. members and the growing immigrant 
Italian community whose extended family system seemed to be 
giving the newcomers the edge. Thus when the A.C.T.U's 
Pan-Pacific Worker began attacking the White Australia 
policy there was a genuine groundswell of A.W.U. rank-and- 
file opinion against radical unionism. To men like H.E. 
Boote, the influential editor of the Australian Worker« the 
issue was compounded by the P.P.T.U.S's links with world 
Communism. In the early post-war years Boote had taken a 
leading part in attempts at broadening the outlook of A.W.U. 
members and had insisted that Australian labour's destiny 
lay in active participation in the international movement.
He had come to blame Communism for the dissolution of the 
international movement and despise the C.P.A. for what he 
considered its disruption of Australian labour's affairs.
The Australian Worker thus viewed the A.C.T.U's Secretariat 
affiliation and the Pan-Pacific Worker's attacks on the 
White Australia policy as presaging a concerted Communist 
offensive against the local labour movement.
Yet when all this is said the A.W.U's antagonism 
to the P.P.T.U.S. was given real point and direction by the 
power-oriented manoeuvrings of that union's leaders. At 
its February meeting in Shanghai the P.P.T.U.S. had 
recommended that militants in Australia should work to
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undermine the leadership of the A.W.U. in order to extend
1 37the authority of the A.C.T.U. Men such as A.W.U. General
Secretary Ted Grayndler and N.S.W. Secretary John Bailey 
were noted for their spirited response to any such challenges. 
Furthermore the P.P.T.U.S. affiliation of the A.C.T.U. was 
a heaven-sent opportunity to score points against their 
industrial and political enemies and to develop an alliance 
with the F.P.L.P. and its newly elected leader J.H. Scullin 
against the electorally embarrassing militants of the labour 
movement. Thus the campaign against the P.P.T.U.S. quickly 
acquired a familiarly factional political direction as one 
of an unending series of issues seized upon by the A.W.U. 
bureaucracy to defend their stance on labour questions, and 
attack and discredit their enemies and competitors. However 
genuine the attitudes of many A.W.U. rank and file it is 
hard to credit with any sincerity the testimony of men like 
John Bailey that they opposed the P.P.T.U.S. out of real 
concern for A.L.P. principles and in the hope of saving it
1 o Qfrom a Moscow-directed plot. J This was the same man who
but a few years earlier - under different circumstances of
Labor factional intrigue, had joined with the Garden Communists
in organising a deputation to a N.S.W. A.L.P. Conference
which had broken open the doors and stormed into the conference
room with red banners aloft, fists flying, and issuing forth
1 39a lusty rendition of the 'Red Flag'.
Predictably, the first faction to launch its 
weight behind the A.W.U. campaign was the Bailey-controlled 
Conroy Executive, recently ousted from control of the N.S.W. 
Labor Party by the Seale-Willis-Lang alliance. In an address 
to the Federal Executive in April 1928 members of the Conroy 
faction asked for Federal A.L.P. assistance in their fight 
against the "propagators of piebald sentiment" who were 
causing this "drift towards Communistic and Oriental
137. See P.P.W., May 15, 1928, p.11.
138. See for example A.W,, July 18, 1928, p.18.
139. L.D., April 19, 1924, p .5.
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140doctrines". The Australian Worker noted sympathetically
that the Conroy Executive's address demanded the Federal 
A.L.P’s immediate attention and a declaration of attitude 
towards the dangerous alliance in control of N.S.W. Labor 
politics. As a gesture of support for the stance of the 
Conroy faction it was solemnly announced that the A.W.U. had 
decided not to affiliate with the A.C.T.U. because "the 
pernicious doctrines and piebald principles enunciated in 
the Australian edition of the 'Pan-Pacific Worker'... are 
calculated to bring disaster to the political Labor Party 
unless repudiated by every section of the Labor Movement"J 
Despite such concern for its well-being however the Federal 
A.L.P. refused to be drawn directly into the N.S.W. faction 
fights, hoping that the issues aroused just might die down 
before the forthcoming federal elections.
However the issue of White Australia, once 
aroused, did attract some interest amongst union organisations 
generally. Victorian unions in particular responded to the 
A.W.U's arguments by agreeing that the P.P.T.U.S. was a 
disrupting influence. Throughout June and July the Melbourne 
T.H.C. engaged in long and heated discussion over the matter, 
the dominating chauvinist and pro-A.W.U. tone of which was 
summed up by the Trades Hall President H.C. Gibson's acute 
analysis of the Secretariat as containing only "three white 
men... and a heterogeneous mob of Asiatics with unpronounce­
able names who have got the impertinence to lay down a policy
1 42for the Australian workers". Finally, on the eve of an
A.C.T.U. Congress in July the Melbourne T.H.C. passed a 
motion asking the A.C.T.U. to cancel its Secretariat 
affiliations.
A surprise convert to the anti-P.P .T.U.S. 
propaganda of the A.W.U. was R.S. Ross, who had up to this 
time been a stalwart of the pan-Pacific idea. Ross emerged
140. S.M.H., April 25, 1928.
141. A.W., July 4, 1928, p.11.
142. See P.P.W.t Sept.15, 1928, p.11.
143. Melbourne T.H.C. Minutes, July 12, 1928.
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in the debates over the Secretariat as the foremost 
advocate of retaining the White Australia policy as a 
practical means of maintaining Australia's living standards, 
and of preventing unnecessary and dangerous social division 
within this country. Ross had developed a close relation­
ship with A.W.U. General Secretary Grayndler and a consequent 
antipathy to the Garden-led radicals who had played a leading 
role in promoting the P.P.T.U.S. scheme. Suspicious of 
Communist machinations through the A.C.T.U. Executive 
affiliation, Ross regarded the P.P.T.U.S. as an attempt to 
force Labor to abandon the White Australia policy, and he 
recommended cancellation of unionist links with the 
Secretariat pending the decision of an All-Australian Trade 
Union Congress on the subject. Furthermore, Ross was 
genuinely hopeful that moves to have the A.L.P. convene a 
Pan-Pacific Conference could yet bear fruit and he helped 
persuade the Melbourne Trades Hall Council to endorse the 
V.S.P. figure Muriel Heagney as a delegate to the 1928 
Pan-Pacific Women's Conference at Honolulu in a bid to 
keep Labor's Federal Executive involved and interested in
1 44such projects. Intemperate and continued criticisms of
such allegedly 'pacifist' conferences by Sydor Stoler in
the Pan-Pacific Worker strengthened Ross's feelings of
mistrust of P.P.T.U.S. motives and increased his pessimismaconcerning the possibilities of working with/Communist-
dominated movement in achieving the anti-war aims of the
pan-Pacific idea. In an era when - in Ross's view -
1 4 5capitalism was in the ascendant the world over he 
considered it ill-advised to associate too closely with 
revolutionaries whose main concern was with liberation 
movements in lands less happy than Australia, and who as 
a consequence were likely to sacrifice a White Australia 
without due consideration of the benefits of that policy 
to the working class here.
144. See Melbourne T.H.C. Minutes, July 19» 1928.
145. U,V., Feb.18, 1928, p.5.
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Garden, Stoler and Ryan at Sydney Trades Hall 
led the counter-attack on the A.W.U. over the issue of the 
P.P.T.U.S. In an article in the Pan-Pacific Worker Garden 
described the campaign against the P.P.T.U.S. as a ’capita­
list plot' to subvert the union movement into paths of
reaction, and pointed out the similarity of A.W.U. and
1 46Nationalist Party propaganda. A spate of similar
articles followed, mainly from Stolen's pen, and the attacks 
on the P.P.T.U.S. were answered in two widely distributed 
pamphlets: What Is The Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat?, 
and 'White Australia'? What Does It Mean by 'Lily White' 
(Pure-but-not-simple).
P.P.T.U.S. propaganda sought to counter 
isolationist arguments by associating the Secretariat with 
the anti-war and anti-capitalist traditions of the labour 
movement. What Is The Pan Pacific Secretariat? set the 
history of the pan-Pacific trade union movement in the 
context of the growing threat of war in the Pacific, and 
related moves against the P.P.T.U.S. to a deliberate 
attempt - engineered by imperialists through their 
reactionary puppets in the union movement - to break down 
the growing international solidarity of the Pacific peoples. 
A similar point was made by the 'White Australia'? pamphlet 
when it pointed to the growing worldwide 'capitalist 
offensive' against the working class and asked the opponents 
of the P.P.T.U.S. to ponder some questions:
(1) Are the workers, say of this very country, 
exploited by "White" capitalists or not? Or are we 
exploited by the "mob of Asiatics" referred to by 
Mr. Gibson....? (I I)
(2) Has the "Crimes Act" which is directed against 
our working class and against the Trade Unions, been 
passed by White Agents of the bourgeoisie, or perhaps 
by the "yellows, blacks and brindles" so contemptuously 
referred to by the nationalist junta in chorus with the 
Baileys and Grayndlers?
(3) Has the Anti-Trade Union Bill (Bruce's 
Bludgeon Bill) been passed by our own White capitalist 
government, or by the Chinese or Japanese?
146. P.P.W., Aug.1, 1928, p.1
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(4) Has the ban on working-class literature 
been proclaimed by the immaculately White Mr. Bruce 
or by our yellow-skinned fellow workers?
(5) Is the capitalist offensive on wages and 
hours in our country, at this very moment, based on 
the color of our skin or on a more vital cleavage in 
society? Is it based on our complexion or on our 
class division? ^ 7
Continuing the interrogation the 'White Australia1? pamphlet 
drew attention to the Bruce government's sumptuous reception 
of a visiting Japanese naval squadron as underlining the 
growth of dangerous military alliances between capitalists 
in Australia and overseas: why then should the White Australia 
question prevent the workers building their alliances in 
order to prevent wars?
Careful casuistry was employed in explaining
clause four of the P.P.T.U.S's constitution, which had been
utilised by the A.W.U. as evidence of the Secretariat's
148intention to undermine the White Australia policy.
Clearly this clause had committed the P.P.T.U.S. to oppose
racialism, but it was denied that this implied support for
the immigration of either coloured or white workers into
Australia. The P.P.T.U.S., it was asserted, would oppose
"the unrestricted immigration of the workers from any other
149country, whether white, yellow or black". At the same
time it was pointed out that through the operation of the 
capitalist economic system it was not necessary for the 
working class in low-wage countries to migrate to Australia 
to undermine this country's living standards: capital would
inevitably flow to those areas where labour was most 
exploited and the resulting cheaper products would force 
wage standards down on a world-wide scale. The Pan-Pacific 
Secretariat sought to counter this state of affairs by 
"raising the level of the living and working standards of 
the workers of those countries which are oppressed by 
imperialism to that of the most advanced sections of the 
proletariat".  ^^
147. 'White Australia'? What Does It Mean (Syd., 1928),p p .2-3.
148. Refer back to pp 222, 230-32.
149. What is the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat?, p.75» 
p.34; 'White Australia'?, p.10.130. Ibid.,
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The position adopted by the P.P.T.U.S. proponents
then was that their criticism of1 the White Australia policy
was in effect an attack on the shibboleth rather than the
substance of the labour movement's immigration restriction
policy. Clearly enough they were opposed to the racialist
overtones of the White Australia policy, on the grounds that
the paramount division in society was class, and that the
elevation of such a racialist slogan to an issue of faith
would inevitably lead the workers astray. Yet at the same
time they vigorously denied that they were in any way
opposed to immigration restriction as a practical measure.
Their principal concern was, they argued, with theoretical
clarification of a measure originally devised as an economic
policy, but in danger of confusing the working class by its
concentration on colour rather than capitalism as the threat
1 51to their living standards. And against their opponents
the P.P.T.U.S. advocates had made the telling point that 
immigration restriction was in itself no guarantee of 
standards of living. The real safeguard of Australian wages, 
it was argued, was alliance with progressive movements in the 
East with the aim of raising overseas living standards so 
that they no longer constituted a threat to the Australian 
working class, thus removing the root causes of the problem. 
Such an approach served to mollify those on the left of the 
labour movement at least, and managed to de-fuse the issue 
of P.P.T.U.S. affiliation as meaning direct advocacy of 
coloured immigration.
In July 1928 an Emergency Congress of the A.C.T.U. 
met in Melbourne to consider, amongst other things, the 
issue of P.P.T.U.S. affiliation. The Congress was addressed 
by J. Ryan on the decisions of the Pan-Pacific Secretariat 
at its Shanghai meeting. After Ryan's report was received 
and adopted Garden moved a resolution, passed by 92 votes
to 36 ,
That this Congress endorses the action of the 
Australasian Council of Trade Unions in affiliating 
with the Pan-Pacific Secretariat, realising that the 
workers of the Pacific should unite in combating £sic^]
151. P.P,W., Sept.15, 1928, pp.10-11
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the dangers of* war in the Pacific, and in assisting 
workers in more backward countries of the Pacific to 
improve their position, which is a menace to workers
in other countries.152
A rearguard motion by Ross and Gibson designed to have the
A.C.T.U. abandon the Pan-Pacific Worker project was defeated
on the voices. Even a majority of Victorian Congress
delegates were persuaded of the calumny and misrepresentation
1 52of the Secretariat indulged in by the A.W.U. and its cohorts,
and after considering correspondence with the A.C.T.U.
Executive in which Grayndler had advanced the overseas
affiliation as an excuse for his union's refusal to amalgamate
with the new organisation, the Congress announced the
launching of "an intensive campaign among the rank and file
of the A.W.U. which will make clear to every worker the
necessity for working class unity as the sole effective means
1 54of resisting the onslaught of Capitalism". Hailed as a
great victory for internationalism by P.P.T.U.S. supporters,
a majority of unions swung solidly behind the new overseas
affiliation, all the A.C.T.U.-affiliated Labor Councils
(including the Melbourne T.H.C.) ratifying the Emergency
1 55Congress decisions on the matter.
152. See Labor Monthly, Aug.1, 1928, p.17. At the request
of C.O'Neill(Seamen's Union) a small addendum was 
added to the motion: "and to assist to prevent the
exploitation of Asiatic and Pacific island labor on 
ships trading on the coast and mandated territories".
153« P .P .W . , Aug.1, 1928, p.3; Melbourne T.H.C. Minutes,
Aug.30, 1928.
154. Official Report of the All-Australian Trade Union 
Congress, July 16-21, 1928, p.4.
155« P .P .W., Sept.15» 1928, p .9. For the favourable change
in attitudes of leading unionists towards the P.P.T.U.S. 
see also U.V,, Oct.20, 1928, p.6; Dec.15» 1928, p.3*
As usual rank and file opinion on the P.P.T.U.S. issue 
is impossible to gauge with any accuracy. However it 
should not be supposed that the P.P.T.U.S. lacked 
support. In particular the Secretariat's public commit­
ment to oppose ALL immigration possibly to some extent 
outweighed reservations about its theoretical opposition 
to the White Australia policy. Under the Bruce-Page 
government the White Australia policy had seemed to many 
unionists to operate less as a method of immigration 
restriction than a device for flooding the labour market 
with new arrivals from Britain and Europe. Following 
the endorsement of the Secretariat by the A.C.T.U. and 
its affiliated T.H.Cs the right-wing Brisbane Tramways
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For Federal Labor leader J.H. Scullin the
A.C.T.U's reaffirmation of its internationalism was bad
news electorally. The conservative press raged at the
decision and John Bailey publicly challenged Scullin to
declare his position as between the 'Communist* A.C.T.U.
and the 'White Australia' A.W.U. On the defensive, Scullin
publicly disavowed the July Congress of the A.C.T.U.,
stating that its decisions "do not alter one word in the
1 56Labour party's platform". Strong pressure - exerted on
the A.C.T.U. Executive - resulted in Secretary C. Crofts
announcing that unionists did not intend to abandon any of
the fundamental policies of the A.L.P., including the White
Australia policy. This concession allowed Scullin in his
policy speech delivered in October 1928 to claim
The first plank of Labor's Fighting Platform is:
"The cultivation of an Australian sentiment and the 
maintenance of a White Australia". That has always 
been a plank of the Labor Platform, and was unanimously 
re-affirmed at the last Interstate Labor Conference, 
held at Canberra last year. To that plank every member, 
and every organisation affiliated with the Australian 
Labor Party is pledged.^ 57
Scullin went on to argue along old-style A.L.P.-lines that 
the real opponents of the White Australia policy were 
Nationalist and Country Party representatives of capitalists 
interested in getting cheap labour. Nevertheless the doubts 
remained in the minds of many voters, and the tension between 
the Federal A.L.P. and the militant unionists continued. 
Though Garden could cheerily point to an improvement in the 
A.L.P. vote at the 1928 elections, few were prepared to go 
along with his suggestion that this constituted a vote of 
confidence in the P.P.T.U.S. J Most Labor politicians 
began to look askance at their ties with the N.S.W. militant 
union left wing and with the newly created electoral 
liability of the A.C.T.U.
Union held a ballot on the P.P.T.U.S. amongst its members 
and decided to withdraw from the Brisbane Trades and 
Labor Council by 434 votes to 343»
136. S.M.H., July 27, 1928.
137. Labor Policy for the Commonwealth. Enunciated at
Richmond (Victoria) on October 4, 1928, By J.H. Scullin,
M.H.R. Leader, Federal Parliamentary Labor Party. (Melb.,
1928), p .8.
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The Bruce government’s stance at the 1928
federal elections yielded disappointing results for
conservatives. The election was held on the 17th of
November, and resulted in a substantial reduction of the
1 59Nationalist House of Representatives majority. Conser­
vative candidates lost votes heavily to Labor in New South 
Wales, revealing the White Australia issue as an ineffective
and inappropriate ploy as far as the people of the most
160populous State were concerned. At the same time the
conservatives did remain in power, and militant unionists 
were able to draw only rhetorical comfort from the results 
of the 1928 election. Already in June 1928 S.M. Bruce had 
announced that "under no circumstances" would he allow the 
projected 1929 Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference to be 
held in Australia, and despite A.C.T.U. agitation and 
negotiation with the Federal government, the plan for a local 
venue once again had to be abandoned, much to the chagrin of 
militants. Shorn of its bases in China by Chiang Kai-shek’s 
campaign of terror against the left, and with potential 
delegates denied entry to Australia by an intransigent 
conservative government, the P.P.T.U.S. finally decided to 
hold the 1929 conference in Vladivostok. Even so Australian 
unions were willing to send a strong delegation to this 
conference in the persons of F. Roels (President of the 
Labor Council of N.S.W.) and F. Walsh (of the Trades and 
Labor Council of South Australia) as representatives of the 
A.C.T.U., and P.G. Hannett with credentials from the Labor 
Council of N.S.W. These three delegates left Sydney on 
29th June 1929 for what proved to be a long and eventful 
voyage to the P.P.T.U.S. Conference scheduled to open on 
1st August in Vladivostok.
The Vladivostok Conference marked the beginning 
of the end for the pan-Pacific movement. Increasingly 
throughout 1929 the P.P.T.U.S. had moved away from the
138. P.P,W., Dec.1, 1928, p.1.
139. See C .A. Hughes and B.D. Graham, A Handbook of Australian
Government and Politics 1890-1964 (C anb., 1968),
pp.331-341.
160. Round Table. Vol.19, No.74, March, 1929, pp.415-416.
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united front programme of the Hankow Conference in favour 
of ’third period' policies which gradually transformed that 
body into little more than an appendage of the Comintern.
The Vladivostok Conference and the P.P.T.U.S. plenums which 
followed confirmed this transformation, veering leftwards in 
policy and repudiating an array of labour organisations 
previously associated with the pan-Pacific movement. The 
Australian delegates found themselves pressured into 
supporting edicts aimed at directing the course of the 
labour movement along Communist lines, and in the furore 
that resulted the P.P.T.U.S. was repudiated by the A.C.T.U. 
Thus the movement which had started in earnest hope of 
uniting the diverse working class movements of the Pacific 
became in the end another snarling side-show of the 
Comintern's third period.
This however was still in the future and by the 
late 1920s pan-Pacific unionism - along with its P.P.T.U.S. 
acquired Leninist tinge - had become a touchstone of 
militancy for important sections of the organised labour 
movement in Australia. The product of a broadly-based 
united front of left-wing forces in the union movement, 
pan-Pacific internationalism seemed finally to have borne 
fruit in the form of an organisation acceptable to a majority 
of its supporters. This development occurred despite the 
early problems of enthusing overseas unionists to join in 
the scheme; despite both passive and open opposition to the 
scheme from moderates and conservatives of the Labor 
Movement, and despite continued, highly organised, and 
determined interference and harassment of unionists by the 
Bruce government. None of these pressures however proved 
sufficient to deter militants from persevering with the
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project and giving widespread support to Garden and the 
Communists in their attempts at translating into action 
the pan-Pacific idea.
Union support for radicalism was thus an 
important and continuing feature of the 1920s. The ideas 
which had been enshrined in the socialist objective of the 
1921 trade union congress continued to operate as a powerful 
force in labour affairs.
At the same time socialism after 1921 had also 
been a source of division within the unions, and against 
the achievements of the radical impetus there might be 
listed quite as many failures and reverses. If the A.C.T.U. 
could be counted as an achievement in diluted form of the 
O.B.U. and Council of Action ideals its authority was limited 
and sometimes only grudgingly accepted, and it had excited 
the jealous hostility of what was still the single most 
powerful union in Australia, the A.W.U. If the pan-Pacific 
trade union movement had finally assumed organisational 
form in the P.P.T.U.S., it had sparked racialist outbursts 
from some as well as encouraging the growth of interna­
tionalism. And beyond the unions an electorally conscious 
Labor Party was increasingly outspoken in its condemnation 
of the union left and intent on differentiating the A.L.P. 
from their aims. These barriers to the influence of 
radicalism had been erected from within the labour movement 
in reaction to the continued propagation by the left of 
values deeply at variance with those of most Australians.
For in truth left-wing radicalism lacked wide 
support in the broader sweep of Australian society. It had
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been attuned in the immediate post-war years to a world 
revolution which in fact did not occur, and later the left 
clung to the notion that international working class 
solidarity remained a force on a world-wide scale, an 
illusion which Moscow was fostering as a matter of 
convenience and tactic rather than sincere belief. To the 
majority of Australians all such ideas seemed strange and 
remote and in basis the fantasy of a lunatic fringe. Many 
of the left-wing union leaders retained strong rank and 
file support for their class-conscious stance, but such 
militancy clearly did not extend even to all those unions 
affiliated with the A.C.T.U. Nor was rank and file 
militancy more than sporadic and concerned mostly with 
heartfelt issues. In particular it had proved exceedingly 
difficult to rally convincing mass support within the 
labour movement for the socialisation objective, and without 
such backing the advocacy of these ideals was from the 
electoral point of view impolitic in the extreme. This 
the Labor Party politicians realised all too well.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE A.L.P. AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM
Since £1921^] Labour politicians have been 
compelled to profess and call themselves 
(but not joyfully nor in the market-place) 
socialists. The new objective has been a 
handicap to the practical men of the Labour 
movement in their efforts to win the consti­
tuencies,,,, Australian Labour has doctrines, 
but the majority of Australians have none.
It is the political misfortune of the Labour 
party that its old nationalistic doctrines 
appealed directly and powerfully to the instinct 
of the Australian people, whereas its new 
socialistic doctrines are repugnant to their 
instinct,*
The Labor Party served as a focal point for 
opposition to socialist and radical influences, A confederal 
party based on six State bodies and with only a fledgeling 
Federal Executive, the A.L.P, was conveniently ill-equipped 
to translate formally adopted policies into practice. The 
major day to day pronouncements on both local and foreign 
affairs were made by the politicians. These were in the main 
reformist and empirical in their approach to all questions, 
devoid even of that vision of strident nationalism which had 
informed their predecessors up until 1916. Acutely responsive 
to the pressures of the community, A.L.P. politicians sought 
to mollify electoral concern about the extent of the post-war 
doctrinaire socialist trend in labour affairs, and they 
marshalled the diverse non-radical elements of the party behind
* W.K. Hancock, Australia (London , 1930), pp.178-179
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them to exercise an increasingly mild and conservative 
influence on the formulation of official Labor Party policies 
at the triennial Commonwealth Conferences of the A.L.P. Aided 
by the divisions in the union movement the politicians in the 
course of the 1920s increasingly established the A.L.P. as an 
alternative voice to the radical and internationalist-inclined 
trade unions, so that it came once again to champion a 
conventional Australian nationalism; only this time in a form 
more muted, less enthusiastically imperial, and above all 
negative and isolationist in tendency.
i. The mood of the electorate and the radical goad
After 1918 the labour movement's radicalism had 
reflected the industrial, social, and political turmoil of 
the aftermath of World War One. In the 1920s Australians 
sought a return to normalcy, and the labour movement's attitude 
to left-wing doctrines was bound as a result to change. The 
A.L.P. came to view its radical phase not as presaging the best 
and reasoned hopes for an otherwise blighted future, but as an 
embarrassing flirtation with ideas that had no place in the 
Australian context. This of course was a message that middle 
class and right thinking citizens had worked long and hard to 
teach in order that the A.L.P. might learn.
The intense concern of the electorate at the 'Red
Peril' was most dramatically illustrated by the huge demon-
1strations against Communism in Sydney early in 1921. Follo­
wing an incident during which a Union Jack was burnt in the
1. The post-war unrest leading up to the 1921 demonstration 
in Sydney has been analysed by D.W. Rawson: "Political
Violence in Australia", in Dissent, No.22, Autumn, 1968, 
pp.18-27. As Rawson notes
Sydney in 1921 almost reproduced the circumstances 
of Brisbane in 1919. There existed a small but 
indubitable body of genuine and demonstrative revolu­
tionaries. There was a Labor government which, though 
itself anything but revolutionary, could be seen, if 
regarded with the eye of faith, as betraying the Empire 
to these assailants. And there was unemployment.
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Domain on May Day 1921 a campaign was begun by church
leaders, conservative politicians and press, and the Returned
Sailors and Soldiers’ League to demonstrate against the
'Bolshevik disturbers' and 'May Day seditionists' who had
made so bold as to defile the sacred symbol of contemporary
2nationalism and imperial sentiment. The results of such
agitation however far exceeded even the most optimistic hopes
of its promoters, for when the appointed day arrived for a
united conservative counter-demonstration the Sydney Domain
filled with over 150,000 people who with their threepenny
flags aloft made it a veritable sea of red, white, and blue3that Sunday afternoon. "Yesterday was Diggers' speech day 
in the Domain", the Daily Telegraph trumpeted jubilantly in 
its report on this enormous rally; and there was certainly 
little lee way given to spruikers other than those whom ex­
soldiers were willing to hear. Angry returned servicemen 
overturned socialist rostrums and set upon their speakers.
They mounted a lorry occupied by members of the A.L.P. and 
after chasing off its previous occupants set alight to a red 
flag. And all the while the extremists were urged on by 
crowds subsumed in the patriotic fervour of the day and 
obeisance to the Union Jack. There was only a little exaggera­
tion in the Daily Telegraph's comment that this outburst of 
feeling and riotous behaviour
was more than the honoring of a mere emblem. It was 
the spontaneous outburst of a great populace tired of 
the disloyal utterances and acts of an unpopular 
minor!ty.
The citizens of Sydney in a wonderfully impressive 
and emphatic manner, made it clear that disloyalists, 
revolutionaries, and enemies of the flag generally have 
no place in our sun.^
2. See for example D,T., May 3» 1921, p.5» May 4, 1921, p p .9>11» 
May 5, 1921, p.5; May 7, 1921, p.11.
3. D.T., May 9* 1921, p.5» Though an extraordinary figure by
any standards it seems quite possible that the number of 
people involved in the demonstrations was around the 150,000 
mark. Some socialist papers suggested that the crowd was as 
large as 200,000.
4. Ibid.
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Once alight the flame of anti-Bolshevism was 
fanned eagerly by conservatives throughout the 1920s. The 
Bolshevik bogey in these years emerged as a regular part of 
Australian political campaigns, right-wing propagandists 
showing themselves intensely aware of the profit to be had in 
portraying the A.L.P. as strongly under Communist influence.
In place of earlier allegations that Labor had been lost to 
the I.W.W. it was now contended that Communism had become 
interlocked with the Labor Party and that despite the 
protestations of parliamentarians the men with their hands 
on the levers of power in the A.L.P. were directed in their 
activities by Moscow. At the 1925 Federal elections 
Bolshevism was stated to be the principal cause of all current
5. See for example the Nationalist election pamphlet Labor 
Rule Means Red Rule I (Sydney, n.d. - 1928). The most 
comprehensive outline of this viewpoint (and a poignant 
testimony to the enduring tone of right-wing propaganda 
on the issue of Communism) is M.H. Ellis's The Garden Path 
(Sydney, 1949)• For earlier works in a similar vein see 
Ellis's A Handbook for Nationalists (Brisbane, 1918) and 
his mammoth confidential dossier Summary of the Disloyal 
Actions of the Queensland Official Labour Party and its 
Adherents... During the Period of the War and the Months 
Succeeding(Brisbane,1919)>in M.L.Seealso Ellis's 
1932 book The Red Road (Sydney, 1932), which is virtually 
an early draft of The Garden Path. In 1919 Ellis was a 
private secretary to the Leader of the Opposition in 
Queensland and was involved in organising the anti-Bolshevik 
demonstrations of that year. Subsequently he was doyen of 
the anti-Communist journalists who emerged in increasing 
numbers after World War One.
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industrial unrest and much was made of Labor's reluctance 
to subscribe to this view of events. S.M. Bruce presented 
himself at this election as the man to put down the threat to 
Australia from the revolutionary elements, whilst the A.L.P. 
was contrasted with the government parties as wholly 
untrustworthy in this respect. In the Federal elections of 
1928 Communism was once again a leading issue, and this time 
the Bolshevik plot was allegedly to subvert the White Australia 
policy through its control of the A.L.P.
The reaction of A.L.P. politicians to the electorate's
fear of Communism was mixed and confused at first. Some few
parliamentarians such as M.Considine had loudly proclaimed their
support of Communism wholehearted, and they were far from keen
to recant their beliefs. Others, such as Frank Anstey and
Maurice Blackburn, had joined in labour's early enthusiasm
for Bolshevism but had soon become more reserved and critical
concerning developments in Russia; and they were quick to
realise the electoral liability open support for Communism 
7would incur. And for most of Labor's parliamentarians, 
ensconced as they were in the State sphere of politics, the 
issues involved seemed remote and a nuisance either way. They 
could see little resemblance between their own activities and 
that portrayed by conservatives in the propaganda concerning 
the Bolshevik bogey, and they were prone to the belief that 
conservative parties had deliberately contrived the whole issuegof anti-Communism. On the other hand the sectarian elements 
in the Communist Party made it very clear that no goodwill 
existed towards the A.L.P. from that quarter, and the C.P.A's 
loudly proclaimed intention of wresting control of the labour 
movement from the A.L.P., and its opposition to Labor Party
6. See for example All-Australian Trades Union Conference
Report, 1921, p.10.
7. Ibid., p .11; A.L.P, State of Victoria. Annual Conference 
Report, 1919« P.7.
8. See for example the reported reactions to the N.S.W. Labor
Premier J. Dooley to the 1921 Sydney anti-Communist 
demonstrations: D,T., May 12, 1921.
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candidates at elections seemed tantamount to a declaration of 
war to parliamentarians. These two electoral obstacles decided 
the path that most A.L.P. politicians would tred: whilst wary 
of attacking Russia or making anti-Communism a crusade, they 
sought very clearly to differentiate Labor from the C.P.A. and 
to eliminate anything that looked like Communist influence from 
their Party platform and policy.
In the forefront of those politicians advocating
moderate policies for Labor were the leading State parliamentary
figures including E.G.Theodore and J.T.Lang. Behind them stood
the A.L.P. branches and leagues spread throughout the city and
country areas whose members saw themselves first of all as part
of an electoral machine. Significantly, nearly all those who
attempted to steer the A.L.P.by the compass of electoral cheer
were Catholics, who had gained ascendancy in the Party following
the abandonment of Labor by most of its Protestant supporters
in the course of the conscription split. Traditionally the
Catholic influence on the A.L.P. had favoured the populist and
pragmatic ideology that the Party had acquired in its early
years, Church spokesmen praising this approach as a method of
achieving ’social justice’, in contradistinction to the proscribed
left-wing socialism emanating from the unions and doctrinaire
Qsocialist groups. In 1919 Catholic prelates had felt compelled
to intervene in the battle over the possible adoption of the
O.B.U. plan by the N.S.W. A.L.P. and they maintained their
1 0pressure against the union left from this point on.
Even so the general support of Catholicism for the 
moderate stance on Labor policies was for some time complicated 
on the question of foreign affairs. Many rank and file Catholics 
were uncommonly parochial in their outlook, and their Tammany
9. See on this C.Hamilton: ’Irish Catholics of N.S.W. and the
Labor Party 1890-1910”, Historical Studies Australia and New 
Zealand Vol.8, No.31, Nov.1958, p .254 ff.; "Catholic Interest 
and the Labor Party: Organisation and Catholic Activity in 
N.S.W. 1910-1916", in Vol.9, No.33, Nov.1959, p .62 ff.
10. See I.E.Young, Conflict Within the N.S.W, Labor Party 1919-
32 (M.A. Thesis^ Syd. Univ., 1961) pp.15 ff.
style of politics was most suited to their principal area of 
of interest in the local government scene. They were thus 
not geared to participate in a crusade over issues of foreign 
affairs or wider policy concerns as a later generation of 
Australian Catholics were. Furthermore the Irish issue still 
rankled Catholics and pushed many into a more left-wing stance 
than they would otherwise have occupied. Particularly in the 
early post-war years the issue of freedom for Southern Ireland 
merged easily with issues of anti-imperialism and opposition 
to capitalism, and it was difficult to convince many Irish-
Australians that the left was wrong in its appreciation of
11the world scene. Consequently although Catholicism helped 
as an influence towards moderation it was not a united force 
in the battle over foreign affairs. In the event religious 
faith was probably less important in turning the A.L.P. away 
from its flirtation with international socialism than the 
simple necessity of adapting to the pressures of the community 
by presenting a face to the electorate that could ensure the 
Labor Party’s elevation from an opposition minority to office 
in the Federal sphere.
Labor’s dilemna had been correctly diagnosed by 
Theodore in his stand against the 1921 socialisation objective 
at the Ninth Commonwealth Conference of the A.L.P. at Brisbane. 
In opposing the proposals of the Melbourne Trade Union Congress 
Theodore had argued that
It was very essential, in the interests of the Movement, 
that they should have an objective that everyone knew 
the meaning of.... Some would declare socialisation was 
what the Party was always striving for - collective 
ownership - and others would hold differently....
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11. Witness the exchange between two Catholics at the 1921
Brisbane Conference of the A.L.P. over the efficacy of the 
proposed Councils of Action to combat war in the Pacific: 
Mr. Hannan (V.) supported the amendment. They 
could not object to fighting in their own country. 
That was in the fighting platform of their Party. If 
any policy was likely to bring about an international 
difference it was the objective of a White Australia.
Mr. Scullin: I don’t think so. The capitalist 
causes all war.
A.L.P, Ninth Commonwealth Conference Report, 1921, p.31.
250
Socialisation as advocated by some in Australia was 
control by the workers through a supreme economic 
council. They must not regard themselves as being 
under some obligation to swallow the recommendations 
of the Melbourne Congress holus bolus.^
Later, in a further attempt to urge the Conference to an
uncompromising stand against the radical notions of socialisation
advocated by the Trade Union Congress, he said
It is going to be the end of the Labour Movement....
Why not call it the Communist Party?... We do not want 
a decision on which one section can go out and say the 
old obsolete methods are discarded and henceforth they 
are standing as Communists and others go out and say 
they have simply carried an innocuous term called 
Socialism.^ 3
Theodore's argument foreshadowed the very situation that 
arose in the 1920s: either Labor was to revert to its nationalist, 
reformist, and electorally successful image of pre-war years, 
or it was to run the risk of being seen as foreign, revolutionary, 
and akin to Communism. The problem was that the trade union 
left saw itself as synthesising these two extremes, and in its 
continued pursuit of united front activities with the C.P.A. 
and affiliations with international working-class organisations 
including the R.I.L.U., the union movement was a constant source 
of embarrassment to politicians set on reviving the gradualist 
and pragmatic Labor traditions so close to the affections of 
the Australian electorate.
As a result election campaigns throughout the 1920s
saw the frequent disavowal of the socialist left of the labour
movement by aspiring A.L.P. politicians. "Those posing as
Labor's friends had created an adverse psychological effect
in the community by supporting foolish demonstrations, such
1 has those concerning Sacco and Vanzetti", declared J.B.Chifley, 
a young Labor candidate for Federal Parliament in late 1927.
Within twelve months Chifley was to demonstrate his own better 
understanding of community psychology by winning the N.S.W.
12. A.L.P. Ninth Commonwealth Conference Report, 1921, p .6.
13. Ibid.
14. W.W., Oct.21, 1927, p.4.
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country seat of Macquarie despite its strong reputation as
1 5a conservative and ’law and order’ constituency. Yet such
comments were mild indeed when compared with some of the full-
blooded attacks of J.T.Lang. Throughout the 1920s Lang
frequently joined issue with the C.P.A. and I.W.W. as ’elements
foreign to the true Labour Movement’ and delivered many an
outspoken attack on the Trades Hall reds and the union left.
As did the McCormack government in Queensland, Lang campaigned
for State office on purely reformist programmes which often
pointedly ignored the A.L.P’s socialisation objective, thus
drawing upon himself open attacks from the Labor Council of 
1 6N.S.W. And despite his post-1926 alliance with Garden and
the industrial unionists Lang continued to snipe at trade union
internationalism into the late 1920s. Following the breakup
of the C.C.P.-Kuomintang coalition in China Lang issued a
denunciation of those who had sought to promote a Hands off
China campaign in Australia throughout 1927, and declared such
efforts the work of a handful of Communists, and totally
repugnant to the Labor spirit. "When the Australian Labour
party is branded ’red’.... to serve squalid political ends",
Lang announced in January 1928,
certain propagandists are apparently prepared to hold 
their country up to scorn as a place to be shunned as 
a plague. And the sole excuse for this campaign of 
defamation is the fact that one or two prominent unionists 
(in a population of 6,000,000) have attended industrial 
conferences in foreign countries, and trade union councils 
have passed resolutions in sympathy with less fortunate 
workers abroad. On this thin foundation the people are 
asked to believe that Australian Labour is dominated by 
"reds" and is full political brother to foreign assassins 
and sanguinary revolutionaries. T say without hesitation 
that such implications are a vile slander on half our 
population, and a calculated insult to men like Mr. Charlton 
and myself, who have always advocated constitutional reform 
and the parliamentary form of Government.^
Politicians on the hustings however were one voice 
only of the A.L.P. Against these often ultra-nationalist
15. See L.F.Crisp, Ben Chifley (Melb., 1963), esp. pp.29-36.
16. W.W., May 15, 1925, p.1.
17. S.M.H., Jan.30, 1928, p.13.
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statements could frequently be set the official policy 
pronouncements of the A.L.P. as laid down by Labor Party 
Federal Conferences, many of which betrayed the unmistakeable 
influence of left-wing ideas in the melange of resolutions 
and decisions which marked each conference’s passing. As 
Labor’s political arm revived after the conscription split 
increasing pressure came to be applied also towards wide- 
ranging alterations to official A.L.P. policies in the direction 
desired by the politicians.
The high tide of socialism and internationalism in 
the A.L.P. had been reached at the 1918, 1919» and 1921 Federal 
Conferences of the Party. The Perth Conference of 1918 welcomed 
the Russian Revolution as a portent of socialist change, called 
for an international peace conference to discuss ways of ending 
the Great War, and stressed the need for convening concurrently 
an international labour conference to ensure an adequate voice 
for working-class organisations in peace discussions and to
form the basis for positive action on the part of the workers
1 8to prevent future wars. The Eighth (1919) Commonwealth
Conference followed up earlier A.L.P. greetings to the Russian
Revolution with a protest against Allied intervention in that
country’s internal affairs. After hearing T.J.Ryan's report
ofon his attendance at the Berne-Amsterdam meetings/^the Socialist 
International the Conference also instructed the Federal Executive 
to arrange for A.L.P. representation at future conferences, and 
went so far as to revise the A.L.P’s objective to include "The
maintenance and extension of fraternal relations with the
1 9Labour organisations of all countries”. However the 1919 
objective was quickly superseded by the 1921 objective with 
its concentration on achieving socialism in Australia, and 
although the 1921 Conference of the A.L.P. endorsed the plan 
for the setting up of Councils of Action throughout the Pacific 
area nothing specific was included as to the role of the Labor 
Party in organising this movement. In partial recognition of
18. A.L.P. Seventh Commonwealth Conference Report, 1918, esp. 
pp. 8-14.
19. Ibid., 1919, pp.68-9.
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this fact, and following- the Council of Action's virtual
demise, the 1924 Conference of the A.L.P. reiterated the
belief that only the working class could prevent future wars
and it instructed the Federal Executive to take active measures
in the promotion of a pan-Pacific anti-war organisation.
Yet the 1924 Federal Conference marked a turning
point in Labor attitudes to the question of internationalism
and overseas links. For despite the Conference's endorsement
of the pan-Pacific idea there was also a marked hardening of
opinion against Communism and a majority acceptance that such
extremist internationalism and revolutionary posturing was to
be openly eschewed and condemned by the A.L.P, Far more weight
was now given to the electoral impact of Conference policies,
and the politicians voiced loud and angry complaints at the
electoral liabilities that left-wing policies had forced them 
20to bear. By 1927 the A.L.P. Conference was so clearly in
the tow of the politicians that it discharged with as little
discussion as possible all items dealing with international
21labour relations, and modified the A.L.P's socialisation
objective with a facility that suggests a considerable measure
of agreement having been reached before formal debate was 
22resorted to.
An immensely important factor in the politicians' 
success in gaining control of the A.L.P. machine was the 
increased support given them in this period by the A.W.U.
In pre-war years the A.W.U. had traditionally provided union 
support for the right wing of the A.L.P., and it maintained 
a close alliance with Labor parliamentarians, many of whom 
had served their apprenticeship to politics by achieving office 
in the A.W.U. The traditionally close and mutually beneficial 
relationship however had suffered somewhat in the period of 
industrial turmoil during World War One, and this had seriously 
weakened the right wing of the Labor Movement in the early 
post-war years.
20. See for example Ibid., 1924, p.35»
21. Ibid., 1927, p.27.
22. Ibid., p .21.
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Partly the division of right-wing forces in the
early 1920s was due to the fact that some sections of the
A.W.U. - notably in Queensland - had been affected by the
23radical ideas emanating from the socialist left. Even more
significant however in breaching the alliance between the
A.W.U. and the political leaders of the A.L.P. were the
manoeuvrings of J.Bailey, Secretary of the N.S.W. Branch of
the A.W.U. Bailey was an unscrupulous political buccaneer
who had assumed part control of the N.S.W. A.L.P. through the
Industrial Vigilance Committee following the conscription
split of 1916, and he sought to rule that party as his own
24personal political machine. In 1919 he had rallied support 
from parliamentarians and several of the more moderate unions 
to defeat a challenge to his control by Willis and Garden, but 
he emerged from this fracas with increased power by adroitly 
manoeuvring the socialist left outside the A.L.P., where some 
of them toyed for years with the I.S.L.P. and C.P.A. in the 
political wastelands of minority socialism. In 1921 Bailey 
once again sided with the politicians and supported Theodore 
in his opposition to the socialisation objective at the Brisbane 
Conference of the A.L.P. Yet already by this date N.S.W. 
politicians were restive under Bailey’s dictatorship and control 
over their affairs, and in late 1922 the Federal parliamentary 
leadership joined them in a bid to oust Bailey and initiate 
widespread reforms in the N.S.W. A.L.P. The ensuing bitter 
and complicated struggles set off a factional warfare which 
plagued the A.L.P. for the next several years, and as often 
as not saw Bailey in close alliance with the Trades Hall reds 
and C.P.A. as he sought to regain control of what had once 
been his own party machine. The net effect was to make impossible 
any really concerted effort by the right wing in the Labor Movement 
to exclude the left from the policy-making organs of the Labor Party.
23* For an account of the Queensland situation see E.M.Higgins:
"Queensland Labor: Trade Unionists versus Premiers", Historical 
Studies of Australia and New Zealand, V o l . 9 *  No.3 4 ,  pp.1 4 0 - 1 5 5 .  
2 4 .  For an account of some of the machinations of Bailey in N.S.W. 
labour politics see I.E.Young, Theodore His Life and Times 
(Syd., 1 9 7 1 )  esp. pp.5 1 - 9 0 .
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A dramatically changed situation emerged however
following the strong victory of the Seale-Willis-Lang alliance
in the N.S.W. A.L.P. in early 1927# Finding themselves locked
out of the Labor Party by what were promptly labelled the 'Red’
Rules of 1927 Bailey and his cohorts swung into a campaign
aimed at involving the Federal Labor Party in support of the
pretender Conroy Executive of the N.S.W. Party. And the theme
adopted by the N.S.W. A.W.U. in developing this elaborate ploy
was that the socialist left with its international links was
an unbearable electoral liability to the Federal A.L.P., and
the tool of a foreign plot to destroy the influence of the
established leadership and policies of the Australian labour
movement. Henceforward the A.W.U. spared no effort in alerting
the A.L.P. to the dangers the industrial left posed to its
2 *5hopes of achieving office in national politics.
ii. The ’Red* objective
From the time of the Brisbane A.L.P. Conference in 
October 1921 Labor politicians achieved some success in 
moderating the radicalism of the trade union congress decisions 
earlier that year. At the Brisbane Conference the moderate and 
right-wing forces clearly had the numbers, and although the 
socialisation proposals were endorsed they were also modified 
in a number of ways to make them more acceptable to the 
electorally conscious.
The Brisbane Conference rejected the trade union 
recommendations that socialisation be made an A.L.P. fighting 
platform in favour of making it a Labor ’objective’. This 
modification was recommended by a committee headed by Theodore 
and was ostensibly aimed at adopting the Melbourne proposals 
without actually abandoning the practical programmes and 
electoral promises of which the existing A.L.P. fighting 
platform was composed. At the same time the move made it
25. For the tone of the A.W.U. campaign see A.W., June 20, 1928, 
p.13; July 4, 1928, pp.1,11; July 18, 1928, p.1; July 25,
1928, p.1.
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possible to interpret socialisation as a long term goal
rather than as an immediate policy with which the politicians
would have to face the electorate. Theodore's recommendation
was challenged by the left wing. An amendment was moved that
the new socialisation policy be the A.L.P's fighting platform?^
However the left failed to save the day and finally Theodore's
proposal was approved by 21 votes to 11. The Conference later
cast further doubts on the applicability of the socialist
objective to real-life politics by adding, at Maurice Blackburn's
instigation, a public 'declaration' that
wherever private ownership is a means of exploitation 
it is opposed by the Party; but.... the Party does not 
seek to abolish private ownership even of any of the 
instruments of production where such instrument is 
utilised by its owner in a socially useful manner and 
without exploitation.
A second serious modification to the Melbourne 
proposals was the stress placed by the Brisbane Conference on 
'constitutional' implementation of the socialisation objective. 
This move was underlined by the explicit addition of the word 
constitutional to those congress proposals which insisted on 
the need to utilise both industrial and parliamentary 
machinery in achieving the goal of socialism. Far more 
significant however was the A.L.P's total rejection of the 
Council of Action as a partner in putting into operation the 
programme outlined by the trade union congress. The debate 
over the Council of Action was short, sharp and to the point.
A motion to have the Council admitted to the Brisbane 
Conference to take part in discussions, and a subsequent 
amendment that Council of Action members who were not A.L.P. 
delegates at least be allowed to address the conference, were 
both overwhelmingly defeated. The conference also rejected 
a move to have the Labor Party enter into negotiations with 
the Council of Action in order to carry out the Melbourne 
Congress's request that a scheme be devised which would allow 
the C.P.A. and other socialist parties to affiliate with the 
A.L.P.
26. A.L.P. Ninth Commonwealth Conference Report, 1921 > P •30.
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The most determined opposition to the A.L.P.’s
handling of the socialisation issue came from the New South
Wales radicals. Throughout 1921 and 1922 Garden and the Trades
Hall reds convened conferences attended by a number of left-
wing unions which called for unequivocal endorsement by the
Labor Party of all the Melbourne Congress decisions. In
June-July 1922 a second All-Australian Trade Union Congress
sat in Melbourne to consider the position and after some debate
adopted a compromise but clearly left-inclined resolution
£t^]hat this Congress, desiring a united working-class 
front in this country, reaffirms the industrial and 
political policy adopted by the June Congress of 1921 
J^ but^ l endorses , as far as it is consistent with this 
resolution, the work of the Brisbane Convention of 
October 1921 .... '
The congress also renewed the call for the A.L.P. to allow
affiliation of "all schools" of labour thought, endorsed the
Council of Action as the "governing body" of the trade union
movement, and granted the Council increased powers and an
expanded membership to include representatives from the two
2 8leading Trades Hall Councils in each State.
Labor politicians were loud and angry in reply to 
this further attempt to nudge them to the left. In Victoria 
the ex-M.L.A. Colonel R.A. Crouch attacked the 1921 socialist 
objective as 'communistic' and confidently called for a 
referendum of all A.L.P. members and affiliated unions to
29finally decide the issue of socialism for the Labor Party.  ^
Crouch's stand found some support amongst right-wing Victorian 
unionists and State politicians, but in the end nothing came 
of his suggestions. In N.S.W. however the A.W.U. (which had 
already refused to attend the 1922 Melbourne Trade Union 
Congress) joined with the politicians in blaming a State 
election defeat on the socialisation objective, and the N.S.W. 
branch of the A.L.P. refused to endorse the programme outlined 
by the 1921 Brisbane conference. These right-wing attempts 
at revisionism were repudiated by the 1924 Commonwealth
27. L .C ., July 6, 1922, p.5. (My underlining).
28. Ibid., Argus, July 3, 1922, p.7.
29. L.C., July 6, 1922, p .4.
258
Conference of the A.L.P. which ruled that the objective 
adopted by the Federal A.L.P. was binding on all members of 
the party. By this time however socialism was clearly not 
seen as an immediate practical issue, and given the continued 
disunity amongst trade unionists it was only a matter of time 
before the voice of the politicians would prevail.
A concerted campaign against the socialisation
objective began in Queensland in 1926. There the A.W.U. and
the politicians combined to exclude the militant A.R.U.
delegation led by T. Moroney and G. Rymer from the State Labor
Party convention, which subsequently carried by a narrow margin
a series of modifications to the ’methods' section of the Party
objective. These modifications included elimination of the
proposals for a Supreme Economic Council and for the
nationalisation of banking. They represented a considerable
victory for the politicians who had been under strong attack
from the conservative press for the allegedly Soviet character
of the A.L.P. objective. Nevertheless the modifications still
fell short of what the politicians had hoped for. As the
Queensland Premier W. McCormack explained to the convention,
he would have much preferred the complete abandonment of the
methods section of the objective unless it were recast in
terms more easily reconcilable with the reformist measures
which composed the actual A.L.P. fighting platform, and on
30which he fought for election to government office.
The alterations made to the Federal objective in 
1927 more closely reflected criticisms mounted by the 
politicians. Nominally the Objective of "socialisation of 
industry, production, distribution and exchange" was retained, 
but the Methods were now declared to be
(a) The constitutional utilisation of the Federal, State, 
and Municipal Government Parliamentary and administrative 
machinery;
(b) The extension of the scope and powers of the Commonwealth
30. For an account of the 1926 Southport Labour-in-Politics 
Convention see M.B. Cribb, Some Manifestations of 
Ideological Conflict Within the Labour Movement in 
Queensland (1924-1929) (B.A . Hons. thesis, Queensland 
Univ., 1964), esp. pp.61-3. The A.R.U. delegation was 
excluded from the convention when they announced that they 
were only signing the 'anti-Communist pledge' insisted on by 
the State Executive under protest. Earlier Moroney had been
excluded from standing for Labor Party pre-selection when he
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Bank until complete control of banking is in the hands of the people;
(c) The organisation and establishment of co-operative 
activities, in which the workers and other producers 
shall be trained in the management, responsibility and 
control of industry;
(d) The cultivation of Labour ideals and principles, 
and the development of the spirit of social service;
(e) The setting up of Labour research and Labour 
information bureaux and of Labour educational institutions;
(f) Progressive enactment of reform, as defined in the 
Labour Platform.31
The glaring omissions in this programme were all too plain to 
see. The first clause dropped all reference to the unions as 
having any part to play in achieving socialism and plumped 
exclusively for a parliamentary path for Labor to tred. The 
clauses which followed were an expansion of this approach, 
carefully avoiding any mention of the union movement at all.
The idea of a Supreme Economic Council went too, as did the 
worker control and guild socialist notions associated with it. 
And pervading the Methods was an assertion of the A.L.P.’s 
traditional self-sufficient reformism and repugnance of the 
overseas influences which had been so patently displayed in 
the original socialisation objective.
The changes predictably brought angry outcries from 
left-wing unionists, but they were considerably more muted than 
those which had greeted the original modifications to the 
objective in 1921. Then a prominent factor in debate was the 
serious possibility that major unions could break away 
completely from the A.L.P. if it did not accede in large measure 
at least to the Melbourne Congress’s decisions. By 1927 this 
danger was very remote. Years of disappointment and division 
had made inroads into left-wing expectations, and it was clear 
by now that there was no likelihood of rallying the working 
class away from the A.L.P. over its moderate approach to the 
socialisation issue. The politician’s grip on the Federal 
Conference machinery was also now quite unassailable and it 
was to remain so from this time on.
refused outright to sign such a pledge.
31. A.L.P. Eleventh Commonwealth Conference Report, 1927> p.21.
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iii. The A.L.P. and the C.P.A.
The idea of affiliating the C.P.A. to mainstream
Labor organisations had strong support at first in trade union
circles, but opinion changed in the course of the 1920s in
favour of keeping that party outside the A.L.P. Despite the
A.L.P?s rebuff in 1921 to the plan for affiliating the C.P.A.
through the Council of Action Communists were allowed to
enter the Labor Party for some years, and in the course of
complicated factional manoeuvring C.P.A. leaders were able to
assume easy entry to the State Conference of the N.S.W. A.L.P.
in 1923.^^ A.C. Willis’s ruling in their favour at that
conference also gave the C.P.A. a probationary affiliation 
33to the A.L.P. Their expulsion some four months later was
due very largely to the C.P.A's own foolish attacks on A.C. 
Willis, but it was also due to a mounting opposition from 
within the A.L.P. which Communism’s sudden 1923 successes 
had inspired. By 1924 the vagaries of Labor politics had 
detached from the politicians' lobby the powerful Bailey 
controlled N.S.W. A.W.U. whose bitterness at its defeat at 
the 1923 conference pressed it into an alliance of convenience
34with the C.P.A. But in the same process the C.P.A. had been
deserted by many of the radical unions and A.L.P. rank and 
file, who had decided that Communists had shown themselves 
not suited to affiliation with the mass political party of 
organised labour.
The movement from within the A.L.P. to expel the 
Communist Party was led by the N.S.W. parliamentary leader 
J.T. Lang and his deputy P.F. Loughlin. For Lang the C.P.A. 
was an electoral liability, and it was all the more resented 
because it had singled him out in its press for special
32. For an account of the events leading up to the 1923 N.S.W. 
A.L.P. Conference and the state of the various factions as 
a result of that conference see Round Table, Vol.XV, No.38» 
March 1923, PP.390-393.
33» For a discussion of Willis's ruling see D.W. Rawson,
The Organisation of the Australian Labor Party 1916—41 
(Ph .D .thesis', Me lb. Uni v . , 1934) , pp . 93-6 •
34. Though as usual Bailey proved an erratic and unreliable 
ally - see further on.
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35vituperation and attack. For Loughlin, a zealous Roman
Catholic, there was also a strong element of ideological
repugnance to Communist doctrines and he opposed the C.P.A.
26far beyond the call of electoral necessity. However the
factor which most swung A,L,P. opinion behind the campaign
for disaffiliation was a growing conviction that the C.P.A.
was irresponsible and disruptionist, and set upon pursuing
policies which could only lead to reverses in the Australian
context. This irresponsible attitude was clearly to be seen
in the C.P.A’s intervention in the affairs of the Miners’
Federation, which lost it the goodwill of A,C.Willis and the
leaders of N.S.W.’s most militant unions. But for many
A.L.P. members what was even more disquieting was the strong
Communist insistence on maintaining a separate party identity.
In the light of continued Communist assertions that affiliation
with the A.L.P. was only a step in the conversion of the working
class to support the C.P.A. many Labor Party members felt that
it was unwise to continue to harbour potential enemies within
their own ranks. Few were prepared to go as far as H.E.Boote,
who declared that those who wished to maintain the C.P.A. as
37a separate party were the slaves of ”a foreign master", but 
a feeling was widespread that the C.P.A. had been too over­
bearing in its demands upon Labor.
Thus when the Tenth Commonwealth Conference of the 
A.L.P. gathered in Melbourne in October 1924 attitudes had 
become clearly defined on the subject of Communism. In the 
vain hope of reversing their rebuff by the N.S.W. State 
Conference earlier in the year the C.P.A. sent a delegation 
to address the Conference, but they were not allowed to be 
heard. A South Australian Labor M.H.R. moved that Conference 
declare itself openly against the Communist Party, and the
35. For Lang’s complaints against Communism see Worker, June 6,
1923, p.9.36. For an account of Loughlin’s views and his role in promoting
the cause of anti-Communism in the A.L.P. see I.E.Young, Conflict 
Within the N.S.W. Labor Party esp. pp.118-123, 146, 175* See 
also P.F.Loughlin, 10 Reasons Why Labor Should Continue to 
Expose the Communist P a r t y (Syd.,1923)
37. Australian Worker, Oct.10, 1923, p.3.
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prevailing opinion was summed up by the Victorian trade
unionist E.A.Painter who declared that
The endeavor to introduce the Soviet system into Australia 
- or any other country that has advanced along the lines 
of evolution as we have done - is like an endeavor to 
transplant a hothouse plant into the Antarctic.38
After some discussion Theodore succeeded in persuading Conference
not only to reject C.P.A. affiliation but to prevent individual
Communists from joining the A.L.P., and by thirty votes to six
it was resolved that
The Conference declares itself against the affiliation of 
the Communist Party with the Australian Labor Party, and 
declares ineligible for membership avowed Communists.39
A direction laying down rules for the application of this 4odecision was then forwarded to all State branches of the A.L.P.
After the defeat of the C.P.A. and A.W.U. factions at
the 1924 State Conference of the N.S.W. A.L.P. the Lang-Loughlin
parliamentary coalition urged further action against Communism
and the Trades Hall reds. Moves were undertaken to refuse
A.L.P. affiliation to unions connected with the Labor Council
of N.S.W. and even to have Communists expelled from individual41trade unions. Attempts were made to interest the Federal
A.L.P. in joining in this anti-Communist crusade through State
politicians playing up the menace of the C.P.A. to the Labor
Movement and deliberately joining in the Bruce Government’s
criticisms of the A.L.P’s links with Communism during the course
42of the 1925 federal election campaign. However Willis and
other trade unionists would not accept such extreme measures
and continued to offer a united front in the trade unions to43the chastened C.P.A. Then, an increasingly confident Loughlin 
split the parliamentary ranks by challenging Lang for the leader­
ship of the N.S.W. A.L.P. This gave Willis the opportunity to 
bring together Lang and Garden in a mutually beneficial alliance:
38. A.L.P. Tenth Commonwealth Conference Report, 1924, p.39.
39. Ibid., p.38.
40. Ibid., p.42.
41. See Worker, Nov.25, 1925, p .5; Dec.2, 1925, p.3*
42. Labor Council of N.S.W. Report, 1925, pp.36-7.
43. A.W., Dec.2, 1925, P.3; D.T., Aug.25, 1924, p.5.
263 .
Lang was elected parliamentary leader by State Conference 
(instead of parliamentary caucus) which thus assured him 
the support he lacked amongst his politician colleagues; 
and in return for providing conference numbers the left-wing 
unionists obtained a pliant State parliamentary leader, and 
a breach in the ranks of the politicians arrayed against
44their socialist aims. Part of this arrangement appears to
have been an acceptance by Lang of left-wing control of all
State industrial affairs and in return a soft-pedalling by
the Trades Hall reds of the issue of C.P.A, affiliation to 
45the A.L.P.
However the attempt to dissociate the A.L.P. from 
Communism moved forward a further step when the 1927 Federal 
Conference excised all ideas of industrial unionism and 
syndicalism playing any role in establishing the Party's 
socialist objective. The reaction from the socialist left 
carne in 1928 when the N.S.W. Conference of the A.L.P. over­
whelmingly passed a motion moved by J. Kilburn that "the 
objectives of ... the Communist Party and the A.L.P......
4are identical in the matter of the socialisation of industry".
In reply to A.W.U. urgings that this contravened Labor Party
rules the new Federal President of the A.L.P. J.J. Kenneally
went so far as to assert that the 1924 Conference decisions
meant "Individual members of the A.L.P. are prohibited from
advocating the policy of the Communist Party"; needless to
say the N.S.W. A.L.P. begged to differ, and the issue was
referred to the 1930 Federal Conference of the A.L.P. This
Conference after debate came down in favour of Kenneally's
ruling. Furthermore, following the breakdown of the united
front by that date, there was a willingness even on the part
of the professed 'communists 1 of the N.S.W. A.L.P. to join din public corybmnat ion of the C.P.A. at the Conference, and
44. Connected with their acceptance of Lang was a growing 
realisation by left-wing unionists of the irrelevance of 
State parliaments in instituting full-scale socialism 
given the increasing predominance of the Federal govern­
ment in terms of consitutional powers arid financial control. 
See D.W. Rawson, The Organisation of the Australian Labor 
Party.
45. See [T. Wright;] 'C.E. Report for 1928', in Eighth Annual
Conference of C.P.A., Report (Syd., 1928), p .6.
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47there the issue was allowed to rest. After this any 
idea of affiliating the Communist Party faded completely 
as a serious issue in the A.L.P.
So within a decade of the formation of the C.P.A., 
its relations with the A.L.P. had moved through a sequence 
fairly typical of those between a minority ideologue grouping 
and the mass political party of the working class. Along with 
such bodies as the Australian Socialist League and the 
Victorian Socialist Party of pre-war years the C.P.A. had 
begun its history favourably placed to influence the mass 
Labor Party and to operate through it as a political force, 
but relinquished this role largely for reasons of doctrinal 
purity. This process was greatly hastened by the opposition 
that Communist claims had aroused within the A.L.P. and 
amongst sections of the Catholic community. And as had 
occurred with earlier left-wing withdrawals from the A.L.P. 
the break with the C.P.A. was followed by an intense campaign 
in favour of ’moderation* as right wing forces strove to make 
good the victory of traditional Laborism over more full-blown 
socialist ideas. Thus a distinctive party consciousness had 
been fostered in the A.L.P. in pace with C.P.A. attempts to 
compete with it in the political sphere. Such an enthusiasm 
for mainstream Laborist policies naturally rebounded against 
the socialism of the 1921 objective. Just like other 
Australians the average Laborite had come to believe that 
both extreme socialism and Communism were to be eschewed and 
were altogether too far beyond the pale.
46. S.M.H., April 10, 1928; Worker, April 11, 1928, p.l4.
47. See A.L.P. Twelfth Commonwealth Conference Report, 1930» 
pp.81-82; 88-89. According to Kilburn "the hostility 
between the Australian Labor party and the Communist 
Party was more correctly defined and bitter in New South 
Wales than anywhere else. He was going to advocate the 
common ownership of the means of life everywhere and at 
all times, but he was not going to advocate the policy 
of the Communist party....".
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iv, International affiliations of* the A.L.P.
The growing nationalist awareness and electoral 
consciousness which characterised A.L.P. domestic attitudes 
also found reflection in the pattern of Labor's international 
links. In pre-war years efforts to have the A.L.P. affiliate 
with the Second International had foundered on the failure of 
State Labor Party Executives to carry through Commonwealth 
Conference instructions on the matter. In the post-war period 
internationalist initiatives were too strong any longer to be
48ignored, but the newly established Federal Executive proved 
slow and inefficient in its affairs and was anyway little 
more favourably inclined to radicalism than its predecessors. 
Except briefly under E.J. Holloway's Presidency (1916-22) the 
Federal Executive looked almost exclusively to Labor's 
parliamentary spokesmen for guidance and provided machine 
support for the politicians' ideas. Thus pressures on the 
A.L.P. towards establishing links with overseas labour 
movements were often to some extent dissipated by Federal 
Executive inaction. And even when translated into effect 
internationalist ideas for the most part proved impractical, 
the experience of the A.L.P. in the international sphere 
being an important factor in the growth of isolationism.
Only the more electorally acceptable organisations such as 
the Commonwealth Labour Conferences and the League of Nations 
evoked any sustained enthusiasm at all.
A. The Labour and Socialist International
The A.L.P's links with the Labour and the 
Socialist International-1" came closest to fruition in the 
excited climate of opinion at the close of World War One.
In this period internationalist ideas had their widest appeal.
48. The Federal Executive of the A.L.P. was established in 
1915.
+ . That is the rump of the Second International which
incorporated the Two-and-a-Half International in 1923 
and was thereafter known by the above title. See p p .140 
144 of this thesis.
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For a large range of moderate and pacifist opinion socialism 
as a force on a world-wide scale was accepted as part of an 
evolving system of international arbitration which would 
eliminate warfare and outright aggression in disputes between 
nations; whilst even for the most solidly nationalist it 
offered a more desirable post-war model than the ideas of 
Imperial Federation touted by Australian conservatives as 
alternatives to internationalism. For all these reasons 
initial enthusiasm was high for the Labor Party to affiliate 
with the reviving International, but the difficulties proved 
insuperable and relations were allowed to fade.
Following the 1918 Perth Conference decision that
the A.L.P. should henceforth play an active role in the
international labour movement the Federal Executive appointed
Frank Anstey and T.J. Ryan to represent the Labor Party at
the Berne Conference of February 1919* Anstey at this time
was greatly influenced by the propaganda emanating from
Moscow concerning the Conference at Berne and refused to
attend on the grounds that he "did not desire to be connected
49with anything wrong". Consequently the sole representative
of the A.L.P. at the meetings aimed at reconstituting a 
socialist International was the Queensland Premier, who 
arrived at Berne too late to take part in its meetings, and 
after briefly participating in subsequent proceedings at 
Amsterdam had to cut short his stay there because of prior 
commitments in London.
Despite his brief attendance at Amsterdam Ryan 
succeeded in underlining many of the problems international 
representation posed for a party as divided as the A.L.P.
The Premier found it necessary to record Australia's opposi­
tion to the Berne Conference resolution on the League of 
Nations, which had included a recommendation for a strong 
super-national authority. He dissented from any such plan 
"which ... proposed to give power to the League of Nations
49. Anstey, Red Europe, p.xi
267
to interfere with domestic policy regarding the imposition
of tariffs, or, for example, with such a settled policy as
that of 'White Australia'"; and he made a point of explaining
to the Amsterdam Conference "the problem of the colored 
50races". Such practical Laborism offered poignant commentary
on hopes expressed at the 1918 Perth Conference that the
machinery of international arbitration could be expanded:
51"ultimately merging into a world-wide Parliament". Again,
the Queensland Premier supported the Amsterdam Conference's 
unanimous resolution in favour of exacting indemnity payments 
from Germany; this was in marked contrast with the Perth 
Conference decision that the A.L.P. would only continue to 
participate in recruiting contingent upon the Allies expres­
sing willingness to enter into peace negotiations on the 
basis of no annexations or penal indemnities. However the 
issues at stake were apparently not pursued within the A.L.P. 
and following Ryan's report on the Amsterdam meeting to the 
Eighth (1919) Commonwealth Conference a plan to have future 
international representatives elected by plebiscite was 
abandoned in favour of allowing the Federal Executive to 
continue to arrange delegations through visiting politicians, 
as had been done with Ryan.
However the Federal Executive's next attempt to 
arrange A.L.P. representation at the International proved 
abortive. Following a cabled request from the British Labour 
Party the new Queensland Premier E.G. Theodore (who had succee­
ded Ryan on the latter's move into Federal politics) was creden- 
tialled to represent the A.L.P. at the August 1920 meeting 
of the self-styled 'Second' International. Theodore agreed, 
but due to travel difficulties was unable to attend. By 
this time the disputes between the 'Second' and the Third 
Internationals had reached fever pitch and there was little 
interest in the A.L.P. pursuing the matter any further. For 
many radicals the right wing socialists attempting to resur-
50. A.L.P. Eighth Commonwealth Conference Report, 19^9» p.58. 
51• A.L.P. Seventh Commonwealth Conference Report, 1918, 
p . 1 1 .
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rect a 'Second* International appeared as apostates and 
traitors to working class unity, whilst even those Laborites 
whose outlook was very strongly opposed to Communism were 
repelled by the crusading zeal of the Europeans and naturally 
disposed to isolationism. Thus from the early 1920s the 
Federal Executive allowed representation at the L.S.I. to 
lapse and A.L.P. participation in the activities of the 
European labour movement became increasingly sporadic.
B. World Migration Congress
One European gathering to which the A.L.P. did 
send representatives was the World Migration Congress held 
in London in June 1926. Organised by the I.F.T.U. in close 
cooperation with the Labour and Socialist International the 
Congress aimed at elucidating a working class policy on the 
problems of post-war migration. Several earlier migration 
conferences had been held by the I.F.T.U. where only 
European labour had been present, and declarations in favour 
of free trade, labour mobility and suchlike 'internationalist' 
policies had been adopted; this time however strenuous 
efforts had been made to involve labour movements of 
recipient nations, and as well as the Europeans there were 
representatives of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Palestine, 
India and Mexico. The Australian representatives were the 
future Labor leader Dr. H.V. Evatt (then a newly elected 
member of the N.S.W. Legislative Assembly) and W.H. Kitson, 
a Labor member of the Legislative Council in Western 
Australia.
From the start the congress was divided into two 
irreconcilable camps: the emigrant countries on the one side,
the immigrant countries on the other. The Europeans stressed 
their adherence to 'internationalist' ideals arguing that 
'free circulation' of the working class was necessary to 
accord with such principles and that "the interests of a 
single country, a single labour group ... must be subordinated
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to the common interests of the workers of all lands".
The recipient countries naturally took a different view.
With equal felicity to the Europeans they laid the blame 
for immigration problems onto ’capitalism' and argued that 
the various forms of immigration restriction they favoured 
were also in the best interests of the working class as a 
whole: allowing a pace-setting role for the new countries
in the area of living standards to which the Europeans could 
aspire. The congress resulted in a series of mild resolutions 
restricted to minor administrative aspects of migration 
control on which both sides could agree, and the broader 
questions were referred to a committee which could submit 
its findings to a future congress; which in the event was 
never held.
Evatt and Kitson took the lead in manoeuvring the 
Congress into this impasse. Kitson argued the case for 
general immigration restrictions on the basis that under the 
existing capitalist system mass migration programmes 
inevitably led to exploitation of the working classes both 
of donor and recipient nations. Pointing to disputes between 
Japan and those Pacific countries (particularly the U.S.A., 
Canada and Hawaii) which had accepted immigrants from that 
nation Kitson and Evatt argued that in such population 
movements lay the seeds of racial conflict and possibly a 
future war. In a sophisticated defence of the White Australia 
policy Evatt commended it as a measure which could ensure no 
such race conflicts began in Australia. At the same time he 
argued that White Australia defended living standards by 
ensuring that those 'races' used to pre-industrial modes of 
existence and wage levels would not be allowed to undermine 
the achievements of more class conscious Australian workers.
52
52. See J.W. Brown, World Migration and Labour (Amsterdam, 
1926), p.383* This book includes a long report of the 
World Migration Congress on which my account is primarily 
based. Kitson and Evatt's joint report of the Congress 
is contained in the A.L.P, Eleventh Commonwealth Conference 
Report, 1927»
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Such arguments were not without weight, for earlier in 
1926 French and Belgian unions had attempted to restrict 
intra-European migration from Mediterranean countries on 
very similar grounds. Scandalised, but on the defensive, 
the major emigrant countries agreed to leave the drafting 
of any congress resolutions to a sub-committee on which both 
donors and recipients were equally represented. In his 
usual judicial manner Evatt stonewalled on the sub-committee, 
warning that the A.L.P. would reject any attempt to criticise 
or denigrate the White Australia policy. This stance 
inspired the labour movements of other recipient nations to 
be equally obdurate in defending measures of immigration 
restriction. To avoid a split the Europeans refrained from 
utilising their voting superiority to force a statement in 
favour of free migration, though there were many unhappy 
mutterings that a better result would have accrued from the 
congress if it had been restricted only to I.F.T.U. and 
L.S.I. members!
The World Migration Congress succeeded only in 
souring relations between the Australian and the European 
labour movements and ensuring that the A.L.P. would stand 
aloof from the L.S.I. To Australian Labor the European 
attempts to force acceptance of mass migration onto unwilling 
recipient labour movements seemed no more sensible than 
Comintern attempts to structure political activities after 
a narrow model founded on the experience of its promoters.
Both approaches were opposed to the obvious and practical, 
and totally ignored the Australian situation in favour of 
'principles' which on examination seemed no more defensible 
than those of the A.L.P. To the Europeans, on the other 
hand, the A.L.P. seemed to represent an unscrupulous, 
racialist and uncouth brand of labour monopoly, and many 
I.F.T.U. and L.S.I. members made it clear that any affiliation 
with those bodies would involve drastic modification of 
Australian labour's attitudes towards immigration restriction. 
Predictably the A.L.P. refused to consider affiliation on 
any such terms, and though R.S. Ross and John Curtin succeeded
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in carrying a motion at the 1930 Commonwealth Conference 
calling for renewed links to be established with the L.S.I., 
no action resulted. In the upshot it was another thirty 
five years before the A.L.P. finally affiliated with the 
successor to the Labour and Socialist International.
Nevertheless internationalist sentiment continued 
to be an influence in the Labor Party in the 1920s. For in 
the unions the tide ran strong towards participation in 
founding a pan-Pacific international, and this movement 
found its inevitable reflection in the A.L.P.
C. The Honolulu pan-Pacific Conference
In September 1925 the Federal Executive announced 
that it would at last act to convene a pan-Pacific conference 
along the lines requested by the A.L.P. Commonwealth Conference 
of 1924. Duly, in February 1926 - at the same time as
invitations were issued by the N.S.W. Labor Council for a 
pan-Pacific congress to be held in Sydney - the A.L.P. sent 
out invitations to labour organisations in the Pacific to 
attend a conference scheduled to be held in November at 
Honolulu. Thus there were two parallel and competing pan- 
Pacific movements emanating from Australia. The Sydney pan- 
Pacific meeting convened by the Labor Council of N.S.W. 
proved to be a disappointment, but nevertheless led on to 
the establishment of the P.P.T.U.S. in China in 1927. The 
A.L.P's endeavours on the other hand proved a complete 
failure, the Honolulu conference existing only in shadow and 
never in substance.
Whether it was the A.L.P. or the Labor Council 
which was more responsible for the competition in calling
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5 3a pan-Pacific conference in 1926 is difficult to determine, 
but the basis for this conflict is clear. In the eyes of 
the politician-dominated A.L.P. Executive the pan-Pacific 
concept was fraught with grave electoral dangers. In its 
original formulation at the 1921 trade union congress the 
project had the most radical overtones and counselled close 
alliance with labour movements overseas. Such working class 
internationalism posed an electoral threat on at least three 
counts: it meant the likelihood of having to cooperate 
formally in a united front with Communism, a course anathema 
to most politicians of the A.L.P.; it meant alliance with 
labour movements in countries such as China and India which 
might choose to threaten the hegemony of Great Britain and 
thus give offence to the advocates of Empire loyalty in 
Australia; and it also meant the possibility of negotiating 
with overseas labour movements over the question of White 
Australia. For such reasons the A.L.P. Executive had at 
first been unwilling to translate into action the pan-Pacific 
idea. For the very same reasons the Labor Party persevered 
with the projected Honolulu conference in opposition to the 
Labor Council’s plans, for it was considered that a 
conference held in Sydney under Garden’s auspices would 
inevitably prove detrimental to the interests of the A.L.P.
The overseas venue had first been suggested as a way of 
focussing the attention of other labour movements on the aims 
and objects of the pan-Pacific conference; Honolulu offered 
the added advantage of a conference for which the A.L.P. 
could establish terms of reference, but was far enough outside 
Australia for it to be repudiated should it get out of hand.
To the Labor Council of N.S.W. however the proposed 
Honolulu conference represented a deliberate diversion of the
33. In strict temporal sequence the A.L.P. invitations preceded 
those of the Labor Council by about one week. On the other 
hand the A.L.P. Executive had not announced its plans for 
a Honolulu conference until after the Labor Council of 
N.S.W. had already begun moves for a conference to be held 
in Australia and obtained endorsement of its plans from 
the Commonwealth Industrial Disputes Committee at its 
meeting in Adelaide in June 1923. Each organisation 
could justify its stance by its own lights.
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pan-Pacific concept. Its own Sydney conference was seen 
as laying the basis for the establishment of a militant pan- 
Pacific movement in direct line of descent from the Council 
of Action plan. Garden had from the start also perceived the 
possibilities of linking up the militant initiatives of the 
1921 trade union congress with the R.I.L.U.; and the P.P.T.U.S. 
programme announced by the 1927 Hankow Conference did at first 
appear to do fair justice to its Australian origins. Much 
to the chagrin of the A.L.P. this was to be the judgement 
also of a majority of trade unions and of the A.C.T.U.
Following the Federal Executive’s invitations to the
Honolulu conference several State branches of the A.L.P.
guaranteed to send delegates and to pay for their expenses,
but the response from other countries was discouraging.
Those overseas labour movements most interested in the proposal
were left-wing oriented and enthusiastic about the N.S.W.
Labor Council’s proposed conference (though even then not to
the point of ensuring delegates arrived in Sydney by the due
date). Some other labour movements displayed interest in the
pan-Pacific conference but were perplexed by the factional
origins of the competing A.L.P. and Labor Council proposals;
Important organisations such as the American Federation of
Labor and the official Japanese trade unions were openly
hostile to the scheme. In July 1926 the Federal Executive
announced that due to poor response the Honolulu conference
was postponed until early 1927* and assistance was sought
from the Institute of Pacific Relations in popularising the
55proposal amongst peace bodies overseas. Some replies were
54. For example the New Zealand Alliance of Labour wrote to 
the Melbourne T.H.C. protesting at the holding of two 
separate conferences. Following the failure of the A.L.P's 
pan-Pacific scheme the Alliance of Labour resolved to 
attend the Hankow Conference of 1927 but in the event 
affiliation with the P.P.T.U.S. was never carried into 
effect.
55. The Institute of Pacific Relations was an unofficial 
international body comprising academics and various groups 
and individuals organised "to study the conditions of the 
Pacific peoples, with a view to the improvement of their 
mutual relations". (See Campbell et al., op. cit., p.i).
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forthcoming to these renewed initiatives but the degree of
support was deemed inadequate and the project was abandoned.
Notwithstanding this failure the pan-Pacific
concept continued to find favour amongst many members of the
Labor Party. At the party’s Eleventh Commonwealth Conference
in 1927 motions criticising Federal Executive delaying tactics
and calling for a pan-Pacific conference to be convened in
56Australia appeared amongst the agenda items. In reply 
members of the Federal Executive claimed they had done 
everything possible to make the Honolulu conference a success. 
The matter was then left in the hands of the Federal Executive 
and no action resulted. In July 1928 the Melbourne T.H.C. 
endorsed a delegate to the Pan-Pacific Women's Conference at 
Honolulu and supported attempts to involve the A.L.P. in this 
move, but to no avail: the Federal Executive was antipathetic.
By this time too the majority of left-wing trade unions had 
swung behind the P.P.T.U.S.; and both the A.W.U. and the 
leading Labor politicians were solidly against making even a 
token gesture towards the pan-Pacific idea.
The A.L.P's handling of the pan-Pacific proposal 
well illustrates the attempts by the electorally conscious 
to manage and moderate radical initiatives in the area of 
party policy. Through control of the Federal Executive the 
politicians sought at first to delay implementation of 
Conference policy until eventually forced to compete with 
trade union initiatives over the issue. After this the 
members of the Federal Executive strove - possibly with 
genuine enough enthusiasm - to promote interest in a con­
ference to be held in a place of their own choosing and with 
acceptable terms of reference and organisational representa­
tion. As the Federal Secretary of the A.L.P. D.L.McNamara 
admitted to the Twelfth (1930) Commonwealth Conference of the
Following the inaugural conference of the I.P.R. in 
Honolulu in 1925 members of the Institute were in more 
or less regular contact with the A.L.P. Federal Executive. 
56. A.L.P. Eleventh Commonwealth Conference Report, 1927« p.27.
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party: MA few small Labor organisations were friendly to
£the pan-Pacific conference proposal^], but the organisations
which counted most, from Canada and the United States of
57America, witheld their support"; the Executive had no 
compunction in abandoning the project when those who ’counted 
most' stood aloof. In other words there had been a shift in 
emphasis in the A.L.P's pan-Pacific scheme away from simply 
establishing an anti-war movement towards ensuring that 
’recognised’ organisations were represented at any conference 
held.58
This redefinition of the pan-Pacific concept - 
paralleled as it was by the more successful attempts of the 
Labor Council of N.S.W. to associate the movement with the 
R.I.L.U.-created P.P.T.U.S. - was subtle, but very meaning­
ful. Beginning with the basic proposal for a pan-Pacific 
conference the R.I.L.U. hoped to lead labour movements which 
affiliated to the P.P.T.U.S. progressively leftwards. The 
Labor Party on the other hand wished to ensure that any pan- 
Pacific conference held under its auspices would not move 
beyond a straight-forward anti-war position or prove embarras­
sing to the A.L.P. Such self-imposed constraints doubtless 
inhibited efforts by the Federal Executive to organise the 
minority of labour organisations favourable to the pan-Pacific 
proposal into a movement which might later have proved capable 
of expansion. Such an attitude also helps explain the 
opposition of some erstwhile supporters of the pan-Pacific 
idea to its successful manifestation in the P.P.T.U.S. To 
many such moderate internationalists, as to most A.L.P. 
politicians from the very beginning, a position of isola­
tionism towards overseas labour movements seemed preferable 
to the Leninist-tinged P.P.T.U.S.
57• A.L.P. Twelfth Commonwealth Conference Report, 1930» 
p . 5 8 . (My underlining).
58. Ibid.
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D. The Commonwealth Labour Conferences
Greater perseverance was shown in the A.L.P's 
association with the Commonwealth Labour Conferences. These 
conferences gathered together labour and union organisations 
throughout the British Empire, including Canada, New Zealand, 
South Africa, Ireland, British Guiana, India, Palestine and 
Trinidad. Some representation was also afforded to the I.F.T.U. 
and the Labour and Socialist International. Part of J. Ramsay 
McDonald's attempts to develop closer relations between the 
labour movements of the Empire the conferences were sponsored 
on a triennial basis by the British Labour Party until McDonald 
abandoned ship in 1931» The A.L.P. was represented at each 
conference held. Muriel Heagney was credentialled by the Labor 
Party and the Melbourne T.H.C. to attend the founding con­
ference of 1925. A. Walker (the current delegate from the 
Australian unions to the I.L.O.) represented both the A.L.P. 
and the A.C.T.U. in 1928. While two delegates were present 
at the last conference in 1930: P.E. Coleman M.H.R. represen­
ting the A.L.P., and C. Crofts the A.C.T.U.
From the start the participating labour movements 
were deeply divided on many issues and it was decided that 
there would be no resolutions adopted which would bind 
constituent bodies to the pursuit of a given policy. As a 
result the conferences were restricted to consultation and 
exchange of information on subjects which included inter­
national labour legislation, social and industrial problems
of Great Britain and the various colonies, migration and
59racial problems, and inter-Commonwealth relations.
Both the 1925 and 1928 conferences were marked 
by heated debates over migration questions. As at the World 
Migration Congress the basic division was between donor and 
recipient nations: British Labour parliamentarians and union 
leaders berating the colonials for their 'selfish' attitudes 
in wanting to restrict immigration, the recipient nations 
stressing the precarious economic circumstances of their
59. See J. Price, The International Labour Movement 
(London, 19^5)» p.209.
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respective countries and stonily maintaining their rights
to oppose "any measure that might menace their standard of
living".^ Indian delegates were concerned to induce the
conferences to denounce South Africa for its treatment of
indentured nationals; Australian delegates were intent on
defending the White Australia policy from sundry attacks.
Failing to obtain support for their attitude towards South
Africa the Indian delegates staged a walkout from the 1928
Commonwealth Labour Conference; whilst the A.L.P. and the
labour movements from the other white dominions formed into
a solid anti-immigration bloc which ensured that despite the
heat of discussion no attempt would be made to tamper with
61White Australia.
The last Commonwealth Labour Conference of July 
1930 discussed in great detail problems of inter-Commonwealth 
relations and issues raised by the impact of world depression 
on Britain and the colonies. In accordance with a policy 
outlined the previous month by the Economic Council of the 
T.U.C. British union leaders and parliamentarians sought to 
convert the colonials to the notion of developing the 
Commonwealth as a 'mutual' benefit economic grouping with 
free trade amongst themselves but tariffs against outsiders. 
This would provide Britain comfortably with raw materials and 
foodstuffs and a preference market for manufacturers. Not 
surprisingly the idea made heavy weather at the Conference 
for like British proposals on migration it was not easily 
compatible with the interests of dominion labour movements, 
especially those with manufacturing industries of their own. 
The A.L.P. representative P.E. Coleman warned that any attempt 
to over-exploit the Empire would lead to Britain's ultimate 
decline. Crofts of the A.C.T.U. was rather less diplomatic 
and berated the British over their migration, tariff and 
fiscal policies. Reporting to the A.L.P. on the 1930 London 
conference Crofts noted that in the course of his speechifying
60. A. Walker: "Report on British Commonwealth Labor
Conference... ", in A.L.P. Twelfth Commonwealth Conference
Report 1930* pp.92-93»
61. Ibid.; [M.Heagney], First British Commonwealth Labour 
Conference Report.
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the British miners' leader A.J. Cook accused him of 
"advocating secession", whilst Prime Minister Ramsay 
McDonald closed the conference by remonstrating with Crofts 
for "having turned on the Mother Country". Crofts declared 
that he "had as courteously as possible stated Australia's 
position as viewed from the Labor standpoint".
Crofts's outburst at the 1930 Conference presaged 
an increasingly bellicose attitude by many A.L.P. members 
towards Britain. The Lang movement in N.S.W. with its 
slogan of repudiating interest payment to British bondholders, 
and the bias in favour of British manufacturers embodied in 
the 1932 Ottawa Imperial agreement on tariffs and trade 
(which incorporated ideas similar to those outlined in 1930 
by the Economic Council of the T.U.C.) both served to promote 
an intense suspicion of British motives in the minds of many 
members of the Labor Party. There was thus little enthusiasm 
in the 1930s for the A.L.P. to pursue any further its asso­
ciation with British Labour. In the event the opportunity 
did not arise, for following McDonald's desertion of the 
B.L.P. no more Commonwealth Labour Conferences were convened, 
and the idea lapsed completely until the revival of Common­
wealth labour links during World War Two.
Nevertheless throughout the 1920s the Commonwealth 
Labour Conferences had attracted considerable support, 
especially from prominent members of the A.L.P's parliamentary 
wing. The gatherings had initially appealed both to those 
hoping to foster a wider internationalism and to Empire 
loyalists; while even those with very grave reservations about 
Britain had accepted them as a forum from which to express a 
heartfelt viewpoint. And the conferences, despite the deep 
divisions between labour movements, had served to symbolise 
the growth of a new loose but friendly Commonwealth relation­
ship between constituents of the British Empire; a growth 
paralled by the changes at governmental level begun by the
62. P.E. Coleman and C. Crofts: "Report on British Common­
wealth Labor Conference...," in A.L.P. Thirteenth 
Commonwealth Conference Report 1931» p.44.
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Imperial Conference of 1926 and eventually embodied in 
the Statute of Westminster of 1931» For A.L.P. politicians 
such a concept of Australia's relations with the Empire 
offered at least the possibility of resolving the strong 
undercurrents of anti-imperialism in the party with the 
absolute electoral necessity of maintaining a broad Labor 
loyalty to Britain.
E. The League of Nations and the I.L.O.
Regarded at first with grave suspicion by many 
members of the labour movement the League of Nations and the 
I.L.O. won some increasing acceptance as the 1920s progressed. 
From the start working class internationalism within the 
A.L.P. had been intertwined with support for a system of 
international arbitration of disputes between nations. At 
first the League of Nations had been seen as inadequate for 
this task and hopes had rested on the reviving world socialist 
movement to make peace a reality. As time passed however 
quite a few began to place their faith in a League of Nations 
which for all its inadequacies seemed at least an existent 
body through which peaceful solutions to international 
disputes might be negotiated. In similar fashion the 
International Labour Office, which at first had been ignored, 
won increasing acceptance as a practical organisation which 
could achieve what the chimera of a world working class 
movement had proved incapable of doing.
Initial hostility to the League of Nations stemmed 
from a compound of Laborist and left-wing criticisms. T.J. 
Ryan's attacks on the League at the Amsterdam Socialist 
Conference in 1919 reflected the fears that such a 'capitalist' 
concept of world government brought to all sections of Labor.
At a time when Japan was promoting its budding imperialist 
policies through the League's mandate system and attempting 
to insert clauses of 'racial equality' into the League charter 
which looked suspiciously like attempts to force immigrants
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onto Pacific countries including Australia it is easy to 
understand A.L.P. and trade union apprehension. The League 
seemed in fact little more than a tool of the new and 
aggressive capitalist powers hell-bent on extending their 
empires and finding new pretexts for war. This view 
dovetailed closely with left-wing interpretations of the 
League such as that put forward by Frank Anstey when he
/T odismissed it completely as a league of victor imperialists.
Despite such suspicions sympathy for the general 
principles behind the League and pressures from within the 
A.L.P. for the institution of a system of international 
arbitration often led to expressions of support for some of 
the League’s activities. Increasingly too the moderation of 
League policies and its obvious lack of influence on world 
power politics were such as to inspire pity rather than fear. 
Thus many Labor spokesmen came increasingly to support League 
efforts towards disarmament and peace. At the height of the 
Chanak incident of 1922 Labor's Federal Parliamentary leader 
M. Charlton led the A.L.P. front bench in a concerted protest 
against rising defence expenditure which included accusations 
that the government was transgressing obligations to disarm
64which were encumbent on members of the League. After
attending the League of Nations as a member of the Australian
delegation in 1924 Charlton expressed regret that the League
had not been given a chance, and as time passed the League
entered increasingly into the firmament of Labor political
speeches as a force for world peace which was being circum-
65vented by capitalism and imperialism.
A slow process of endearment also operated in the 
case of the International Labour Office. Brainchild of the 
French patriot socialist Albert Thomas the I.L.O. was esta-
63. See for example Red Europe, p.187.
64. See P. Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939-1941 
(Canb., 1932), p .21.
63. See on p.330. Cf. Sawer, op. cit., p.287
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blished under the League of Nations Charter with the aims
of promoting labour legislation and improving conditions
of work throughout the world. After 1919 I.L.O. conferences
were held annually at Geneva with each country affiliated to
the League entitled to four delegates: two representing the
government, one representing employers, and one representing
the workers. Australian unions had been induced to take up
their representation at Geneva in 1923 in response to the
Bruce government's nomination of its own 'labour' delegates
66in lieu of a recognised trade union nominee. Despite this 
inauspicious beginning a number of union delegates to the 
early I.L.O. meetings including E.J. Holloway (1923) and 
John Curtin (1924) were enthusiastic as to the potentialities 
of the Geneva conferences. Others,such as the then President 
of the N.S.W. Labor Council J.A. Beasley (1926) were intensely 
critical of the weight accorded to government and employer 
representatives and of the I.L.O's failure to achieve 
spectacular results. Australian union representatives 
regularly participated in the attempts by the labour minority 
at I.L.O. conferences to have the credentials of the Italian 
fascisti delegates rejected. At the same time a majority of 
trade unionists came to believe that continued I.L.O. 
representation was worthwhile, if for no other reason than 
to deny the Bruce government the opportunity to promote its 
own nominees.
This attitude of critical but growing acceptance 
was sorely tested in 1928 when Australian union representation 
at the I.L.O. came under challenge from both the left and the 
right. Following trenchant criticism of the I.L.O. by Sydor 
Stoler in the Pan-Pacific Worker the Labor Council of N.S.W. 
moved to boycott the A.C.T.U. conducted ballot of Trades Hall
66. See Ch.4, fn.21. The Seamen's Union was represented at 
the second session of the I.L.O. at Geneva in 1920 which 
discussed conditions in the maritime industry throughout 
the world. The union however was dissatisfied with the 
results and the visit served only to increase unionist 
suspicion of the I.L.O. in the early 1920s.
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Councils to select a union nominee. At the same time the 
Bruce government responded to Stoler's articles by accusing 
the A.C.T.U. of insincerity and refused to issue an invita­
tion for a union representative to the 1929 I.L.O. meeting.
The Executive of the Melbourne T.H.C. was enraged at the 
situation (it was their turn to nominate) and pressed the 
A.C.T.U. to carry through the ballot, which in the event was 
won by H.C. Gibson, who proved acceptable to the Bruce 
government. Union representation at Geneva in 1929 was thus 
in the end ensured.
In 1930 the Secretary of the A.C.T.U. C. Crofts
represented unions at the I.L.O. together with the Labor
M.H.R. P.E. Coleman as Australian government representative.
By this time the A.C.T.U. had broken with those who counselled
opposition to the Geneva conferences on ideological grounds
and there was a much closer involvement of Australian Labor
both in League of Nations and I.L.O. activities. In the
years which followed A.C.T.U. and Labor leaders evinced
increasing enthusiasm for the I.L.O. as an organisation for
inaugurating practical internationalism in an evolutionary
67but 'realistic' way.
v. The Labor Party's world outlook
Thus by the late 1920s the A.L.P. had evolved an 
outlook much more in keeping with its populist and empirical 
traditions than the doctrines of socialism. In domestic 
policy socialisation had hardly seriously been entertained 
by leading Labor politicians and the modifications to the 
party objective in 1927 had removed completely any likelihood 
that the A.L.P. would condone extra-parliamentary or revolu­
tionary methods. Socialism had once more become a long term 
goal definitely remote from electoral considerations. In
67. Crisp, op. cit., p.105
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foreign affairs and broader national questions more doubts 
remained, but a trend towards moderate and electorally 
acceptable policies was apparent. If it was left to the 
politicians there was little chance that Labor would greatly 
challenge the status-quo.
The rag-bag of domestic policies which A.L.P. 
politicians had come to champion bore a fair resemblance to 
the electoral programmes of pre-war years. White Australia 
held pride of place as of old, with the difference that it 
had merged now into complete opposition to all mass migration 
schemes while there was unemployment in Australia. Greater 
powers were sought for the Commonwealth Bank, on varying 
grounds according to audience, but mostly on the basis that
it should be a "People’s Bank” and "an important factor in...
68national development”, and rarely as a step towards 
socialisation. Protectionism through tariffs and assistance 
to primary and secondary industry was strongly pressed for 
also, both to provide employment and to develop Australia 
as a nation. Following the pro-unionist industrial 
legislation of the Lang government in N.S.W. (1925-27) 
similar measures were promised by the A.L.P. at a Federal 
level, a stance made electorally acceptable by the incessant 
anti-union tampering with arbitration procedures by the Bruce 
government. In addition the A.L.P. regularly proposed more 
social welfare measures, increased returned soldier benefits 
and unemployment insurance. Such, in broad outline, were 
the policies of national development and moderate reformism 
which characterised A.L.P. Federal election platforms.
Labor Party attitudes on foreign affairs and 
defence matters however were vague and tinged with isolationism.
68. Scullin, Labor Policy for the Commonwealth (1928), p.9
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Under Frank Tudor (Federal Labor leader from 1916 to his 
death in 1922) and his successor Matthew Charlton there had 
been much debate and great dispute over these subjects within 
the A.L.P., but little agreement was reached. By the time 
J.H. Scullin assumed leadership of the party in 1928 disputa­
tion had declined, but there remained only limited scope for 
the new parliamentary leader to elucidate policies which 
necessarily had to remain lacklustre and vague.
The immediate post-war ferment in the labour
movement and the rapidly changing international scene led
to a bewildering array of foreign policy attitudes amongst
Labor politicians. Outside the left-wing viewpoints described
in Chapter Three there were a plethora of more moderate
prescriptions as to the course of events and Australia's
allotted place in developments. To take two examples. On
a loan raising tour to London in March 1921 the Labor Premier
of N.S.W. John Storey assured British parliamentarians that
nothing had changed in the A.L.P's attitudes as a result of
World War One: "though we may have controversial discussions
upon the various questions that present themselves... there
is no genuine opposition to whatever we may do in consonance
with the desire to maintain our connection with the British 
69Empire". At almost the same time however the N.S.W. Labor
M.H.R. J.H. Catts was proposing that Australia break with
Britain in favour of a concept of white dominions led by "our
70great Pacific kith and kin - the United States of America"J 
In reaction to the proposed renewal of the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance Catts argued the absurdity of a possible clash 
between Australia and America for the sake of Britain's 
attempts to protect her Far Eastern possessions. Basing his 
arguments on A.L.P. planks opposed to Imperial Federation 
and denying the right of governments to commit Australians to 
overseas conflicts without recourse to a vote of the people
69. J. Storey, The Real Aims of Labour in Australia (London, 
1921), p.4.
70. J.H. Catts, The Imperial Conference (Melb., 1921), p.5«
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Catts warned against any idea "of embroiling j^Australia^ 
in Asiatic quarrels in opposition to the interests of our 
American cousins". Catts's view was undoubtedly close to 
the feeling of most A.L.P. members, combining a shrewd 
assessment of Australia's strategic interests with the acute 
suspicion bred of World War One that the British Empire was 
by its nature warlike and prone to involve the dominions in 
disputes in which their interests would be subsumed.
September 1922. The Chanak crisis had a dramatic
impact on Labor attitudes to Empire, apparently verifying
the left-wing critique of the inevitability of capitalist war
and the fears that Australia would be automatically involved
in any such hostilities through its continued links with
Britain. In the face of W.M. Hughes's sabre-rattling in
support of Britain, and his commitment of Australia to the
fight should war be declared on Turkey, labour organisations
ranging from the Council of Action to the Federal Parliamen-
71tary Labor Party issued calls for defiant opposition. As
with the Hands Off Russia agitation of 1919-20 there was a 
significant difference in the stance adopted by unionists 
and politicians, Charlton and other leading parliamentarians 
intent on stressing the folly of involvement from a nationa­
list rather than working class point of view. Yet the net 
effect on attitudes towards the Empire was the same: a wave 
of isolationist thinking swept throughout the Labor Movement, 
and the Imperial connection was openly denounced as too 
inflexible and warlike for the A.L.P. In the years which 
followed Labor spokesmen were prepared to challenge the links 
with Empire in a previously unheard of way.
In practical application this outlook laid primary 
stress on domestic affairs and sought to ignore the power 
political setting in which Australia as a nation had perforce
71. See All-Australian Trade Union Congress. Council of
Action Report and Manifesto. October 1st, 1922; M. Perks, 
Foreign and Defence Policies and Policy Making in the 
Australian Labor parties, 1 9 1 6 - 3 0 (M.A.thesis, A.N.U.,
197M  > p .255 ff.
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to operate. When the Bruce government initiated a debate
in parliament on the results of the Imperial Conference of
1923 Charlton declared that it was wasting the time of the
House, which could better occupy itself with local issues.
The A.L.P. also rejected the Singapore base strategy decided
on at the Imperial Conference and later applauded the
decision of the short-lived McDonald Labour government in
72Britain not to proceed with this plan. Federal Labor
leaders also joined in the Hands Off China agitations in 
1925 and 1927> some - like the Deputy Leader of the Party, 
Frank Aiistey - on the basis of working class internationalism, 
but most in the professed belief that Australia's interests 
simply were not involved. Pervading A.L.P. parliamentary 
speeches on all these questions was a notion that Australian 
affairs could somehow be portrayed as distinct and removed 
from developments overseas. This was the essence of Labor 
isolationism.
By its own lights however such a stance was 
curiously irresponsible and escapist, for it was not based 
on any rational calculation as to Australia's national 
interests, but on an emotional rejection of the limitations 
of the world polity on A.L.P. principles and ideals.
Australia was a small power in a hostile environment and its 
links with the Empire at least offorded it the security of 
the British navy in time of war. What then could replace 
this security? Labor evolved no clear or generally agreed 
upon answer. Some of the more far sighted politicians 
sought to induce the A.L.P. to accept a large-scale defence 
platform in the direction of a 'Fortress Australia' idea; 
some few others placed their faith in the variants of 
internationalism emanating from the left. When all such 
efforts towards developing a distinctive foreign policy 
failed there was little choice but for the more responsible
72. A.L.P. Federal Parliamentary Caucus Minutes, Mar.25,
1924. The British Labour government thought to abandon 
the Singapore base as a gesture to disarmament.
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to move back to a broad acceptance of the inevitability 
of continued Imperial links.
The Fortress Australia idea was given its fullest 
expression in the defence platform adopted by the 1924 
Commonwealth Conference of the A.L.P. The constraints 
imposed upon this idea were considerable, feeling in the 
A.L.P. precluding compulsory military training and inhibiting 
even tactical movements of troops beyond Australian shores.
The parameters for the Fortress Australia concept were 
explicitly laid down in the party ’defence’ planks adopted 
in 1919 specifying amongst other things abandonment of all 
’’compulsory training and service" and no participation "in 
any future over-seas war, except by a decision of the people". 
These twin anti-militarist provisions remained unchallenged 
assumptions behind all A.L.P. defence thinking up to the 
second world war. Nevertheless the 1924 Conference adopted 
a proposal moved by the N.S.W. M.H.R. A, Blakeley and seconded 
by Maurice Blackburn that modified the A.L.P. platform to 
provide for "adequate home defence against possible foreign 
aggression" and went on to prescribe a number of specific 
measures to achieve this end. The measures stressed the 
need to pattern Australian industrial development along lines 
which would allow ready conversion to wartime production and 
usefulness, and concentration on air power and submarines as 
the basic defence forces suitable to defending the country. 
This was a development of a theme exploited endlessly by 
A.L.P. politicians throughout the inter-war years to the 
effect that improving aerial and submarine weapons systems 
were rendering the British Navy redundant. It was, one 
suspects, an argument based not so much on acquaintance with 
any demonstrated technological developments as on the simple 
fact that it was the only possible system of defence 
imaginable which could dispense with conscription and
73operate independently of British Imperial forces.
73. For a sensible discussion of these matters see P.G.
McCarthy: "The A.L.P. and the Armed Services: Theory and
Practice 1919-1949", in Labour History, No.25, November
1973, p p .58-67.
288
Even so the defence policy adopted in 1924
scandalised the radicals on Labor's left, who mounted a
campaign to repudiate such militarist proposals. R,S.
Ross denounced the new platform as an election gimmick
"permitting almost anything in the way of preparedness for 
74war". At the 1925 Conference of the Victorian A.L.P.
socialist and pacifist forces combined to pass a motion
protesting "against the elaborate defence scheme outlined
by the Interstate Conference" and insisting that the Federal
Executive take immediate steps to convene the Pan-Pacific
Congress as an alternative to such a militarist approach to
75the question of war. Similar protests were registered at 
branch level in other States and the A.L.P's new defence 
platform helped convince many unionists to support the N.S.W. 
Labor Council proposals for independent trade union initiatives 
on the pan-Pacific proposal. In the face of such reactions 
in 1927 the A.L.P. Conference abandoned the explicit defence 
provisions of 1924, retaining only the statement in favour 
of "adequate home defence..." appended to the anti-militarist 
planks of 1919» ^
The radical alternative to the Fortress Australia 
plan was the Pan-Pacific Conference which was envisaged as 
providing security against war in a way more congruent with 
working class principles. The course of this idea has already 
been traced above. Initiated by the Federal Executive only 
under extreme pressure the pan-Pacific idea faced constraints 
similar to those which inhibited Fortress Australia. At one 
level the constraints were imposed by the politically conscious 
who were unwilling to translate radical ideas into effect.
In a broader perspective however it is also clear that the 
judgement of the politicians and the Federal Executive as to 
the overall viability of the pan-Pacific project was correct.
74. Cited in Perks, op. cit., p.267.
75. A.L.P., State of Victoria, Annual Conference Minutes, 
April 11, 1925.
76. A.L.P. Eleventh Commonwealth Conference Report, 1927*
p . 26.
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Without the cooperation of the Japanese and American labour 
movements a pan-Pacific conference could provide no regional 
security for Australians. And if the project was to proceed 
without such participation and take on the distinctly anti­
imperialist complexion that the P.P.T.U.S. assumed then it 
not only failed to provide regional security but undermined 
that which already existed through the Imperial connection. 
Added to the P.P.T.U.S's electoral repercussions such 
considerations ensured that there would be a drawing back 
from internationalism on the part of the A.L.P. and that the 
pan-Pacific project would be firmly eschewed.
So Labor had come to an impasse over questions 
concerning foreign affairs. Its torpor was not, as is 
sometimes supposed, a 'natural* reflection of the views of 
dull ('parochial') working men set in an environment remote 
from the centre of world developments. Rather it was a 
reflection of the strength of diverging nationalist and 
internationalist forces in the A.L.P. and pressures from the 
electoral and international environment in which the party 
had to operate.
Labor isolationism, then, was in its political 
manifestations essentially a coping strategy directed at 
reconciling the diverse pressures exerted on the A.L.P.
First applied to the Imperial connection under pressure of 
post-war enthusiasm for internationalism and more especially 
the sudden Chanak crisis, isolationism had been adopted as a 
defence against the implications of the links with Britain. 
Attempts to move beyond the isolationist stance towards a 
more rationally based policy on foreign affairs foundered on 
the opposition of bodies of opinion within the party to whom 
the rival schemes of Fortress Australia and the Pan-Pacific 
Conference were anathema. At the same time whilever isola­
tionism remained dominant in Labor policy there was little 
hope of capturing mainstream Australian nationalist 
aspirations. This fact was fully recognised in the late 
1920s by the new leader of the Federal Parliamentary Labor 
Party J.H. Scullin. Following his election as leader of the
party in April 1928 Labor began a faltering, slow but 
fairly distinct movement away from the isolationism which 
had characterised the A.L.P. under Charlton towards a tacit 
accommodation with majority Australian attitudes on issues 
of external affairs. Labor under Scullin came to stress 
that it accepted the Imperial connection and the League of 
Nations as existent reality and would seek to work within 
those realities. Such a view (often vaguely put)'' was a 
compound of pacifism without radicalism, eschewing working 
class internationalism but insisting that by maintaining and 
strengthening Australia's links with the British Empire 
('Commonwealth') and the League of Nations it would be 
possible to exert pressure towards peace and disarmament. 
Australian electors could at least believe that this outlook 
possessed some of the basic elements of common sense logic.
In his own personal metamorphosis James Henry
Scullin well demonstrated the conflicts between radical and
reformer, unionist and politician. Born a Catholic to devout
Irish parents he had first entered Federal parliament in 1910
but lost his seat three years on. In the years which followed
he developed a reputation as a labour journalist and was
prominent in the affairs of the A.W.U., on whose patronage he
was able to rely. During the conscription campaigns and the
period of post-war unrest iron had entered into his soul and
he had turned hard against the British, whom he blamed for
7 8Ireland's woes. He had believed then in the radical
appraisal of the trend in world affairs and at the 1921 All- 
Australian Trade Union Congress it was Scullin who moved the 
report of the ways and means committee, stressing in his
77. See the pamphlet Militarism or Peace in the collection 
of Labor's Federal Election Campaign Literature 1928, 
in A.N.L.
78. For his attitude towards the Irish question see J.H.
Scullin, A Nation's Agony. The Labor View of the Irish 
Question (Ballarat, 1921).
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speech the importance of the proposed Supreme Economic
Council - "which will really take the place of our
79Parliaments of to-day". The following year he was elected 
M.H.R. for the Victorian seat of Yarra and began his trek 
away from the left. Disillusioned by the factional struggles 
which had broken out amongst Republican forces in Ireland as 
the 1920s progressed, Scullin came to see the local left as 
similary disruptive, and gradually put aside the hopes for 
socialism which he had once held so high. Instead he came 
to champion solid practical reformism and developed a 
reputation as a hard-line moderate in attempts to curtail 
the influence on the A.L.P. of trade union radicals.
At another level the British grant of dominion status and 
self-determination to Southern Ireland had slowly reconciled 
Scullin to the new emerging concept of a Commonwealth of 
Nations, and he looked favourably on the independent status 
accorded members of the British Empire. This view of Empire 
came to be increasingly accepted by the Labor Party as the 
scars of the Chanak affair healed and electoral pressure 
towards conformity increased with every step which brought 
the party nearer to government.
Scullin's luck was in, for the November 1928 
elections showed solid Labor gains, enhancing the prestige 
of the new leader and ensuring party solidarity in anticipa­
tion of assuming government. From this time onwards Labor 
witnessed the novel phenomenon of its parliamentary opponents 
in open disarray, the Bruce-Page government collapsing in 
September 1929 to face the electorate with an erudite argument 
in favour of abolishing Federal arbitration in a climate of 
opinion in which no government could win.
79. All-Australian Trade Union Congress Report, 1921, p.9
CHAPTER SIX
COMMUNIST INTERNATIONALISM AND LABOR ISOLATIONISM 1930-32
Effective resistance to the capitalist 
offensive can be prepared and carried to a 
successful conclusion only on the basis of 
the united front of the working class. Such 
unity cannot be achieved by entering into 
agreements with the traitorous officials.
It can only be achieved on the basis of the 
united front from below, which excludes the 
trade union bureaucracy from leadership.*
In 1930 the whole political and economic climate 
in Australia changed most sharply. At the end of 1929 the 
A.L.P. was elected to power in the Commonwealth with a 
majority of seats in the House of Representatives, but with 
a hostile Senate which ensured Labor enjoyed office but little 
real power. At precisely the same time the world economic 
depression hit Australia in full force and the prosperity of 
the 1920s disappeared completely. Unemployment, which had 
been steadily increasing since 1928, now reached crisis 
proportions, with almost 15 per cent of trade unionists 
unemployed in early 1930» rising to over 23 per cent of the 
total work force being thrown out of work before the Scullin 
government fell in late 1931. The Labor government's fate 
was integrally tied up in this coincidence of achieving 
office at a time of acute economic downturn. Australians 
of every political persuasion came to judge it primarily on 
the basis of how it faced up to the problems that the Great 
Depression brought in train.
* 'Herbert Moore': "The Meaning of 'Niemeyerism'", in
P.P.W., Jan.5, 1931, P •5.
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Trade unionists were the first section of the 
labour movement to feel the brunt of unemployment, and as 
the full impact of world depression hit Australia it found 
the unions already on the run from three great strike 
battles which had been fought and lost in the late 1920s.
The battles had begun in September 1928 with a rank and file 
watersider's strike against the Beeby arbitration award; the 
drama of this battle had not faded before it was overshadowed 
by an even more militant timber workers' strike against 
Justice Lukin's award ending their 44-hour week; then came 
also an equally bitter struggle spreading over the coalfields 
of northern N.S.W., following a lockout of miners who had 
refused to accept a wage reduction of 12^ per cent. Hard 
fought throughout by the rank and file, and with increasingly 
militant union leadership of the struggles, the results were 
nevertheless most uninspiring and sapping of morale. The 
watersiders were cowed into submission; the timber workers' 
union broken so badly as to never properly recover; and the 
miners totally and bitterly alienated from the rest of 
Australiern society, an alienation later to be compounded by 
the Scullin government's refusal to carry out an election 
pledge to reopen the mines. The lesson which the whole union 
movement drew from these disputes was the urgent need for 
political action in an attempt to reverse or at least to 
ameliorate the capitalist offensive against conditions. 
Sectional militancy had clearly proven no match for the 
capitalist onslaught; a general industrial confrontation was 
ruled out as impractical; and trade unionists, with their 
resources depleted and under increasing pressure from 
economic forces which they could do little to counter through 
industrial effort, turned to the Labor government for relief.
The depression however had a devastating effect 
on the Scullin government which proved to be a great 
disappointment to the trade union movement. Almost devoid 
of radical ideas the Scullin ministry was dedicated to 
respectability and allowed its initiatives towards changing 
the state of industrial relations to fade in the face of an 
aggressive Senate. Scullin and his ministers called for
294.
unity of the labour movement and obtained it, but the 
problems of unemployment became still worse. They called 
for patience and understanding of their problems, yet the 
longer the unions waited the less the government seemed to 
achieve. They made no attempt to promote the A.L.P's 
socialist objective as an answer to the problems which the 
Great Depression posed, and sought to carry out their 
obligations to the working class and the victims of the 
depression by compromise and negotiation, in the belief that 
it was better to so ameliorate their lot than to face the 
electorate on a record so poor. This meant that Labor sought 
only to administer the capitalist state in the time of its 
greatest crisis and eschewed proposals for radical change. 
Demoralisation and disintegration resulted, and the last year 
of the Scullin government saw factionalism rampant and finally 
triumphant. Some amongst the right wing of the parliamentary 
Labor party took the logical step of crossing to the other 
side of the House and forming a United Australia Party much 
more efficiently to rationalise industry and bring about those 
economic reforms which it was thought would make Australia 
cope better with the Great Depression within the ambit of the 
capitalist system. At the same time from N.S.W. came a 
forceful challenge from the Lang-led Labor Party to adopt far 
more radical and truculent policies in the face of the 
depression; and to make this criticism crystal clear in March 
1931 a separate pro-Lang caucus formed in Federal Parliament. 
It was the Lang Federal caucus which finally brought an end 
to the Scullin government by combining with the Opposition 
to vote down the F.P.L.P. in November 1931•
The role of the socialist left in this period of 
acute crisis was neither coherent or distinguished. In some 
States - notably in N.S.W. and to a lesser extent Victoria - 
strong movements were launched to make the A.L.P. live up to 
its socialist objective and to advocate the replacement of 
capitalism with another social system guaranteeing security, 
equality and freedom from the depravations that capitalism in 
crisis had inflicted on Australia, At another level the
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radical left was a force behind the Lang phenomenon in 
N.S.W. which mixed socialist policies with extremist 
rhetoric and the traditional populist appeal of an able 
Labor politician. Yet in all these moves there was a marked 
ideological confusion and a lack of conviction that reflected 
the acute division and disunity in labour's left wing.
For adding to the problems of depression politics, 
in 1930 the Comintern's third period hit the labour left with 
a vengeance, making unity and concerted socialist initiative 
impossible. In this process the mainstream left totally lost 
the sense of purpose and international unity which in the 
difficult years of the 1920s it had attempted to sustain.
The C.P.A. fought with every means at its disposal to assert 
itself as the only voice of militancy and class conscious 
internationalism in opposition to all other segments of 
labour. In so doing it framed fighting policies which the 
unemployed could follow, and which the official union movement 
tended to overlook; but at the same time it did not succeed 
in moving the mass of workers forward, but only in hindering 
the growth of radicalism within the organised labour movement.
i. The C.P.A. under new leaders
The Ninth Conference of the C.P.A. in December 
1929 declared its complete agreement with the third period 
policies of the Comintern. The Conference declared its most 
emphatic belief that
Australian capitalism reflects in all its main aspects 
the general situation of world capitalism in the present 
period, which is marked by an increasing accentuation of 
all the contradictions of imperialism leading inevitably 
to new imperialist wars, an intensification of the class 
struggle, and an upward surge of the revolutionary 
movements against imperialism in the colonial and semi­
colonial countries.^
1 . W, W Jan.10, 1930, p.3
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Henceforth the Australian situation had to be interpreted 
by all C.P.A. members through the prism of the officially 
announced Comintern theory of the third period in world 
capitalism, and the policy of cooperating with other groups 
in the labour movement, now branded as ’exceptionalism', was 
decisively abandoned.
As a result the C.P.A. throughout 1930 began to 
differentiate itself from all other political parties more 
clearly than ever before. The C.P.A. formulated radical 
and revolutionary policies on a wide range of issues and 
Communists publicised a view of the world based on the new 
line of the Comintern in its most doctrinaire application to 
Australia.
The central assumption of the new line of the 
Communist Party was that the Great Depression meant the 
final collapse of capitalism, which could henceforth only 
save itself by resort to imperialist war. Thus the 
radicalisation of the masses in the course of time was 
assured; it was the primary task of Communists to ensure that 
they were theoretically and organisationally equipped to take 
advantage of the revolutionary situation in Australia which 
would inevitably occur. The envisaged revolutionary situation 
was seen in terms of a rigid model as laid down by the 
Comintern, and paid scant regard to the complexities of 
Australian conditions. The Comintern had laid down that in 
the period of capitalist collapse the parties of the 
bourgeoisie would lose the support of the masses who would 
turn increasingly to the left as they began the radicalisation 
which would eventually lead them to the C.P.A. All other 
working-class parties, the Comintern predicted, would simply 
keep alive amongst the masses the illusion that reform within 
the capitalist system was possible and discourage them from 
overthrowing it. They would also, according to the Comintern 
prescription, collaborate in bourgeois manoeuvrings designed 
to lead the masses into imperialist wars. On this line of 
reasoning the C.P.A. launched an attack on all other socialists
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accusing them - often on the slightest and most unconvincing
evidence - of the most heinous crimes and intentions, and
ruthlessly perverting reality in pursuit of the sectarian
purity that the third period vision of the Comintern 
2prescribed.
The principal aim of C.P.A. propaganda was to link
the Labor Party and trade unions with capitalism so as the
more quickly to discredit labour leaders in the eyes of the
working class. Thus all aspects of Labor policy were derided
as capitalistic ploys. A.L.P. and trade union support for
arbitration in industrial disputes was alleged to be a
deliberate act of treachery and connivance in a plot to bring
down wages. Support or even equivocation towards the White
Australia policy was portrayed as support for imperialism,
which in an unspecified way was alleged to be utilising that
3policy in suppressing colonial revolts. Typically, C.P.A. 
third period propaganda pretended that such a complete 
rejection of the established policies of the labour movement 
was nevertheless in keeping with working class aspirations. 
White Australia, compromise and arbitration were labelled as 
policies with appeal only to the 'social fascist' trade union 
leaders. In C.P.A. jargon a 'united front' was still 
extended to the trade union rank and file. In fact however 
this was a mere play on words, and little scope was allowed 
to anyone who would not toe the Communist line.
To assist the new line C.P.A. in assuming 
leadership of the revolutionary situation which was predicted 
for Australia a number of Communist front organisations were 
set up in 1930» Some of these 'mass' bodies were entirely 
new, such as the Unemployed Workers' Movement, which was 
designed to enrol and educate those thrown out of work by the 
depression. Others, such as the Militant Minority Movement 
- which aimed at enrolling militant trade unionists in its
2. For a full outline of the Comintern's third period theory
and its application to the Australian situation see'Herbert 
Moore,' Australia's Part in the World Revolution (Syd. , 
1930); Australia and the World Crisis (Syd. , i"93l)*
3. W.W. , Feb.14, 1930, p .3» Australia's Part in the World
Revolution, pp.38-39*
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ranks - had been founded by the C.P.A. in earlier years 
but had been neglected or had proved unsuccessful. All of 
them attempted to increase C.P.A. influence through an 
organised Communist ’fraction* working within bodies 
ostensibly dedicated to promoting specific causes which 
could draw in members who were prepared to rub shoulders 
with Communists because of their commitment to that issue.
In addition to the U.W.M. and M.M.M. there was the League 
Against Imperialism which was aimed at opposing colonialism 
and imperial exploitation in all its forms, and the Friends 
of the Soviet Union - an organisation promoting cultural 
interchange and friendly relations between Australians and 
Russians. 'Hands Off India’ and 'Hands Off China' Committees 
were also formed to attract those who were desirous of 
preventing imperialist intervention against the forces of 
unrest in those countries. Through some swift fraction work 
and lobbying of parent Comintern-controlled organisations the 
C.P.A. was also able to obtain control of the I.C.W.P.A., the 
W.I.R. and I.L.D., which had all previously been largely in 
the hands of the Trades Hall reds and sundry militant 
unionists.^
The new line C.P.A. inspired considerable 
enthusiasm and idealism amongst the party rank and file.
Many C.P.A. members who had been resentful and confused at 
the compromises of the Garden and Kavanagh leaderships now 
saw the world prismatic clear in the light third period 
Communism provided. Free of the restrictions imposed by 
alliances with union and Labor leaders these C.P.A. members 
threw themselves into a frenzy of activity in preparation for 
a revolutionary situation which at last the party accepted 
as nigh. From the start too new recruits were forthcoming 
from the coalmining districts of N.S.W. and from the mounting 
unemployed. To such groups the Scullin government, and the 
equally moderate Labor regimes in Victoria, South Australia
4. For discussion of the party work involved in wresting
control of these organisations from the Trades Hall reds 
see W.W., Mar.21, 1930, p.4; Mar.28, 1930, p.2.
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and (later, and to a lesser extent) N.S.W. seemed to be 
fulfilling the role of 'social fascism' as set out for them 
in the third period scenario. Overwhelmed by the problems 
of government, Labor was unable to cope with unemployment, 
and seemed powerless to stop the inroads the depression made 
into living standards and conditions; the C.P.A. on the 
other hand seemed to be at last moving forward.
At the leadership level the scene was more grubby, 
and was for some time intensely factional and confused. Of 
the new party leaders J.B. Miles from Queensland was 
relatively unknown in Sydney where the bulk of C.P.A. members 
lived, L.L. Sharkey was young and inexperienced, and the 
General Secretary H. Moxon was an aggressive personality
5noted for his ultra-left views and factional activities.
Of the old party leaders only E.M. Higgins retained his 
place on the C.E.C., but in January of 1930 J. Kavanagh and 
Tom Wright were elected to the N.S.W. and Sydney District 
Committees by a C.P.A. membership which looked to a 
diminu^tion of factionalism now that the policy issues had 
been decided. Moxon immediately cabled the E.C.C.I. that 
the old Central Committee was trying to usurp power. The 
Moxon-Sharkey-Miles alliance reacted harshly to this challenge, 
and embarked on a policy of unremitting persecution and 
vindictiveness towards the old C.P.A. leadership which 
resulted in the forcing out of the party of all except Tom 
Wright by the mid-1930s. Moxon contrived to remove Wright 
and Kavanagh from the party's Sydney committee, and the 
C.E.C. despatched Kavanagh to South Australia to organise 
a State election campaign against the Hill Labor Party 
government. Wright, Kavanagh, Ryan and Higgins were 
belaboured with a stream of censures and charges, and 
constant attempts were made to embarrass and belittle them
5. W.W., April 22, 1932, p.2.
6. See "Kavanagh to C.E.C., 29 January 1930", in Kavanagh 
Collection, A.N.U. Archives.
300
in the eyes of their followers. In addition the old 
C.E.C. members, and the rank and file too, were kept in 
line by a not infrequent resort to summary expulsion from 
the C.P.A.
The first of the ex-C.E.C. members to be expelled
was J. Ryan. Ryan had become a foremost advocate and a
living embodiment of the rapprochement of the C.P.A. with
Garden and the N.S.W. Labor Council's brand of leftism, and
under Garden's patronage he occupied a number of posts
7connected with the official trade union movement. Whilst 
in Moscow in 1928 he had clashed with N. Jeffery over the 
possibilities of applying third period policies in the 
Australian context. Following the victory of the new line 
leadership he finally accepted that third period policies 
were intended to be fully applied in Australia, but he 
denied that it was encumbent on him publicly to recant hisgerrors, as his enemies demanded. He was thus deemed
impenitent and dangerous by the new leadership of the C.P.A.
In February 1930 Ryan was charged by the C.E.C. with
perpetuating reformist illusions and "attempting to raise
the status of the counter-revolutionary Garden" in the pages
9of the Pan-Pacific Worker. He was then peremptorily
expelled when he refused to answer these charges, and his
supporters were warned that they would be dealt with likewise
if they continued to engage in 'factional activities', which
apparently meant complaining about the severity of the
1 0treatment meted out to Ryan.
7. Ryan's success in the trade union movement had long been 
a source of controversy within the C.P.A. He persuaded 
Kavanagh of the efficacy of utilising Garden's goodwill 
to develop Communist Party contact with trade unionists 
through the Labor Council of N.S.W., but this had the effect 
of laying Kavanagh open to the charge that the C.P.A. was 
being run from Trades Hall as of old. Thus the very notion 
of the need for an independent C.P.A. which Kavanagh had 
championed after 1923 came to be used against him by the 
Moxon-Sharkey-Miles group. See for example W.W., Oct.5» 
1929.
8. W.W., Dec.27, 1929, p.3.
9. See "C.E.C. Circular 30/l4... re JACK RYAN'S EXPULSION", 
in Kavanagh Collection, A.N.U. Archives.
10. W.W., Mar.21, 1930, p.4.
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Such precipitate action brought no kudos from
Moscow. Instead the Comintern directed the C.P.A. that
1 1Ryan be re-admitted to the party. Ryan also received
a cable from Lozovsky assuring him that it was Moscow's
intention that he remain as assistant editor of the Pan-
Pacific Worker. Such strange reactions indicate the subtlety
and elements of duplicity in Moscow's policies towards the
Australian labour movement. Lozovsky appears to have hoped
to maintain his connections with the Labor Council of N.S.W.
and even the A.C.T.U. despite the R.I.L.U's formal adoption
of third period policies, and was apparently willing for some
time to sacrifice doctrinal purity to achieve these ends.
A second consideration which could have influenced Moscow's
attitudes towards the C.E.C's actions in early 1930 was the
increased importance of the P.P.T.U.S. as a possible weapon
against Russia's enemies in the Far East following the
outbreak of hostilities with China over the possession of
1 2the Manchurian Railway. Whatever were Moscow's intentions
however - and they appear confused - a rapprochement with 
the old-line C.P.A. leaders was not in the event openly 
pursued, and the responsibility for solving the problems of 
the Australian party was delegated to the Comintern emissary 
and former C.P.U.S.A. official H.M. Wicks, who in April 1930 
discreetly arrived in Australia. Known in Australia as 
'Herbert Moore', Wicks was armed with plenipotentiary powers
to rearrange the affairs of the C.P.A. and to solve the
1 3problems of the transition to the third period line.
11. See J. Blake: "The Australian Communist Party and the
Comintern in the Early 1930s", in Labour History, No.23, 
November 1972, p.45.
12. This aspect of the P.P.T.U.S. was given very great
emphasis in all Communist discussion of the subject from 
late 1929 onwards. See for example W.W., Mar.7, 1930,
p .3. In 1930 Moscow made almost frantic efforts to 
promote insurrectionary activities and to cause dislocation 
in various Eastern countries through the P.P.T.U.S., 
injecting huge sums of money into these endeavours. See 
C.A. Willoughby, Shanghai Conspiracy (New York, 1952), 
pp.302-305.
13» H.M. Wicks, Eclipse of October (Chicago, 1957), p.258.
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Wicks's first act was to draw up a manifesto for 
the party to contest the N.S.W. State elections, which was 
accepted by the C.E.C,, and then presented to the State Party 
Conference. Rather foolishly Kavanagh chose to launch an 
attack on the manifesto as theoretically inadequate and by 
this affront ensured Wicks's support of Moxon, Sharkey and 
Miles in their attempts to purge the old leaders from the
1 4party. From this time on Wicks took a leading part in
what Kavanagh not unreasonably described as a 'vendetta' to
destroy his influence amongst C.P.A. members, and the pages
of the Workers' Weekly filled with attacks on 'right devia-
tionists' and verbose articles by Wicks laying down the
'correct' party line on a bewildering range of issues. A
campaign was launched against the 'right errors' committed
by Kavanagh during his embarrassingly successful election
visit to South Australia, and in June 1930 he was censured
by the C.E.C. for refusing to recant his numerous errors and
warned of his continuing right-wing tendency. In November
1930 Kavanagh was denied the right to hold any position of
office in the C.P.A., and in January of the following year
he was expelled for a long list of alleged misdemeanors,
some of which dated back to his membership of the Socialist
1 5Party of Canada. Subsequently he admitted his errors and
was allowed probationary C.P.A. membership, only to be accused 
of flirting with Trotskyism in 1934 and once again expelled.
After suppressing the 'right' by eliminating 
Kavanagh Wicks also axed Moxon. Throughout 1930 the attitude 
Moxon adopted to the beaten northern N.S.W. coalminers 
(describing many of those who returned to work as 'scabs')
14. In launching this attack Kavanagh mistakenly believed he
was criticising theses drawn up by Professor John Anderson, 
whom he described as "Moxon's theoretical coach". See 
"Kavanagh to C.E.C., April 20 1930"; "To the National 
Conference of the Communist Party of Australia", etc., 
in Kavanagh Collection, A.N.U. Archives.
15» See "To the National Conference of the Communist Party 
of Australia", in Kavanagh Collection, A.N.U. Archives.
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had displeased many members of the C.E.C. Then Moxon
was despatched as C.E.C. Instructor to Melbourne to organise 
the Unemployed Workers' Movement and in an attempt to mount 
an effective street demonstration cooperated with Don Cameron 
and A.E. Monk whose rival Central Unemployment Committee had 
a significant following amongst the workless. The Political 
Bureau of the C.P.A. intervened and commanded Moxon to engage 
in ’self-criticism' and admit before the membership his 
'right' error in engaging in united front tactics with 'social 
fascists'. Moxon agreed. Wicks anyway removed Moxon from 
his party secretaryship and replaced him with J.B. Miles;
Moxon was later finally expelled from C.P.A. membership by 
the Miles-Sharkey duo in whose care the party was from this 
time on to remain.
Wicks's next major reorganisation of the affairs
of the C.P.A. involved the detailed 'bolshevisation' of the
party through the adoption of a new constitution in April 
1 71931» Efforts to introduce democratic centralism as the
operative principle of C.P.A. activity had been made 
sporadically throughout the 1920s, particularly by J.
Kavanagh, who in 1927 had introduced constitutional amend­
ments designed to bring this about. Under Wicks however the 
complete C.P.S.U.(b.) apparatus of democratic centralist 
leadership rule was initiated and 'made' to work. The new
constitution made the basic unit of organisation the factory
1 8or locality cell to which each party member was to belong. 
Each cell was grouped into a local section and elected 
delegates to a section conference which in turn elected 
delegates to a section committee. The section committee
elected delegates to its appropriate district conference:
1 9there being a total of eight districts throughout the 
whole of Australia, the most important one Southern N.S.W.,
16. W.W., Mar.27, 1931, p.2.
17. Wicks left Australia soon after his new constitution 
was adopted by the C.P.A.
18. Known as the 'nucleus' in Wicks's constitution. For an
outline of the operation of the nucleus see ^H.M.Wicksjj, 
The Factory Nucleus and its Functions (Syd., 1931)«
19» In 1933 a ninth district of Northern Queensland was added.
which included Sydney. Each district conference elected a
district committee, and at three-yearly intervals district
conference delegates were also to compose a national party
congress which elected the Central Committee of the party.
And from the Central Committee were drawn the organs of real
power and day-to-day activity such as the Political Bureau,
and the Organisational Bureau, and the Party Secretariat.
Cells were not allowed to communicate, and party
links at the lower levels were made strictly vertical,
allowing almost total control from the C.P.A. centre. Party
control was even more closely centralised by the election
through the Political Bureau of a Secretariat which was in
charge of communications between the Central Committee and
the E.C.C.I. Thus by being placed in key positions in the
Secretariat, the Political Bureau and Central Control 
20Commission, the new leaders of the C.P.A. were completely 
secure and impossible to remove so long as they stayed 
friendly with Moscow. Opposition could be easily isolated 
and dealt with by the leadership at any level from the 
Central Committee down to the cell, and so long as the 
Secretariat correctly interpreted whatever was the current 
Moscow line it was immune from change.
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By 1931» then, the C.P.A. was for the first time 
in its history a closely organised and rigidly controlled 
section of the Comintern. Its policies were now uncompro­
misingly revolutionary, and phrased in the exact jargon of 
the third period decrees emanating from the E.C.C.I. It 
was committed to the idea that the decisive revolution of 
the Australian proletariat was near at hand, and the party 
had been disrupted and reorganised and purged and purified, 
on the premise that all this was necessary for it to give 
the correct lead to an increasingly radicalised working 
class. Its cell basis and democratic centralist mode of
20. Which was in charge of handling complaints against senior 
C.P.A. members and formulating methods of reproof. In 
addition to the Central Control Commission district 
conferences could also elect control commissions.
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operation ensured easy conversion to clandestine operations
as the revolutionary situation progressed. Its military-
style leadership was installed in total control of the party
apparatus and could be toppled only from Moscow, and not from
anywhere in the party ranks below. And if its programme of
sectarian extremism was generally ill-suited to increasing
its influence in the Australian labour movement the C.P.A.
could point to increasingly long lines of unemployed as
evidence that the process had clearly begun whereby the old
traditions and practices of the working class were about to
be swept away and that there was a growing scope for the
mass action and political agitation which the party had so
carefully prepared itself for.
Membership too had expanded considerably as the
depression worsened. By May 1931 total membership of the
party had reached perhaps 1200, the highest figure for a
decade, and subsequently party numbers continued to grow to
22a boasted 2329 later the same year. Furthermore many other
Australians shared transiently in the party's growth. Mem­
bership figures for the new line C.P.A. masked very high 
drop-out rates, including both individuals who found the 
pace of life and the requirements of party membership too 
exhausting or time-consuming to maintain, and a goodly number
expelled, mostly for minor infractions of party discipline or 
23mores.
21. The adaptability of the cell system of organisation to 
conditions of clandestine activity was of course very 
important in the adoption of the elaborate vertical link 
system by the Comintern in 1924. For a detailed assess­
ment of the strengths and weaknesses of democratic 
centralism in this regard see M. Duverger, Political 
Parties. Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern 
State (London, 1954) , esp . pp .27-36.
22. See W.W., May 29, 1931, P.3; Aug.21, 1931, p.2. All such 
published membership figures need to be treated with 
caution, but they do underline that recruitment was at a 
height in this period. After 1932 recruitment slowed, and 
it was not until 1940 that party membership reached about 
4000, after which it began to rise to the peak membership 
of about 23,000 in 1944.
23. For No.1 district recruitment figures which show a 
quarterly drop-out/new recruit ratio of 70°/o see W. W. ,
May 5, 1933, p.2. The drop-out/new recruit ratio for
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On the other hand most of the new recruits were 
inexperienced and newly politicised, and the party suffered 
from its personnel weaknesses. For the most part those who 
were recruited to the C.P.A. in the early 1930s found their 
way into the party through the U.W.M., which in 1931 claimed 
a membership of over 30,000 and which to some extent absorbed 
the time and energies of almost every active party worker.
The fact that the U.W.M. provided the main source of 
recruitment meant that experienced C.P.A. cadres were swamped 
by the politically uneducated and intellectually confused, 
and suitable manpower was stretched to the limits to provide 
training courses for party members whose acquaintance with 
radical ideas had sometimes begun only when they had suddenly 
been thrown out of work a few months before joining up. In 
addition the new party members, along with some of the newly 
promoted leaders themselves, gave to the new line C.P.A. an
✓ 24air of zealous naivete.
The C.P.A’s considerable successes in organising 
the U.W.M. had the further effect of providing the party 
leadership with a tool for extending their power, and it was 
used as the basis for promoting 'mass action against capita­
lism'. In Sydney and Melbourne particularly the C.P.A. 
successfully induced numbers of the unemployed to resist 
tenant evictions by violent means, and when clashes with the 
police resulted the unemployed were exhorted to join the 
Workers' Defence Corps which was devoted to training its 
members in the arts of street warfare. As with all third 
period endeavours however the potential of the U.W.M. for 
harassing the hated 'social fascists' was never overlooked, 
and indeed was concentrated on by C.P.A. cadres. No sooner 
had viable U.W.M. organisations been created in the major 
capital cities than the wrath of the unemployed was turned
individual sections of district No.1 ranged from about 
7°/o to over 400^. In only two sections was the ratio less 
than 50°/o.
24. See L.J. Louis, Trade Unions and the Depression. A Study 
of Victoria, 1930-193^" (Canb., 1968), p .36.
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against members of the Labor Party and officials of the
trade unions. Demonstrations were arranged to disrupt
T.H.C. meetings and 'deputations' visited prominent trade
union officials leaving behind them bloodied noses and
25wrecked furniture as mementoes of their visit. Police
protection had frequently to be resorted to in order to 
conduct T.H.C. business, and in Sydney it was not unknown 
for union officials to spend their days behind locked doors, 
and to greet unwelcome visitors from the U.W.M. with loaded 
revolvers in order to dissuade them from becoming violent.
This penchant for utilising violence as a weapon, 
which may at first have owed something to Wicks's American 
background, brought the C.P.A. swiftly up against the barriers 
to its influence in Australian society. Firstly, it provided 
propaganda ammunition against the party and alienated those 
unemployed whose main concern was to return to work or 
provide sustenance for their families rather than rush head­
long into revolution or gaol. Secondly, it focussed the 
forces of the state against the threat to law and order, and 
the scanty resources of the C.P.A. and U.W.M. were soon 
dissipated by vigorous police action and long gaol sentences 
meted out to the party's star pugilists. Thirdly, it ensured 
the labour movement as a whole would attempt to counter the 
influence of a body which, whatever its pretensions and 
partial successes, had only relatively tenuous links with 
the Australian working class.
The reaction of the trade union movement to the 
attacks of the C.P.A. and the riotous behaviour of the U.W.M. 
was predictable. The Communist Party had begun to attack 
trade union leaders as 'social fascists' from the very 
beginning of 1930 and stood a full party team for office 
against the encumbents at the Labor Council of N.S.W. elections
25. See for example S .M,H., June 6, 1931» W.W., Aug.1, 1930,
p.5; R.L., Sept.25, 1931, p.2.
26. W.W., June 13, 1930, p .3•
308
in January of that year. Garden energetically countered
this challenge to his position and no C.P.A. members were
elected. From this time onwards mutual recriminations between
the Labor Council and the C.P.A. mounted continuously, its
always lively meetings on a number of occasions degenerating
27into open brawls between the contending factions. In July
of 1930 U.W.M. attacks on the trade union movement prompted
Garden to set up his own Unemployed Workers’ Union to counter
28C.P.A. influence amongst the out of work. Later he began
also to enlarge and reinvigorate the Labour Volunteer Army
(renamed the Australian Labor Army) to recruit the workers
and the unemployed, nominally to defend the labour movement
against the right-wing All For Australia League, but with a
weather eye cocked on the belligerent U.W.M. and the C.P.A.-
controlled Workers' Defence Corps. After some bitter struggles
and manoeuvres Garden's counter-offensives succeeded in
restricting the C.P.A. to a noisy though for the most part a
fairly isolated minority on the Labor Council.
The experience of the Labor Council of N.S.W. was
mirrored to some extent by the A.C.T.U. and its affiliated
Trades Halls in other States. In all States the 'social
fascist bureaucrats' of the Trades Hall Councils were assailed
by C.P.A. cadres and their unemployed followers, and in all
States Council meetings were the scene of brawling and
29organised disruption. The trade unions were confused and
disorientated in the face of the tactics of the U.W.M., and
a hiatus quickly appeared in their handling of one of the
most important questions of the depression era: the gigantic
problems of the unemployed. The February 1930 Congress of
the A.C.T.U. recommended that all Trades Hall Councils apply
themselves closely to the organisation and welfare of the
unemployed, but organisational difficulties and the problems
30of waging open and intense warfare against the U.W.M. hindered
27. L.D,, Mar.14, 1930, p.6; W.W., June 27, 1930, p.3j Dec.5, 
1930, p.3 5 June 12, 1931, p.1.
28. See W.W., June 27, 1930, p.3; Aug.1, 1930, p.6.
29. See for example W,W., Mar.21, 1930, p.4; May 23, 1930, p.4.
30. W.W., June 27, 1930, p.3. For mention of the occasional
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much in the way of positive achievements for the victims of
the depression, and increasingly the actual plight of the
unemployed was relegated to second place in the minds of
union leaders engaged in a vicious struggle to control the
organisations of the workless. At first the U.W.M. flourished
throughout Australia, but as the Trades Hall Councils - often
with the assistance of A.L.P. governments - mounted their
counter offensive, the C.P.A's mass front for the unemployed
began to decline and by 1932 had greatly lost influence
31amongst the workless.
Another important front organisation for the new 
line C.P.A. was the Militant Minority Movement. As with the 
U.W.M. the Minority Movement was dramatically successful at 
first, but became so involved in the fight against 'social 
fascism' that its progress was halted by the internecine 
warfare and vigorous counter-attack which its policies 
provoked from the established trade unions. Through the 
M.M.M. unionists were urged to resist wage cuts and 
lengthened hours by the setting up of rank and file committees 
to conduct strike action. In the course of these strikes the 
M.M.M. aimed to win over the rank and file of the union 
movement from the 'trade union bureaucrats' and increasingly 
politicise industrial action so that general strikes and 
coordinated mass actions in support of the establishment of 
proletarian dictatorship would result. Early in 1930 the 
militant tone of this programme of action found considerable 
support amongst the N.S.W. coal miners, whose sad experiences 
and determined struggle against the consequences of depression 
were perhaps more closely congruent with the Communist spectre 
of official betrayal and ruthless capitalist onslaught than 
any other segment of the Australian workforce. There was 
support forthcoming too from the rank and file of many other
open streetfighting between rival Trades Hall and Communist 
unemployed organisations see W.W., Mar.27, 1931, p.2;
April 3, 1931, P.1.
31. The U.W.M. revived again later in the 1930s following the 
adoption of a united front policy by the C.P.A. See A. 
Davidson, The Communist Party of Australia. A Short History. 
(Stanford, 1969), pp.60-6l.
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unions with a militant tradition, so that by October 1931
M.M.M. groups were firmly established in twenty five unions
in N.S.W. alone and exerted some influence on trade unionists
32in Queensland, South Australia and Victoria. The M.M.M.
fighting propaganda clearly had a considerable appeal to 
many shopfloor militants whose natural impulse was to fight 
the Great Depression and its effects by the most radical and 
determined means.
Throughout 1930 M.M.M. candidates captured a number 
of official posts in the Miners' Federation, and through a 
combination of rank and file support and strong-arm tactics 
also succeeded in gaining control of the N.S.W. Branch of
33the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners.
In addition the Militant Minority gained some pyrrhic 
victories on the Labor Council of N.S.W., successfully 
intimidating a number of the more mild-hearted unions to 
withdraw their affiliations from the Council altogether, and 
on occasions holding rowdy 'Council' meetings which endorsed 
Communist policies after the pugilists of the U.W.M. had
34chased the majority of delegates away. But for the most
part the M.M.M. found itself opposed by men made of sterner 
stuff than their early successes led them to suppose. The 
leaders of various unions were soon organising to limit the 
effectiveness and hinder the growth of Militant Minority 
groups amongst the rank and file of their unions, and promi­
nent M.M.M. advocates on Trades Hall Councils throughout 
Australia were in a number of cases withdrawn by their unions,
35or defeated for their posts on Council.
And once the battle was joined the dogmatic and 
unreal character of the Minority Movement's ideas was 
revealed. For it was precisely in the most militant unions 
that the M.M.M. had its initial successes, and it was the
32. R.L,, Oct.30, 1931, p.3.
33. R.L., Aug.21, 1931, p.4; cf. W.W., June 13, 1930, p.3.
34. W.W., June 27, 1930, p .2; Dec.5, 1930, p.3.
35. See for example W,W., July 18, 1930, p.3; Oct.24, 1930, 
p.6; Jan.23, 1931» p.1; June 19, 1931, p.3.
most radical and consistently left-wing figures amongst 
unionists whom its adherents denounced as 'social fascist' 
traitors. Such charges simply could not be sustained and 
many of the militant-inclined amongst the rank and file soon 
came to realize that the depression had imposed practical 
limits on radical union activity which could not, with the 
best will in the world, be easily overcome. Though the 
beginnings of the depression in Australia had stirred vigorous 
strike activity in defence of working conditions by 1930 only 
the fighting miners favoured this recourse: the fear of losing
their job increasingly restrained all other workers from 
attempting to counter wage cuts and declining conditions of 
labour by resort to the strike. Despite this - and the fact 
that the Minority Movement's offensive strike strategy was a 
disastrous failure when applied by militants amongst seamen 
and shearers in 1931 - the leadership of the C.P.A. insisted 
that the policy of aggressive and general strike action be 
continued with, and they expelled any member of the M.M.M.
O /T
who questioned the wisdom of this decision. The Minority 
Movement was also instructed to oppose attempts at union 
amalgamation and at forming broad industrial unions, which 
trade union leaders promoted as moves which could strengthen 
the hand of workers against capitalism, but which M.M.M. 
propaganda insisted was simply a move by the 'trade union 
bureaucracy' to consolidate its hold over the workers.
Trade union leaders could thus easily portray the Minority 
Movement as a disruptive and anti-union arm of the C.P.A., 
and rank and file opinion came to agree. By 1932, despite 
occasional boasts of continuing gains, the M.M.M. was clearly 
losing influence amongst the mainstream membership of the 
trade unions, and it was not to regain the initiative until
36 . See for example the case of C. Nelson, Western District 
Vice-President of the Miners' Federation and prominent 
M.M.M. leader who was expelled in 1932. W.W., July 8, 
1932, p.3.
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later in the 1930s 37
One other attempt to expand C.P.A. influence in 
industry was through the promotion of dual unionism. This 
tactic was applied first to the Pastoral Workers' Industrial 
Union of Australia, set up by breakaway A.W.U. militants in 
1930 in reaction to a wage cut in their arbitration awards.
The C.P.A. quickly captured control of the P.W.I.U. of A. and 
was able to capitalise on rank and file disillusionment with 
the arbitration system so that membership grew to a peak of 
about 2000. On the other hand this represented only a tiny 
fraction of the A.W.U. membership and the C .P .A.-controlled 
union was quite unable to demonstrate viable alternative 
policies in the face of the Great Depression to those of the 
'trade union bureaucrats' still wielding power in the indus­
trial colossus the P.W.I.U. of A. sought to compete with.
In addition the P.W.I.U. of A. focussed the bitterness of 
many trade unionists against the Communist Party for engaging 
in splitting tactics at a time when all union organisations 
were struggling for survival. The P.W.I.U. of A. was 
eventually disbanded in 1936.
The second exercise in dual unionism was the 
setting up in 1932 of an Australian Section of the Interna­
tional of Seamen and Harbour Workers out of the remnants of 
the International Seamen's Club in Sydney. The I.S.H. was 
a R.I.L.U. subsidiary operating out of Hamburg and originally 
intended by the Russians as a weapon to disrupt munitions 
supplies to hostile powers in the Far East.+ As a dual union 
the I.S.H. was a failure world wide and its Australian Section 
appeared as a confused extension of parallel attempts to apply 
M.M.M. tactics in the Sydney branch of the Seamen's Union and 
to overturn its 'social fascist' (Socialist Party of Australia)
37# Davidson, The Communist Party of Australia, pp.58-59#
+. On the I.S.H. see Hardy, Those Stormy Years, Ch.3> J.
Valtin, Out of the Night (New York, 19^ +1) > esp. pp.328ff. 
The P.P.T.U.S. and its related R.I.L.U. communications 
network provided a basis for I.S.H. activities in the 
Pacific.
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leadership. Though the I.S.H. helped lay a basis for the 
rapid extension of Communist influence throughout the 
maritime unions later in the 1930s as with the P.W.I.U. of 
A. its main function in the early years of depression was to 
demonstrate clearly the poverty and impracticality of third 
period industrial policies.
At the height of the depression, then, the C.P.A. 
stood far from its goal of becoming a mass organisation 
supplanting the A.L.P. and the official union movement as 
the focus of working class opposition to capitalism. The 
party had grown, it is true, but hardly to the extent that 
it posed any real threat to capitalism, or a viable alterna­
tive to the established labour movement. The disastrous 
third period policies had cut the party off from the counsels 
of labour and brought upon it the concerted and intense 
opposition of almost every shade of opinion outside the party, 
ranging from far left trade unionists across the political 
spectrum to the semi —  fascist New Guard. Furthermore the 
1bolshevisation1 of the C.P.A. had ensured that whatever 
else might happen there was little chance of the Australian 
party abandoning the official Comintern line, for the 
circumstances in which the new leadership had been installed 
in power ensured a most full and complete application of the 
third period policies.
As a result when the C.P.A. reflected on its 
relative failure to take full advantage of the opportunities 
offered by the Great Depression for the development of radical 
working class politics it was to the details of policy 
application and party and front organisation that it looked. 
The basic folly, destructiveness, and impractical nature of 
third period policies was studiously ignored. "Defects - 
such as... irresponsibility in carrying out Party tasks, 
ill-considered and hasty tactics, and numerous other 
crudities - must be criticised out of existence", an 
editorialist in the Workers * Weekly in 1932 exhorted his
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readers after guardedly admitting that the party was not
faring as well as it might.
Lenin has shown us how to use a mighty weapon - 
self-criticism - in order to eradicate harmful 
tendencies, deviations from the line of the Party 
and the [Communist International], This weapon 
has [[to be increasingly used[] in order to eradicate 
the harmful tendencies that exist in our ranks and 
that are amongst the chief obstacles to the growth 
and development of our Party into a mass Bolshevik 
Party - the leader of the struggles of the Australian 
working class.38
So it seemed by 1932 that intra-left-wing feuding 
and intense internecine warfare was to become an endemic 
factor in working class politics. It had engaged above all 
the elements furthest to the left in the labour movement and 
had involved concerted activity on the part of leading trade 
unionists to stem the open attacks of the Unemployed Workers' 
Movement and the inroads into their power base made by the 
Militant Minority Movement. The C.P.A's reaction to the 
reverses it had begun to suffer at the hands of the 'social 
fascist bureaucrats' was to explain away such setbacks as 
due to tactical deficiency, and to continue to endorse the 
strategy of attack laid down by the third period line, no 
matter how spurious and counter-productive it had proved to 
b e .
And meanwhile, the third period of world Communism 
had also opened a breach between the trade union movement and 
the P.P.T.U.S. and precipitated the victory of an isolationist 
outlook in the A.C.T.U.
38. W.W,, April 1, 1932, p .2
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ii. The trade unions and the P.P.T.U.S.
The Australian delegation to the 1929 P.P.T.U.S. 
conference at Vladivostok suffered bad luck, and interference 
by hostile governments. Roels, Walsh and Hannett had no 
sooner embarked on a ship to Hong Kong, intending to proceed 
to Shanghai and from there by rail to Vladivostok, when there 
was a severing of relations between China and Russia, effec­
tively cutting off that route to them. They then proceeded 
to Kobe in the hope of travelling through Japan to ports 
maintaining shipping links with Vladivostok, but were prevented 
from landing by Japanese authorities. The delegates then 
travelled to Shanghai and finally managed to slip away by boat 
to Vladivostok, arriving there on 24th August, just two days 
after the conference had ended. As their experience was a 
common one, a session of the conference was arranged in Shanghai
for those delegates who were held up by imperial interference
39and who had not been able to get to the Soviet Union. For
the Australian delegation however a special plenary session of 
the P.P.T.U.S. conference was held lasting from the 26th 
August to the 5th September, as conference members travelled 
by train to Moscow, taking this long way round to their home 
countries following the closing of the border and warming of 
hostilities between China and the Soviet Union.
Throughout 1929 the P.P.T.U.S. had increasingly 
come to function as a propaganda outlet for current Soviet 
policies towards the Far East. At the same time the third 
period breach between Communist Parties and other anti­
imperialist and leftist forces had led to a decline in 
interest in the P.P.T.U.S., and most of the organisations 
represented at the Vladivostok meeting were Communist dominated 
splinter groups. The conference centred its discussions and
39» The Shanghai session of the Conference was attended by 
delegates from union bodies in Formosa and the Malay 
States, Japan, China and the U.S.S.R. The resolutions 
adopted by the Shanghai meeting did not contradict those 
of the Vladivostok Conference, so for convenience I will 
refer only to the latter meeting in my text.
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resolutions around the current Sino-Soviet hostilities and 
ways of combatting the alleged plot of the imperialist powers 
to press China into a war with Russia. Alter calling for 
increased anti-war activities the conference outlined measures 
aimed at strengthening the P .P .T.U.S.-affiliated union 
movements and preparing the workers in colonial countries for 
armed struggle against their imperialist oppressors.
The P.P.T.U.S. plenum which discussed the Australian 
situation consisted of Roels, Hannett and Walsh; the American, 
Earl Browder; two Chinese delegates, Tze Won-pin and Ting 
Yu-lin; Yamagata of Japan; Lozovsky and Avdeeva of the U.S.S.R.; 
Herclet of the French C.G.T.U.; the Philippines Communist J. 
Manahan; Nat Watkins of the British Minority Movement; as well 
as the Pan-Pacific Worker journalist Stoler, and several other 
Secretariat officials and minor Vladivostok conference figures. 
Predictably, the meeting tended to be dominated by Lozovsky 
and the other Communists. The plenum was in fact for the 
most part a heated debate, with the Communist delegates 
attacking the Australian labour movement; the Australian, 
representatives (particularly Roels and Walsh) attempting 
to answer and moderate the criticisms. Following the 
Secretariat meeting a number of compromise resolutions were 
drafted concerning trade union affairs in Australia and issues 
of principle and theory arising therefrom. The debates and 
discussions leading up to these resolutions concentrated 
around four main issues: the question of White Australia and
the correct internationalist stance to be adopted concerning 
immigration restriction; the attitudes adopted by Australian 
unionists towards the 'Industrial Peace' proposals put 
forward by the Bruce government in 1928 and 1929» the 
question of industrial arbitration; and the necessity, 
zealously urged by most P.P.T.U.S. members, of the need for 
mounting an increased struggle against all advocates of 
reformism in Australia.
On the question of White Australia the P.P.T.U.S 
echoed more or less exactly the ideas outlined in the 1928
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pamphlet on that subject published by the Labor Council 
of N.S.W. "It was a commendable factor to know that the 
masses were jealous of their standard of living and were 
prepared to fight for it", Lozovsky observed of Australian 
opposition to large-scale migration schemes, "but unfortu­
nate. . . £thatj] the fight was directed against color and not
class. Unless the fight was made a class fight, no good to
40the working class would come out of it". The P.P.T.U.S.
resolution on 'The Tasks of the Trade Unions of Australia'
thus directed its criticisms to the specifically racialist
aspects of the White Australia policy, represented by
a certain section of the Australian trade union movement 
steeped in ... white chauvinism .., and a very dangerous 
racial prejudice based not only on the fear of economic 
competition from lower-paid labor from this or that 
country, but also the false doctrine of the superiority 
of the white or "Nordic" race, a doctrine which is 
deliberately being fostered by imperialists in their 
own interests and in preparation of coming imperialist 
wars.^
The P.P.T.U.S. was less laudatory of the N.S.W. 
Labor Council when it came to discuss the attitude that body 
had adopted towards the Peace in Industry Conference which 
the Bruce government had continuously proposed throughout 
1928 and 1929» This Conference had aimed at bringing 
together unionists and employers for the purpose of resolving 
the widespread industrial unrest in Australia, and had at 
first attracted the interest of trade union bodies and 
employer organisations, the A.C.T.U. Emergency Congress of 
July 1928 deciding to send delegates. The Labor Council had 
endorsed the A.C.T.U. decision and sent Garden, Roels and 
the Communist Jeffery as its delegates to a joint meeting
42of trade unionists who drew up an agenda for the Conference. 
However, as the clashes between labour and capital became 
increasingly violent and acrimonious as 1928 progressed, the 
N.S.W. Labor Council pressed for an aggressive stance at the
40. P.P.W., Mar.1, 1930, p.69.
41. P.P.W., Dec.2, 1929, p .20.
42. Labor Council of N.S.W., Report, 1928, p.62.
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Conference by trade unionists, listing a number of 
repressive measures of the Bruce government such as its 
amendments to the Federal Arbitration Act and other 
legislative actions which would require repeal before 
meaningful negotiations could get underway. The Labor 
Council's stance drew support from the A.C.T.U. and other 
Trades Hall Councils and individual unions represented at 
the Conference, and following a walkout by Garden, Roels and 
Jeffery, the Peace in Industry convocation gradually collapsed 
as other trade unions followed suit and abandoned the 
gathering.
According to most Secretariat members Australian
unionists had erred badly in showing a willingness to attend
the Peace in Industry Conference in the first place, though
the subsequent tactics pursued by the Labor Council had been
correct. Lozovsky and the P.P.T.U.S. majority urged the
view that to attend such a conference "meant disintegration
and ideological demoralisation of the trade union movement",
and should not have been countenanced by the militant left.
Against the arguments of Australian delegates that attendance
of the entire labour movement was required because of the
overwhelming A.C.T.U. consensus on the question, Lozovsky
suggested that over such "a basic issue" those on the left
43should be prepared to "break away". In a special
resolution on 'Compulsory Arbitration and So-Called
"Industrial Peace"' it was stressed that "the struggle
against industrial peace constitutes an organic part of the
programme and tactics of the Pan-Pacific Trade Union
44Secretariat". The resolution added
the essence of ... the theory and practice of "industrial 
peace"... is the voluntary renunciation of the class 
struggle by the workers and the surrender of the labor 
movement into the hands of the ruling class.
The rich experience furnished by industrial peace 
in England, Germany and in other countries shows clearly 
that under the banner of "industrial peace" there is 
carried on the most intensive capitalist offensive on
43. P.P.W., Mar.1, 1930,  p . 7 4 .
44. P.P.W., Dec.2,  1929, P . 2 3 .
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the existing working and living conditions of the 
working masses.
Under the mask of industrial peace the capitalist 
class utilise the trade union leaders of many countries 
in its own class interests.
Ideas of 'industrial peace' were deemed by the
Secretariat to be the "logical consequence of compulsory
arbitration", which was also to be fought by P.P.T.U.S.
affiliates. Outlining its view of the history of arbitration
in Australia the Secretariat declared that this had functioned
only to reduce capitalist concessions to the workers. The
P.P.T.U.S. announced that it considered "as one of the most
important tasks of all its affiliated organisations,an
energetic and systematic struggle against compulsory
45arbitration". It was here that the Australian left and
the P.P.T.U.S. came to diverge greatly, for the A.C.T.U. was 
in early 1930 in no mood to begin any concerted or determined 
attack on the system of arbitration.
Unionist equivocation on the arbitration question 
was well underlined by the changes in attitudes adopted by 
the Labor Council of N.S.W. and other militant union 
organisations throughout 1929« The leaders of the Labor 
Council had long opposed arbitration on principle as a system 
which bred passivity amongst unionists, and they had been 
joined in this condemnation by a range of individual militant 
unionists and A.C.T.U. affiliates. Arthur Rae summed up this 
viewpoint in the Pan-Pacific Worker in April 1928 in an 
article entitled 'The Curse of Compulsory Arbitration':
It is impossible to estimate the moral harm which 
has been done to the Australian working-class by its 
hasty and ill-considered acceptance of arbitration as 
the solution of Labor's problems.
Having lived and worked under that system for a 
generation there are now hundreds of thousands workers, 
who have no knowledge of any other method and look upon 
the facts of the early struggles of their fathers as 
mere babblings of old age passing into its second child­
hood . 46
45. Ibid.
46. P.P.W., April 2, 1928, p.17
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But Rae was optimistic that there was a growing disillusion­
ment with arbitration and an increasing understanding amongst 
workers that "not from capitalist Parliament and Courts but 
by the workers’ own united efforts can social freedom and 
economic justice be won". And indeed there were growing 
signs that this was the case as union after union became 
involved in strikes in defiance of judgements and awards of 
the arbitration courts throughout 1928 and early 1929. In 
May 1929 however the position changed dramatically with the 
Bruce government’s announcement that as all its earlier 
attempts to ’reform' arbitration had failed, the Commonwealth 
intended to withdraw from the arbitration field altogether.
This sudden decision came as a shock to almost all groups and
47factions in the Australian polity, and overnight it turned 
most of the vehement left-wing critics of the arbitration 
system into its ardent defenders. The entire labour movement 
interpreted the Bruce government's attempt at abandoning 
arbitration as simply another move in a general capitalist 
offensive against the working class which had been heralded 
by Bruce's repressive 1928 amendments to the arbitration act. 
The change in tactics on the part of Bruce was quickly 
matched in this situation by a complete reversal of attitudes 
by unionists. On the eve of the announcement of the Federal 
government's intentions the Australian Railways Union issued 
a scathing denunciation of the arbitration system; weeks later 
it had joined with other unionists in launching a propaganda 
campaign against Bruce's projected plans. And the N.S.W.
Labor Council, after appointing a committee to consider the 
questions posed by Bruce's proposals, adopted a majority 
report which came down solidly in favour of retaining the 
Federal Arbitration Court.
Adoption of the majority report on arbitration 
followed animated discussion of the subject on the Labor 
Council, a number of ultra-militants rejecting the apparent 
turn-around involved, and instead advocating a minority
47. See Wildavsky and Carboch, Studies in Australian Politics, 
esp. pp.186-212.
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report of the arbitration committee. The minority report 
argued that historically the arbitration system had retarded 
both the wage levels and the class consciousness of the 
working class. While admitting that Bruce's attempt to 
abolish arbitration was prompted by the fact that the system 
was restricting the onslaught of the employers against 
working conditions, the minority report suggested that never­
theless the "time is ripe for a complete repudiation of all
48restrictions on the right to strike", and proposed that the 
union movement strengthen its fighting capacity and meet the 
offensive head-on. On the other hand the majority report on 
arbitration refused to accept that the issue in question was 
one of theory, or of the long-term effect of arbitration on 
the working class, but instead pointed to the horrific and 
immediate practical results which would accrue if Bruce 
succeeded in revoking Federal awards in the midst of an 
economic recession. Whilst fully accepting that the arbi­
tration system should be supplanted by Industrial Councils 
of aggressive and united unions which could meet capitalism 
head on in the industrial arena, the majority report pointed 
out that militants had been working towards this goal since 
the plans for such councils were outlined at the 1921 All- 
Australian Trade Union Congress, but at its present state 
of development industrial unionism was not likely to safeguard 
the working class against a massive lowering of living 
standards. When it came to a vote the overwhelming majority 
of Labor Council affiliates accepted this assessment. 
Commenting on the Labor Council's debates over arbitration 
in his annual report for 1929 Garden summed up the feeling 
of most affiliated unions when he observed
The minority report was solely a propaganda 
report... containing no effective machinery for fighting 
the employers on the general wage-reduction campaign 
which they had planned through the abolition of the 
Arbitration Court.... The majority of the committee 
recognised that the fight was not essentially for or
48. See Labor Council of N.S.W., Report, 1929» p.11
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against the Arbitration Court, but was DIRECTLY 
CONCERNED WITH A REDUCTION IN THE WAGE STANDARDS OF 
THE WORKERS.^9
Garden added that the course of events throughout 1929 as 
the depression worsened had Fully born out the wisdom of the 
Labor Council's decision: "The consideration of the abolition
of the Arbitration Court cannot logically be made apart from 
the existing circumstances. On a rising market its abolition 
would be a blow to the employers. On a falling market its
50abolition would mean a big wage sacrifice for the workers".
The turn towards support for arbitration was even
more marked in the A.C.T.U. itself. As late as the July 1928
A.C.T.U. Congress in Melbourne a resolution had been passed
recommending that all unions hold a referendum of their
members on the question of cancelling their registration with
the Commonwealth Arbitration Court; but following the May
1929 announcement by the Commonwealth of its plans to withdraw
from arbitration it was the A.C.T.U. which took the lead in
organising a conference which expressed its "uncompromising
hostility to the Bruce Government's proposal to destroy
51Federal Conciliation and Arbitration". The conference met
in Melbourne in June 1929 and gathered together fifty five 
Federal unions. These unions, amongst whom were a goodly 
sprinkling of some of the more militant and left-wing bodies, 
were all acutely aware that they had been largely created by 
their registration with the Commonwealth Arbitration Court 
as parties to its awards, and that they had very meagre 
resources of rank and file militancy to fall back on should 
they have to fight employers head on. The Federal unions 
were not necessarily theoretically wedded to arbitration as 
a principle: a number of them indeed looked beyond arbitration
and had throughout the 1920s played a leading role in formu­
lating plans to supplant it with militant and strong Industrial 
Councils capable of direct bargaining. But they were at the 
same time aware of the creative as well as retarding effects
49. Ibid., pp.8-9.
30. Ibid., p .9.
51 . £a . C . T. U. and Federal Unions...]], Report of Conference 
which considered the Bruce Anti-Federal Arbitration 
Proposals, N o ,1 (Melb., 1929)•
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of the arbitration system on the growth of Australian 
trade unionism; cognisant of the overall transience and 
paucity of rank and file militancy, and soberly convinced 
by the course of events in the early years of economic 
depression that to renounce the arbitration system would 
spell disaster for the trade union movement. These conside­
rations ensured that the A.C.T.U., which was strongly influen­
ced by Australia's Federal unions, would not entertain any 
'energetic and systematic' anti-arbitration campaign in the 
early years of the depression. The P.P.T.U.S. resolution on 
the question of arbitration was thus, to say the least, badly 
timed.
Furthermore the A.C.T.U. had begun to cooperate 
very closely with State and Federal branches of the Labor 
Party as an insurance that should Bruce proceed with his 
plans a succeeding Labor government would nullify the move 
by restoring Federal jurisdiction in the area of arbitration.
The A.L.P. position - which owed much to the ideas of the 
traditional defender of the arbitration system as a principle, 
the A.W.U. - was that arbitration was overall of immense 
value to the working class and that union dissatisfaction 
with its operation was due to the interference and class 
bias of the Bruce government, which through its constant 
tinkering with court administration, and its legislative 
amendments to the Arbitration Act, had perverted the Common­
wealth Arbitration Court from its original purpose of bringing 
justice to the settlement of industrial disputes. The Labor 
Party throughout 1929 made the most extravagant promises to 
the electorate at large and unionists in particular as to 
what it would do if installed in office after the October 
elections of that year. To the electorate at large the A.L.P. 
promised 'industrial peace' through its correction of the 
class bias imported into the affairs of the arbitration court 
by the Bruce government; while to unionists the A.L.P. 
suggested that it could redesign the courts to eliminate 
many of the costly legalisms and practices which had handicapped
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the workers in their fights under the Arbitration Act.
Labor spokesmen also argued that wage reductions and 
unemployment were largely due to a combination of 'the 
employers' offensive' and the Bruce government's financial 
maladministration, both of which would be corrected by a 
Labor government which would initiate public works and increase 
tariffs so as to divert the captains of industry from their 
programmes of retrenchment and cutback, to programmes of 
economic expansion and employment.
Just how much importance A.C.T.U. members attached 
to Labor promises that the position of the workers would 
dramatically improve with the election of the Scullin govern­
ment is hard to say. It is noticeable however that a number
of former radicals including R.S. Ross apparently paid more
52than lip-service regard to such propaganda. But unionists
were certainly convinced that a Federal Labor government 
would ensure that employers were no longer able to use the 
arbitration system to spearhead their campaigns against unions 
and wage levels. Nor was it for some time that the A.C.T.U. 
was to become disillusioned in this regard for in March 1930 
the A.C.T.U. drew up extensive plans to remodel the arbitra­
tion system. These proposals served as the basis for a bill 
introduced by the Scullin government in May to amend the 
Commonwealth Arbitration Act. It was not until much later 
in the year (after the bill had been amended beyond recogni­
tion by a hostile Senate) that A.C.T.U. leaders began openly 
criticising the Scullin Ministry for its performance on the 
issue of arbitration. Even then some sections of the A.C.T.U.
were prepared to defend the Act as an improvement on earlier 
53legislation until the High Court eventually invalidated all 
those provisions emphasising conciliation that had remained 
in the Act as watered-down versions of A.C.T.U.-A.L.P. policy. 
The final disillusion came with the announcement of a ten per
52. See for example A.W., Nov.13» 1929«
53. Louis, Trade Unions and the Depression, p.65.
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cent cut in arbitration court awards in January 1931» a 
move answered by an A.C.T.U. call for the Scullin government 
to declare a state of emergency to deal with the situation.
But even behind the pyrotechnics of dissent many union 
leaders recognised that without Labor in power wage reductions 
might be much greater still. There was in fact little choice 
during the depression but to continue trying to work through 
arbitration procedures and to maintain a sympathetic 
government in power, for resort to direct action would have 
been suicidal.
The A.C.T.U's close cooperation with the A.L.P.
was anathema to the Communists who sat in a majority on the
P.P.T.U.S. Though no Secretariat resolution was adopted
specifically dealing with this question, the strong attacks
on the A.L.P. delivered at the Vladivostok-plenum meeting
by Lozovsky, Stolen and a medley of lesser figures, did not
go unnoticed by opponents of the A.C.T.U's overseas
affiliation. Similarly the advice of the P.P.T.U.S. that
Australian unionists should "liquidate the reactionary
clique of leaders at the head of the A.W.U......parallel
with the purging of the trade unions affiliated with the
54A.C.T.U. of any reactionary leaders" was an ill-timed 
admonishment to a labour movement generally seeking unity 
of purpose in support of the Scullin government. Furthermore 
it re-activated the A.W.U. leadership's campaign against the 
P.P.T.U.S. at a time when the cooperation of all union bodies 
over the arbitration issue rendered it extremely likely that 
such controversial overseas affiliations would take second 
place in importance to local trade union unity. In November 
1929 a Queensland Trade Union Congress, though endorsing 
several militant and left-wing policies, nevertheless rejected
54. P.P.W., Dec.2, 1929, p .22
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a motion to affiliate the State's Labor Councils directly
to the P.P.T.U.S. in deference to the wishes of the A.W.U.
Throughout early 1930 the pages of the Australian Worker
56once again filled with attacks on the P.P.T.U.S. A clever
campaign of psychological warfare simultaneously waged
against the P.P.T.U.S. by the conservative press did nothing
at all to assuage doubts amongst unionists that the charges
57made by the A.W.U. might be well-founded after all. In 
such an atmosphere of doubt and suspicion about the P.P.T.U.S. 
an A.C.T.U. Congress met in Melbourne in February 1930 to 
consider the report of its delegates to the P.P.T.U.S. meeting 
the previous year.
In his report to the A.C.T.U. Congress on the
5 ftVladivostok-plenum meeting RoelsJ attempted to minimise the 
differences between Australian unionists and the P.P.T.U.S. 
Roels argued that it was encumbent on the A.C.T.U. to try to 
align its policies with the P.P.T.U.S. resolutions by 
adopting a generally more militant pose politically, by 
clarifying its position on the White Australia policy, and 
by accepting the Secretariat decisions on compulsory 
arbitration and industrial peace as the theoretical basis 
for dealing with such questions. Acknowledging that there 
had been opposition by Walsh and himself to the position 
maintained by other P.P.T.U.S. members over the question of 
arbitration, Roels intimated that nevertheless there was 
much more flexibility in the position of the Secretariat than 
the bald resolutions could convey. Roels stated that Lozovsky 
and the P.P.T.U.S. majority had been clearly informed by the
55. P.P.W., Jan.2, 1930, p.31.
56. A.W., Jan.8, 1930, p.3.
57# The Melbourne press particularly devoted considerable
attention to the publication of news items which implied 
that the A.C.T.U. was being manipulated by Communists 
through its affiliation with the P.P.T.U.S.
58. The other A.C.T.U. delegate F. Walsh was not present at
the Congress due to illness. Hannett had earlier reported 
to the N.S.W. Labor Council which had endorsed the P.P.T.U.S. 
resolutions.
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A.C.T.U. delegates that their labour movement was not 
revolutionary and would apply the Secretariat resolutions 
in situations in Australia only to the degree that they were 
appropriate and able to be related to the mass aspirations 
of the working class. The P.P.T.U.S., according to Roels,
59understood and accepted this relationship with the A.C.T.U;
Following Roels*s report Garden moved a motion 
that affiliation with the Secretariat be continued, and a 
debate ensued which lasted for several days. L.L. Batten, 
a reporter with the Melbourne Herald and delegate representing 
the Billposters * Union of Victoria led an attack on the 
P.P.T.U.S. in which he was strongly supported by the right- 
wing pro-Labor Party unionists who had come largely to 
dominate the affairs of the Melbourne T.H.C. by the late 
1920s. Batten charged that the P.P.T.U.S. affiliation of the 
A.C.T.U. was an act of treachery to the Scullin Ministry and 
that the Labor government deserved the support of all trade 
unionists. Citing recent C.P.A. utterances on the White 
Australia policy Batten repeated the old A.W.U. charge that 
the P.P.T.U.S. was part of a plot to flood Australia with 
coloured immigrants. Following speakers who opposed the 
Secretariat affiliation were less dramatic and less xenopho­
bic, but they repeated again and again Batten's central 
argument that the need for unity of the Australian labour 
movement precluded any association with bodies such as the 
P.P.T.U.S. According to J.L. Kean, of the Federated Marine 
Stewards' Union, the problem of associating with bodies such 
as the P.P.T.U.S. was that the Communists clearly had the 
numbers and were in a position to dominate it and divert it 
from its original anti-war and anti-imperialist aims into an 
organ of propaganda against the established labour movements 
instead. Similar arguments stressing the disruptive intentions 
of Communism and the consequent difficulties of working with 
them in the international arena were put forward also by H.C. 
Gibson and R.S. Ross.
39. For Roels's report and the subsequent debate on P.P.T.U.S. 
affiliation see All-Australian Trade Union Congress 
Report... February 1930»
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Kean, Gibson and Ross were all at pains to stress 
that they were still in favour of the pan-Pacific idea, but 
that they were specifically opposing the P.P.T.U.S. as its 
organising agency because it was under the tutelage of 
Moscow. Those who were in favour of pursuing the pan-Pacific 
trade union project, it was suggested, would best be served 
by abandoning the Communist-dominated P.P.T.U.S. and by 
transferring support to A.L.P. attempts to organise a 
regional working-class organisation. Only a new organisation 
which was loose-knit and non-Communist could serve the 
purposes of the Australian unions.
In an emotional speech to the A.C.T.U. Congress 
Garden urged the retention of P.P.T.U.S. affiliation. 
Reiterating the arguments earlier outlined in the White 
Australia pamphlet and in various Pan-Pacific Worker articles 
Garden stressed that international solidarity was the only 
long-term safeguard of Australian living standards. Supporting 
Garden's arguments H. Kneebone suggested that despite their 
differences it was in the interests of both the A.C.T.U. and 
the Secretariat that their representatives should meet for 
the development of mutual understanding, and to prevent 
imperialists from utilising scare propaganda and a veil of 
ignorance as the basis for promoting a war against the Soviet 
government. A similar point was made by Don Cameron who 
expressed the view that a break with an international affiliate 
was an evasion of the responsibility incumbent on all trade 
union leaders to help foster class consciousness on the part 
of their rank and file. Commending the P.P.T.U.S. affiliation 
as an educative experience for the Australian working class 
Cameron pointed out that the right-wing Labor opponents of 
the P.P.T.U.S. affiliation had never yet mustered any strong 
rank and file support for their isolationism amongst A.C.T.U.- 
affiliated unions, and that even the Melbourne T.H.C. had 
recorded a majority vote in favour of the P.P.T.U.S. when it 
had fully considered the matter in 1928.
The Congress as a whole was almost equally divided 
on the Secretariat affiliation, and attempts at compromise 
were made by both right and left-wing speakers on the subject.
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Those favouring compromise were generally much in favour
of continued pan-Pacific links between unionists, but were
at the same time alarmed at the apparent differences with
the A.C.T.U. revealed by the Secretariat resolutions
concerning Australia, and the acrimonious debates which had
occurred at the P.P.T.U.S. plenum meeting. R.S. Ross proposed
an amendment to Garden’s motion of affiliation that would
ensure that membership of the Secretariat was "open to all
trades unions, as such, irrespective of allegiance to
particular theories or theses”. The aim of this amendment,
Ross explained, was to water-down the influence of Communism
on the Secretariat "and to have as much consultation and
fraternity as possible, rather than mandates that in Australia
they were not able to observe". Yet few at the A.C.T.U.
Congress were prepared to see a P.P.T.U.S. quite as inchoate
and pluralist as Ross suggested, and his amendment was lost
by a large majority. Much more support was forthcoming for
an amendment moved by W. Brown of the Furnishing Trades Union
which re-affirmed affiliation with the P.P.T.U.S. with the
proviso only that there be no interference with the A.C.T.U's
handling of questions of local wage fixation and the White
Australia issue. Such an amendment, as D.J. Davies of the
Miners' Federation (W.I.U. of A.) pointed out,
embraced the position as put forward by the majority of 
those speaking in support of the motion. They had all 
said that the affiliation with the Pan-Pacific Secreta­
riat did not mean that the "White Australia" policy was 
to be given up, nor Australian methods of carrying on 
industrially altered. Why not state that in plain 
language in which there would be no ambiguity? The 
amendment left no room for doubt as to what was intended 
by the affiliation and that was what they were all 
prepared to accept.
This amendment was passed by the A.C.T.U. Congress by eighty 
two votes to seventy seven, but after lobbying by Garden a 
re-count was called for and the margin in favour of the 
amendment narrowed to seventy seven for and seventy six
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against, ¥. Duggan then using his deliberative vote as 
chairman of the Congress to declare the amendment lost.
Following this over-confident rejection of 
compromise by supporters of the P.P.T.U.S., the left lost 
support amongst Congress delegates and when it came to a 
vote Garden's motion to continue affiliation with the 
Secretariat was lost by eighty votes to seventy five, a 
number of those who had supported Brown's amendment refusing 
to vote on the issue. Stunned by this reverse Garden later 
accused the right-wing at Melbourne Trades Hall Council of 
stacking the Congress with unaffiliated unions, and he 
announced his support of the compromise amendment which he 
had been instrumental in defeating. When Brown's amendment 
was eventually recommitted however the Congress decided to 
reject it on the grounds that most of the delegates interested 
in the subject were no longer present and that a rump decision 
to continue affiliation would only bring about confusion and 
disunity. A further defeat was administered to the left when 
Congress declared its "unequivocal allegiance to the White 
Australia policy", rejecting an amendment moved by J. Ryan 
that it was "a political formulae that badly expresses our 
economic needs".
There were a number of factors which had worked
towards disaffiliation of the P.P.T.U.S., but one overriding
reason was clear: the division on the left engendered by the
Secretariat's swing towards extremism. An article in the
Pan-Pacific Worker explained the defeat as due to behind the
6 0scenes manoeuvrings by Labor politicians, and it was true
enough that the forces of the right had been organised long
61before the conference sittings had begun. Scullin's 
embarrassment at the A.C.T.U's international links had been 
obvious since 1928, and the Federal Labor government showed 
no enthusiasm whatsoever for the Pan-Pacific Congress which
6 0 . P.P.W., April 1 ,  1 9 3 0 ,  p . 1 0 4 .
6 1 . S . M . H . , J a n . 3 ,  1 9 3 0 .
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the left-wing unions looked forward to holding in Australia 
now that the Bruce government had been voted out,^ Yet the 
core of opinion in the A.C.T.U. had always stoutly resisted 
efforts to have the unions abandon the pan-Pacific project 
and in the final analysis it was because of the equivocation 
of normally left wing unions that the politicians so narrowly 
won. Union leaders were traditionally removed from direct 
electoral pressures and it was from the mainstream left wing 
unionists that the P.P.T.U.S. had derived its support as a 
valid expression of their viewpoint. But it was entirely 
different for the P.P.T.U.S. to ask that Australian trade 
unionists deliberately commit a series of acts of vandalism 
against working-class industrial and political organisations 
and abandon arbitration at a time when this would necessarily 
have meant that living standards would be brought crashing 
down. The extreme and demanding tones of the P.P.T.U.S. 
plenum resolutions, together with the increasingly strident 
attitude of Communism generally, made it inevitable that a 
weakening of support for internationalism would ensue.+
iii. The third period and the ’left social fascists'
Following the A.C.T.U's break with the P.P.T.U.S. 
most socialists and left wing unionists became increasingly 
and bitterly alienated from Communism. The motivating force
62. S.M.H,, Jan.31, 1930.
+ . This development was foreseen by the old C.E.C. of the
C.P.A. when they rejected the extreme stance on the White 
Australia question advocated by Stoler in 1928. In a 
short submission refuting Stoler's arguments (and tacitly 
also those of the E.C.C.I.) C.P.A. Secretary Tom Wright 
had warned that any movement by Communists or the P.P.T.U.S. 
towards extreme repudiation of practical measures utilised 
by the Australian labour movement in maintaining working- 
class living standards would inevitably be counter­
productive. "There has been a gradual deepening of 
solidarity with the workers of other Pacific countries", 
Wright had argued
and this process continues with encouraging rapidity. 
To "be in a hurry" and use more forceful tactics 
would mean a serious setback by arousing and
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in this process was the continued application to the 
Australian labour movement (and to affiliated international 
organisations like the P.P.T.U.S. and the R.I.L.U.) of the 
Comintern's third period policies. The C.P.A. pressed 
eagerly forward in applying this notion to all aspects of 
its relations with other socialist groups; while the P.P.T.U.S. 
and R.I.L.U. were as a matter of course committed to the 
third period, and bound to suffer reverberations from the 
political manoeuvrings within the Comintern whence the policy 
had derived.
The C.P.A's attitude towards the left wing of the 
labour movement was one of unequivocal opposition and 
denunciation. Its particular bete noire was the Labor Council 
of N.S.W. which remained until 1931 the official Australian 
section of the R.I.L.U., and whose Secretary J.S. Garden 
continually denounced the new line C.P.A. as misguided, 
dominated by agents provocateurs and professional thugs, and 
lacking support from Moscow,^ The first act of the new 
leadership of the C.P.A. in 1930 was to nominate a party 
ticket against Garden and his supporters for the official 
positions on Council. When this ticket was defeated the 
Communists set up through the M.M.M. a 'Vigilance Committee 
for the Defence of the Line of the R.I.L.U.' which urged upon 
the Labor Council majority the necessity of adopting third 
period policies in order to fulfil their obligations to their 
overseas affiliation. Despite the fact that the R.I.L.U. 
issued an invitation to Garden to attend its Fifth Congress 
in 1930 the M.M.M. organised its own rival delegation to 
Moscow which denounced the Labor Council leaders as traitors 
to the working class and was successful in having Garden voted
strengthening the opposition elements.... TTHhe 
only positive result that would be anticipated 
would be a strengthening of race prejudice and a 
revulsion to Pan-Pacific Trade Union Unity, through 
fear of its implications.
"An Answering Note on 'White Australia'", in Eighth Annual
Conference of C.P.A., Report (Syd., 1928)
63. See, for example, L,D,, Sept.26, 1930, p.7; June 6, 1931»
P. 3.
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64off the R.I.L.U. Executive. Led by L.L. Sharkey the 
Communist delegation charged the Labor Council majority with 
a long list of deviations from R.I.L.U. policies including 
alleged strike-breaking, support of the Labor Party, and 
support of proposals for establishing industrial peace in 
Australia.
The R.I.L.U. however was much more hesitant in 
attacking its official Australian section. As with the 
C.P.A's attempts to expel J. Ryan in early 1930 the party’s 
manoeuvres against the Labor Council met with some equivoca­
tion from Moscow. Once again Moscow’s hesitation seems to 
have been due to its plans for the P.P.T.U.S. whose journal 
the Pan-Pacific Worker was now being published by the N.S.W. 
Labor Council with a subsidy from the R.I.L.U. Lozovsky's 
R.I.L.U. Executive, which in the case of some countries had 
been eager and zealous in repudiating 'exceptionalism' and 
applying third period policies, showed remarkable tolerance 
towards the Labor Council. Even after the R.I.L.U's Fifth 
Congress when the increased formal commitment to third period 
policies made a split with the Council inevitable Lozovsky 
only slowly and (it would appear) somewhat unwillingly broke 
with the Garden-led radicals of the N.S.W. left wing.
At the same time the R.I.L.U. had already in 1929 
begun to exert pressure on the Labor Council to move leftwards. 
Following the P.P.T.U.S. plenary meetings over the Australian 
question in August and September 1929 the two N.S.W. Labor 
Council delegates Roels and Hannett attended a meeting of 
the Executive Bureau of the R.I.L.U. in Moscow at which 
further discussion along the lines of the P.P.T.U.S. session 
took place. Roels presented the R.I.L.U. with the majority 
Labor Council view on the questions of arbitration and 
industrial peace and argued against any attempt to force the 
R.I.L.U's Australian section to change its position or to 
come out in open opposition to the A.L.P.; Hannett argued
64. W.W., Jan.9, 1931, P .3
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the minority pro-R.I.L.U. Labor Council view on compulsory 
arbitration and industrial peace, but also warned against 
trying to force the Australian unions into a position openly 
hostile to the Labor Party. In reply the R.I.L.U. Executive 
addressed a carefully worded letter to the Labor Council which 
despite its "spirit of the most comradely and constructive 
self-criticism" suggested the Council more firmly adhere to 
the R.I.L.U's third period line by repudiating all forms of 
arbitration and talcing steps which would in effect have 
amounted to denouncing the A.L.P. The R.I.L.U. Executive 
also praised the 1929 minority report on arbitration - dismis­
sing the majority viewpoint as 'retrogressive' - and criticised 
the continued organisational weakness of the Council, particu­
larly its relatively decentralised control over affiliated 
unions.^
The R.I.L.U. letter caused a furore when it was 
discussed by the Labor Council throughout the early months 
of 1930. It was not so much the theoretical criticism of 
Council policies which inspired opposition: in the course of
the Council's long discussion of the letter the P.P.T.U.S. 
resolutions were fully endorsed, and N.S.W. delegates to the 
February A.C.T.U. Congress were instructed to support 
continued affiliation with the Secretariat. However the 
R.I.L.U. letter had gone much further than the P.P.T.U.S. 
resolutions, leaving no scope for negotiation with the parent 
organisation and detailing doctrinaire measures which were 
hailed by the M.M.M. minority on the Council as edicts to be 
obeyed, but were regarded as ridiculous and suicidal by the 
Labor Council majority. After much heated debate and in the 
face of rowdy Communist disruption it was finally decided to 
reply to the R.I.L.U's epistle with a letter through which 
the R.I.L.U. could "be ^more] fully informed of working class 
efforts in this State"• Following consideration of the
65. P.P.W., April 1, 1930, pp.113-118.
66. L.D., May 2, 1930, p.6.
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R.I.L.U. letter there was a pronounced disillusionment with 
the Council's overseas affiliations and although an official 
majority delegation was selected to attend the R.I.L.U's 
1930 congress the project was eventually abandoned because 
of failure to raise the necessary funds for their travel 
overseas. Nor was the official delegation encouraged by 
Moscow to attend the R.I.L.U. Congress. The field was thus 
left clear for the M.M.M. delegation to berate the N.S.W.
Labor Council at the Moscow forum.
Still the R.I.L.U. did not openly repudiate the
Labor Council. In spite of the M.M.M. delegation's fierce
criticism of the Labor Council majority and the united
cacophony of praise for third period policies at the Fifth
Congress, the R.I.L.U. Executive declined to attack its
Australian section, and it was not till 1931 that the break
finally came. Though official reports of the R.I.L.U's Fifth
Congress mentioned M.M.M. attacks on the Scullin government
references to its disputes with the N.S.W. Labor Council were
suppressed,^ For some months after the M.M.M. delegation's
return the Workers' Weekly also maintained silence on the
outcome of the Congress vis-a-vis relations between the Labor
Council and the R.I.L.U. The explanation for this delay is
difficult to fathom and is virtually impossible to document
but it would appear that there was an attempt by the R.I.L.U.
Executive to work through the Comintern representative H.M.
Wicks to seek some rapprochement or understanding with its
Australian section. It was apparently hoped that by such a
rapprochement the Pan-Pacific Worker could be maintained and
trade union pressure brought to bear on the Scullin government
to allow the convening of the Third P.P.T.U.S. Pan-Pacific
6 8Conference in Australia.
67. For the report of the Fifth Congress of the R.I.L.U. and 
its occasional references to the Australian question see 
Inprecorr, 1930» No.38» pp.782-784; No.40, pp.850-852;
No.41, pp.874-876; No.42, pp.891-900; No.43, PP.919-922.
68. Cf. P.P.W,, Oct,1, 1930, pp.291-293; Nov.1, 1930, pp.231- 
232.
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Wicks would have been a logical enough choice
for such negotiations, for he had previously attracted the
attention of Comintern and R.I.L.U. leaders for his antipathy
to both the right and left factions in the C.P.U.S.A. during
69its third period reorganisation in the late 1920s. Failing 
to gain a place in the restructured American party Wicks had 
undertaken party reorganisation in several Asian countries 
before being despatched to Australia, apparently with no very 
clear mandate beyond restructuring the C.P.A. but with the 
obvious intention of providing Moscow with an independent 
assessment of the local situation. However Wicks was soon 
closely involved with the Moxon-Sharkey-Miles faction in 
ousting Kavanagh from the C.P.A. and in the course of these 
struggles decided to throw in his lot with the new leadership. 
Wicks's enthusiasm for violence helped inspire the organised 
basher gangs that the party unleashed on its nominated enemies, 
and his ruthlessness in restructuring the C.P.A. and his 
dictatorial manner towards all who questioned his authority 
were principal factors in antagonising unionists and left-wing 
socialists who had previously willingly cooperated with 
Communism. Wicks saw Garden as a rival and the arch 'left 
social fascist' traitor and was unable to reach any agreement 
with him over the P.P.T.U.S. issue. He clashed too with the 
Pan-Pacific Worker's assistant editor J. Ryan and advised the 
R.I.L.U. to desist in its plans to continue associating with 
such men and to make a final break with the N.S.W. Labor 
C ouncil•
Wicks moved to oust Ryan from the Pan-Pacific Worker 
late in 1930» but was met with further delay over the issue 
on the part of Moscow. He charged Ryan with continuing to 
utilise the Pan-Pacific Worker as a vehicle for 'social fascist'
69. See Wicks, Eclipse of October, p p .240 ff. Just previous 
to his Australian assignment Wicks was briefly considered 
for accession to the leadership of the American Communist 
Party. In 1937 he was expelled from the C.P.U.S.A. on the 
charge that he had since 19^9 been a secret anti-Communist 
agent.
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propaganda on behalf of Lang and Garden. His specific
charges apparently concerned an article in the September
1930 issue of the Pan-Pacific Worker in which Ryan referred
approvingly to the idea of a moratorium on interest payments
to British investors. C.P.A. leaders later denounced these
references as "echoes of Lang; his exact words as spoken from
70dozens of platforms and blazoned in the press", and Wicks
insisted on ’correcting’ the Pan-Pacific Worker’s line on
71this issue. Even so it was not until January 1931 that
Moscow agreed to Ryan's ouster from assistant editorship of
the journal. "The Party on numerous occasions endeavoured
to correct Ryan but he is determined now to leave the rough,
hard work of organising the revolution to others", the Workers'
Weekly finally announced with some relief. "He says he cannot
'understand' the C.I. line".
Ryan has now broken with the R.I.L.U. and is 
finished completely with the revolutionary movement, 
both in Australia and internationally. Ryan now openly 
joins Garden as a left Social Fascist.
Adieu, Ryan revolutionary - enter Ryan renegade I'
Henceforth the Pan-Pacific Worker was edited by Wicks and his
closest protege L.L. Sharkey and soon succumbed to the third
period's Midas touch of failure, its circulation dropping
abruptly and its debts mounting, till it was finally forced
to cease publication in early 1932.
As well as sacking Ryan from the Pan-Pacific Worker
the R.I.L.U. Executive issued a long thesis on the Australian
situation in which it finally and decisively repudiated the
leadership of the Labor Council of N.S.W. and called on
unionists to support the policies of the M.M.M. dominated
73Vigilance Committee. Garden however continued to maintain 
publicly that it was the C.P.A. that was "out of step with 
the Communist International" and that the Labor Council of
70. W.W., April 24, 1931, P •2.
71. P.P.W,, Jan.3, 1931, PP.3-5.
72. W.W., Jan.23, 1931, p .2.
73. See P.P.W., Jan.5, 1931, pp.7-12.
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74N.S.W. remained affiliated to the R.I.L.U. In the face 
of these claims Lozovsky in mid-1931 addressed a letter to 
the Australian working class which came down decisively in 
support of the C.P.A., and after listing the Australian 
M.M.M's charges against Garden concluded that
Owing to these and similar activities, Mr. J.S. 
Garden placed himself outside of the ranks of the Red 
International of Labor Unions, which has no room for 
strike-breakers, agents of the capitalists and oppo­
nents of the class struggle, even if from time to time 
they make "left" speeches to deceive the workers and 
retain their allegiance.... Attacking as he does the 
revolutionary wing of the Australian working class 
movement in the person of the Militant Minority Movement, 
J.S. Garden has thereby gone over to the camp of the 
enemies of the Australian and international proletariat.
There is not and cannot be any room for the enemies 
of the working class in the ranks of the R.I.L.U.73
In the face of C.P.A. attacks and repudiation by 
the R.I.L.U. the Labor Council leadership turned increasingly 
anti-Communist and moved into closer and closer alliance with 
the N.S.W. Labor Party. Throughout 1930 the Council had 
campaigned strongly to have the Labor Party placed in 
government in N.S.W. and following its electoral success in 
November of that year Garden entered into a pact with 0.
Schreiber (marshal of the more moderate unions at Trades 
Hall) to give full and unequivocal support to the Lang 
regime.^ As a result Garden increasingly cooperated with 
Lang's notorious Inner Group at A.L.P. headquarters (Room 32 
of Trades Hall) in promoting the Lang government as the answer 
to the problems facing unionists. This was a necessary move 
in safeguarding the position of the Labor Council leadership, 
as a combined vote of the M.M.M's Vigilance Committee with 
the traditional moderate and right-wing opponents of the 
Garden group might have led to a spill of office-holders.
74. W.W., April 3, 1931, p .15 S.M.H., Jan.10, 1931. 
73. W.W., July 31, 1931, P •2.
76. S.M.H.. Nov.10, 1930.
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Garden's new alliance with the Inner Group-dominated moderate
unions provided valuable assistance in countering Communist
attempts to influence and disrupt the business of the Labor
Council and he frequently resorted to the Schreiber faction's
little known Trades Hall Secretaries' Association to manage
77Council business. In return he helped direct a propaganda 
campaign aimed at rallying militant workers behind the N.S.W. 
Labor Party, meeting C.P.A. 'social fascist' arguments with 
populist pro-Lang slogans of nationalist and simple appeal.
And to counter the C.P.A's attempts to extend its influence 
through front organisations the N.S.W. A.L.P. placed a ban on 
Labor Party members joining these bodies, continually 
updating this ban as the Communists attempted to form new 
organisations to elude the A.L.P's new restrictions.
The right wing Inner Group domination of Labor 
Party affairs was further strengthened by the appointment of 
A.C. Willis in early 1931 as N.S.W. Agent-General in London. 
Willis had been Lang's only real threat amongst State Labor 
politicians (he was, before his departure, Leader of the 
Government in the Legislative Council) and his decision to 
leave the field open to his adversary is difficult to explain. 
Willis may have been influenced by personal considerations, 
and at the age of fifty four sought retirement from labour
>7 opolitics in his country of origin. On the other hand he 
may have also, as the Workers' Weekly claimed, been intimi­
dated by the erosion of his old power base in the Miners' 
Federation by a variety of other 'left social fascist' leaders 
and the angry rank and file M.M.M. Certainly it was a fatal 
move, for in the heated and Rafferty rules atmosphere of 
N.S.W. politics there was little hope of maintaining influence 
from afar. Soon after the new Agent-General left for London
77. W.W., July 19, 1931, p.2; July 24, 1931, p.2.
78. Willis was born in Wales and educated at a boarding school
in London and at Ruskin College, Oxford. He arrived in 
Australia in 1911. For a detailed (though peculiarly 
interpretative) sketch of his political career in 
Australia see I.E. Young: "A.C. Willis: Welsh Nonconfor­
mist and the Labor Party in New South Wales, 1911-33", in 
the Journal of Religious History, Vol.2, No.4, 1963, P P .
303-313.
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Lang managed to secure control of Willis's old mouthpiece 
the Labor Daily and made it part of his own personal political 
machine. With Lang's fall from office in 1932 the new conser­
vative State government recalled Willis from his London post 
to face a bleak political future. Opposed by the Lang machine 
at every turn, in 1933 Willis finally sought to regain his 
position by contesting a by-election for the N.S.W. coalmining 
seat of Bulli, hoping for support from the miners and from the 
strong Socialisation movement within the Labor Party. He was 
easily defeated by an Inner Group nominee who had the benefit 
of being a Catholic in a campaign in which Willis's known 
anti-Catholicism figured prominently; and for opposing an 
endorsed candidate Willis found himself expelled once more 
from the N.S.W. Labor Party.
Thus by 1931 the left-wing industrialist-Lang 
alliance had dissolved into the all-powerful Inner Group 
dictatorship, dedicated only to Tammany-style politics and 
populist demagogy. After eliminating Willis from the Labor 
political scene Lang was able to utilise Garden in mustering 
militant unionists to his bidding. Consistently, from 1931 
to 1933 the Inner Group utilised the Garden-led unionists in 
managing and finally dissolving the electorate based Sociali­
sation Units which were attempting to commit the Lang Labor
79Party to 'Socialism in Our Time'. It is a fair certainty
that Lang could not have so beaten the Socialisation movement
had not Garden's organising skills and industrial muscle been
at the Inner Group's disposal. Thus the man who had commanded
the forces of the far left at the 1921 Melbourne trade union
congress now found himself opposing a three year socialisation
80platform for the A.L.P. as 'unscientific socialism'. The
Labor left had indeed become, as the C.P.A. had predicted, a 
force for 'social fascism'; for reform rather than revolution.
Doubtless it was that the ex-E.C.C.I. and R.I.L.U. 
Executive member had increasingly mellowed in the decade since
79» For a detailed account of the rise and fall of the Sociali­
sation Units see R. Cooksey, Lang and Socialism (Canb.,
1971).
80. Ibid., esp. pp.44-45; 81
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he had joined with W.P. Earsman to form the first C.P.A.
In this process personal advancement had come to substitute 
for ideals. Always prone to lapses in behaviour Garden and 
most of the old Trades Hall reds who followed his lead 
apparently found the rewards of Inner Group patronage 
irresistible by the early depression years. Certainly Garden 
was to serve Lang as a loyal lieutenant for the next few 
years until the Inner Group's attempts to gain control of the 
radio station 2KY finally inspired the Labor Council leaders 
to leave the Lang fold in 1936.
Yet when all this is said the elements of continuity 
in Garden's political stance are equally clear. From early on 
he had culled his faith from Left Wing Communism and not from 
Lenin whole. He had always seen that in a complex and 
developed labour movement such as Australia's the necessity 
to compromise and manoeuvre meant adjustment of principles 
to the dictates of power and political reality. This was a 
logical application of tactics expounded in Left Wing Communism 
and endorsed by the united front policy of the 1920s which 
inevitably led on to the dilemma men such as Garden were faced 
with when the Comintern returned to the tenets of a more 
pristine and sectarian Leninism in its adventurous third period. 
For those placed in Garden's position the choice then lay 
between following the new line C.P.A. out of the organised 
labour movement or moving into alliances with more right wing 
forces as protection against Communist attacks from the rear.
The move towards the right was more appealing if for no other 
reason than that third period policies prescribed a course 
which was totally impractical in Australia (and most other 
Western countries as well). Given the power relationships 
and political realities surrounding left-wing activity in the 
labour movement the policy of 'social fascism' was a self- 
fulfilling prophecy.
The drift towards anti-Communism on the part of 
the previously most militant section of the N.S.W. labour
342
movement was paralleled in other States too. As in Sydney, 
the T.H.C. leaderships in Brisbane and Adelaide were soon 
organising to control and thwart the activities of their 
Communist minority of delegates. Initially much further to 
the right, the Melbourne T.H.C. acted strongly against 
attempts by two Communist delegates on the Council to intro­
duce Sydney-style organised disruption into its affairs, and 
after repeated attempts to do this the offending delegates 
were suspended. More significant was the leading role played 
by left-wing socialists in attempts to suppress the C.P.A.
The anti-Communist zeal of right-wing trade unionists was if 
anything exceeded by members of the tiny Socialist Party of 
Australia whose union representatives and delegates to the 
Melbourne Trades Hall Council called for the suppression and 
banning of the Workers 1 Weekly and the M.M.M's Red Leader and
frequently also launched into attacks on the Soviet Union
81itself as a capitalist state in disguise. Leading A.C.T.U.
officials like W. Duggan, though they would have no truck
with the S.P.A's advocacy of placing legal bans on the C.P.A.,
joined readily enough in formulating measures designed to
curtail Communist activities in the political and industrial
sphere. Even Don Cameron, who staunchly defended the C.P.A’s
right to free speech and had continuously worked to promote
tolerance towards Communism for over a decade, finally lost
patience and supported efforts to combat Communist attempts
to influence events in the labour movement. In early 1932
Cameron, as newly elected President of the Victorian A.L.P.,
publicly commended the N.S.W. Labor Party’s ban on Communist
fronts, and later in the year he was instrumental in bringing
82into effect a similar ban in Victoria.
Cameron's conversion to outright anti-Communism 
was indicative of the shift away from old-style radicalism 
in the labour movement. Like Garden, Cameron had previously 
taken up a position on the far left of organised labour and
81. See for example W.W., May 22, 1931» p.2; R.L., Mar.11,
1932, p .2.
82. See Louis, op. cit., p.185.
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consistently stressed the need for unity of left-wing forces 
to advance the cause of socialism. As Secretary of the V.S.P. 
throughout the 1920s he had worked hard to maintain that 
party as an agitational and propaganda force. It had not been 
an easy task. The party had steadily declined to but a shadow 
of its former self, its older members absorbed into trade 
union or Labor Party affairs, the few new recruits to radica­
lism often more attracted to the C.P.A. or youth organisations 
associated with the A.L.P. Nevertheless the V.S.P. had 
remained influential for, paradoxically, the critical factor 
in its organisational decline had been its successful infusion 
of former members into the front ranks of the unions and the 
A.L.P.: the party thus maintained an entree into the counsels
of labour which was denied to other left-wing sects, and the 
tolerant and united front doctrines which were the hallmark 
of the V.S.P. remained an important factor in promoting 
radical causes throughout the 1920s. With the changed atmos­
phere of the early depression years however even the stalwarts 
of the V.S.P. could see little point in persevering with
socialist propaganda seeking to bridge the gap between organised
8 qlabour and the C.P.A. In 1932 the party organ Union Voice 
ceased publication and the V.S.P. was formally wound up.
There were however some socialists who despite 
constant C.P.A. attacks persevered with efforts to maintain 
a broad working-class unity. The most important example of 
this was amongst the rank and file of the Socialisation Units 
of the N.S.W. Labor Party. Socialisation Units had developed 
in the N.S.W. A.L.P. following the appointment by the 1930 
Annual Conference of a committee to propagate the socialist 
objective of the Labor Party and the Units quickly expanded 
into a significant challenge to the Inner Group leadership
83. The Union Voice, edited by R.S. Ross, succeeded the
Socialist in 1924. As well as incorporating the Socialist 
and Ross’s Monthly the Union Voice also contained the 
Clothing Trades Gazette as a supplement.
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of the Party till they were eventually brought under strict
control and disbanded in 1933. Increasingly radical in their
politics many Socialisation Unit members supported attempts
to commit Labor to a definite Three-Year Plan of widespread
socialisation, and some even supported an attempt to convert
84the Labor Party to a programme of violent revolution. In 
addition the Socialisation Units provided a centre of 
opposition to the N.S.W. A.L.P. Executive’s ruling barring 
Labor Party members from joining Communist front organisations. 
Based on a minority report submitted by a member of the 
socialisation movement to the N.S.W. A.L.P. Annual Conference 
in 1932 a concerted effort was undertaken to repudiate the 
Executive ruling, a move which was eventually defeated by 73 
votes to 4 2 . 85
From early on the Socialisation Units were a target 
of intense C.P.A. calumny, and leading figures in the movement 
such as J. Kilburn, W. McNamara and D. Grant were constantly 
attacked as 'left social fascist' rogues intent on providing 
a smokescreen for the class treachery of the A.L.P. The 
Communist policy towards all such organisations was to form 
a 'united front from below' with Unit members in order to 
expose the 'social fascist' designs of their leaders and thus 
draw the radicalised rank and file towards the C.P.A. In fact 
- as with most third period endeavours - the yawning gap 
between the demonstrable intentions of Socialisation Unit 
leaders and the Communist description of their intentions 
was such that no 'united front from below' ever crystallised 
and C.P.A. attempts to break away Socialisation Units from 
the A.L.P. were ignominious failures. In the light of these 
facts it is difficult to explain the interest shown by 
Socialisation Unit members in opposing the A.L.P. Executive's 
ruling on Communist front activities. Crypto-Communists in 
the ranks of Socialisation unit members are of course a 
possibility, but there seem to have been remarkably few of
84. Cooksey, op. cit., pp.4 9 -5 7 .
85. Ibid., p . 5 9 .
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these judging- by the poor response to C.P.A. efforts to
induce the Units to repudiate the A.L.P. when - presumably -
the Party would have ordered them to declare themselves.
Certainly some A.L.P. members - one known example was Senator
Arthur Rae - were prepared to stand the hectoring and abuse
that was the lot of non-Communists who joined in the C.P.A.
auxiliary bodies and took part in their activities at this
86period. More likely however the large minority of 
Socialisation Unit members who refused to join the leadership 
of the N.S.W. A.L.P. in their anti-Communist campaigns saw the 
issue as a matter of principle that the working class should 
not engage in warfare on itself, and were prepared to turn 
the other cheek to the attacks of the C.P.A., and to bide 
their time in the hope that Communism would once again begin 
to work with its potential allies and friends in the counsels 
of organised labour.
A similar attitude towards Communism was adopted 
by the militant leaders of the Australian Railways Union.
Though trenchantly attacked by the C.P.A. as ’left social 
fascists', A.R.U. leaders attempted to stand aside from the 
anti-Communist crusades popular with many members of the 
A.L.P., and in August 1931 the Commonwealth Council of the 
A.R.U. went so far as to announce their intention to affiliate 
the union directly with the R.I.L.U. and the P.P.T.U.S.^ 
Undoubtedly a critical factor in this decision was the A.R.U. 
leadership's disillusionment with Labor government treatment 
of its members in cutting back wages and employment in the 
course of the depression. But at the same time the A.R.U's 
action also reflected a strong concern in that union to regain 
the initiative towards establishing working-class internation­
alism as a principle of action in labour affairs and to re-form 
the old left-wing Labor and socialist alliance that had existed
86. For oblique references to the treatment meted out to Rae
and other prominent 'social fascist' members of Communist 
front organisations see W.W., April 3» 1931» p.6; May 1,
1931, P.2.
87. R.L., Aug.28, 1931, p.4.
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throughout the 1920s. The move however was doomed to 
failure for the A.R.U's overtures were not welcomed by the 
C.P.A., whose organs continued to berate the 'bureaucrats' 
of that union, and whose M.M.M. continued for some time to 
attempt to oust the leaders of its unwelcome sister R.I.L.U.
o oaffiliate. The practical demise of the P.P.T.U.S. after 
mid-1931 and the inapplicability of R.I.L.U. industrial 
policies also prevented anything very positive resulting from 
the affiliations. Following threats by the conservative 
Lyons Federal government to deregister the A.R.U. from the 
arbitration courts because of its association with the R.I.L.U. 
the affiliation was quietly withdrawn in late 1932, and after 
this the railwaymen's interest in direct overseas links tended 
to 1ap s e .
Of all the radical groups then, few of their 
members showed any interest in joining the C.P.A. in promoting 
insurrection after the Russian model and even those organisa­
tions opposed to the anti-Communism of the Labor Party were 
interested principally in united front activities in the 
Australian context. Exceptions of course were welcomed 
noisily by the C.P.A. but of all left-wing groupings only 
the I.W.W. in Adelaide provided converts in any numbers to 
third period Communism. The C.P.A. had been revived in Adelaide 
in 1929 and had expanded quite rapidly with the impact of the 
depression and spreading disillusion with the incompetence and 
conservatism of the State Labor government. To the Wobblies 
the new aggressiveness injected by the M.M.M. into the 
industrial scene proved highly attractive and they joined 
with that organisation in unemployed demonstrations and strike 
activities in Adelaide throughout 1930* The C.P.A's abandonment 
of the united front too had removed reservations in the minds 
of the Wobblies as to Communism's attitude towards the A.L.P. 
and the A.W.U., and following a number of individual conversions 
the Australian headquarters and Adelaide Local of the I.W.W.
88. R.L., Sept.11, 1931, p.3; Oct.16, 1931, p.5-
347
was disbanded in February 1931» the majority of its members 
joining either the M.M.M. or the C.P.A. y After this date 
nothing remained of the I.W.W. as an organisation, though a 
few of the indefatigable attempted to carry on some Wobbly 
propaganda in opposition to the C.P.A. - mostly restricted 
in their horizons to the conversion of audiences in the 
Sydney Domain.
Clearly enough third period Communism had hindered 
rather than helped the radicalisation of the labour movement 
in the period 1930 to 1932. Of all the left-wing groups 
outside the C.P.A. only the I.W.W. can be said to have been 
won over to Communism and even then there was some dissent.
Thus the C.P.A. in these years remained essentially a party 
of the unemployed and largely isolated from organised labour. 
Its logical allies in the socialist movement exhibited varied 
reactions to the attacks mounted on them by the Communists, 
ranging from rabid counter-attack from men of the Garden 
stamp, to abject forgiveness from fellow travellers like Arthur 
Rae. Xn practice this meant either merger and alliance with 
right wing forces in the labour movement or inactivity on the 
part of those still willing to work with Communism but excluded 
or repelled from taking a leading part in radical activities by 
aggressive C.P.A. fraction work in its fronts. The net effect 
was to weaken the forces of the left. Despite the growth of 
conditions favourable to the propagation of socialism left-wing 
initiatives lacked overall direction, and radicalism stood 
divided on itself.
Feb.13, 1931, p.6.89. W.W.,
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iv. Labor isolationism
From early on the Scullin government was intent
on asserting itself as the authoritative voice of organised
labour on matters of foreign affairs. The division of the
forces of the left, and the A.C.T.U. break with the Pan-Pacific
Secretariat, ensured that throughout 1930 at least the Labor
government found itself with an unexpected freedom of
manoeuvre. As Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs
90Scullin seized the opportunity to promote those policies 
born out of his attempts to draw a divided and recalcitrant 
party towards acceptance of the Imperial connection: stressing
at the same time the A.L.P’s commitment to peace and disarma­
ment, and its responsibility towards the British Commonwealth. 
By 1931 however the impact of the Great Depression and the 
threatening international scene caused a revulsion against 
the Scullin government’s initiatives, and the Labor Movement 
was thrown back towards extreme isolationism.
The government's leading role in the formulation of
foreign policy was demonstrated at the Commonwealth Conference
of the A.L.P. held in May 1930» Despite the promises
flourished by Labor Party supporters at the February Congress
of the A.C.T.U. a motion - moved by R.S. Ross and pressed by
the N.S.W. radicals - that the A.L.P. make renewed efforts
91to convene a pan-Pacific conference was soundly defeated.
A sop to internationalist sentiment was provided by a vague 
motion that investigations be carried out into the lapsed 
affiliation with the Labour and Socialist International, but 
no action resulted. The Conference decided that it was 
unnecessary to appoint a committee to make any detailed 
investigations of foreign affairs questions because, as the 
Queensland politician W. Forgan Smith put it, ”if committees
90. Scullin was Minister for Industry and External Affairs 
as well as Prime Minister.
91. A.L.P. Twelfth Commonwealth Conference Report, 1930» p.56.
were going to be formed on every conceivable item on the
agenda paper, there would be no delegates left to take part
92in the conference".
In government, cautious but general acceptance of
the foreign policy status-quo was an accomplished fact by
this time. A clear guide to Labor's thinking was provided
by the visit of J.E. Fenton (Minister for Trade and Customs)
to London in January 1930 to attend the Naval Disarmament
Conference. Not only did Fenton participate in the framing
of a common British viewpoint for the Conference but he
publicly announced his enthusiasm for the Admiralty's blue
93water strategy and supported the 'big navy' men. This
positive acquiescence in the links with Britain was further
underlined by Scullin's visit to the Imperial Conference in
London in October 1930. His visit was highlighted by the
announcement of the appointment of an Australian (Sir Isaac
Isaacs) as Governor-General, and efforts to expand markets
for Australian exports. However the Prime Minister in no
way sought to transgress the limits of Empire membership and
dominion status already well established by precedent
throughout the 1920s, and the overall direction of his visit
was to assert Labor's 'independent Australian Briton' stamp.
"I have come to the Imperial Conference representing a
nation, not a political party", Scullin announced in a speech
at the British National Trade Union Club. "I am no flagwagger;
nevertheless I strongly believe in the unity of the British94Commonwealth of Nations". In the course of the Conference
Scullin complemented the McDonald Labour government on its
moves towards disarmament and the promotion of world peace
and stressed that "On the unity of the British Commonwealth
may depend, in time of crisis, the preservation of world
95peace".
92. Ibid., p.54.
93. Perks, op. cit., p.274.
94. S.M.H,, Oct.24, 1930, p.11.
95. Imperial Conference 1930» Report (Ottawa, 1931), p .12
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Accompanying these moves to promote Commonwealth 
unity were very positive Australian initiatives towards 
disarmament. Within a fortnight of being sworn into office 
the Scullin Ministry abolished compulsory military training, 
and the subsequent dramatic and continuing rundown in defence 
was vaunted as a wilful act. At the London Imperial Conference 
Scullin pointed to Australia’s 'active sympathy’ for the 
movement towards world disarmament. His co-delegate to the 
Imperial Conference, the religio-pacifist Attorney-General 
Frank Brennan, went somewhat further in a speech before the 
League of Nations:
Australia tells the world, as a gesture of peace, that 
she is not prepared for war.... We have given practical 
proof of our earnestness.... We have drawn our pen 
through the schedule of military expenditure with 
unprecedented firmness. We have reversed a policy which 
has subsisted in Australia for twenty-five years of 
compelling the youth to learn the art of w a r . ^
On the other hand the wish to bask in the warm glow of current
’peace by disarmament' opinion was not shared by all members
of the Labor cabinet and there were those who explained the
severe defence cutbacks in more mundane terms, as economy
measures, or as an attempt to introduce efficiency into defence
97expenditure as well as a 'gesture of peace'! In the upshot
there was little enough interest in sustaining Brennan's parade 
of Australian defence inadequacies before world opinion and in 
1931 the Labor government decided that it could not afford to 
send a delegate to the League. By this time Australia's 
contribution to world disarmament was one of the lesser 
concerns of a government deep in the process of collapse and 
struggling to comprehend the enormity of the problems brought 
on by the Great Depression.
The decline of Labor interest in world affairs was 
followed by a move back towards extreme isolationism. Japan's 
invasion of Manchuria in late 1931 had an effect similar to
96 . Cited in Hasluck, op. cit.,
97. Ibid. pp.39-40.
p. 39
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that of Chanak a decade before. Both the League of Nations
and the British Empire were involved in possible developments
and both became the object of intense suspicion. E.J. Ward,
the newly elected Lang Labor M.H.R. for East Sydney
immediately challenged Scullin to "give an undertaking that
in no circumstances will Australian lives be sacrificed in
98the event of a war for Chinese markets". Scullin refused
to comment. Later, in reply to further questioning by the
Leader of the pro-Lang caucus in Federal parliament J.A.
Beasley, the Prime Minister denied that he was privy to
League attitudes on the Manchurian question and defended the
government's total silence on the matter as the best way to
99avoid aggravating a war situation. Labor tumbled from
office shortly after, still maintaining stony silence on 
developments in the Far East.
The Lang movement in N.S.W. served to crystallise 
Labor's growing isolationism into a dogma and item of faith. 
Lang abstracted from the Australian experience of depression 
a radical populist ideology that placed his movement in 
history and made him the man of the hour. The depression was 
characterised as a selfishly contrived affair begun by London- 
based bankers and employers who had also manipulated Australian 
"Money Power" in their attempts to exploit the world,
Seizing on Scullin's acquiescence in the Bank of England- 
sponsored Niemeyer-Gregory Mission to Australia Lang accused 
the Federal A.L.P. of treachery to the labour movement in its 
pursuit of moderate economic policies. In opposition to the 
Federal Labor Party he promoted the 'Lang Plan': a skein of
proposals which included ideas of declaring a moratorium on 
the payment of interest to British invest ors,expanding the 
local economy by 'funny money' inflation, and abandoning the 
gold standard. Former Communists and Trades Hall reds like
98. C.P.D., Vol.132, Oct.14, 1931, P.709.
99. Ibid., Oct.22, 1931,  P .1 0 7 4 .
100. See J.T. Lang, Why I Fight (Syd., 193^)«
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Garden and J.A. Beasley were completely subservient to this 
line of propaganda, supporting it with quick-grab quotes from 
Marx and Lenin, Though some Lang Labor politicians such as 
Arthur Rae (and - at more remove - E.J. Ward) participated 
in the activities of Communist front organisations such as 
the League Against Imperialism, the class struggle imagery 
in Langism was essentially confined to nationalist dimensions. 
Anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, anti-British, Langism 
played on a parochial kind of "Ocker" nationalism and isola­
tionism, This approach to foreign affairs was well illustrated 
by one of Lang's Federal parliamentary spokesmen H.P. Lazzarini, 
M.H.R., when he attacked the Scullin government's proposal to 
send a senior representative to the world disarmament talks 
at Geneva in 1932, suggesting that instead they could simply 
send a cable "that the Australian Government is absolutely in
favour of disarmament of all kinds, and thus save the expense
1 01of sending an Australian delegation to the conference".
Such an approach was to set the tone of A.L.P. politics 
throughout the thirties era, the major factions of the Labor 
Movement competing with each other to enunciate the most 
extreme isolationist stance.
v. Communist internationalism
By the early 1930s, then, the sole remaining voice 
of labour internationalism was the Communist Party, In stark 
contrast to a labour movement bereft of internationalist 
ideals the C.P.A. sought to inculcate the working class with 
a sense of belonging to a worldwide movement and to develop 
solidarity with Comintern sections overseas. The efforts met 
with mixed success, for although a basis was laid in these 
years for the extension of Communist influence as international 
affairs became of increasing importance, the C.P.A's third
101. C.P.D,, Vol.130, July 14, 1931, p.3800
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period policies for the most part proved an almost insuperable 
barrier to the propagation of Communist ideas. Up until 1933 
Communist internationalism was of little positive influence 
in the wider labour movement.
The most important overseas cause which the C.P.A. 
sought to promote was the image of the U.S.S.R., whose 
interests were attended to by the newly created front organi­
sation known as the Friends of the Soviet Union. The F.O.S.U.
1 02had been born originally in Moscow in 1927 and the idea of
setting up a branch in Australia was first mooted in early
1930. It was not until September of that year however that
branches of the F.O.S.U. were established in Sydney and
Newcastle, and an organiser for the project appointed in the
103person of E.C. Tripp. It was a small organisation to start
with but by early 1932 boasted 900 members in the Sydney area 
alone, and thenceforth rapidly expanded to over 2,000 members 
throughout Australia by the end of that year, with active 
branches operating in all eastern States. The F.O.S.U's task 
was to counter all propaganda or commentary that was in any 
way inimical to the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union, whose star had 
shone so brightly in the minds of Australian workers in 1918» 
had come to be thought of by 1930 as backward and long-suffe­
ring, and facing problems so remote from those of the 
Australian working class as to render the experiences of 
Russian Communists of little relevance locally. Despite this 
of course a strong general sympathy for the Bolshevik govern­
ment remained in labour circles. It fell to the F.O.S.U. to 
transform this widespread working class sympathy for Russia 
into positive acclamation of its achievements, and to change
102. For the F.O.S.U's early history see A. Inkpin, Friends 
of the U.S.S.R. (London, 1942).
103. See ¥.¥., Aug.15, 1930, p.2; Sept.26, 1930, p.3. In late 
1929 Tripp attended the Lenin School in Moscow and there 
took part in E.C.C.I. discussions of the Australian ques­
tion. He had earlier been a friend of H. Moxon, and in 
early 1929 stood as a C.P.A. candidate against the A.L.P. 
in the Queensland elections. Back in Australia in 1930 he 
came to support the Kavanagh faction in the C.P.A. Expel-
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the image of that country from that of a backward land in 
which the forces of socialism were making slow if creditable 
advances in extremely adverse conditions into that of a 
country which through the miracle of Stalin’s Five Year Plan 
had advanced to a state where it could be contrasted with 
Western nations and by its full employment and constantly 
improving conditions of life show the out of work masses that 
Communism in action in Russia was the way of the future for 
all mankind.
And there were a number of Australians who found 
elements at least of this view plausible and attractive in 
the depression years. For the unemployed, especially those 
who had come into contact with Communist ideas, the F.O.S.U. 
had an obvious appeal. The F.O.S.U. also appears to have 
fulfilled a wider social function, and by early 1933 its 
speakers were attracting large audiences in Sydney and
1 04Melbourne to some hundreds of lectures per month. In
addition to lectures the F.O.S.U. engaged in social activities 
such as celebrating the anniversary of the Russian Revolution, 
and organising concerts and conferences which proved an 
attraction to large numbers of people. Some idea of the 
F.O.S.U’s broader impact in the years of the Great Depression
can be guaged from the fact that by December 1932 its journal
10 5Soviets Today had reached a circulation of 12,500 and 
continued to expand rapidly despite concerted attempts by the 
Federal government to curb its sales.
Above all else however it was the contribution of 
the intellectuals which helped the F.O.S.U. become a force 
in the early 1930s. The talented and reasoned lecturing and 
argument of men like Ralph Gibson and Professors N. Greenwood 
and John Anderson made the F.O.S.U's message convincing and 
respectable to many who would otherwise have shown little 
interest in the Soviet Union. Their mode of careful discussion
led from the Party in 1933 Tripp became an early member 
of the Australian Trotskyist movement.
104. Soviets Today, Feb., 1933*
105. Ibid., Dec., 1932.
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of Australian-Soviet relations and their subtle bias in 
favour of the U.S.S.R. managed to cancel out and make 
apparently ridiculous much of the criticism of the Soviet 
Union emanating from the right.^^ The intellectuals who 
supported the F.O.S.U. thus made it appear something of a 
voice of reason and moderation, beset by rabid and irrational 
critics on the right, and totally uncritical admirers of the 
U.S.S.R. in the C.P.A. on its left.^^ Partly the intellec­
tuals’ role derived from a simple desire for fair play for the 
Communists in the face of misleading, muddled, and vicious
propaganda against the U.S.S.R. on the part of the Australian 
108right. Partly the enthusiasm of the F.O.S.U. intellectuals
came from fundamental and lifelong commitments some had made 
to themselves that the existing state of Western society was 
cursed, and that the socialist economic and political organi­
sation operating in the U.S.S.R. was the only basis for
109solving the problems of mankind. Still others made a more
106. Right-wing forces in Australia had throughout the 1920s 
made a point of disseminating anti-Soviet literature.
For instance at the 1925 elections the National Publicity 
Bureau circulated large amounts of propaganda issued by 
the Entente Internationale contre le H i e  Internationale. 
The Entente seems to have maintained some direct links 
with right-wing forces in Australia such as the Sane 
Democracy League. In the early 1930s right-wing propa­
ganda against the U.S.S.R. was stepped up dramatically 
with organisations such as the Sane Democracy League 
devoting considerable resources to this end.
107. The problem which the F.O.S.U. intellectuals presented
to right-wing propagandists was underlined by the 
numerous attempts of professional anti-Communists to 
label them as dupes of the C.P.A. See for example the 
pamphlet by T. Walsh, Sydney 'Varsity Professor Goes 
"RED”/An Open Letter to Professor Anderson (Syd. , 1*931 ) •
108. This strain of thought appears to dominate, for example, 
the pamphlet by N. Greenwood, The Soviet Union (N.p., 
N.d.).
. See for example R. Gibson, My Years in the Communist 
Party (Melb., 1966).109
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temporary commitment, showing themselves willing to accept
the less happy aspects of Communism with equanimity at the
height of the Great Depression, but increasingly disillusioned
throughout the 1930s till eventually they became the U.S.S.R's
more trenchant critics in the changed climate of opinion after 
1 1 0World War Two. In the early 1930s however the U.S.S.R.
impressed many thinking persons by its apparent solving of the 
problem of unemployment and by its demonstration that a planned 
economy, however imperfect, could work.
Yet if the F.O.S.U. struck new roots in Australian 
society for Communism it was nevertheless largely isolated and 
cut off from the majority of trade unionists. For the issue 
of unionist support for the Soviet Union could not escape the 
acrimonious disputes which had invaded working class politics 
after 1930* To some extent the F.O.S.U. sought to avoid these 
disputes. E.C. Tripp was a supporter of the Kavanagh faction 
in the C.P.A. and by applying moderate policies and avoiding 
Party intervention as much as possible the F.O.S.U. retained 
some appeal to its natural sympathisers in the union movement. 
In 1932, for example, several left-wing unions were persuaded 
to send delegates on a visit to the Soviet Union arranged by 
the F.O.S.U. The value of such united front activity however 
was drastically diminished by the unseemly fights for 
'possession' of the delegates as propaganda material which 
broke out between the Communist Party and the leadership of
110. John Anderson is a clear example of this. From soon
after becoming Challis Professor of Philosophy at Sydney 
University in 1927 Anderson moved ever closer to the 
C.P.A. and in 1929 supported the Moxon-Miles-Sharkey 
group in their overthrow of the Kavanagh leadership of 
the Party. In early 1930» despite the fact that he was 
still not formally a C.P.A. member, he apparently parti­
cipated in formulating Party policy at the highest level 
and attended its Plena. This state of affairs ended 
following Wicks's arrival in Australia. After Moxon's 
expulsion from the C.P.A. Anderson flirted with Trotskyism 
before becoming strongly anti-Communist in his later years. 
For an outline of Anderson's early career with the C.P.A. 
and the F.O.S.U. see J. Kavanagh Papers, A.N.U. Archives;
W.W., Oct.14, 1927, p .4; Nov.14, 1930, p.5; July 24, 1931, 
p.1; R.L., Aug.28, 1931, P .2.
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militant unions when the delegation returned to Australia. 
Furthermore in 1932 the F.O.S.U. Fell under the N.S.W. A.L.P's 
ban on membership of all Communist front organisations. This 
did not prevent the N.S.W. A.L.P. and a number of militant 
unions in early 1933 joining in successful protest meetings 
and deputations over the dismissal of a F.O.S.U. delegate to 
Russia from her job with the State Education Department. 
Nevertheless the ban on A.L.P. membership of the F.O.S.U. and 
the unavoidable overflow of the acrimony and rivalry between 
working-class organisations meant that it was impossible for 
close and consistent relations to be developed between the 
F.O.S.U. and the mass unions. Successful though the F.O.S.U. 
was when compared with most other C.P.A. fronts there is no 
doubt that it was hampered in its growth and very decisively 
weakened by its failure to develop such contacts with the 
mainstream labour movement.
For Communist-promoted causes less popular than
that of the U.S.S.R. the isolation from the labour movement
proved fatal. A flurry of front organisations were set up
throughout 1930 to lead brief and unsuccessful lives. They
were then quietly laid aside, or transmuted by C.P.A. fiat
into new organisations of similar life expectancy. Though
absorbing Party energies and resources they made almost no
impact whatsoever on Australian society.
One such body was the Workers*International Relief
which the C.P.A. promoted in opposition to the N.S.W. Labor
1 1 2Council's organisation of the same name. Established in
early 1930 in direct opposition to the Labor Council, the 
Communist Party's W.I.R. was completely dominated by a small 
but active C.P.A. membership who lost no opportunity to use
111. See R.L., Dec.7, 1932, p.8.
112. Cf. Ch.4, p.212. The Labor Council had taken over the 
running of the W.I.R. when the Trades Hall reds left the 
Communist Party in 1925-26. The Melbourne Trades Hall 
Council also operated a branch of the W.I.R. throughout 
the 1920s.
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the organisation as a vehicle for propaganda against Garden's
alleged neglect and maladministration of earlier W.I.R.
1 1 3activities. The new Communist Party W.I.R. provided some
assistance in the depression years to militant unionists who 
participated in M.M.M.-promoted strikes, but its resources 
were meagre, and as unionists turned away from strike action 
in 1931 and 1932 the W.I.R's functions lapsed completely.
Another victim of the C.P.A's sectarianism was the
International Class War Prisoners' Aid. This organisation had
attracted some wide support from trade unionists following its
foundation in Sydney in July 1929 but its Executive was soon
taken over by a militant and aggressive C.P.A. fraction and
it was used in early 1930 in a campaign to attack and discredit
the Labor Council of N.S.W. The rift between the I.C.W.P.A.
and the trade union movement was widened still further by the
attempt to concentrate propaganda activities on C.P.A. members
who had been charged with offences under N.S.W. State laws,
as part of a concerted Communist attempt to portray the Lang
Labor government as the initiator of repressive measures
1 1 4against the workers on behalf of capitalist justice. As
a result most of those trade unionists and A.L.P. members who 
had originally set up the I.C.W.P.A. were forced out of the 
organisation and not infrequently openly denounced it as a 
Communist-controlled front. By 1932 it was clear that not­
withstanding the exceptionally favourable conditions in which 
I.C.W.P.A. was established it had degenerated into an organi­
sation with no real mass links whatever. It was merged in 
that year into a new International Labour Defence, a small 
specialist Party organisation, which mainly confined itself 
to engaging lawyers for C.P.A. members in need of legal aid.
Throughout the early depression years the Communist 
Party also tried to promote solidarity activities on behalf
113. W.W,, Mar.28, 1930, p.2; Aug.29, 1930, p.3.
114. See for example W .W ., May 16 , 1931, p.1.
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of other Comintern sections overseas, notably those in India 
and China. For the most part these campaigns were abject 
failures, attracting very little support or even interest 
outside Communist circles. They were principally campaigns 
in which Communists talked to Communists about issues on 
which even they only shakily agreed, and where no divergence 
from the line laid down by the C.P.A. was tolerated.
One of the strangest of these campaigns was that
conducted on behalf of an alleged Communist revolution in
India in 1930. Comintern policy in India at this time was
to urge on the Communist Party of India the decisions of the
Sixth Comintern Congress and to attack Nationalist leaders
like Nehru and Gandhi as bourgeois reformers and enemies and
1 1 5misleaders of the working class. As nearly all the
significant Communists in India at that time were in gaol 
undergoing a lengthy trial in connection with the famous 
Meerut conspiracy case, Comintern policy had little practical 
effect, except to dampen the ardour and enthusiasm with which 
the Indian Nationalists had taken up the cause of the Meerut 
conspirators immediately following their arrest. At the
same time the national interests of the U.S.S.R. dictated that 
the concurrent Indian Nationalist offensive against continued 
Imperial rule (which expressed itself so dramatically in India 
in Gandhi's famous salt march in early 1930 and in the wide­
spread strikes and unrest which followed his subsequent arrest) 
should be supported as an important blow against the British 
Empire. As a result the C.P.A. was ordered to organise a 
'Hands Off India' campaign on behalf of the nationalist movement
115» For the situation of the Indian Communist Party and the 
effect of the Comintern's third period policies in that 
country see G.D. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, Communism 
In India (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959)*
116 . There were continuous attempts by the I.C.W.P.A. to make
the plight of the Meerut prisoners a cause celebre through­
out the world. In Australia at least these attempts were 
a total failure, despite considerable propaganda carried 
out on behalf of the Meerut prisoners in the pages of the 
Pan-Pacific Worker.
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in that country, despite the fact that to do so contradicted 
the third period policies which the Comintern and the C.P.A. 
were at the very same time promoting. In a 'Defend the 
Indian Revolution* thesis presented to the first Plenum of 
the Central Committee of the C.P.A. in June 1930 H.M. Wicks 
explained, with no little casuistry that
Inseparably connected with all our campaigns and 
in the very forefront of our work is the campaign in 
defence of the Indian revolution. At long last the 
blood-streaked monsters of British Imperialism face 
the day of reckoning in India. That vast empire of 
murder, rapine and plunder, gory with the blood of 
millions of savagely oppressed workers and peasants, 
is to-day tottering under the blows of the awakened 
masses of India.... We must show that out of the great 
upsurge in India there is one thing that emerges clearly 
- the advance of the proletariat as the leader of the 
revolutionary movement. The multiplicity of revolutionary 
groups are, in the process of the struggle itself, 
definitely moving along Leninist lines and coming under 
the leadership of the Party of the proletariat - the 
Communist Party,^ ^
In obedience to the instructions of Wicks, but with almost 
no empirical support from actual developments in India at 
the time, the Communist Party set out to promote a Hands Off 
India movement amongst the Australian working class.
Despite its curious raison d'etre the Hands Off 
India campaign attracted some interest at first. Communist 
allegations that the Australian government was about to 
despatch military forces to assist the British in putting 
down the Indian 'revolution' induced a number of A.L.P. 
figures and union leaders to associate their names with the
118calling of a Hands Off India Committee national conference.
The fruits of such propaganda were reaped later however when 
the first national conference of the Committee, held on the 
23rd July 1930» was rent by acrimony and withdrawals. Some 
delegates resented the C.P.A*s misleading propaganda over 
India and what had turned out to be quite untruthful attacks
117»’ Herbert Moore', Australia's Part in the World Revolution,
p p .42-43•
118. See for example W,W., June 20, 1930, p.2; P .P .W,, Aug.1,
1930, p.226.
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on the Federal Labor government, while others refused to
support an overseas movement that was so clearly nationalist
1 1 9in its aims and not socialist as the C.P.A. had claimed.
The Workers * Weekly hailed the first conference of the Hands
Off India Committee as symptomatic of its "great success in
organising resistance to Australian intervention and
1 20popularising the Indian anti-imperialist struggle"; in
fact however it was obvious even to the Communist Party that
the project was a failure, and the remnants of the Committee
were converted into a branch of the League Against Imperialism
at a hurriedly called conference in Sydney in August 1930»
The League Against Imperialism had developed
originally as a subsidiary branch of the W.I.R. but was
established as a separate organisation at a conference in
Brussels in February 1927* It remained however principally
a Comintern front organisation, with its main headquarters
shared with the W.I.R. in Berlin, where directives as to its
1 21activities were received from Moscow. Internationally the
L.A.I's influence had declined considerably by 1930 as it 
suffered from the repercussions in its ranks of the third 
period policies which invited hectoring and expulsion of the 
'social fascist’ non-Communist element of its membership. In 
short order the newly established Australian branch of the 
L.A.I. repeated this experience. The National Secretary of 
the League was E.M. Higgins, a supporter of Kavanagh within 
the Communist Party, and thus in favour of developing a united 
front approach to other working-class organisations and 
individuals who were prepared to work for the aims of the 
League; but his influence was overridden by continuous Party 
supervision of the affairs of the L.A.I. and bureaucratic 
intervention whenever it was felt necessary to safeguard 
third period political purity. The Reverend C. Chandler who
119. P.P.W., Aug.1, 1930, p.227.
120. W.W., July 25, 1930, p.1.
121. See R.N. Carew Hunt: "Willi Muenzenberg, in St. Anthony's
Papers (London, i960), Vol.9«
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had long been publicly denigrated by the C.P.A. as a "cheap
clown" was soon forced off the National Committee of the
League and he subsequently replied to Communist machinations
by mounting a campaign to discredit the L.A.I. in the eyes 
1 22of the public. The Party also placed a ban on J . Ryan's
activities in the League "on account of his treachery to the
R.I.L.U. and the P.P.T.U.S.", and when this led to a vote of
censure being narrowly passed by the 1931 Conference of the
1 23L.A.I. demanding the ban be lifted the Communist fraction 
on the League's National Committee was strengthened, and 
throughout the next year of its operation almost every vestige 
of 'left social fascism' forced out of the L.A.I's activities. 
As a result the L.A.I's task of rallying support outside the 
Communist Party for victims of capitalist imperialism was 
rendered quite impossible, and whenever the League was called 
upon to promote mass action over an issue of foreign affairs 
it invariably made a poor showing.
At its foundation conference in 1930 the League 
had announced that the special task of the Australian L.A.I. 
was to foster links with working class and revolutionary 
movements in the Pacific region. To this end attempts were 
made to develop links with organisations in the Pacific area
1 24including Fiji, and in Australia's "own empire", New Guinea.
At the same time some propaganda was continued on behalf of 
the Indian 'revolution' and the League took upon itself the 
task of trying to organise an anti-imperialist conference in 
Australia in conjunction with the P.P.T.U.S. But all these 
activities were overshadowed with the flare-up of intense 
fighting between Chinese Red Army forces and the Kuomintang 
in late 1930. Urgent appeals from the P.P.T.U.S. for the 
organisation of protest movements against Kuomintang atroci­
ties, and later the solid Red Army advances and apparent 
extension of Communist influence in China, spurred considerable
122. See for example, W.W., June 6, 1930, p.1; P ,P .W., Nov.1,
1930, P.326.
123. W.W., April 3, 1931, p.6.
124. ¥.w, , Oct.3 , 1930, p .2 ; Oct.17, 1930, p.6.
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activity by League members on behalf* of their Chinese 
1 25comrades. However despite its dire warnings that
Australians were about to become embroiled in the war in
China by the treacherous machinations of the Scullin government
the L.A.I. was unable to attract any widespread interest in the
situation outside the Communist Party orbit.
Nor was the Australian L.A.I. able to inspire mass
demonstrations in support of the P.P.T.U.S. when that
organisation’s key personnel were arrested in Shanghai in
1931» By this time the P.P.T.U.S. had degenerated into but
a shadow of its former self with its R.I.L.U. staff replaced
by underground agents of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comin-
1 26tern who were using Shanghai as a base for their operations.
Its earlier links with various non-Communist labour movements 
throughout the Pacific had been broken, and the main function 
of the P.P.T.U.S. now was the channelling of gigantic sums of 
money into the struggling All-China Labour Federation and 
various insurrectionary activities in other South East Asian 
countries. It was such an involvement in insurrectionary 
activities in Malaya which roused the ire of British Imperial 
intelligence authorities and they apparently arranged to have 
the Shanghai Settlement police arrest the F.E.B. organisational127section head Paul Ruegg, who was also in charge of the P.P.T.U.S. 
When however Ruegg and his wife were handed over to the tender 
mercies of the Kuomintang in August 1931 a world protest 
movement was begun to have them released, or at least placed 
on trial in Shanghai, and in this campaign the L.A.I. played 
a leading part. The League's general secretary Willi Muenzen- 
berg threw his weight behind the project, and the Comintern 
announced that the organising of protests and demonstrations
125. W.W., April 3 , 1931> p.6 ; Sept.11, 1931» p*4. See also
China’s Appeal to Australian Workers (Syd., 1931)*
126. See C.A. Willoughby, Shanghai Conspiracy (New York, 
1952), pp.302-305.
127* Cf. H. Miller, Menace in Malaya (London, 1952), pp.23, 
26.
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128against the arrest of the P.P.T.U.S. ’Secretary’ was the
central task of the L.A.I.
In Australia the League began a campaign amongst
trade unionists lor the release of the Rueggs, but the campaign
was slow in gaining momentum and did not extend far beyond
workers involved with the Communist Party and its front
organisations. Not the least difficulty was identifying
exactly who had been arrested. Whilst in Shanghai the Rueggs
used over a dozen aliases and carried five passports between
them, and following their arrest they tried to claim first
that they were a Belgian couple named Herssens, and then that
1 29they were a Dutch couple called Mr. and Mrs. Hilaire Noulens.
An international protest movement was begun under the auspices
of the Noulens Defence Committee but this had to be altered to
the Committee for the Defence of Paul and Gertrude Ruegg when
it was revealed that the real man in custody had previously
1 30been a prominent Swiss Communist known as Paul Ruegg. The
128. In fact it appears doubtful as to whether Ruegg could
even reasonably be described as a ’Secretary' of the 
P.P.T.U.S. Most P.P.T.U.S. work was carried out by 
Ruegg’s underlings including Gerhardt Eisler (head of 
the subordinate political section of the F.E.B. in 
Shanghai) who officially replaced George Hardy as 
P.P.T.U.S. Secretary. The P.P.T.U.S. appears to have 
continued to function briefly following Ruegg's arrest 
(see R.L., Aug.21, 1931» p.1) but subsequently Eisler
fled from Shanghai and it seems that for propaganda 
purposes it became necessary to credit Ruegg as the 
’Secretary' of the P.P.T.U.S.
129. They were also known as Mr. and Mrs. Van der Cryssen 
in early press coverage of the arrests.
130. See Willoughby, op. cit., pp.303-308. A later book, 
which otherwise closely follows Willoughby, has 
suggested that even Ruegg was an assumed identity and 
that Van der Cryssen/Herssens/Noulens/Ruegg was really 
an unnamed Polish Jew who had been recruited to Soviet 
Intelligence in its earliest years. See F.W. Deakin 
and G.R. Storry, The Case of Richard Sorge (London, 
1966).
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Pan-Pacific Worker announced simply that the 'P.P.T.U.S.
executive’ had been arrested by the British police and handed
over to the Kuomintang, but even the clarity of this position
was diminished when the Federal government - in reply to
questions asked in Parliament by Senator Rae, insisted that
the Shanghai Municipal authorities had acted independently
of the British and that the issue was one in which the Chinese
1 31government alone was involved. Henceforth L.A.I. propaganda
was directed at pressuring the Chinese Consul-General in Sydney
to use his influence to have the Rueggs released from Kuomin- 
1 32tang custody.
In the face of these attempts to involve trade
unionists in a campaign on behalf of an unknown 'Secretary'
of what had patently become a Comintern front, most earlier
supporters of the P.P.T.U.S. maintained virtual silence over
the Ruegg affair. The very same propaganda which urged
Australian workers to protest through their unions for the
release of the Rueggs berated those organisations as
reactionary partners in an imperialist plot which had led to
1 33the crushing of the P.P.T.U.S., J and the 'social fascists'
who were the alleged tools of the imperialists in that plot
were not impressed. Consequently the self-fulfilling prophecy
of 'social fascism' was once again proved correct and the
Militant Minority Movement's Red Leader could report to its
audience in 1932 that the 'trade union bureaucrats' had
registered no enthusiasm at all for the Rueggs and that it
was necessary to conduct the campaign on a strictly rank and
1 34file basis through mass street demonstrations. On Party
orders the League Against Imperialism throughout 1932 
attempted to organise the motley groups of M.M.M. union sub­
branch members who had been brought actively into the Ruegg 
affair to attend a series of protest meetings outside the
131. See R.L,, Sept.28, 1932, p.6.
132. R.L., Sept.7» 1932, p .3. For similar Communist pressure
on the Chinese Consul in Melbourne see Argus, Jan.6, 1932.
133. P.P.W., Jan.16, 1932, p .2; R.L., July 6, 1932, p.7.
134. R.L., June 29, 1932, p.7»
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Chinese Consul-General's offices in Sydney. These meetings 
were badly attended and produced little of the 'mass pressure' 
that was looked for to free the Rueggs and embarrass 'trade 
union bureaucrats' of the A.C.T.U.
Thus by 1932 the Australian branch of the League 
Against Imperialism was a body of almost no significance, 
relying mainly on C.P.A. members to attend its meetings and 
edit and contribute to its small journal World Survey.
However it did provide the basis for the creation in 1933 
of a new Communist front that was to assume considerable 
importance as the thirties progressed: the Movement Against
War and Fascism. The M.A.W.A.F. originated in the anti-war 
and anti-fascist movement begun by Willi Muenzenberg and 
Henri Barbusse in Amsterdam in 1932 and was taken up by the 
Comintern as its most important front after its only remaining 
significant section - the K.P.D. - collapsed in the face of 
Hitler's rise to supreme power in Germany. The M.A.W.A.F. 
proved popular with the militant trade unionists who had for 
long stood out against the fascist menace even as a general 
policy of isolationism had been forced on them by third period 
Communism. The M.A.W.A.F. also proved a magnetic attraction 
to intellectuals, and many middle class, who were disturbed 
by the rise of Nazism in Germany and the authoritarian res­
trictions of discussion on such important developments in 
foreign affairs resorted to by conservative governments in 
Australia. In the course of organising a front organisation 
which could capture this increasingly popular anti-war and 
anti-Nazi feeling of the thirties era the L.A.I. was quietly
disassembled and its assets and personnel given over to the 
1 35M.A.W.A.F.
135» For an account of the dismemberment of the L.A.I. by 
Communist Party intervention in its affairs see J.
Normington-Rawling: "Recollections in Tranquility", in
Quadrant, Vol.5» No.4 (Spring, 1961), pp.23-31« Norming- 
ton-Rawling became National Secretary of the M.A.W.A.F. 
in the 1930s but broke with the C.P.A. in 1939 after the 
signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. He later became an 
outspoken critic of Communism. Another front organisation
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But the necessary preliminary to the growth of 
the M.A.W.A.F. and the re-establishment of Communist influence 
in the labour movement was the total abandonment in early 1934 
of the fratricidal third period policies of the Comintern.
For the Comintern the final change came with Stalin's foreign 
policy manoeuvres to save France from a fascist takeover and 
to build up a Russo-French alliance as a counter to Hitler's
1 O /Cpronouncedly anti-Soviet and anti-Rapallo policies. ^ For 
the C.P.A. the harsh realities of its failure to make progress 
in any sense proportional to the opportunities afforded by the 
Great Depression had induced a softening of its application of 
third period policies following Comintern equivocation on the 
matter throughout 1933» When the Comintern openly transacted 
its change in policy in 1934 the C.P.A. leadership accepted 
it - as they were anyway bound to do — without demur. The 
C.P.A. leaders once again began openly and increasingly to 
make overtures to other socialists in the labour movement and 
to try to overcome bitterness, suspicion, and distrust which 
they above all others had helped to inject into the affairs 
of the labour movement.
which was 'raided' to help get the M.A.W.A.F. operating 
was the minute Ex-Serviceman's Defence Corps whose 
journal WarI What For? was developed into an important 
M.A.W.A.F. publication.
136. See Braunthal, op. cit., 
pp.376-386.
p.426; Borkenau, op. cit.,
CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION: LABOUR AND SOCIALISM
The history of Australian Labor's policy 
in international affairs is a succession of 
patterns; of nuclei, of groupings. The .... 
argument and forces decide at every stage which 
shall be the dominant influence - and a decision 
will be made. That will become at a particular 
moment the policy of the Movement or of the 
Party, leading to a test of loyalty, or a piece 
of legislation, a Ministerial act or a historian’s 
generalisation. But always the neglected or 
discarded factors, some of the defeated activists 
and groups remain, awaiting a turn of events that 
will give them an opportunity to exert an v.influence in the next formulation of a nucleus.
World War One had its deepest effect on Australian 
society in the changes it wrought upon the labour movement.
The splits over conscription in 1916 marked the end of an era 
in labour history; the turmoil of wartime's end and the impact 
of the Russian Revolution were the beginnings of a new epoch. 
The radical impulse was dramatic indeed in the years from 
1918-21. The dislocation of union and Labor Party affairs 
was such that left-wing and international socialists assumed 
easy entry into positions of power and influence, and issues 
that in pre-war years were more or less peripheral, were in 
the 1920s on centre stage. The issues of that time, and the 
ways in which they were settled, have left their stamp on
* Dr. Lloyd Ross: "Some Factors in the Development of Labor's
Foreign Policies", in Australian Outlook, Mar., 19^9»
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developments to this day.
It was the union movement which opened most to 
radical doctrines. Dissatisfaction with Labor in power had 
already been growing steadily before but the pressures
of war ensured that industrial militancy would become closely 
intertwined with left-wing critiques and class struggle 
concepts. Many trade union leaders and activists came to 
view the state as not only capitalist but militaristic and 
repressive. The war seemed far away and fought for dubious 
motives, and its cost too gruesome to contemplate. With 
emotions heightened by the extraordinary experiment of 
carrying out two referendums over conscription in the midst 
of a war, the labour movement swung over dramatically to 
radicalism, eagerly scanning the international horizon to 
find support for a myth and theory of opposition. Against 
the conservative position advocated by W.M. Hughes and its 
other lost leaders the labour movement plumped for a negotiated 
peace as a prelude to a worldwide socialist change which would 
usher in an era of human and material progress. These notions 
led on naturally enough to the policies and programmes 
developed at the All-Australian Trade Union Congress of June 
1921 .
Union radicalism found its inevitable reflection
in the A.L.P. With party structures buckled under the
pressures of World War One the left succeeded in converting
Labor to the anti-war platform provisions adopted at the
Commonwealth Conferences of and 1919« These policies
marked a distinct change in outlook for a party which in
pre-war years had proven able to withstand radical pressurepolicieswith equanimity. The/ also established a strong basis for 
the pursuit by activists of left-wing idealism within the 
Labor Party throughout the 1920s. However they were but a 
foretaste of the changes to Labor policy that came in 1921.
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The Labor Party's adoption of the socialist 
objective in October of that year marked both the apex of 
the radical impulse and the beginnings of its adaptation to 
the electoral milieu. Australia in 1921 was suffering from 
a short-lived recession, not a fundamental economic collapse. 
Social unrest due to unemployment and industrial dislocation 
was seen as a nuisance rather than an incurable ill, and the 
electorate looked to normalcy, not radical change. Politically 
the weight was with the right and not the left. It was through 
the A.L.P. that these social realities exerted pressure 
towards modification of left-wing ideals. The electorate- 
based Labor leagues with their bewildering array of petty 
causes provided the fulcrum: Catholics - intent on redressing
the wrongs inflicted on the Irish by obtaining preferment in 
their jobs, local identities seeking a following, real estate 
agents after mayoral robes, government employees in search of 
political patronage, small business men hoping to secure 
contracts, supporters of liquor interests, gambling and tin 
hare racing; this plethora of axe-grinders and interest groups 
ensured that 'practical' issues were never lost sight of in 
A.L.P. affairs. And above this the professional politicians 
with their acute electoral consciousness exerted direct 
leverage for moderation of the socialist objective. The 
modifications to the objective in 1927 closely reflected the 
criticisms mounted by the politicians against the radical 
socialism of the immediate post-war years. The modifications 
also reflected the changed balance of forces within the labour 
movement as a whole: Labor remained distinctly socialist in 
aim, but only to the extent that would allow politicians, if 
required, to relate their practical reformism to long-term 
evolutionary socialist goals. This was a return to a 
situation which had existed in pre-war years and still exists 
today: it is an ideology born out of the internal politics of
the labour movement - which requires some acceptance of left- 
wing doctrines as a theory, but full acceptance also of 
electoral reality. Fabian state socialism, practical 
reformism and isolationism are a common resultant.
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The divisions within the union movement itself 
were a further impediment to the ascendancy of the left wing. 
Union power struggles, ideological differences amongst 
socialists, and divisions of craft and temperament all 
contributed to the failure of the Council of Action as a 
viable organisation. But above all it was the massive 
Australian Workers' Union which stood as a barrier to the 
influence of radical ideas. The more opportunist A.W.U. 
leaders such as J. Bailey sought to play off the politicians 
against the radical left to their own advantage for as long 
as it was possible to do so. By the late 1920s however they 
had been forced to throw in their lot decisively with the 
Labor Party. This was also their natural place in the 
political spectrum, for the A.W.U. represented a section of 
the union movement steeped in the reformism and nationalism 
of the pre-war era. Such unionists clung to a distinctly 
atavistic concept of the White Australia policy and had an 
almost unbounded confidence in the arbitration system. They 
represented a section of the organised labour movement 
generally at peace with the status quo.
Nevertheless the activists and leading figures in 
the city-based and industrial unions continued to press the 
doctrines embodied in the 1921 socialist objective. They 
helped maintain and develop a distinctly working class and 
socialist consciousness within the labour movement. If their 
achievements seem fairly mild in comparison with the tradi­
tional European models of socialist development the magnitude 
of their efforts can perhaps be seen by enumerating some of 
the difficulties in their way. The pan-Pacific trade union 
movement, for example, was faced from the outset with an 
enormous range of problems: the implicit - and later, very
outspoken - opposition of nationalist and isolationist 
elements in the A.L.P. and A.W.U.; the initial aloofness and 
the underdevelopment of labour movements in most other 
countries of the Pacific region; the difficulties involved
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in communicating with working class movements separated by 
thousands of miles of ocean; consistent governmental sabotage 
of efforts by Australian trade unionists to attend conferences 
overseas; and last, but certainly not least, the uncertainties 
and disruption emanating from the split in the world trade 
union movement and the changing moods of Moscow. It was this 
element of chronic disunity which finally brought to an end 
the whole pan-Pacific trade union scheme. By the early 
depression years trade union leaders stood unhappily between 
the right wing leadership of the Labor Movement and the third 
period C.P.A.; as heirs to a radical tradition that
retained its militant socialist bent, but had lost its 
internationalist inspiration and justification.
Thus in the final analysis it is necessary to trace 
through the history of world Communism in order fully to 
understand Australian socialism. Furthermore because of the 
subtlety and shading of the links between the various 
International organisations and the trade union left it is 
perhaps worth noting two salient points which emerge from 
detailed investigation of the situation in the 1920s.
In the first place it must be stressed that Moscow 
established its connections with the Australian labour 
movement not only through the Comintern, but also via several 
other organisations, the most prominent being the R.I.L.U. 
and the P.P.T.U.S. Each of these organisations operated 
separately from the Comintern and pursued policies vastly 
different from the nominally superior body. The R.I.L.U. 
offered an extremely loose version of the united front, aimed 
at merger with the I.F.T.U. and independent trade union 
centres such as the A.C.T.U. The P.P.T.U.S. went even further 
in taking up the very broad ideas of the pre-existing pan- 
Pacific movement. These policies struck responsive chords 
in the labour movement, for they were in direct accord with 
Australian radical traditions. Moscow thus helped foster the
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tenets of pre-existing socialism while neglecting the C.P.A.
It is hard to escape the conclusion that some minds in 
Moscow perceived the Comintern as an auxiliary body in the 
Australian context at least until 1930 or so. Certainly 
'Communism’ in the twenties in Australia assumed a different 
complexion than in Europe, where for the most part the 
Comintern dominated the left-wing scene.
The second and related point concerns the Communist 
Party. Clearly enough Moscow endorsed the third period as a 
general policy for the C.P.A., and E.C.C.I. advice to 
Australian Communists was critically important in securing 
victory for the Moxon-Sharkey-Miles group in December 1929» 
but, contrary to the assiduously fostered myths of the 
official Party histories, it is not clear that the Russians 
were pleased with the C.E.C. that resulted. And there is also 
evidence of Moscow's strange tardiness in the logical 
application of the third period policies to links with the 
P.P.T.U.S. and the R.I.L.U. The break with these organisations 
was inevitable from the time the third period was announced in 
1928, but it was apparently for the most part the C.P.A. which 
pressed the initiative in these matters. One possible 
explanation is that Moscow genuinely believed that given time 
the Labor Council of N.S.W. and the A.C.T.U. would swing over 
to Communism despite constant and explicit warnings from 
Australia that this would not be the case. A far more 
probable explanation however is that Russia's Far Eastern 
strategy required continuation of the P.P.T.U.S. and R.I.L.U. 
links with Australian unionists as part of a spoiling and 
containment-by-disruption programme aimed at the imperialist 
powers (and especially Japan) in the uncertain and threatening 
climate of the early depression years. For this reason 
Moscow was unwilling to face up squarely to the full implica­
tions of policies already decided on by the Comintern. The 
almost unbounded subtlety of the situation that resulted 
from the contradictory edicts and actions of the world
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Communist movement was lost on Australia's first resident 
Comintern agent, H.M. Wicks. And after all, just what can 
one say about a C.P.A. leadership which found itself secured 
in power and directed in its policies by a man later expelled
1from the C.P.U.S.A. as a lifelong anti-Communist double-agent?
These issues aside, the C.P.A. did in the event 
establish itself as the only remaining internationalist 
influence in the labour movement by the early depression years. 
It was a typical Communist Party of the Stalinist era: at the
top a bureaucracy with a simple commitment to follow Comintern 
policy with zealous and unquestioning loyalty; in the middle 
and lower ranks a group with some experience of the old 
socialist movement, but possessed of a bitterly sectarian 
outlook which made them determined to establish the C.P.A. as 
a viable alternative to the established labour movement; at 
the bottom a fluctuating mass of new recruits enthused by the 
activist answers which Communism seemed to propose to the 
problems of the Great Depression. And around the C.P.A. sun 
rotated a bewildering solar system of organisations which 
reflected its light and extended its field of gravity. Most 
of these front organisations were short-lived, and all but a 
few seemed total failures. However they did succeed in 
establishing some new bases for Communism in Australian 
society: especially amongst the unemployed, the militant rank
and file trade unionists and the intellectuals. It was from 
these bases that Communism began slowly to expand its influence 
again as the 1930s progressed.
Following abandonment of third period policies by 
the Comintern in 1933-34 the radical movement soon began to 
regroup. In late 1934 the visit of Egon Kisch to Australia
1. For some early rumination on Wicks's status by the fledge­
ling Trotskyist movement in Australia see Behind the 
Shooting of Zinoviev (Syd., 1936); cf. Draper, American 
Communism and Soviet Russia, p p .434-5, 530-31»
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served to crystallise anti-war and anti-fascist opinion
behind the M.A.W.A.F. front organisation, At the same time
the Communist Party began once again to make headway in the
2unions as economic conditions improved and united front 
policies made it easier to develop alliances and arrangements 
with other left-wing groups. Then came the Spanish Civil War 
and the growth of concern over developments in Europe. With 
Russia now in the League of Nations C.P.A. front organisations 
led opinion in favour of collective security against fascist 
aggression and maintained this stance till the Nazi-Soviet 
Pact of 1939* The C.P.A. itself grew only fairly slowly in 
these years, many of its earlier members suffering disillusion 
or expulsion, drifting into apathy, or joining the tiny 
Trotskyist sect to ease their transition away from Communism. 
Nevertheless the C.P.A's very moderate united front policies 
- applied by the Miles-Sharkey leadership with single-minded 
devotion to the current Comintern line - extended Communist 
influence tremendously in the late depression period. In 
1939» for example, the 'Hughes-Evans' State Executive assumed 
office in the N.S.W. Labor Party with secret C.P.A. members 
and fellow travellers exercising control over its affairs and 
hundreds of Communists and their sympathisers at work in the 
A.L.P. machine. It was on the basis of these gains that the 
C.P.A. was able to make its spectacular advances throughout 
the early 19^0 s.^
So successful were Communist efforts to increase 
their influence that it sparked strong resistance from the 
A.L.P. In the 1930s the Labor Party at first sought to 
promote its own anti-war and anti-fascist movement in
2. The slow but marked improvement in the economic situation 
was critical to the advance of the C.P.A. for two reasons. 
Firstly, it allowed unemployed C.P.A. members to find work 
in industry and thus widen party support amongst the working 
class. Secondly, it allowed aggressive Communist industrial 
tactics to succeed. In contrast with the early depression 
period workers could now undertake strike action and win 
some limited gains instead of losing all.
3. Gibson, op. cit., p.89.
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competition with the M.A.W.A.F. but soon turned back towards 
isolationism, banning membership of the new front organisations 
and ignoring the C.P.A's proferred united front. Following 
the pro-Communist 'Hands Off Russia* declaration of the Hughes- 
Evans Labor Party in 19^ +0 the A.L.P. Federal Executive 
reorganised the N.S.W. branch of the party to exclude leading 
C.P.A. supporters, and over the next few years steadily broke 
down the considerable electoral support enjoyed by the break­
away State Labor Party that resulted from intervention. In 
the unions A.L.P. leaders after 19^ +5 encouraged the 
organisation of Industrial Groups to counter the growing 
power of the Communist Party. In the course of this movement’s 
development the right-wing Catholicism of B.A. Santamaria 
became a force in labour affairs and the background to the A.L.P. 
split of 1954 was prepared.
The unioiB played an ambivalent role in this train 
of events. By the time of the Spanish Civil War the A.C.T.U. 
showed signs of moving back from the isolationism of the 
early depression years towards its earlier radical outlook 
and in 1937 it came down in favour of collective security and 
united front anti-war policies. Throughout the early 19^0s 
the trade union movement returned to advocacy of complete 
social reconstruction under the Labor Party governments of 
the day. The trade union movement also took up the wartime 
united front policies advanced by the C.P.A. and in 19^5 the 
A.C.T.U. affiliated with the Communist dominated World 
Federation of Trade Union?. This situation altered dramati­
cally with a return to Communist intransigence and 
sectarianism after World War Two. Many A.C.T.U. leaders 
joined in the successful undermining of C.P.A. industrial 
strength throughout the early Cold War period and in 19^ +9 
the A.C.T.U. broke with the World Federation of Trade Unions.
In the 1950s however a once more repentant Communist Party 
was again welcomed into the counsels of the industrial labour 
movement. At the time of the Labor Party split the unions
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presented an almost unbroken left wing front which ensured
the victory of Dr. Evatt over the supporters of the Industrial
Groups. In this period the old relationships between leading
A.C.T.U. and Communist union officials were re-established on
4both political and industrial issues. Still today the 
divided remnants of the Communist movement are able to use 
their positions in the unions and their working alliances 
with left-wing members of the A.L.P. to amplify the strength 
of their otherwise almost totally unsupported political ideals.
Behind such recalcitrant union attitudes towards 
capitalism and anti-Communism lies a deeply ingrained tradition. 
True enough most union leaders have moved away from the 
doctrinaire aspects of earlier left-wing ideas, but they 
retain the habit of thinking that they are the true guardians 
of socialism in the labour movement. Distrustful of Labor 
politicians they are acutely unwilling to be seen as 'class 
collaborators' in either industrial or political affairs. 
Communism appears in this light as a variety of the socialist 
beliefs that all 'true' working class spokesmen must to some 
extent share. There thus still remains a pattern of thinking 
that encourages cooperation with Communism, stresses labour's 
international working class obligations, and insists that the 
Labor Party must remain socialistic in theory if not 
necessarily in practice. In basis these traditions in large 
measure derive from the labour movement's experiences half 
a century ago.
4. See D.W. Rawson: "Politics and 'Responsibility' in
Australian Trade Unions", in Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, Vol.4, No.2, Nov., 1958* esp. 
pp.238-241.
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